Asian corporate recovery : findings from firm-level surveys in five countries (English) by Dwor-Frecaut, Dominque et al.
A S IAN CO R PO RAT E
R EC OV ERY
FINDINGS FROM FIRM-LEVEL SURVEYS IN FIVE COUNTRIES
20381
Apr'I 2000
Edited by Dominique Dwor-Fr6caut, Francis Cola~o,
and Mary Hallward-Driemeier
~~ TH E WO RLD BAN K * WASH IN GTO N D. C.
Pu
bl
ic 
Di
sc
lo
su
re
 A
ut
ho
riz
ed
Pu
bl
ic 
Di
sc
lo
su
re
 A
ut
ho
riz
ed
Pu
bl
ic 
Di
sc
lo
su
re
 A
ut
ho
riz
ed
Pu
bl
ic 
Di
sc
lo
su
re
 A
ut
ho
riz
ed
Pu
bl
ic 
Di
sc
lo
su
re
 A
ut
ho
riz
ed
Pu
bl
ic 
Di
sc
lo
su
re
 A
ut
ho
riz
ed
Pu
bl
ic 
Di
sc
lo
su
re
 A
ut
ho
riz
ed
Pu
bl
ic 
Di
sc
lo
su
re
 A
ut
ho
riz
ed
ii
I
AS -IAN
CSORPO loRATE
RECO)VERY
Findings from ]Firm-Level Surveys
in iFive Countries
E{dited by Dominique l)wor-Frecaut, Francis Cola,co,
and Mary IHrallward-Driemeier
* ~T HE W O RLD B AN K
W AS HI NG T ON D .C.
Copyright ( 2000
The International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development/THE WORLD BANK
1818 H Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20433
All rights reserved
Manufactured in the United States of America
First Printing April 2000
The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this publication and
accepts no responsibility whatsoever for any consequence of their use. The boundaries, colors,
denominations, and other information shown on any map in this volume do not imply on the
part of the World Bank Group any judgment on the legal status of any territory or any endorse-
ment or acceptance of such boundaries.
The material in this publication is copyrighted. Requests for permission to reproduce portions
of it should be sent to the Office of the Publisher at the address shown in the copyright notice
above. The World Bank encourages dissemination of its work and will normally give permission
promptly and, when the reproduction is for noncommercial purposes, without asking a fee.
Permission to copy portions for classroom use is granted through the Copyright Clearance
Center, Inc., Suite 910, 222 Rosewood Dr., Danvers, Massachusetts 01923, U.S.A.
ISBN 0-8213-4634-2
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Asian corporate recovery: findings from firm-level surveys in five countries / edited by
Dominique Dwor-Frecaut, Francis X. Colaco, Mary Hallward-Driemeier.
p. cm.
"Regional conference based on firm-level surveys in Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the
Philippines and Thailand, Bangkok, March 31-April 2, 1999."--CIP gallery.
ISBN 0-8213-4634-2
1. Financial crises--Asian, Southeastern--Congresses. 2. Asia, Southeastern--Economnic
conditions--Congresses. 3. Industrial management--Asia, Southeastern--Congresses.
I. Dwor-Fr&aut, Dominique, 1962- II. Colaco, Francis X. III. Hallward-Driemeier, Mary,
1966- IV. World Bank.
HB3808 .A853 2000
338.095--dc2l
00-024442
Contents
Abbreviations and Acronyms vii
Abstract ix
Acknowledgments xi
Foreword xiii
Editors' Notes xv
Chapter 1 Asian ManLifacturing Recovery: A Firm-Level
Analysis 1
Data 2
Impact of the Crisis 3
Conclusion 17
Chapter 2 Corporates" Views of the Constraints to
Recovery 21
Impact of the crisis on the surveyed firms' performance 22
Reasons for declining performance and constraints to corporate recovery 25
Constraints to recovery and policy recommendations 32
Conclusions 34
Chapter 3 MacroeconoDmic Views of the East Asian
Crisis: A Comparison 37
Macroeconomic development 38
Monetary and fiscal policies in the adjustment process 44
Assessment of the adjustment process 49
Policy implications and concluding remarks 50
Chapter 4 The New Miyazawa Initiative and Response to
the Corporate Debt Problem 55
Basic perspectives 55
Issues for the promotion of debt restructuring 56
iii
Approaches to the corporate debt problem under the Miyazawa Initiative 57
The Asian Growth and Recovery Initiative (AGRI) 59
Transparency in markets and stockholder-oriented corporate governance 59
Transparency in markets 59
Conclusion 59
Chapter 5 Asian Corporate Credit Needs and Governance 61
Structure of corporate finance prior to the crisis and in mid-1998 63
Determining whether credit availability is a constraint to corporate recovery in Asia 69
The firms' views on loan repayment prospects 75
Issues in corporate financial governance 77
Concluding comments 80
Chapter 6 Financial Sector Restructuring: Progress and Issues 83
The genesis of the crisis 83
Restructuring and recapitalization 85
Strengthening prudential standards and the legal frameworks 89
Interest rates and loan growth 90
Conclusions and lessons 91
Annex 6.A Financial restructuring in East Asia at a glance 93
Chapter 7 Publicly Listed East Asian Corporates: Growth, Financing, and Risks 97
The data 98
Performance measures 99
Financial structures 103
Summary 108
Chapter 8 Corporate Foreign Debt in East Asia: Too Much or Too Little? 111
Introduction 111
The survey data 112
Foreign debt financing 114
Short-term versus long-term debt 116
Unhedged short-term foreign debt: too much or too little? 118
Profitable versus less profitable firms 118
Conclusions 119
Chapter 9 Corporate Employment and Public Policy 123
Background information 124
Employment performance across countries, sectors, and the export status of the firms 126
Causes of employment changes 128
The characteristics of workers leaving the firms 131
The firms' reactions to the loss of human capital 135
Summary and policy implications 137
Annex 9.A The frequency of use of formal training programs during the crisis 139
iv
Chapter 10 Indonesia: The Impact of the Economic Crisis on
Industry Performance 141
The economic crisis 142
Overview of the competitiveness study 143
Impact of the crisis on firm performance 146
The financial position of the firms 150
Financial characteristics and impact of the crisis 153
The government's response to the crisis 154
The firms' expectations for the next six months 155
Summary and conclusion 155
Chapter 11 A Study on the Crisis, Recovery, and Industrial Upgrading in the
Republic of Korea 159
The survey 160
Analysis of the impact of the crisis on the firms 161
Financial position of the firms before and after the crisis and its impact on the firms' responses to the crisis 166
Concluding remarks and recommendations 172
Annex 11.A Government support programs listed in the questionnaire 175
Chapter 12 The Asian FinanciaL Crisis: Impact at the Firm Level-
The Malaysian Case 177
Framework of the survey 179
Impact of the crisis on the firms 180
Impact of the crisis on the financial position of the firms 184
The policy response 188
Conclusion 191
Chapter 13 The Impact of the Southeast Asian Financial Crisis
on the PhiLippine Manufacturing Sector 195
Description of the survey 196
Analysis of the impact of the crisis on the firms 198
Financial position of the firms before and after the crisis 206
Transparency 212
Short-run prospects 214
Conclusions and recommendations 215
Chapter 14 Thailand: The Road to Recovery 219
Description of the survey 220
Corporate adjustments to the crisis 221
Constraints on corporate recovery and policy implications 227
Prospects for the first half of 1999 and policy recommendations 232
Annex 14.A Macroeconomic data 235
Annex 14.B Methodology 237
References 239
v

Abbreviations and
Acronyms
ADB Asian Development Bank
AGRI Asian Growth and Recovery Initiative
AGRP Asian Growth and Recovery Program
AMC Asset Management Corporation (Thailand)
APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ASEAN Association of South East Asian Nations
ASEM Asia-Europe Meeting
BAAC Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives
BIR Bureau of Internal Revenues
BIS Bank for Int,ernational Settlements
BMA Bangkok Metropolitan Administration
BNM Bank Negara Malaysia
BOI Board of Incustry (Thailand)
CIF Cost, Insurance, and Freight
CRPP Currency Rate Protection Program (The Philippines)
CDRC Corporate Debt Restructuring Committee (Malaysia)
CPI Consumer Price Index
DOLE Department of Labor and Employment (The Philippines)
EBIT Earnings Before Interest and Taxes
EBITDA Earnings Before Interest and Taxes (but adding back
depreciation)
EFAL II Economic a:-d Financial Adjustment II program, World Bank
EIU Economist Intelligence Unit
ESCL Exchangeable Subordinated Capital Loans
EXIM Export Import Bank of Thailand
FIDF Financial Institutions Development Fund (Thailand)
FDI Foreign Dir2ct Investment
FOB Free On Board
FRA Financial Restructuring Agency (Indonesia)
FSC Financial Supervisory Commission
GAAP Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
GDP Gross Dom estic Product
GHB Government Housing Bank
HRDF Human Res,ource Development Fund (Malaysia)
IBRA Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency
IFCT Industrial Finance Corporation of Thailand
vii
ILTD Linkages and Technology Development Study (Malaysia)
IMF International Monetary Fund
ISIC International Standard Industrial Classification
ISIS Institute of Strategic and International Studies (Malaysia)
JEXIM Export-Import Bank of Japan
KAMCO Korean Asset Management Company
KDIC Korean Deposit Insurance Company
LE List of Establishments (The Philippines)
M&As Mergers and Acquisitions
MATRADE Malaysia External Trade Development Corporation
MDB Multilateral Development Bank
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement
NCR National Capital Region (The Philippines)
NERP National Economic Recovery Plan
NICs Newly Industrialized Countries
NPLs Nonperforming Loans
NSO National Statistics Office
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OECF Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund
RA Republic Act (The Philippines)
ROA Return On Assets
SAL Structural Adjustment Loan
SBGFC Small Business Guarantee and Finance Corporation (The Philippines)
SBI Sertifikat Bank Indonesia
SCB Siam Commercial Bank
SEC Securities and Exchange Commission
SFIs Specialized Financial Institutions
SITC Standard Industrial Trade Classification
SIFC Small Industry Finance Corporation
SIP Social Investment Program (Thailand)
SMEs Small and Medium Enterprises
SPVs Special Purpose Vehicles (Thailand)
SSN Social Safety Net
SSS Social Security System (The Philippines)
TFB Thai Farmer's Bank
UNDP United Nations Development Program
viii
Abstract
This volume presents the main findings of surveys of 3,700 manufacturing
firms in Indonesia, The Republic of Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and
Thailand, conducted by the governments of these countries from November
1998 to February 1999. The resulting papers were prepared for a conference
on Asian corporate recovery, hield in Bangkok in March and April of 1999, and
are collected in this book. The papers compare the effect of the 1997-99 crisis
on various countries, sectors., and types of firms, in terms of output, exports,
and employment. They analyze the causes of corporate decline and assess the
policy options to foster corporate recovery. The impact of the financial sector
crisis on the corporate sector is discussed through an analysis of corporates'
financial structure and credit needs. The extent of foreign corporate indebted-
ness is reviewed, as well as the role debt played in the propagation of the crisis.
Each of the five survey countries prepared a report; these reports are also
included in this volume.
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Forewordi
Asian corporate recovery frcm the devastating effects of the financial crisis of
1997 is in its initial stages in some economic sectors and some companies in cer-
tain parts of Asia. For sustained recovery, the region needs to adopt a balanced
response that combines expansion of domestic demand with accelerated cor-
porate and financial restructuring. This was the key conclusion reached by par-
ticipants at the Conference on Asian Corporate Recovery: Corporate
Governance, Government 7:olicy, organized by the World Bank in Bangkok,
Thailand, from March 31 to April 2, 1999.
New data emerged at the conference showing that economic revival pro-
grams in Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and
Thailand are beginning to pay off in certain sectors. The participants acknowl-
edged, however, that much riemains to be done to stimulate a wider and fuller
recovery.
The participants were responding to extensive new surveys of nearly 4,000
firms in the five crisis countries mentioned above. Substantial information on
how small and medium-sized firms and those listed on stock exchanges are far-
ing is now available for the ,irst time. This important information, in addition
to the standard macroeconomic data, is pointing the way to the kind of policy
and institutional reforms most likely to engender sustained recovery.
After two days of discussions on the survey results, the participants agreed
on the following points:
* Stimulation of domestic demand alone is not enough, since the crisis was
caused primarily by structural problems. Stimulation of domestic demand
is, however, necessary to facilitate the accelerated restructuring of banks
and other financial institutions and corporate restructuring;
* Corporate and financial restructuring must take place simultaneously for
both to succeed;
* The institutional framework for corporate finance needs urgent strength-
ening to improve the efficiency of credit allocation. Laws to regulate bank-
xiii
ruptcies, foreclosures, and mergers and acquisitions economic policies and restructuring in the financial and
are needed to facilitate the transfer of resources from corporate sectors.
less to more viable activities; The five countries that participated in the collection
* Financial transactions need greater transparency and analysis of the survey information are to be com-
through improved reporting, accounting, and audit- mended. The World Bank is also to be commended for
ing; having organized this unique conference with entirely
* According to business responses to the survey, the new firm-level information and for having brought
demand for credit has declined as sales have fallen. together such an impressive group of individuals from
However, many firms reported difficulties in secur- business, government, academia, and research institutes
ing adequate credit. As demand grows, credit avail- from Asian countries. It is to be hoped that efforts to col-
ability will become a bigger issue; lect firm-level information will continue, since this a
* Excess capacity has both a cyclical and structural valuable additional element that can give policymakers
nature, so macroeconomic policies need to be sup- confidence in making recommendations.
plemented with measures to improve corporate Recent events indicate that Asia constitutes a distinct
competitiveness; region in the global context. They have also highlighted
* The development of longer-term instruments and the linkages between countries. Asia's successes have
bond markets needs urgent attention; spread from one country to the next, and recently so
* More discussion is required to design competitive- have difficulties. Further effort is thus needed to con-
ness strategies; tinue similar regional discussions on key issues of inter-
* The speed of adjustment must be balanced with the est, based on good and timely data and systematic
social costs and the need for social safety nets. analysis.
Asia has been through a dramatic adjustment in a
very short period. The task, however, is not complete. Dr. Il Sakong
Incipient recovery should not deter continuing efforts at Former Minister of Finance
corporate and financial restructuring. The key to sus- CEO, Institute for Global Economics
tained recovery is to balance accommodative macro- Seoul, Korea
xiv
Editors' Notes
This volume contains papers presented at a regional conference on "Asian
Corporate Recovery: Corporate Governance, Government Policy," organized
by the World Bank with the financial support of the Policy and Human
Resource Development Fund (Japan) and the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM)
Trust Fund, and cosponsored by regional private sector organizations.
The regional conference--based on firm-level surveys in Indonesia, the
Republic of Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand-was held in
Bangkok from March 31 to April 2, 1999. The surveys covered some 3,700
firms in seven manufacturing sectors: electronics, textiles, garments, food pro-
cessing, chemicals, machinery, and auto parts. They were conducted between
December 1998 and Februaiy 1999 by the respective governments, with tech-
nical assistance from the World Bank. Two-thirds of the companies were small
and medium-size enterprises with fewer than 150 workers while the rest were
large companies. About 20 percent of the firms were publicly listed.
The conference brought together 60 senior government officials, business
people, academics, and researchers in a roundtable format to examine the
prospects for Asian corporate recovery based on the unique and new data made
available by firm-level surveys. The chairperson of each session was a senior
Asian policymaker: Dr. II SaKong, a former Minister of Finance of Korea and
currently Chairman and CEO of the Institute for Global Economics Institute;
Dr. Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Deputv Governor of Bank Negara Malaysia; M.R. Chatu
Mongol Sonakul, Governor of the Bank of Thailand; Secretary Benjamin
Diokno, of the Department of Budget and Management of the Philippines; and
Dr. Mari Pangestu, Executive Director of the Center for Strategic and
International Studies of Indonesia. Each session consisted of paper presenta-
tions, followed by designated lead commentators and a general discussion by
the participants.
The conference had five sessions:
* Macroeconomic Constraints to Corporate Recovery, and Country
Presentations on Thailand and Korea;
xv
* Corporate Domestic Credit 'and Financial Fragility, ified, allowing for the rational behavior of financial
and Country Presentations on Indonesia, Malaysia, institutions in limiting the allocation of credit only to
and the Philippines; viable firms. Differences across countries (for example,
* Corporates and Foreign Financing; Korea and the Philippines) and between firms
* Corporate Employment and Public Policy; and (exporters versus nonexporters) must be kept in mind.
* Summing Up. It was acknowledged that "survival bias" was an
The principal issues taken up in the lively exchange of unavoidable feature of such surveys. While it called for
views among the participants in this roundtable and caution in interpreting the results, the fact was that in
closed-door regional conference were (a) corporate two consecutive firm-level surveys undertaken in
recovery's current status and the major constraints it Thailand following the crisis, only 10 percent of the
faced, observed from macroeconomic and firm-level firms in the sample had not survived. The large size of
perspectives-and (b) a number of interrelated financ- the sample also reduced the impact of this bias.
ing questions: Is there a "credit crunch?" Is firm-level The firm-level surveys indicated that the collapse of
indebtedness a major constraint? What is the role of domestic demand was a critical factor hindering corpo-
short-term indebtedness? What is the role of foreign rate recovery. They stressed the importance of stimulat-
financing? Is there "labor hoarding" and what is its ing consumption demand, without further damaging a
impact on corporate restructuring and on the nature of country's creditworthiness. They also underlined the
government social policies? What are the policy options importance of improving competitiveness to take advan-
for accelerated corporate recovery on a regional basis? tage of buoyant foreign markets. Others indicated that a
The regional conference took place against the back- lesson Asian countries could learn from the crisis was
drop of an incipient corporate recovery in some sectors avoiding the kind of rapid contraction that had taken
and in some, but not all, countries. A general point place. It was also pointed out that demand stimulation
emphasized in the discussions was that the crisis had nei- had to be accompanied by required corporate and finan-
ther affected all five countries at the same time, nor had cial restructuring for international competitiveness.
its intensity been of the same magnitude. Accordingly, The discussion on foreign financing raised the issues
the constraints to recovery also varied by country, as did of excessive borrowing and the availability of hedging
the policy options. Caution had to be exercised, there- instruments. Grenville noted that the crisis had high-
fore, in making generalizations. (See the Foreword for lighted the prominent issue of how to open an economy
the principal conclusions of the conference.) without excessive capital inflows, an overappreciation
The issues of macroeconomic demand stimulation of the exchange rate, and a vulnerability to changes in
and the so-called "credit crunch" were at the center of investor sentiment. He stressed the difference between
discussions during the first two sessions. Ito, comment- perceived and real profits. According to Grenville, the
ing on the papers by Atchana Waiqwamdee and Dwor- perception of high profits in the region was overblown.
Frecaut, Hallward-Driemeier and Colaco, drawing on a As these economies opened, there was a huge in flow of
study that he had undertaken of Thai financial institu- capital. Hedging alone would have provided insuffi-
tions immediately after the onset of the July 1997 crisis cient protection. Many firms decided not to hedge not
in Thailand, indicated that he had found there was because of the insufficient development of such instru-
indeed evidence of a credit crunch. He also cautioned ments, but because the cost of hedging was high. Other
that there might be a "survival bias" in the firm survey participants of the foreign financing roundtable noted it
results (since only those firms in existence at the time of was not surprising that the more profitable firms were
the survey could be interviewed). Other discussants those that had not borrowed in foreign currenci.qs; they
noted that it was important to distinguish between the also expressed caution regarding the quality of financial
early postcrisis period when there had been a major data, stressed the importance of further development of
spike in domestic interest rates following the initiation corporate legal systems, and indicated the importance
of stabilization programs, and the period covered by the of resumed capital inflows for corporate recovery.
survey when interest rates had returned to precrisis lev- The discussion on corporate employment ancd public
els. The definition of "credit crunch" must also be clar- policy elicited a wide range of comments. Siamwalla
xvi
cautioned that official unemployment numbers might academics, and researchers to exchange views on Asian
be underestimating the number of unemployed, as there corpo:ate recovery on the basis of a unique set of sys-
had been a substantial move to nonparticipation in the tematically collected and analyzed firm-level data.
labor force, particularly by women. He made a plea for Some lessons on crisis management were drawn. The
compulsory severance pay and an employment insur- incipient signs of recovery, even though they were
ance system. Choi argued that the degree of labor mar- uneven- between countries and sectors, have led to
ket flexibility was inversely related to firm size and increased attention being paid to issues of corporate
degree of unionization. Others noted that there was sig- restructuring for international competitiveness. There
nificant evidence of labor hoarding in Indonesia, are indications that the five countries, and possibly oth-
Malaysia, and Thailand; that with wages not having ers in che region, will undertake further such surveys as
adjusted fully, significant labor restructuring might still a basis for returning Asian countries to strong interna-
be ahead; that the human costs of the crisis and of tional competitiveness in the next few years of the new
restructuring needed to be given adequate attention; millennium.
and that the social cost of the crisis had been unevenly
distributed and mitigated since the bulk of the redun-
dancies was among younger and less skilled workers. Dominique Dwor-Frecaut
This regional conference provided an opportunity for Francis X. Colaco
senior Asian policymakers, business representatives, Mary Hallward-Driemeier
xvii
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Asian MAnufacturing
Recovery: A Firm-Level
Analysis
Mary Hallward-Driemeier
Dominique Dwor-Frecaut
Francis X. Colafo
-IL AW- acroeconomic studies investigating the causes of the crisis in Eastf~J3 Asia abound. However, until now, there have been little systematic
A4= v ^or comparable data across the crisis-hit countries to provide a
microeconomic explanation of the last two years' events. Recognizing the
importance of filling this information gap, the governments of Indonesia, the
Republic of Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand, with the technical
assistance of the World Bank, undertook an extensive survey of 4,000 firms
between November 1998 and February 1999.
The surveys have two areas of focus. The first is understanding the extent of
the impact of the crisis on firms and identifying their constraints to recovery.
The second is looking at the determinants of productivity and longer-run issues
of structural impediments to growth. This paper provides the overview to the
first of these topics. It is based on the survey results and the conclusions of a
regional dialogue attended by senior policymakers and private sector repre-
sentatives from across Asia.'
The paper explores the impact of the crisis by looking at changes in capacity
utilization, export performance, and employment practices. The causes for the
decline are then examined from the perspective of the surveyed firms. Given the
attention paid to issues of credit availability, this issue is discussed at length.
One of the contributions of the data set is that it provides information on the
financial position of small ar d medium enterprises (SMEs) and unlisted large
companies. It relates the extent of the firms' leverage and their reliance on dif-
ferent sources of capital to their reported access to credit. One of the principal
findings of the survey is that the nature of the firms' cash flow position is the
I
key to understanding their response to the crisis. These principal manufacturing sectors in each country: elec-
firms had been relying heavily on internal funds-and tronics, textiles, garments, food processing, chemicals,
as sales fell with the slump in demand, the costs of machinery, and auto parts. The sectoral composition
imported inputs rose and nominal interest rates differs somewhat across countries, with each country
increased, severely hampering cash flow position. One selecting five of the seven sectors. Each sector was cho-
of the policy messages is that the lack of demand was the sen by at least three countries, enabling regional com-
main constraint reported by the firms. Stimulating parison (see table 1.1).
demand is a priority, but the survey also demonstrates The sample was designed in conjunction with the sta-
other structural problems, and that any stimulation tistical agency in each country. Rather than focus on the
must be complemented by simultaneous restructuring largest firms, a random sample of surveyed firms was
of the financial and corporate sectors. drawn so that the results would be significant for the
larger population of firms in the economy. Par-icipating
Data firms were drawn from the population of firms with 20 or
more employees in the selected sectors. Approximately
Close to 4,000 firms were individually interviewed as two-thirds of the resulting sample consists of SMEs
the basis of the survey. The firms were selected from the (firms with fewer than 150 workers), and one-third is
TABLE 1.1
Characteristics of the sample
Size (%) Export orientation (%/D) Fflfirm (%/.) Sector (%) Total
Small Large Nonexporters Exporters No Yes Food Text. andgarm. Elec. mach. Chem. Auto.
Country
Indonesia 56 44 64 36 82 18 32 26 12 30 -- 816
Korea, Rep. of 65 35 25 75 83 17 - 23 35 28 14 857
MaLaysia 74 26 53 47 74 26 26 31 20 20 4 693
PhiLippines 48 52 48 52 64 36 26 37 21 16 -- 564
Thailand 63 37 43 57 70 30 10 54 16 20 659
Sector
Food 66 34 64 36 84 16- - - - -- 649
TextiLes and garments 63 37 48 52 82 18 - - - - -- 1194
ELectronics, eLectr. mach. 58 42 29 71 61 39 - - - - -- 752
ChemicaLs 61 39 44 56 73 27 - - - - -- 717
Auto parts 63 37 44 56 75 25 - - - - -- 277
Size
Small - - 60 40 85 15 19 34 20 20 8 2077
Large - - 24 76 62 38 16 33 23 21 8 1257
Export orientation
Nonexporters 80 20 - - 90 10 25 35 14 19 8 1629
Exporters 46 54 - - 64 36 12 33 28 20 8 1923
FDlfirms
No 69 31 54 46 - 20 36 17 20 8 2792
Yes 38 62 19 81 - 12 25 33 22 8 889
Indebtedness
Low 63 37 49 51 73 27 17 33 22 20 8 1204
High 55 45 36 64 76 24 12 35 24 19 9 772
Foreign borrowing
No 67 33 49 51 80 20 16 36 21 20 8 1911
Yes 37 63 13 87 58 42 6 29 30 21 13 700
Total 2000 1221 1570 1861 2688 872 649 1194 752 717 277 3589
Note: Percentages represent the share of the row variabLe that has the corresponding column characteristic.
Source: WorLd Bank, Firm-LeveL Survey.
2 Asian Corporate Recovery: Findings fron Firm-Level Surveys in Five Countries
made up of large companies. The ownership structure the crisis (see figure 1.1).3 Since the onset of the crisis in
of these firms varies across countries, but on average 20 July 1997, 71 percent of the firms have reported declin-
percent are publicly listed companies, 55 percent are ing levels of capacity utilization. With investment plans
private corporations, and the remainder are partner- virtua] ly halted, this decline corresponds very closely to
ships, single proprietorships, cooperatives, or other decreases in output. The proportion was highest in
forms of business. Indonesia, followed by Thailand, Malaysia, the
While the chosen sectors represent tradable goods Philippines, and Korea. Indonesia also experienced the
industries, just over one-half of the firms export some of largest magnitude in the decline, with declines averag-
their output. The extent to which the firms export also ing about 20 percent. The lowest average decline was in
varies, with less than 20 percent exporting the majority the Philippines, at 9 percent. This is consistent with
of their products. A significant number have a relation- other evidence that the Philippines was less affected and
ship with a foreign partner; about a quarter are classi- felt the impact at a later date. Korea saw its largest drop
fied as foreign direct investment, with a foreign partner in the first half of 1998, again corresponding to the later
holding at least a 10 percent ownership stake. date of the onset of its financial crisis.
The firms were asked two kinds of questions. The Conmparing exporting and nonexporting firms, the
first are quantitative questions regarding production, capacity utilization of the former remained less affected
employment, and balance sheet information. The ques- than nonexporters. While levels were comparable in
tions cover the period from 1996 through the first half 1996, by 1998 the exporters' capacity utilization was
of 1998. The second part of the questionnaire asked nine percentage points higher than the nonexporters'.
qualitative questions that were answered by the owner The hardest hit sector was auto parts, with 90 percent
or senior manager during an interview. These questions of the firms experiencing a decline. The average decline
referred to the time of the interview-between for auto parts was almost 22 percent, followed by
November 1998 and February 1999. decline s for electronics (13 percent), chemicals (10.7
Some important caveats need to be kept in mind in percerLt), garments and textiles (9.3 percent), and finally
interpreting the data. First, while the survey was food processing (8.4 percent).
endorsed by the governments, the firms' compliance
was voluntary. Verification of responses can be scruti-
nized using internal consistency checks, but it was not
possible to obtain external confirmation of responses. FIGURE 1.1
This caveat is particularly relevant with regard to the Capacity utilization
financial data. Second, this survey, as with any other,
suffers from a survival bias. Only firms that were still in 90
existence were available for interviewing. To gain some 80
measure of the extent of the problem, the statistical 70 *.
agencies kept track of the nonresponse rate owing to 60
bankruptcies or closures. On average, 10 percent of the 50
firms selected for the sample were no longer in opera- 40
tion at the time of the interview.2 30
20
10
h:ndonesia Rep. of Malaysia PhiLippines ThaiLand
Capacity utilization KoreaE1 1996 El Second half 1997
The firms were asked to report their capacity utilization U First half 1997 U First half 1998
in 1996, the first half of 1997, the second half of 1997, Source: WorLd Bank, Firm-LeveL Survey.
and the first half of 1998 as a measure of the impact of
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The exporting firms in Korea, Malaysia, and a loose correlation between the firms' expectations and
Thailand were also asked to report on changes in their their actual performance in the prior year.
export performance. Just over half of the firms in these
countries export some of their output, with the highest Employment
proportion found in Korea. The surveyed firms were
more likely to report an improvement from 1996 to The survey data provides information on the extent to
1997 than from 1997 to 1998-despite the continued which the crisis has affected employment and the causes
devaluation. However, one-third of the firms reported for employment reductions.4 These data have implica-
that their export performance had declined, on average tions for the social costs associated with the crisis and
10-25 percent. As discussed below, with a significant for the likely extent of human capital loss for firms, and
share of exports sold to neighboring countries, the they provide an indication of the extent to which firms
regional recession has created an impact on the demand are undertaking restructuring. One of the principal
for exports. Coupled with falling dollar prices in many findings is that employment changes are only loosely
sectors, it is not surprising that the export performance correlated with changes in capacity utilization; there is
of firms after the devaluation was mixed. evidence of labor hoarding in Indonesia, Thailand, and
It is clear from the data that the fall in capacity is not Malaysia. Thus, while the data indicate that bKorea has
just a cyclical story associated with the financial crisis. made the most progress in adjusting its labor force to
Particularly noticeable in Thailand is that capacity uti- the new market conditions, significant labor reductions
lization was already falling prior to the devaluation in could still be on the horizon.'
July 1997. Data are available on inputs and outputs Almost half the firms in the survey currently employ
from 1996 to 1998 that will allow this to be investi- fewer workers than they had prior to the crisis (see fig-
gated further in a separate paper. In certain sectors, part ure 1.3). The rate is highest in Korea, where 60 percent
of the explanation is the worldwide overcapacity, such have fewer workers. Korea and Thailand are also the
as in electronics and auto parts. countries where the proportion of redundancies are
greatest, with over a quarter of the firms reporting a
Prospects for capacity utilization decline in employment of over 25 percent. In Korea,
the reduction in total employment was close to 20 per-
Firms in Korea are the most optimistic that recovery is cent. Malaysia is the country where the impact on
likely in the first half of 1999 (see figure 1.2).
Approximately 70 percent of the sample firms in Korea
and the Philippines believe that they will maintain or
increase their capacity utilization. In contrast, more Prospects for recovery: firm expectations
than 35 percent of the firms in Indonesia, Malaysia, and of changes in capacity utilization in the
Thailand believe that their capacity utilization will next six months
decrease in the next six months. The financial position Rep of Korea
of the firms gives insights into these differences that will MaLaysia
be addressed further below. Among the sectors, auto PhiPippinese
parts firms are the most optimistic. Having suffered the ThaiLande VWorsen
greatest declines in capacity utilization, many believe that OveralL m
their position will improve as demand picks up again. FFood 1011ENE _ Imnprove
Table 1.2 provides information on which firms have Textites _N _ 1 _
in fact experienced some recovery, with either capacity ELectricaL _
utilization or export performance having improved in Auto parts *_I__ l__
1998 relative to the end of 1997. It is clear in this infor- -jO -40 -30 -r0 -10 0 10 20 30 40 S0
mation too that Korean firms, particularly exporting Percent
firms, have been able to increase their output in recent Source: WorLd Bank, Firm-Leve[ Survey.
months. However, it should be noted that there is only
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TABLE 1.2
Who is recovering: characteristics of the firms that expanded in 1!398 relative to the end of 1997
Reported as percent (by country) of firms that have expanded
By size By export orientation FDlfirm Sector
Small Large Non- Text. and
exporters Exporters No Yes Food garm. Elec. mach. Chem. Auto Total % Sample
Increase in capacity utilization
Indonesia 43.1 56.9 40.1 59.6 79.4 20.6 47.6 7.9 17.5 26.9 - 51 6.3
Korea 70.1 29.1 21.9 78.1 81.9 18.1 - 31.4 25.0 32.4 1.0 103 12.0
MaLaysia 65.1 34.9 39.3 60.7 68.5 31.5 31.5 19.1 20.2 27.0 2.3 86 10.6
Philippines 43.9 56.3 33.8 66.2 59.8 40.2 25.6 40.2 19.5 14.1 - 71 12.6
ThaiLand 56.0 44.0 25.9 74.1 67.0 33.0 12.1 66.4 12.9 - 8.6 100 15.2
TotaL 57.9 42.1 30.8 69.2 71.2 28.8 20.4 36.3 21.3 19.1 2.9 - -
Increase in exports Percentage of exporters
Korea 50.0 50.0 - 55.1 77.6 22.4 - 21.8 38.2 27.9 12.1 348 40.6
Malaysia 39.9 60.1 - 59.2 52.4 47.6 14.0 22.6 25.6 33.5 4.3 164 29.1
Thailand 41.3 58.7 - 40.3 56.6 43.4 10.1 61.1 16.1 - 12.8 149 22.6
TotaL 45.7 54.3 - - 66.7 33.3 12.1 30.86 30.1 29.7 10.3 - -
Total sample
Indonesia 47.9 37.1 55.1 31.4 82.5 17.5 32.1 26.2 11.8 29.9 - 816 -
Korea 62.7 33.4 24.9 73.7 83.0 17.0 - 23.2 34.5 28.4 13.9 857 -
Malaysia 68.1 24.8 52.3 47.7 73.8 26.2 21.9 26.0 17.0 17.0 3.3 814 -
Philippines 42.6 45.9 45.4 49.1 63.3 34.9 25.7 37.2 20.7 16.3 - 564 -
ThaiLand 53.9 31.4 43.1 56.1 68.3 28.8 9.7 54.5 15.9 - 19.9 659 -
Total 62.3 37.7 45.9 54.1 75.9 24.1 17.5 32.2 20.3 22.6 7.4 - -
Source: WorLd Bank, Firm-LeveL Survey.
employment has been mildest. Across sectors, auto Conmparing the declines in employment with capacity
parts experienced the largest reductions with 73 percent utilization changes, there are stark differences across
of the firms reducing their work forces, followed by countries (see figure 1.4). In Indonesia and Thailand, the
electronics and machinery. countries with the largest declines in capacity utilization,
FIGURE 1.3 FIGURE 1.4
Percent of firms with employment change Changes in capacity utilization by categories
of employment response
Employment Changes by Country Percent change in capacity utilization
70 Decrease between June 1997 and June 1998
* Same 10
60 D_ IncreaseRe.o
60 | g Increase 5 Indonesia Korea MaLaysia PhiLippines Thailand
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40
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30
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Korea -25
Source: World Bank, Firm-Level Survey. Source: NorLd Bank, Firm-LeveLSurvey.
Asian Manufacturing Recovery: A Firm-Level Analysis 5
there are also large declines in employment. However, Minimizing the loss of human capital is consistent with
there are also a significant number of firms that have rational behavior on the part of the firms. Looking at it
maintained their employment levels despite declines in from the social perspective, younger people are less
capacity utilization averaging 5-10 percent. A similar likely to have family responsibilities and likely co be eas-
phenomenon is discernible in Malaysia. This is consis- ier to train, thus lessening the social cost dimension of
tent with labor hoarding.6 the lost employment.
Labor hoarding could be the result of inflexible labor The one exception to this pattern is Korea. In Korea,
markets. A high cost of firing workers can lead firms to almost half of the lost jobs had been held by workers in
maintain higher than optimal levels of employment. their 30s. Korean firms also had a lower share of pro-
Further investigation is needed to examine the specific duction job losses, consistent with the lower overall
labor market institutions in each country and to ascribe share of production jobs in Korea, but this category still
to them the cross-country differences in the data. What bore a disproportionate share of the lost jobs. Like
is particularly striking, however, is that Korea, the firms in the Philippines, those in Korea lost a higher
country with the strongest union movement is also the share of workers with six to ten years tenure. This could
country with the highest redundancies and the least represent a significant loss of human capital. llowever,
labor hoarding. One explanation is that with the crisis bearing in mind the loosening of inflexible labor mar-
there has been an introduction of measures that have kets, this is consistent with Korean firms' using the
loosened the restrictions on firing workers. Further- opportunity to substantially restructure their work-
more, union activism seems to have been curbed by forces. This explanation is consistent with the fact that
workers' worries about job security in the face of rising Korean firms are also the most liKely to be filling vacan-
unemployment. Many firms may have taken advantage cies; a sign that they are reacting to meet changes in
of this to undertake desired restructuring. Such a line of labor demand.
reasoning is most consistent with the chaebols, the con- That only firms in Korea show substantial signs of
glomerates with large labor forces. This explanation is restructuring their work force does not bode well for
also consistent with further evidence on the types of the extent of labor adjustment that could be on the hori-
workers that were made redundant. zon. If demand does pick up soon, the labor haoarding
From another perspective, labor hoarding can be
optimal if real wages have fallen or if the firms wish to
maintain firm-specific human capital and the shock is 0
perceived to be short-term. Research on the changes in \ 4
real wages continues, with preliminary indications that Age profiLe of workers who have left firms
real wages have fallen-in some cases, substantially. Percent
The age, tenure, and position of workers who have been 90 * Under 20
made redundant do indicate that the firms are trying to m Age 20-30
minimize the loss of human capital. 80 E Age 31-40
Younger workers were disproportionately made 70 X Age 41-50
redundant in all countries but Korea (see figure 1.5). 60 U Age over 51
Most of the lost jobs had formerly been held by 21-30 50
year-old workers. Likewise the job losses were concen- 40
trated in the production jobs rather than managerial or 30
technical staff. Production jobs represent close to two-
thirds of the jobs, but represent three-quarters of the 20
lost jobs. This is most striking in Malaysia and 10
Thailand. The average tenure of those made redundant 0 i P sIndonesia Rep. of MaLaysia Philippines i'hailand
was one to three years. The implication of these pat- Korea
terns is that younger workers with less firm-specific Source: WorLd Bank, Firm-LeveL Survey.
human capital have been those that are let go.
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FIGURE 1.6a FIGURE 1.6b
Sources of output decLine Sources of export decline
Importance to output decline (1=not important, 5=important) Imporlance to export decline (1=not important, 5=important)
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44
33
2
.~~~~~~~~~~~4 0151 11|0
mav have been j'ustified, but only if there is little sub- decline in investment and consumption. As emphasized
stantial shift in the skills needed by the firms in the post- by Cho and Rhee,1° the withdrawal in capital flows that
crisis period. If significant labor shedding develops in took place in 1997 translated more into a sharp rise in
the upcoming months, the need will grow for continued interest rates than into a contraction of money supply
improvements in the expansion of social safety nets and as gove-rnments continued to extend liquidity support
a further balancing of the speed of adjustment with to theilr fledgling financial sectors (see figure 1.7).
social costs. Clearly this is an area that justifies careful Nomirnal and real interest rates jumped to historical
monitoring in the months ahead. highs. Because East Asian firms were highly leveraged,
the rise in interest rates translated to a sharp decline in
Corporate views of the causes of the output the firms' investment demand. The collapse of this
decline demand had a large impact on aggregate demand
because before the crisis, investment in these countries
The firms were asked to list and rank the causes of out- accournted for 40 percent of gross domestic product
put decline.7 The responses are shown in figure 1.6a (GDP), with the exception of the Philippines where
and table 1.3.8 The first four causes were, in order of investraent represents only about 20 percent of GDP.
decreasing importance, domestic demand, the rise in The restrictive fiscal policies initially adopted in
imported input costs caused by the depreciation, high response to the withdrawal of capital flows further con-
interest rates, and labor cost. It should be kept in mind tributed to the collapse of domestic demand.
that the answers to this qualitative question were based The second cause of the output collapse reported by
on the firms' position and the economic environment the firms was the rise in the cost of imported inputs
prevailing in the time period from the end of 1998 to caused by the devaluation. (Filipino firms reported this
early 1999.9 as the most important cause of output decline.) This
The main complaint of the firms in all countries, with complaint can be expected in countries that have deval-
the exception of the Philippines, was the collapse of ued their currency. The rise in input costs caused by the
domestic de-mand for their products. This complaint is devaluation reduces the profit margins of nonexporting
mirrored by the macroeconomic data showing a sharp firms a~nd provides them with the incentive to redirect
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NominaL and reaL interest rates, March 1997-December 1998 (percent)
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Source: World Bank, Firm-LeveL Survey.
their production to the tradable sector, which eventu- for the causes for the decline in export performance (see
ally results in an increase in the volume of exports and figure 1.6b and table 1.4). The most important one
in the restoration of the firms' profits. Indeed, in 1997 given was the lack of foreign demand and the lack of
the expectation was for a rapid recovery led by exports. stability in foreign markets. The collapse of domestic
However, the export-led recovery did not materialize. demand in the five countries and the recessiorL in Japan
The survey results shed some light on the reasons. also hurt exporters, because of the importance of
Exporters in Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand were asked intraregional trade. Including Japan, about half of the
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exports of the five countries go to the region (the excep- following the devaluation of the Thai baht, export vol-
tion is the Philippines, which sells a greater share of its umes in the five countries rose by about 20 percent, but
exports to the United States). The firms have reported nominal export values in U.S. dollars remained flat,
fewer complaints about the impact of the decline in for- with the exception of the Philippines where nominal
eign demand on overall output, not so much because export values continued to grow at a 20 percent clip.
the decline in foreign demand has been less pro- Thus, exporters and domestic producers trying to reori-
nounced, but rather because the firms sell a smaller ent their production to the export markets were hit
share of their output abroad. simultaneously by shrinking markets and declining
The second main reason given by exporters as the prices.
cause of their decline was exchange volatility and the The third cause of output decline reported by the
lack of price competitiveness. Export prices in the five firms tvas the high level of interest rates. At the time
countries had started to decline before the crisis hit."1 when the question was asked (late 1998 to early 1999),
And after the crisis, they declined sharply: in the year nominal interest rates were back to their precrisis levels.
TABLE 1.3.
Change in leveL of output after the crisis and source of outpiut decline
By change in B_v source of
level of output (%) output decline (%)
,'eavy Not
Increose Dom. Costly Labor debt Wk. Fgn. Raw Expans. Suppl. deliver
or some Decrease demand Depreciation loans costs tlurden capital demand materials credit credit goods
Country
Indonesia 24 76 3.5 3.6 3.1 2.6 2.1 1.8 2.5 2.1 1.8 2.1
Korea 33 67 4.3 2.9 3.1 2.0 2.3 2.6 2.8 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.1
Malaysia 33 67 4.0 3.6 2.8 2.5 2.5 2.3 2.4 2.1 2.2 2.1 2.0
Philippines 31 69 3.2 3.9 3.4 3.3 2.7 2.4 2.6 2.4 2.3 2.3
ThaiLand 27 73 4.0 4.0 3.3 3.4 2.9 2.7 2.8 2.3 2.2 2.4 2.1
Sector
Food 34 66 3.4 3.6 3.0 2.7 2.3 2.2 1.8 2.7 2.0 1.9 2.1
TextiLes and
Garments 32 68 3.7 3.7 3.2 3.0 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.2
Electronics and
elect. mach. 26 74 3.9 3.3 2.9 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.9 2.1 2.1 2.0 1.9
Chemicals 33 67 3.9 3.6 3.2 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.2 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.0
Auto parts 7 93 4.6 3.6 3.3 2.7 2.8 2.7 2.6 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.1
Size
SmaLL 26 74 4.0 3.5 3.0 2.7 2.5 2.4 2.2 2.3 2.1 2.1 2.1
Large 34 66 3.6 3.6 3.2 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.8 2.3 2.3 2.1 2.0
Export orientation
Nonexporters 21 79 4.1 3.6 3.0 2.7 2.5 2.3 1.7 2.3 2.0 2.1 2.1
Exporters 37 63 3.6 3.6 3.3 2.7 2.6 2.6 3.2 2.4 2.4 2.2 2.1
FDIfirms
No 28 72 3.9 3.6 3.2 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.2 2.4 2.2 2.1 2.1
Yes 34 66 3.5 3.6 2.9 2.8 2.4 2.3 3.0 2.1 2.1 2.0 1.9
Indebtedness
Low 28 72 3.9 3.6 3.0 2.8 2.4 2.2 2.4 2.3 2.1 2.0 2.0
High 27 73 3.9 3.6 3.4 2.8 2.8 2.6 2.6 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.1
Foreign borrowing
No 26 74 3.9 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.7 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.1
Yes 35 65 4.0 3.3 3.2 2.4 2.5 2.6 3.0 2.2 2.2 2.1 1.9
Capocity utilization
Increase 3.4 3.7 3.3 3.1 3.3 2.7 2.6 2.7 2.5 2.4 2.4
Same 3.5 3.5 2.9 2.8 2.5 2.3 2.4 2.3 2.1 2.0 2.0
Decrease 4.0 3.6 3.2 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.1
Total 29 71 3.8 3.6 3.1 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.1
Soarce: World Bank, Firm-Level Survey.
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TABLE 1.4
Source of export decline by firm characteristics
By change in export (%/.) By source of export decline (%)
Exchange High
Poor rate Unstable Price import Credit
Decrease Same Increase demand volatility markets competitiveness cost constraints Design
Country
Indonesia - - - - - - - - -
Korea 29 11 60 3.68 2.94 3.55 3.28 2.71 2.30 1.97
Malaysia 38 15 46 4.24 3.64 3.22 3.48 3.76 - 2.82
PhiLippines - - - - - - - - - -
Thailand 36 20 44 3.93 3.96 3.96 3.76 3.84 3.12 -
Sector
Food 40 21 39 3.79 3.85 3.26 3.55 3.57 3.17 2.63
TextiLes and garments 31 15 54 3.85 3.89 3.70 3.60 3.43 2.81 2.36
ELectronics and
elect. mach. 34 14 52 3.97 3.45 3.49 3.36 3.30 2.19 2.32
Chemicals 32 14 55 3.99 3.45 3.45 3.52 3.12 2.44 2.40
Auto parts 38 10 52 4.02 3.79 3.73 3.20 3.48 2.82 2.14
Size
SmaLL 38 17 45 3.98 3.66 3.67 3.49 3.31 2.48 2.35
Large 27 11 62 3.85 3.71 3.35 3.46 3.32 2.68 2.36
Export orientation
Nonexporters - - - - - - - - - -
Exporters 33 14 52 3.93 3.68 3.55 3.47 3.34 2.58 2.36
FDI firms
No 33 13 53 3.79 3.59 3.53 3.42 3.18 2.48 2.26
Yes 34 16 50 4.18 3.79 3.56 3.54 3.62 2.82 2.56
Indebtedness
Low 35 15 50 4.03 3.66 3.84 3.43 3.34 2.31 2.39
High 33 15 52 3.94 3.63 3.76 3.44 3.34 3.01 2.31
Foreign Borrowing
No 35 15 50 3.84 3.67 3.65 3.43 3.28 2.49 2.20
Yes 31 12 58 3.96 3.67 6.47 3.47 3.20 2.55 2.40
Total 33 14 52 3.93 3.68 3.55 3.47 3.34 2.58 2.36
Source: WorLd Bank, Firm-LeveL Survey.
Real interest rates, measured by the consumer price months of each other. As the countries, particularly
index (CPI) were also below their precrisis level. Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand
However, because of producer price deflation, real have fairly similar exports, their overall competitive-
interest rates measured by the producer price index ness has not increased by much. Finally some of the
(PPI) were above their precrisis level.1 2 Furthermore, countries, particularly Korea and Thailand had experi-
with the decline in output prices, precrisis real interest enced several years of real wage growth that was higher
rates were likely to be perceived by firms as "too high." than productivity growth in the manufacturing sectors.
The fourth cause of output decline reported by the As mentioned previously, the decline in the rate of
firms was the high level of labor costs. This is a surpris- capacity utilization prior to the crisis suggests that
ing finding in view of the nominal depreciation of about structural problems were at play before the crisis hit.
40 percent in nominal terms betwveen mid-1997 and the To sum up, the firms in Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia,
end of 1998. This particular complaint has to be put in and Thailand, were hit by a collapse in domestic
the context of declining output prices. Moreover, the demand and a decline in profitability caused by sharply
currencies in the five countries were devalued within higher imported costs but could not successfully switch
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their production to exports because of shrinking export The crisis has greatly curtailed the availability of
markets, declining export prices, and competitiveness credit. Bank liquidity and capital have been severely
problems that predated the crisis. affected by mounting stocks of nonperforming loans.
The firms in the Philippines eem to have had a some- Estimates of peak nonperforming loans vary from 30
what different experience. First, as mentioned above, of perceni: of the total loan portfolio of banks in Korea to
the five countries, Filipino firms had the lowest rate of 75 percent in Indonesia,14 while the Filipino banking
capacity utilization in 1996 but the smallest decline in sector has not so far suffered from systemic difficulties
capacity utilization as a result of the crisis. Second, (see table 1.5). Second, many countries had initially
Filipino firms ranked costs-imported inputs, high adopted policies that tightened capital adequacy and
interest rates, and labor costs-as more important loan classification rules. These policies have further
causes of output decline than a lack of domestic or for- reduced the availability of credit because banks have
eign demand. found it more difficult than expected to mobilize capi-
This is likely to reflect a different macroeconomic and tal from private sources, especially foreign ones. In view
international environment. The international environ- of the lack of interest on the part of foreign investors,
ment for Filipino firms seems to have been more favor- governnents have had to intervene and provide dis-
able, with firmer export prices and a greater reliance on tressed banks with liquidity and capital. However, with
the U.S. market, in which import demand has been sus- perhaps the exception of Korea, governments have gen-
tained throughout the crisis. Furthermore, the contrac- erally been slow in restructuring and recapitalizing the
tion of GDP in 1998 was much smaller than in the other banking sector. Eventually, the tightening of capital ade-
countries. The Philippines has not been hit by a collapse quacy ratios had to be reversed or phased in over a
in investment demand comparable to that of other longer period of time. A third reason for the decline in
countries. The rise in real interest rates was much less credit availability has been an increased degree of risk
pronounced than in Korea and Thailand,13 and as men- aversion on the part of banks, a phenomenon that has
tioned above, the ratio of investment to GDP in the been observed in most banking crises. Figure 1.8 shows
Philippines is smaller than in other countries. Rather, that, on aggregate, real credit to the private sector has
the Philippines has been hit by a supply shock: the 1998 declined since mid-1997 in Indonesia, the Philippines,
drought led to a contraction of output in the agricul- and Thailand. In the case of Thailand, the decline in the
tural sector, as well as to higher costs of foodstuffs that supply of credit is also well documented in a paper by
fed into higher inflation. Professor Takatoshi Ito and Luis Pereira da Silva.15
The low level of capacity utilization in 1996, the Compared with the sharp output declines that
decline in capacity utilization prior to the crisis, and occurred, and reduced demand for credit, these aggre-
Filipino firms' complaints about costs despite a more gate numbers do not indicate that there were large
favorable international environment suggest that the aggregate shortfalls in credit availability. Despite the
decline of output of Filipino firms and the recent slow- decline in banks' capability to extend credit, the surveyed
down in export growth have been caused more by
structural competitiveness problems than by the col- TABLE 1.5
lapse in domestic and foreign demand. Peak n Dnperforming loans and losses
Credit availability, corporate credit needs, (percentsge of percentNge of Losses/capital
and governance loan portfolio) GDP percent
Indonesia 75 30 474
By the end of 1998, the firms did not report credit avail- Malaysia 35 20 120
. , . Kre .........Kor ..a. 30 16 126
ability as a major source of output decline, despite the Thailand 50 34 248
systemic problems experienced by the financial sectors
of many countries. The surveys shed some light on this Note. Assuniptions on recovery rates: Indonesia 25 percent; Thailand 30 percent;
M~aLaysia anni Korea, 50percent. Net loss is defined as the deterioration in bank capitol
surprising finding by providing information on the rela- resulting from the implied write-down of loans. June 1997 baLance sheet data on Loans
and capital are used as a base.
tionship between the banking sector and the firms. Source: Deutsche Bank Research.
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FIGURE 1.8
Real domestic private credit and industrial production, three-month moving average 1996-98
(Index July 1997=100)
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firms did not report credit availability as a major source The firm-level data shows that caution needs to be
of output decline-and exporters reported that the top exercised against drawing broad generalizations
causes of decline were a fall in demand and a lack of regarding the issue of credit availability. Clearly the sup-
price competitiveness. With the decline in the demand ply of credit has been reduced, but so too has the
for their products, the firms' credit demand is likely to demand for credit. First, distinctions between the time
have declined as well so that credit availability is not an period, after the onset of the crisis need to be taken into
immediate constraint to corporate recovery. However, account. During the stabilization phase when interest
as countries implement expansionary fiscal policies, the rates were raised significantly, the demand for credit
demand for the firms' product and the firms' demand was obviously lower. With output down, the demand
for credit are likely to increase. Financial sector restruc-
turing and recapitalization have to proceed in step with FIGURIE 1.9 
fiscal expansion.fiscal~~~~~~~~~ expnson Share of firms reporting inadequate liquidityFurthermore, credit aggregates do not indicate
whether there were deficiencies in the way credit was Percent
allocated. The survey data indicate that despite overall 60
credit availability, many firms felt severely constrained 50
in undertaking viable projects. In part this is due to the
distinction between credit and liquidity. Liquidity is a 40
broader concept, including the important financing 30
provided by internal funds. About 40 percent of the
firms overall reported experiencing inadequate liquid- 20
ity to finance production (see figure 1.9). Thailand and
Korea were the two countries in which liquidity prob-
lems were the most acute, and, in general, exporters 0 RInidonesia Rep. of Malaysia Phi[ippines Thailandfound it easier than nonexporters to secure adequate Korea
liquidity. When the firms were asked about the causes Source: WorLd Bank, Firm-Level Survey.
of inadequate liquidity, they listed as the main causes
lower revenues and higher input costs caused by the
devaluation. The burden of servicing their debts and
insufficient working capital ranked much lower (see fig- FIGURE 1.10
ure 1.10). In other words, factors affecting cash flow Sources of inadequate liquidity
received more attention than credit. Contribution toinadequote liquidity
The importance of cash flow over credit reflects the (1=no c nitribution, 5=mojor contribution)
structure of working capital of firms in the sample, two- 4.5
thirds of which are small and medium. Only about 20 4
percent (in Indonesia and Malaysia) to 35 percent (in 3.5
Thailand) of working capital requirements of surveyed 2.5
firms comes from loans; the bulk (between 50 and 65 2
percent) comes from retained earnings (see figure 1.11). 1.5
Also, Thai and Indonesian firms get about one-third 1
and Korean, Malaysian, and Filipino firms about one- 0.5
tenth of their working capital from informal sources of 0
financing-family, partners, and informal money C'# ° >& . . z,
lenders. Thus Thailand, the country with the highest .- 9
reliance on loans to finance working capital, is also the ',o\
country where surveyed firms complained the most Source: WorLd Bank, Firm-LeveL Survey.
about the lack of loans for working capital.
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FIGURE 1.11 trate that for the manufacturing firms, foreign borrow-
ing was concentrated in a small number of firms.1 6
Sources of working capital, 1996-98 Based on the survey results, the manufacturing sector
Share of working capital (percent) Ci 1996 does not seem to have been a major player, particularly
50 U 1997 Hl relative to the real estate and financial services sectors.
40 U 1998 H2 With the exception of Korea, less than 10 percent of
30 _ 1 financing was in foreign currency (see figure 1.12).
20 r g ' W Korea is notable for its greater reliance on foreign bor-
10 rowing, with a quarter of the surveyed firms engaging
o _ _ g * W l l t in this practice. That there are more listed companies in
Retained earnings Loans Other the Korean sample is one explanation for this. Of the
share of financing that is in foreign currency, only in
Korea and Malaysia is the majority of it not short-term.
Sources of working capital by country, 1998 HI However, it remains true that most of the effect of the
Share of working capital (percent) 1 Retained earnings depreciation would have been transmitted through
\ 70 U Loans alternative channels (for example, the impact on banks)
60 1 Other than through the balance sheets of manufacturing firms.
50 However, one finding does indicate a more worri-
40 some pattern. The firms that qualified for for-eign cur-
30 rency loans were more likely to be the unprofitable
lo I}}§l 000 * 9\\0000 f000 s firms (see figure 1.13). Conversely, more profitable
0 firms had a lower share of their financing denominated
I Indonesia Rep. of MaLaysia Phi Li ppi nes Thai Land
| ndonesa R ofKorea in foreign exchange. It is certainly possible that the
Source: WorLd Bank, Firm-LeveL Survey more profitable firms had less need to borrow, but this
Scarce: Wur[d Bunk, Firm-Luve[ SurveyIprovides further evidence that the financial sector needs
to scrutinize its clients carefully in deciding whether or
not to extend loans.
for credit has remained lower. However, since interest
rates have been lowered, as recovery picks up, the
demand for credit could well rise, increasing the diffi-
culty of obtaining adequate financing if banks remain FIGURE 1.12
cautious about extending new loans. Second, there are Foreign debt (percentage of total plus ecjuity),
important differences between the firms depending on 1996-98 Hi
their initial level of credit in their total financing, their Percentage offoreign debt C Short-term
recourse to bank lending for working capital and for 25 U Long-term
longer-term investments, and the sectors in which they 20
operate. Another factor is whether the firms export or
are oriented toward the domestic market. The new 15
microeconomic data available here complements the 10
more aggregate analysis that has so far been undertaken. 
Foreign indebtedness 0 L ., AI¾L 
Se S$St e St SiN leSe SSe 0t@
Short-term borrowing in foreign currency and the sud- Indonesia Korea Malaysia PhiLippines ThaiLand
den reversal of capital flows are often cited as important Source: WorLd Bank, Firm-Level Survey.
causes of the financial crisis. However, these data illus-
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A policy implication of the surveys is that even The Firms'responses to this question are shown in fig-
though there is no evidence of an overall shortfall of ure 1. 1 4. In the five countries, a first category of firms
credit availability, credit allocation from domestic and that indicate that they do not expect to have problems
foreign sources is not always efficient. Some firms have in serv:.cing their loan repayments range from over two-
seen their working capital needs increase as their source thirds i n Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand, to one-half in
of liquidity decreased; they could benefit from addi- Indonesia and the Philippines. A second category of
tional credit. At the same time, exporters attribute their firms indicating that they expect to be able to meet loan
decline to a lack of competitiveness, which suggests that payments for the following twelve months but not
additional credit would have to be extended in the con- beyond that period is populated by 10-15 percent of the
text of improvements in competitiveness. These latter firms in Thailand and Malaysia, and 20-25 percent in
improvements require a combination of government Indonesia, Korea, and the Philippines. A third category
competition policies and corporate restructuring to of firms indicated that they are currently having diffi-
increase productivity. culties in meeting loan repayments, or expect to be able
to meer. loan repayments only for the next three months
The firms' views on loan repayment and nDt beyond: about 20 percent in Indonesia,
prospects Thailand, the Philippines, and Malaysia, and 10 per-
cent in Korea.
The questionnaire, as noted earlier, in addition to seek- Table 1.6 shows the characteristics of firms in the
ing quantitative information from the firms, sought three categories. A comparison of the firms in the first
their qualitative views on their ability to meet required and third categories indicates that those not reporting
loan payments, if interest rates remained at current-in loan repayment difficulties, on average:
other words, end-of-1998 through early 1999-levels. * Have experienced smaller declines in capacity uti-
The firms were asked to indicate their perceived ability to lization (a significant exception is Korean firms);
meet required loan payments, by three-month intervals, * Are exporting more (exceptions are Korean and
over the next twelve months and beyond. About 2,000 Thai firms);
firms in the five countries responded to this question. * Are financing a greater portion of their working cap-
ital with retained earnings (Filipino firms are an
exception); and
FIGURE 1.13 * Have experienced much less difficulty in securing
adequate amounts of liquidity for production.
Short-term foreign debt by profitable and less The above information indicates that surveyed firms
profitable exporters, 1996-98 Hl in the five countries see themselves at various stages in
Short-termforeign debt/totalforeign debt El ProfitabLe the recovery process, as well as in their access to liquid-
exporter ity required for production. The bulk of the firms in
5 Less profitable Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand consider themselves to
50 be in good financial condition. This is less the case in
Indonesia and the Philippines. There remain, however,
45 a signilicant number of firms in all five countries that
were either experiencing loan repayment difficulties at
40 the time of the survey, or thought that they would find
themselves in that situation in the near future, if eco-
35 nomic conditions (in particular, demand and interest
rate levels) were to persist. This financial fragility of a
30 1996 1997 1998, Hi significant proportion of the firms is linked both to
Source: World Bank, Firrn-Level Survey. macroeconomic onditions and the pace of bank and
corporate restructuring.
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Ability to meet loan payments, by country
Indonesia Rep. of Korea MaLaysia
2101
15%I
5 D o /~~~~2 67 680,5l
Philippines Thailand Overall
1 40/a020
j8 0 h~~~~8 65 62 %8 Y
Expect o pay Expect to pay Expect to pay
MW for up to 3 months for 3 to 12 months fo r over 1 year
Source: World Bank, Firm-LeveL Survey.
Governance
A central issue of corporate governance is the relation- S
ship between the firm and its financial institution(s), for ban uires ty dere of Lvage
The disclosure and transparency of information is of
particular interest. The firms were asked whether they Percent 1 Highty leveraged
were required to provide audited statements to receive 80 * Low Leverage
a loan. Of those with 20 percent or more of their financ- 70
ing provided by bank or financial company loans, the 60
share that are so required ranged from 40 percent in 50
Indonesia and Thailand to 70 percent in Korea, 40
Malaysia, and the Philippines (see figure 1.15). If the 30
firms are only interested in securing a letter of credit for 20
trade finance, the issue of transparency is not so impor- 10 I
tant. But to the extent that many of the firms' only 0
source of finance is short-term trade credit-which they Indonesia Korea MaLaysia Philippines ThaiLand
in fact use to finance investment or other long-term Source: World Bank, Firm-Level Survey.
activities-the issue is still pressing.
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While the survey provides evidence in favor of accel- and im proved allocation of credit should see the replace-
erating standard accounting methods and disclosure ment of relationship-based loans with more market-
requirements, there is another side to the story. It is true based criteria. This is a long-term endeavor. In the short
that more highly leveraged firms are more likely to be term, wvhat is needed is a clear set of prudential regula-
required to provide audited statements. The ones least tions and disclosure requirements that should be
likely to be required to present them are small firms, imposed on banks and financial institutions with regard
which tend to have long-standing relationships with to thei• loans-including those extended to SMEs.
their financial institutions. On average, these firms have
done business with the same primary financial institu- ConcLusion
tion for over half of the life of the firm. Informal rela-
tionships can be an efficient way of learning about a The main conclusions of the survey results and the con-
firm and having needed credit extended. In credit mar- ference discussions, as outlined by the five senior Asian
kets that discriminate against SMEs, such relationships- policyrnakers who chaired the sessions, are summarized
based financing may indeed be efficient. However, the below:17
development of more transparent financial institutions
TABLE 1.6
Profile of firms with different expectations on remaining current on debt payments
(Percentage offirms in each category)
Firms that expected to remain currentfor more than a year
Indonesia Korea MalaYsia Philippines Thailand Average
Experienced output decLine 80 70 71 77 73 74
Capacity utiLizationa 59 71 69 70 64 66
SmaLL size 51 67 63 54 64 57
Exporter 45 63 51 55 42 49
Low indebtedness 67 37 75 47 63 60
Foreign debt 17 44 2C 14 28 27
Liquidity is a problem 36 60 23 28 55 42
Firms that expected to remain current for more than 3 months and less than 1 year
Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Thailand Average
Experienced output decLine 76 72 86 81 73 77
Capacity utilizationa 63 67 64 61 60 63
SmaLL size 55 77 76 53 68 64
Exporter 38 65 48 41 69 51
Low indebtedness 71 54 91 40 66 62
Foreign debt 10 40 20 11 28 22
Liquidity is a probLem 30 58 46 36 69 44
Firms that were not current or did not expect o remain currentfor more than 3 monrhs
Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Thailand Average
Experienced output decLine 80 73 73 81 88 81
Capacity utiLizationa 56 69 58 62 52 57
Small size 62 42 71 49 62 57
Exporter 38 85 52 50 52 51
Low indebtedness 62 42 72 57 45 55
Foreign debt 21 54 12 23 28 26
Liquidity is a problem 45 70 62 43 85 61
a. Average capacity utilization.
Source: WorLd Bank, Firm-Level Survey.
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* The stimulation of demand alone is not enough. It authors and do not necessarily represent he views of the WorLd Bank,
needs to be combined with accelerated restructuring its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent.
of banks and other financial institutions if corporate 1. The surveys provide the basis for regional conferences on these
recovery is to be robust. issues of corporate recovery and the determinants of productivity. The
* Corporate and financial restructuring must take first was heLd in Bangkok from March 31 to April 2 and was attended
place simultaneously for both to succeed. by 150 senior policymakers and private sector representatives from
* The institutional framework for corporate finance around the region. The second conference is pLanned fo- November
needs urgent strengthening to improve the efficiency 1999. A research conference is aLso under discussion for thie spring of
of credit allocation. Laws to regulate bankruptcies, 2000.
foreclosures, and mergers and acquisitions, are 2. ThaiLand provides a speciaL case as this was the second such sur-
needed to facilitate the transfer of assets of failed vey it had carried out. Twelve hundred firms had been interviewed by
companies to viable ones. the end of 1997. These same firms were then contacted a year later,
* Financial transactions need greater transparency and again, cLose to 10 percent had gone out of business. A foLLow-up
through improved reporting, accounting, and paper will examine the characteristics of the firms that cl)sed during
auditing. 1998 to gain insights into the most vuLnerabLe firms and as a predic-
* According to business responses to the survey, the tor for the Likely extent of future bankruptcies.
demand for credit has declined as sales have fallen. 3. See Waiquamdee, Krairiksh, and PhongsanarakuL, 1999, "Corpo-
However, many firms reported difficulties in secur- rates' Views of the Constraints to Recovery," paper prepared for the
ing adequate credit. As demand grows, availability conference on Asian Corporate Recovery, Bangkok March 31-April 2.
will become a bigger issue. 4. Care has been taken not to cLassify aLL the redundarcies as Lay-
* Excess capacity has both a cyclical and a structural offs or fired workers. Many of the countries have restrictions on fir-
nature; therefore, macroeconomic policies need to ing, incLuding Large severance packages. Thus, many firms have found
be supplemented with measures to improve corpo- aLternative ways to reduce the number of workers, and the number of
rate competitiveness. layoffs is significantLy ower than the overall reductions in empLoyment.
* The development of a bond market needs to be 5. See Xin Meng and RonaLd Duncan, 1999, "Corporate lEmpLoyment
started now because it is a long-term endeavor. and PubLic PoLicy," paper prepared for the conference on Asian
• More discussion is required to design competitive- Corporate Recovery, Bangkok March 31-ApriL 2.
ness strategies. 6. In ThaiLand, and to a Lesser extent Indonesia, firms with
* The speed of adjustment must be balanced with the increased empLoyment aLso increased capacity utilization, implying
social costs and the need for social safety nets. that their markets were expanding. In contrast, in MaLaysia, firms with
greater empLoyment were stiLL experiencing Lower LeveLs of capacity
Notes utiLization. Further investigation, particuLarLy regarding movements in
wages, is underway to explain this pattern.
Mary Hallward-Driemeier and Dominique Dwor-Frecaut are with the 7. See Waiquamdee, Krairiksh, and PhongsanarakuL, 1999,
WorLd Bank. Francis CoLaco is with Asia-Pacific Management "Corporates' Views of the Constraints to Recovery," paper srepared for
ConsuLtants, Inc. The authors wouLd Like to thank Giuseppe Iarossi, the conference on Asian Corporate Recovery, Bangkok Match 31-April
Stacy Nemeroff, Dennis Tao, Hairong Yu, and Hosook Hwang for invaLu- 2, and presented in this voLume.
abLe heLp in assembLing the data set and for exceLLent research assis- 8. There is considerabLe variation in the responses of individuaL
tance. They have aLso benefited from the comments of the participants firms to this question, indicating that managers did differentiate
of the Asian Corporate Recovery Conference heLd in Bangkok, March between the severity of different sources of probLems. The reported
31-ApriL 2, 1999 and from the seminars heLd at the WorLd Bank and resuLts are the mean responses, but if percentile ranks ae used, the
in Kuala Lumpur, Jakarta, Singapore, ManiLa, Hong Kong, Tokyo, Seoul, ordering is the same.
and at the meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 9. Care must aLso be taken in interpreting these quaLitative resuLts,
(ASEAN) Chambers of Commerce and Industry. The findings, interpre- as the firms report their partiaL equiLibrium view of the world. Thus is
tations, and concLusions expressed in this paper are those of the it is possibLe that the decLine in domestic demand is "overreported"
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as a problem, since many suppliers to a large credit-constrained firm conference on Asian Corporate Recovery, Bangkok March 31-April 2,
will report that a decLine in demand is the main constraint, when the and presented in this volume.
root cause is the Large buyers access to credit. However, one piece 15. Ito and Pereira da SiLva (1998). The paper anaLyzes aggregate
of evidence that mitigates this concern is that there is no statisti- data on the Thai financial sector and the responses from 17 banks (7
calLy significant difference between the responses of firms that pro- Thai anc 10 foreign) that returned questionnaires in ApriL and May of
duce intermediate goods and those that produce final goods. l998.
10. Cho and Rhee, 1999, "Macroeconomic Views of the East Asian 16. See Masahiro Kawai, Hongjoo Hahm, and Giuseppe Iarossi,
Crisis: A Comparison," paper prepared for the conference on Asian 1999, (Corporate Foreign Debt in East Asia: Too Much or Too Little?"
Corporate Recovery, Bangkok March 31-ApriL 2, and presented in this paper prepared for the conference on Asian Corporate Recovery,
volume. Bangkok March 31-ApriL 2, and presented in this voLume.
11. See Dasgupta nd Imai (1998). 17. These concLusions are taken from the press conference written
12. There is some controversyabout how bestto calculate reaLinter- by the five chairs of the Asian Corporate Recovery conference,
est rates in a period of rapidLy changing expectations as the ex ante Bangkok, March 31-April 2: Dr. IL Sakong (former Finance Minister of
expected infLation and ex post infLation can differ substantiaLLy. Korea arid President of the Institute for GLobaL Economics), Dr Zeti
13. See Dwor-Frecaut, HaLLward-Driemeier, and CoLaco, 1999, "Asian Akthar Aziz (Deputy Governor of Bank Negara Malaysia), M.R. Chatu
Corporates' Credit Needs and Governance," paper prepared for the con- MongoL Sonakul (Governor of the Bank of ThaiLand), Secretary
ference on Asian Corporate Recovery, Bangkok March 31-April 2, and Benjamii Diokno (Secretary of Budget and Management, the
presented in this voLume. PhiLippines), and Dr. Mari Pangestu (Executive Director, Center for
14. See Javad K. Shirazi, 1999, "The East Asian Crisis: Financial Strategic: and International Studies, Indonesia).
Sector Restructuring-Progress and Issues," paper prepared for the
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Corporates' Views of the
Constraijnits to Recovery
Economic Research Department, Bank of Thailand
he economic and financial crisis that has swiftly and devastatingly
swept through Asia is undoubtedly the steepest and most prolonged
downturn witnessed in recent decades. It has wiped out the economic
gains that have been laboriously accumulated over the years-inevitably result-
ing in widespread social suffering.
More than one year after it first struck Thailand and its contagion effect was
felt throughout Asia, the crisis has now brought to the fore a number of widely
debated issues, especially with regard to the suitability of competing prescrip-
tions for crisis management. Thus far, policy response by most countries has
been characterized by austeriliy measures commonly in the form of fiscal disci-
pline, interest rate hikes, and strengthening financial supervision (although
there have also been alternative approaches, most notably the imposition of
capital controls combined with the easing of positions regarding fiscal and
monetary policy). What is often overlooked in these discussions, however, is
that policy implementation, regardless of methods, has only been based on the
top-down macroeconomic approach. Indeed, while conventional macroeco-
nomic indicators have shown the relative extent to which the crisis has affected
the different countries, a common comparison among the countries in terms of
the microeconomic impacts is yet to be done. Therefore, the surveys conducted
by the national authorities in collaboration with the World Bank are timely and
appropriate, in that they have enabled us for the first time to step back and
gauge the extent of the crisis and its impact on the real sector of the economy.
More important, this bottom-up approach allows us to formulate or fine-tune
policies-though not necessarily implying a preference of one macroeconomic
approach over the other-that could support an early economic recovery.
In this paper, the aim is to identify the impact of the crisis on surveyed firms
in Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand
and assess the relative contributions of the different factors to economic con-
traction. In so doing, it will be possible to identify the major constraints that
21
these firms perceive to be hampering their recovery, and declines since the onset of the regional crisis in 1997.
draw policy recommendations accordingly. The proportion was highest in Indonesia (76.3 percent),
As the details collected from the surveys are quite followed by Thailand (73.1 percent), Malaysia (69.6
extensive and voluminous, and have many combina- percent), the Philippines (68.7 percent), and Korea
tions of dimensions and breakdowns, this paper will (67.3 percent) (see table 2.1).
attempt to highlight only the salient points and features In terms of the magnitude of the decline in capacity
of the firms in the five countries. It is structured to utilization, it was observed that the decline during
answer three basic questions: what happened, why it 1996-1998 was most severe in Indonesia (reduction of
happened, and how it can be solved. Specifically, the capacity utilization by 20.8 percentage points), fol-
paper is structured as follows: The next section looks at lowed by Thailand (17.6 percentage points), Malaysia
the impact of the crisis on the firms' performance, par- (15.6 percentage points), Korea (12.7 percentage
ticularly in terms of capacity utilization, export perfor- points), and the Philippines (9 percentage points). The
mance, and expansion plans. This is followed by a lowest level of capacity utilization in the first half of
section that will identify the reasons for the worsened 1998 was found in Indonesia (at 59.2 percent) and
performance, and another section that outlines the fac- highest in Korea (at 72.1 percent). Corresponding to
tors perceived to be the major constraints to the firms' the fact that Thailand was the first country to experi-
recovery, and collates and synthesizes the entire paper ence the crisis, Thai firms experienced a sharp decline
with the relevant policy recommendations. The final during the first and second half of 1997. Interestingly,
section provides concluding remarks. Indonesia suffered a marginally greater fall in 1997. For
the first half of 1998, Korea saw the highest drop in
Impact of the crisis on the surveyed capacity utilization rate, followed by Indonesia,
firms' performance Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand (see table 2.2).
The largest drop appeared most common in the auto
Prior to identifying the relative importance of the vari- parts and electronics industries (see table 2.3).
ous causes of the economic downturn, it is necessary to As for the capacity utilization levels of exporters, it is
illustrate the impact of the crisis on the firms' perfor- not surprising to note that they were generally higher
mance. In this regard, issues relating to capacity utiliza- than those of nonexporters (see table 2.4). Slectors in
tion, export performance, and expansion plans will be which exporters experienced the smallest decline in
assessed. capacity utilization were found in the garment and tex-
tiles, and food industries. Alternatively, output decline
Capacity utilization of exporters-a concept that is different Irom but
related to capacity utilization-appeared most com-
It was observed that about 71 percent of all the firms mon in the auto parts sector, with over 90 percent of
surveyed in the five countries had experienced output both exporters and nonexporters of auto parts in
TABLE 2.1
The firms: a profile
(percent)
Output since July 1997 Export status Liquidity Partnership
Country Decline Not decline Exporter Nonexporter Problems No problem Foreign Domestic None
Indonesia 76.3 23.7 36.0 64.0 34.8 65.2 11.9 25.6 62.5
Korea 67.3 32.7 74.8 25.2 48.2 51.8 13.2 4.5 82.3
MaLaysia 69.6 30.4 47.6 52.4 25.3 74.7 1.5 3.4 95.2
Philippines 68.7 31.3 52.0 48.0 23.3 76.7 5.5 2.8 91.7
Thailand 73.1 27.0 56.8 43.3 55.8 44.2 7.6 5.4 87.0
Total 71.0 29.0 54.0 46.0 37.9 62.1 8.2 8.9 82.9
Source: World Bank, Firm-Level Survey.
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TABLE 2.2
Capacity utilization levels of the five countries
(percent)
Capacity utilization
1996 1997 1998 1996-1998 HI
Country First half Second half First half
Indonesia 80.0 74.5 66.2 59.2 20.8
Korea 84.8 84.3 30.9 72.2 12.7
Malaysia 81.9 78.5 72.9 66.3 15.6
PhiLippines 77.7 75.1 73.3 68.8 8.9
ThaiLand 79.4 71.4 66.0 61.8 17.6
Average 81.1 77.2 72.1 65.7 15.4
Source: World Bank, Firm-Level Survey.
TABLE 2.3 increasing rate of utilization (see table 2.5). Exporters
SectoraL breakdown of capacity utiLization: particularly seemed to have a more positive view than
1997-1998 Hi domestic producers. The most pessimistic seemed to be
(percentage points) the Malaysian corporates, with as high as 41.4 percent
Capacity utilization expecting a decline, followed by Indonesia, Thailand,
Sectors decline during 1997-98 HI and thte Philippines. In terms of sectoral breakdown,
Auto parts -21.7 electronics and electrical machinery, particularly in
ELectronics -13.0 Indonesia and Malaysia, were exceptionally pes-
Chemical -10.7
Garment and textiLes -9.3 simistic, with 45 percent and 50 percent, respectively,
Food -8.4 predicting that their capacity utilization would fall.
Source: WorLd Bank, Firm-Level Survey. This contrasts with Korea, where more electronics firms
were optimistic than pessimistic. The auto parts indus-
try, having suffered the most dramatic decline, is now
Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand experiencing output the sector that is most optimistic about reversing its
declines. The smallest proportion of exporters facing position and increasing capacity utilization. Overall,
output declines were again exporters of garments, tex- firms in Korea and the Philippines seemed to be the
tiles, and food. most optimistic, with over 70 percent of all firms
As regards prospects for capacity utilization over the expecting stable or increasing capacity utilization rates
next six months, one-quarter of the firms expected an over the next six months.
TABLE 2.4
Capacity utilization Levels of exporters and nonexporters
(percent)
1996 1997: First half 1997: Second half 1998: First half
Country Nonexporter Exporter Nonexporter Exporter Nonexporter Exporter Nonexporter Exporter
Indonesia 80.8 79.3 75.2 74.9 65.0 68.5 56.6 65.1
Korea 85.1 84.8 84.2 84.5 79.6 81.3 68.5 73.7
Malaysia 81.8 82.0 77.7 79.4 70.6 75.5 63.9 68.9
PhiLippines 76.6 78.8 73.3 76.8 70.0 76.2 64.8 72.4
ThaiLand 79.3 79.7 68.5 73.8 60.7 70.0 54.9 66.7
Average 80.7 81.6 75.6 79.0 68.4 75.5 61.0 70.0
Source: World Bank, Firm-Level Survey.
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TABLE 2.5 the most commonly cited magnitude for both the
Expectations of capacity utiUization over the next improved and worsened performance was in the range
six months of 10-25 percent.
(percent of firms) As for sectoral breakdown, a number of respondents
Expectations of capacity utilization in the Thai auto parts industry noted that their exports
over the next 6 months had dropped from 47 percent in 1997 to only 37 per-
Country Worsened Same Improved cent in 1998. The garment and textiles sector in
Indonesia 36.9 47.3 15.9 Thailand reported improved export performance (47
Korea 28.7 35.5 35.9 percent claimed an increase during 1996-97 and 49
MaPaysia [425. 47.9 27.0 percent claimed an increase during 1997-98), while
Thailand 36.2 41.5 22.3 those in Malaysia experienced quite a sharp (Irop (66
Average 34.1 41.5 24.4 percent claimed an increase during 1996-97 but only
Source: WorLd Bank, Firm-Level Survey. 56 percent claimed an increase during 1997-9 8).
In terms of prospects for export performanrce this
Export performance year, proportionately more exporters expected their
exports to increase (43 percent of exporters) than
Approximately 54 percent of the firms surveyed were decrease (24 percent) or remain the same in 1999 (33
exporters but questions on export performance were percent). The average for Korean exporters was some-
only provided to firms in Korea, Malaysia, and what higher at about 50 percent for those with high
Thailand. For these countries, about half of the expectations, but lower at only 39 percent and 37 per-
exporters claimed that their exports had increased dur- cent for Malaysian and Thai exporters. Overall, auto
ing 1996-97 and 1997-98, although slightly larger pro- parts exporters were most optimistic about their future
portions claimed improved performance during prospects.
1996-97 than 1997-98 (54.8 percent against 50.7 per- In the questionnaires, all exporters were also asked to
cent of exporters for the two respective periods). report the reasons for both their improved and declined
Improved performance was most common for Korean export performance in volume terms in 1998 as com-
exporters. Interestingly, a significant proportion of pared with 1997. The exporters in Korea, Malaysia,
exporters remained (28.9 percent and 34.7 percent for and Thailand thus cited the different reasons both for
the two periods) who noted that their performance had their improved and worsened performance, not neces-
declined during 1996-97 and 1997-98, respectively, sarily claiming that their overall performance had fallen
with Thai exporters having the most common instances into one or the other category.
of worsened performance for 1996-97 (32.2 percent) For those with worsened export performance, the
and Malaysia for 1997-98 (41.7 percent) (see table most relevant contributing factor to the decline was
2.6). In terms of the magnitude of export performance, poor demand. Unstable conditions in the export market,
TABLE 2.6
Export performance
(percent of exporters)
Performance in 1997 Performance in the first half of 1998 Expected performance in '999
Country Improved Worsened Some Improved Worsened Same Improved Worsened Some
Korea 64.0 25.9 10.1 59.9 29.4 10.7 49.7 21.6 28.8
MaLaysia 47.4 30.4 22.2 42.5 41.7 15.8 38.6 25.4 36.0
ThaiLand 47.9 32.2 19.9 44.3 35.6 20.1 37.4 26.4 36.2
Average 54.8 28.9 16.3 50.7 34.7 14.7 43.0 24.0 33.0
Source: World Bank, Firm-LeveL Survey.
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lack of price competitiveness, and exchange rate volatil- By analyzing the impact of the crisis on the firms' per-
ity were also cited as significant contributing factors. formance in terms of capacity utilization, export per-
Meanwhile, inferior product design, and to a lesser formance, and expansion plans, two important findings
extent, credit constraints, were regarded as the least rel- have been illustrated. First, in line with the general
evant (details also shown later in table 2.13). expectations, there is consistent evidence throughout all
As regards improved export performance, the five countries that the crisis has severely affected capac-
exchange rate effect and price competitiveness were ity utilization levels. The most depressed sectors seemed
universally cited as the most important factors con- to be auto parts and electronics. The former particu-
tributing to the improvement, while low dependence on larly seemed to be a serious concern for exporters in
imported inputs was the least relevant. It should be Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand, as it probably reflected
noted that the average rating (on a scale from 1 to 5, the limited capacity of the export markets to absorb the
with 5 being an extremely important factor) was highest excess domestic supply, as well as the regional slump in
for Malaysia (3.91) and lowest for Thailand (2.98). This demand for automobiles. Secondly, a notable number
implied that the mentioned factors were most relevant of firrms have indeed reported improved export perfor-
for Malaysian firms and least relevant for Thai firms. mance. Even in the auto parts industry in which capac-
It should also be noted that with questions on capac- ity utilization declined most, a third of the exporters in
ity utilization and export performance being separately Thailand reported having improved export perfor-
asked in the questionnaires, firms with lower capacity mance. Nevertheless, there are two important features
utilization could still give reasons for improved export questioning the widespread perception that exporters
performance if the volume of their exports, not output, represent the major stimulus to economic recovery. The
had increased, thus reflecting their increasing reliance first is that only half of all exporters noted improved
on the export market. export performance despite large currency deprecia-
tions in 1997. In addition, poor demand (the reason
Expansion plans cited as the most relevant for the worsened perfor-
mance) is likely to persist given the regional turmoil-
The last impact of the crisis to be addressed concerns while the exchange rate effect and price competitiveness
expansion plans: How have plans for expansion (the factors previously driving export performance) are
changed with the onset of the crisis and what are the likely to be less supportive as currencies stabilize and
expectations over the next six months? strengthen. Therefore, the outlook for export perfor-
As expected, plans for expansion have been continu- mance does not necessarily support optimistic expecta-
ously scaled back since the crisis, but the outlook for tions regarding an export-led economic recovery. A
1999 is generally better than 1998. In 1997, 44 percent slight counter-argument to this view is that several
of surveyed firms had said that they considered expan- firms, in fact, thought that they had already turned the
sion, but by 1998 this figure had dropped to 15.4 per- corner This is not to say that some firms had already
cent. It rebounded to 22.2 percent for 1999. Also, most recovered from the crisis, but rather that they had
of the firms without expansion plans before the crisis imprcved expectations of the future direction of the
did not have plans to expand in 1998 or 1999 either. economy-a somewhat positive sign.
Conversely, only half of those firms that planned to
expand before the crisis actually did expand. Reasons for declining performance and
Interestingly, despite the many uncertainties, Indo- constraints to corporate recovery
nesian firms seemed to be the most optimistic compared
with other countries, with 27.2 percent of Indonesian The previous section illustrated that apart from some
corporates expecting to expand in 1999, compared exporters, the performance of the surveyed firms across
with 18.9 percent in Korea, 23.6 percent in Malaysia, countries and sectors has deteriorated since the onset of
25.9 percent in the Philippines, and 15.5 percent in the crisis, while prospects for an export-led recovery
Thailand. remains somewhat questionable. Among the many fac-
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tors, the major reasons cited for the declined perfor- extent to which this had been affected by poor external
mance were reduced demand, credit constraints, and demand. In this regard, the majority of those exporters
other cost- and supply-related factors. Each of these whose exports suffered (79.5 percent in Malaysia, 68.3
will be carefully analyzed in this section to determine percent in Thailand, and 61.8 percent in Korea)
which elements are seen by the firms as constraints to believed that poor demand had significantly affected
their recovery. their export performance.
In addition to looking directly at the role of reduced
Reduced demand and revenue demand on capacity utilization and export: perfor-
mance, it would also be useful to see whether -he firms
The firms' responses confirmed that contraction in were seeking foreign partners as a means of expanding
demand had played a very important role in lowering market access to compensate for the reduced demand.
capacity utilization and export performance. On the whole, however, it appeared that the majority
For domestic demand, the data show that its decline (62.8 percent in Indonesia, 79.3 percent in Korea, 94.8
significantly contributed to a reduction in output for the percent in Malaysia, 92.1 percent in the Philippines,
majority of surveyed firms-but to a much lesser extent and 90.0 percent in Thailand) did not seek foreign part-
in the Philippines than in the other four countries. ners. This finding, therefore, rejects the notion that the
When the firms are further divided into exporters and firms were compelled to seek foreign partners as a
nonexporters, the data indicate that proportionately means to expand overseas market access. Nevertheless,
more nonexporters than exporters considered the for those actually seeking foreign partnership, securing
reduction in domestic demand to be an important rea- access to a foreign market was deemed as the most
son for output decline. important consideration (as expressed by 61.3 percent
In contrast, changes in foreign demand were largely of Indonesian firms, 52.0 percent of Korean firms, 85.7
perceived to have less influence on the firms' output percent of Malaysian firms, 83.3 percent of Philippine
level, particularly in Indonesia (see table 2.7). As firms, and 77.3 percent of Thai firms).
expected, however, a notable proportion of exporters- Apart from having direct and adverse imnacts on
24.3 percent in Korea, 33.8 percent in Malaysia, 37.5 capacity utilization and export performance, the prob-
percent in the Philippines, and 39.9 percent in lem of reduced demand also affected revenue. This
Thailand-regarded the decline in foreign demand to would inevitably have important implications on liqui-
have significantly contributed to lowering their capac- dity and a host of other factors. To confirm this point,
ity utilization. of those firms experiencing inadequate licquidity-
In terms of export performance, responses from which surprisingly amounted to only 37.9 percent of all
Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand elaborated on the firms-about three-quarters (74.5 percent) cited lower
TABLE 2.7
Impact of reduced emand on output
(percent of firms with reduction in output)
Reduction i  domestic demand Reduction i  foreign demand
Country None Limited Significant None Limited Significant
Indonesia 12.3 27.8 60.0 66.4 18.8 14.8
Korea 5.0 11.4 83.7 28.2 37.1 34.7
MaLaysia 9.9 19.5 70.6 48.4 21.2 30.4
Philippines 27.6 23.4 49.0 52.9 16.1 31.0
Thaitand 11.5 17.9 70.5 35.4 27.0 37.6
Average 12.1 19.9 67.9 46.4 24.4 29.2
Note: The surveyed firms were asked in the questionnaires to give ratings on a scale from 1 to 5. "None" refers to a rating of 1, meaning that the factor had no relevance to
the question being asked. "Limited" refers to the ratings of 2 and 3, meaning that the factor had some, but limited, relevance. "Significant" refers to the rating.; of 4 and 5,
at which point the factor's degree of reLevancy was highest.
Source: Wortd Bank, Firm-LeveL Survey.
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TABLE 2.8 than exporters throughout, and most exporters (over
Impact of lower revenue on liquidity 70 percent, except in Korea and Thailand) on average
(percent of firms with liquidity probLems) had adequate liquidity to finance production. The
Impact of lower revenue major departure from this trend was observed in Korea
Country None Limited Significant and Thailand, where a much smaller proportion of
Indonesia 12.5 25.0 62.5 exporters had adequate liquidity (54.6 percent and 47.2
Korea 5.0 17.6 77.4 percent, respectively). If exporters are taken to be the
MaLaysia 10.2 12.6 77.2 engine of economic recovery, then this finding high-
Philippines 15.4 17.1 67.5
Thailand 5.8 13.2 81.0 lights the urgent need to address their liquidity prob-
Average 8.4 17.2 74.5 lems. This does not necessarily mean that nonexporters
Source: World Bank, Firm-Level Survey. were better off than exporters in absolute terms, how-
ever. Instead, the lack of liquidity for exporters can be
revenue as a significant contributing factor. The aver- interpreted such that they had demand but not enough
age was even higher for respondents in Thailand (81.0 cash flow to produce, while nonexporters faced much
percent) and surprisingly lowest in Indonesia (62.5 per- more pressing concerns, for example, from the reduced
cent) (see table 2.8). Meanwhile, lower sales were more demand than inadequate liquidity (see table 2.9).
likely to cause a liquidity shortage among nonexporters Alternatively, in terms of country and sector break-
than exporters, apart from the Philippines. downs, the most common instances of liquidity-con-
In all, therefore, it appeared that demand, and thus strained firms in Indonesia were domestic producers of
revenue considerations, were the overriding factors in garments and textiles. In Korea and Malaysia, domestic
driving down capacitv utilization and export perfor- producers of auto parts consistently reported the prob-
mance, as well as contributing to liquidity problems. lem, while the most common instances in the
Philip pines were reported by domestic producers of tex-
Liquidity and the credit crunch tiles, and in Thailand by producers of garments, tex-
tiles, and auto parts.
The second major reason for the decline in capacity uti- Having determined that liquidity problems existed,
lization is associated with liquidity and credit consider- the remaining issue to be evaluated is the conventional
ations. Liquidity and credit are two different perception that liquidity and credit shortages are both
notions-the former generally refers to a firm's cash reasons for the decline in performance and a constraint
flow, which is partially but not completely influenced to recovery. Specifically, there are four questions to be
by credit. In this section we will first determine, based addressed-to what extent credit shortage has affected
on exporting status, the extent of the liquidity problems capacity utilization, how the liquidity shortage was dri-
in different countries and in different sectors of indus- ven by a credit crunch, why the problem with credit
tries. Then we will discuss the degree to which the lack access has prompted the search for partners, and how
of credit contributed to liquidity problems and other credit constraints have affected export performance.
related issues.
Although there is certain evidence of inadequate liq- -
uidity among firms in the five countries, the extent of TABLE 2.9Problems of inadequate liquidity
the problem may not be as severe or widespread as (percent of exportirg firms, or of nonexporting firms)
some might have expected. As commented above, a lit-
tle over one-third (37.9 percent) of the surveyed firms Exporters Nonexporters
reported experiencing inadequate liquidity. Thailand Country Problem No problem Problem No problem
was the country with the largest proportion of firms Indonesia 27.2 72.8 40.4 59.7
facing the problem (56.8 percent), followed by Korea Korea 45.4 54.6 56.8 43.2
(48.2 percent), Indonesia (34.8 percent), Malaysia Malaysiai 20.4 79.6 29.7 70.3Philippines 19.7 80.3 27.2 72.8(25.3 percent), and the Philippines (23.2 percent). In ThaiLand 52.9 47.2 59.9 40.1
addition, this was more common among nonexporters Source: World Bank, Firm-Level Survey.
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Cost and availability of credit as causes of the decline than nonexporters, thus confining the economic recov-
in capacity utilization. The surveyed firms were asked ery prospects.
to give ratings to the various factors that they perceived High interest rates per se were not unanimously per-
to have contributed to the decline in their capacity uti- ceived to be a significant cause of the decline: about 30
lization. Among the factors relating to the cost and percent of all respondents rejected it as a factor. The
availability of credit are supplier credit, credit for work- finding here, though not rejecting the general wisdom,
ing capital, credit for expansion, high interest rates, and is far less conclusive about the problem of high interest
heavy debt burden. rates. The country-wide differences also bring out some
First of all, based on the empirical cvidence, the quite interesting features. A large proportion of
notion that insufficient credit extension by suppliers Malaysian (39.1 percent) and Indonesian (34.2 percent)
had any contribution to the decline in capacity utiliza- firms reported that high interest rates had nc adverse
tion was rejected. consequences on their capacity utilization, while con-
Likewise, insufficient credit for working capital at versely, almost half (48.9 percent) of all respondents
prevailing interest rates was largely rejected as the rea- suggested that high interest rates had significantly con-
son. However, there remained a notable proportion of tributed to it. This proportion was over one-half for the
firms in the Philippines (35.8 percent) and Thailand Philippines (55.5 percent), Thailand (53.7 percent), and
(36.0 percent), suggesting that this factor had signifi- Indonesia (51.3 percent)-but merely 40.5 percent in
cantly contributed to the decline of capacity utilization. Malaysia. Unfortunately, there was again a consistent,
A more worrying feature is the breakdown in exports- disturbing pattern among exporters: a higher propor-
as there was a higher proportion of exporters than non- tion of exporters than nonexporters observed that high
exporters in Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand that interest rates had caused their capacity utilization to
regarded the lack of working credit as a significant fall, and the reverse proportion was observed for those
cause of the drop. This meant that those few firms in noting that high interest rates had no contribution. A
Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand facing significant comfort that could be derived from this finding is that
problems associated with access to working credit were interest rate levels have come down significartly from
largely exporters. their previous levels, thus the recovery prospects, espe-
There was also little evidence that the insufficiency of cially for exporters, should be somewhat more favorable.
credit for expansion had contributed to the decline in Finally, with regard to debt burden, there is again no
capacity utilization or output. (It should be noted that conclusive evidence that this is an influence in the
technically an increase in credit for expansion would decline by way of leaving insufficient internal funds.
initially raise capacity, thus lowering capacity utiliza- Responses to this question were only available in
tion-defined as output per capacitv. Therefore, had Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand. Over one-third (36.9
there been insufficient credit for expansion, we would percent) of the firms whose output had declined
have been able to explain the decline in capacity utiliza- rejected the notion that heavy debt burden had left
tion entirely by the reduction in output.) Only 13.1 per- insufficient internal funds and thus caused capacity uti-
cent of the firms said that credit for expansion was a lization to fall, while almost another third (32.1 per-
severe constraint. This observation implies that the sup- cent) regarded it as having some relevance. Definite
ply of credit at prevailing interest rates was not really a affirmation was highest from Thai firms at 40.5 percent
concern. The relevancy of this factor in determining and lowest from Indonesian firms at 21.4 percent.
capacity utilization was highest in the Philippines and Again, relatively more exporters were affected by the
lowest in Korea. Interestingly, however, in all countries debt burden than nonexporters.
proportionately more exporters than nonexporters In summary, only certain aspects of cost and avail-
regarded availability of expansion credit as a significant ability of credit were regarded as important factors in
contributing factor. This finding supports the previous determining the level of capacity utilization, and the most
view that the lack of expansion credit was unfortu- relevant was deemed to be high interest rates. Through-
nately a more relevant contributing factor for exporters out these breakdowns, Indonesian firms consistently
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regarded the various credit considerations as unimpor- lation of any kind, while another 36.9 percent said that
tant, while those affected by credit considerations in all it had had only a limited or moderate impact. As with
countries were proportionately more often exporters the previous findings, it appeared that Indonesia was
than nonexporters. However, it should be emphasized only partially affected by supplier credit, while Thailand
that these observations only illustrate the link between and the Philippines were most affected. Moreover, there
credit and capacity utilization. Therefore, firms having is a consistent pattern emerging in Indonesia, Malaysia,
lower capacity utilization may not necessarily be driven and the Philippines that exporters were proportionately
by credit considerations and, vice versa, firms with more affected in terms of being liquidity-constrained by
insufficient credit may not have lower capacity utiliza- insufficient supplier credit than nonexporters. This is
tion. In other words, problems associated with credit- indeed a worrying finding although it does not neces-
whether high interest rates or availability of sarily mean that the absolute magnitude of the problem
credit-extend far beyond the realms of capacity utiliza- is greater for exporters.
tion; for example, there are also profitability and liquid- Finally, there is significant evidence that the burden of
ity dimensions, which this section alone cannot cover, debt servicing had left the firms with insufficient inter-
Insufficient credit as a cause of inadequate liquidity. nal funds and was deemed as a major cause of liquidity
The next issue to be discussed is whether inadequate liq- constraint. On average, only 17.0 percent of firms with
uidity was caused by insufficient credit and whether or inadecuate liquidity said that the burden of debt servic-
not there existed a credit crunch; that is, at current ing had no meaningful significance, while over one-half
interest rates, whether credit is being rationed and (52.1 xercent) confirmed that it had had a notable or
viable projects go unfunded. A reduction in the supply major impact on liquidity. Surveyed firms from
of credit alone is not sufficient evidence of a credit Indonesia and the Philippines did not provide responses
crunch. In the questionnaires, credit considerations for this question. The problem was most severe among
included loans for working capital, supplier credit, and Thai firms as over half of those with inadequate liquid-
the burden of servicing outstanding debt as it is affected ity (56.3 percent) regarded the burden of debt servicing
by interest rate levels. as an extremely important factor in contributing to
Although a decline in internal revenue that is attrib- their liquidity problems. The breakdown of exporting
utable to depressed demand was the primary source of status once again reveals that those affected by the bur-
inadequate liquidity reported by the firms, there is suf- den of debt servicing in Malaysia, Korea, and Thailand
ficient evidence that the shortage of loans for working were more likely to be exporters. One point to note here
capital was also a contributing factor, as about half is that the high burden of debt servicing is either caused
(50.9 percent) of them considered it important. When by the high level of indebtedness or interest rates. It
surveyed firms regarded insufficient loans for working would have, therefore, been interesting to see the
capital as an important factor for their inadequate liq- responses from the firms on their ability to service loan
uidity, Indonesian firms ranked lowest (39.0 percent), payments at current interest rates, as this would have
implying that Indonesia was least affected, and Thailand determined the extent to which the high burden of debt
highest at 61.7 percent. Meanwhile, proportionately servicing was driven by high interest rates.
more exporters than nonexporters in all countries Overall, there is supportive evidence of inadequate
except Thailand attributed insufficient loans for work- liquidity and insufficient supply of credit. In particular,
ing capital as a cause of their liquidity problems, thus there is evidently a close association between inade-
reinforcing the views expressed in the previous findings. quate liquidity, and the burden of debt servicing and
In terms of supplier credit, there is no conclusive evi- loans for working capital. Thus, the first criterion for a
dence that this had significantly contributed to the credit crunch has been met, that there is insufficient
firms' liquidity problems. Although about one-third supply of credit. Concerning the second and most
(33.2 percent) of the firms confirmed that it had had a important criterion, however, it is not possible to
notable or maj or impact on liquidity, over a quarter deduce from the survey results that credit is being
(29.9 percent) conversely said that there was no corre- rationed at the prevailing interest rates.
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Problems with credit access as a cause of the firms' Although there is little accuracy in these numbers-
seeking partners. In this subsection, the question of since relatively few firms were seeking foreign part-
why firms wanted to seek partnership will be addressed. ners-it should be noted that Indonesia, despite being
If evidence suggests that firms were compelled to follow the country with the largest proportion of firms seeking
this path in order to secure alternative access to credit, partners, consistently did not consider access to credit
then it further supports the view that there is inadequate an important reason. In general, however, it appeared
supply of domestic credit. that credit considerations played a significant role in
Overall, firms seeking partners were most common inducing firms to seek partnership, thus supporting fur-
among Indonesian firms (38.1 percent) and least com- ther the view that there was insufficient domestic
mon in Malaysia (6.1 percent), and were proportionately credit-though the evidence is still not strong enough to
more common among exporters than nonexporters. conclude that thcre was a credit crunch.
When analyzed by sector, the most common instances The role of credit constraints in hampering export
of the search for partners were reported by the performance. The last issue to be addressed concerning
exporters of food (57.1 percent) and garments and tex- credit constraints is how these have affected export per-
tiles (42.3 percent) in Indonesia. Meanwhile, the least formance. This is a different issue from inadequate liq-
common instances varied among sectors of different uidity that was discussed earlier; this question specifically
countries. In terms of the perceived contributing fac- addresses the issue of credit constraints. In this regard,
tors, foreign market, technology, supplier relationship, there appears to be no conclusive evidence to suggest
and access to working and expansion credit, were that credit constraint was the reason for any decline in
regarded as the most important considerations for the export performance in Korea and Thailand during
firms in their search for partners, while equity partici- 1997-98 (only Korean and Thai firms provided
pation was the least relevant. answers to this question). While about a quarter (23.7
More specifically, for those firms seeking foreign percent) of the firms confirmed that it had had a notable
partners, it appeared that access to credit for working or major influence on their export performance, almost
capital was an important consideration. On average, one-third (29.7 percent) said that it had had no contri-
about 60 percent of those looking for foreign partners bution and the rest (46.6 percent) said that it had had
confirmed that this had had a notable or major influ- only a limited or moderate influence. Nevertheless,
ence on their search. Interestingly, a large proportion of quite a large number of Thai firms (40 percenrt) with
the firms in Indonesia (26.1 percent) said that their worsened export performance suggested that the prob-
search was not driven by this consideration, while the lem was significantly driven by the problem of credit
issue was most important for the firms in Malaysia constraint.
(83.3 percent), followed by the Philippines (72.0 per- By looking at the various aspects of credit, it has been
cent), Thailand (68.9 percent), Korea (62.4 percent), demonstrated that there was indeed an insufficient sup-
and Indonesia (45.5 percent). ply of credit, which contributed to liquidity problems
Meanwhile, there was also supportive evidence to and subsequently compelled the firms to seek part-
suggest that access to credit for expansion was a signif- ners-though evidently the issue was not regarded as a
icant cause for the firms' search for foreign partners. On major cause of the decline in capacity utilization. The
average, 57.2 percent of the firms confirmed that it had widely perceived problem of a credit crunch, which can
had a notable or major influence on their search. Again, neither be confirmed nor rejected by the survey, may in
Indonesia alone was the home country for half (21 out fact have been just a problem caused by the firrns' being
of 42) of those firms saying that their search was not unable or unqualified to secure financing in the first
driven by expansion credit considerations. place; this is different from the concept of a credit
The evidence is far less conclusive for equity partici- crunch in which viable firms go unfunded. Had a direct
pation, since 25.9 percent said that it had had no con- question been asked about the nature of creclit avail-
tribution, and the remaining was equally divided ability at current interest rates and not merely about its
between those saying that it had had either a moderate impact, the notion of a credit crunch could t'hen have
influence, or significant influence. been clearly identified. Alternatively, given that the
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firms' viability concept cannot be readily identified exporters than nonexporters in Korea and Malaysia
from the survey results-as responses were only pro- said that the problem of increased labor costs was a
vided by firms whose output had declined-it would cause Df the decline, implying that these exporters were
have also been interesting to see the same responses of affected more than a proportional distribution between
firms whose output had increased, since this would them and nonexporters would have dictated. The prob-
have represented a proxy for the firms' viability. If the eim may not merely be a new factor, but one that has in
firms complained that they had been constrained from fact p rsisted unidentified long before the crisis, and
obtaining credit despite their increased output, the story that was only seriously felt by the firms when economic
of a credit crunch would then have been confirmed. activities contracted.
Thiud, there was significant evidence to suggest that
Costs and supply considerations shortages of raw materials were not a cause of the
decline in the firms' capacity utilization. The majority
It is generally perceived that among many factors, high of the firms (40.7 percent) confirmed that the issue had
costs associated with currency depreciation and interest no relevance to the decline and only 12.0 percent said
rates have lowered the firms' performance. This section, that it was a severe constraint.
therefore, attempts to evaluate this supposition by look- As with shortage of raw materials, disruption of sup-
ing at the various aspects of costs. plies was not generally perceived to be a cause, as almost
The contribution of increased costs to the decline in half (47.9 percent) of the represented firms revealed
output. In addition to the many factors mentioned ear- that it had no relevance and only 7.8 percent said that
lier, this subsection attempts to evaluate the extent to it was a severe constraint.
which the decline in capacity utilization was caused by On the whole, therefore, it appeared that only cur-
the different aspects of costs-namely, currency depre- rency depreciation and, to a somewhat lesser extent,
ciation, labor costs, raw material shortage, and disrup- labor costs, were contributing factors in the decline of
tion in supplies. capacity utilization.
First, increased costs of imported inputs arising from Input costs as a cause of inadequate liquidity. For
currency depreciation seems to have played a major role those firms that experienced liquidity problems,
in curtailing capacity utilization. On average, almost increased input costs seem to have played a significant
two-thirds (60.4 percent) of the firms confirmed that contributing role (firms in the Philippines did not pro-
the issue had had a notable or major impact and vide answers to this question). While very few firms (7.2
another 23.5 percent said that it had had a limited or percent) said that the issue had no relevance, about two-
moderate impact. In fact, over two-thirds of the sur- thirds (66.4 percent) believed that increased input costs
veyed firms in Indonesia (67.6 percent), Philippines had notably affected their liquidity. Thailand appeared
(70.8 percent), and Thailand (71.5 percent) named the to be hardest-hit by the problem as two-thirds of the
problem as a contributing factor. A breakdown in surveyed firms (66.2 percent) complained that
exporting status also reveals that exporters in Malaysia increa;ed input costs had severely hampered their liq-
experienced proportionately greater difficulties from uidity, while only 16.2 percent in Korea, 24.7 percent in
currency depreciation than nonexporters. This may be Indonesia, and 52.9 percent in Malaysia agreed.
attributable to the fact that exporters in Malaysia are Access to foreign inputs as a cause of the search for
relatively more dependent on imported inputs than foreign partners. In an uncertain economic environ-
exporters elsewhere. ment, forming a foreign partnership can help a great
Second, with regard to increased labor costs, although deal in securing the much-needed foreign inputs. This
the firms did not unanimously perceive this issue to be supply consideration is one way of reducing uncertainty
a cause of the decline in their capacity utilization, a and costs.
notable 35.4 percent of Thai firms responded that it had Indeed, there was some supporting evidence that the
had very significant implications on their capacity uti- reasor for seeking foreign partners was attributable to
lization. In addition, a slightly higher proportion of supplier relationship. Over half (57.0 percent) of the
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respondents commented that the supplier relationship to output decline, worsened export performance, inad-
was a notable or serious reason driving their search for equate liquidity, and the search for foreign partners.
a foreign partner.
There was much more evidence in support of new Constraints to recovery and poLicy
technology as the reason behind the search for foreign recommendations
partners-only 6.5 percent (18 of the 278 firms) that
were seeking foreign partners said that it had no rele- This paper has been structured so as to identify the rea-
vance. Large percentages of the firms seeking foreign sons for the decline in capacity utilization and export
partners in the Philippines (84.6 percent), Malaysia performance, which are inevitably related to three con-
(83.3 percent), and Thailand (82.2 percent) cited access siderations-(a) the reduction in demand and revenue;
to new technology as the overriding motivation. (b) problems associated with liquidity and credit con-
Management expertise appears to have been another straints; and (c) other cost and supply factors. In so
important consideration in the search for foreign part- doing, bottom-up policy formulations can be devised to
ners-only 13.4 percent of the firms seeking foreign address specific areas that the firms regard as the major
partners rejected that it had any relevance. Again, a constraints to corporate recovery.
great majority of the firms seeking foreign partners in This section will first attempt to identify these major
Malaysia (75.0 percent) and Thailand (73.3 percent) constraints by reexamining the previous findings look-
cited access to management expertise as the overriding ing from a slightly different perspective. Specifically, we
reason, while, as expected, Korean firms ranked lowest will rank the reasons cited for the firms' output decline,
at 33.7 percent. problems with liquidity, search for partnership, and
Overall, therefore, access to foreign inputs seems to worsened export performance, and based on the out-
have played an important role among Thai and come give policy recommendations.
Malaysian firms in establishing foreign partnership.
Input costs as possible factors hampering export per- Constraints to recovery
formance. In addition to demand and credit considera-
tions, which we looked at earlier, cost and supply The firms were asked in the questionnaires to give rat-
considerations may have also contributed to the wors- ings to the eleven factors that might have contributed to
ened export performance in 1998. their decline in capacity utilization. The most irmportant
Price competitiveness seems to have been a factor, constraints can, therefore, be interpreted as thc se press-
although only firms in Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand ing factors with average ratings of above 3 (on a scale
provided responses to this question. A large proportion from 1 to 5), which were domestic demand (3.9),
of Thai exporters that experienced poor export perfor- increased input costs arising from currency deprecia-
mance (61 out of 96 firms, or 63.5 percent) cited price tion (3.6), and high interest rates (3.1). (See table 2.10.)
competitiveness as a notable or significant reason. Regarding problems with liquidity, lower revenue
Likewise, there is evidence in support of high costs of (4.1), high input costs (3.8), burden of servicing debt
imported inputs and unstable conditions in export (3.4), and insufficient loans for working capital (3.3)
market as reasons for poor export performance. were regarded as the most significant contributing fac-
Interestingly, almost three-quarters of those exporters tors (see table 2.11).
experiencing poor export performance in Thailand As regards the search for a new partner, the most
(70.1 percent) cited unstable conditions as a notable or important factors (those exceeding 3.5) driving firms to
significant reason. seek a new partner appeared to be foreign market (3.6),
The only area in which there appears to be no con- technology (3.5), supplier relationship (3.5), and work-
nection with poor export performance was inferior ing credit (3.5) considerations (see table 2.12).
product design, although only firms in Korea and Finally, the most important factors (those exceeding
Malaysia provided responses to this question. 3.0) that contributed to the worsened export perfor-
Suffice it to say that in line with general expectations, mance were poor demand (4.0), unstable markets (3.6),
the various elements of costs have evidently contributed
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TABLE 2.10
Ratings of factors perceived by the firms as causes of output decline
Indonesia 3.5 3.6 3.1 2.6 - 2.1 1.8 2.5 2.2 1.8 2.1
Korea 4.4 2.9 3.1 2.1 2.3 2.6 2.8 2.3 2.1 2.1 2.1
MaLaysia 4.0 3.5 2.8 2.5 2.6 2.4 2.5 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.0
PhiLippines 3.2 3.9 3.4 3.3 - 2.7 2.4 2.6 2.4 2.3 2.3
Thailand 4.0 4.0 3.4 3.4 2.9 2.7 2.8 2.3 2.2 2.4 2.1
Average 3.9 3.6 3.1 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.1
-. Not availabLe.
Source: WorLd Bank, Firm-Level Survey.
TABLE 2.11
Ratings of factors perceived by the firms as causes of inadeiquate liquidity
Country Burden oF Insufficient Insufficient
Lower evenue Input costs servicing debt working credit supplier credit
Indonesia 3.5 3.7 - 2.9 2.5
Korea 4.2 3.4 3.1 3.3 2.5
Malaysia 4.2 4.1 3.3 3.4 3.0
PhiLippines 3.8 - - 3.3 2.8
ThaiLand 4.4 4.3 3.9 3.7 3.2
Average 4.1 3.8 3.4 3.3 2.8
-. Not availabLe.
Source: WorLd Bank, Firm-Level Survey.
TABLE 2.12
Ratings of factors for the search of a new partner
Country Foreign Suppdier Working Lpcal Expansion Equity
market Technology relationship credit market credit Monogement participation
Indonesia 3.2 3.1 3.3 3.0 3.5 3.0 3.1 2.8
Korea 4.0 3.9 3.9 3.7 - 3.3 2.9 2.5
Malaysia 4.0 3.9 3.5 4.3 - 4.3 3.3 3.8
PhiLippines 3.9 4.0 3.3 4.1 3.0 4.1 - 3.7
ThaiLand 4.0 4.0 3.8 4.0 - 3.3 3.7 3.3
Average 3.6 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.4 3.3 3.1 3.0
-. Not avaiLabLe.
Source: World Bank, Firm-Level Survey.
lack of price competitiveness (3.5) and high cost of Pokiy Recommendations
imported inputs (3.3) (see table 2.13).
These simple illustrations show that the perceived Based on the above findings, general policy recommen-
major constraints to recovery, in order of importance, dations can be deduced as follows. First and foremost,
were invariably associated with (a) the lower demand it is most crucial to boost domestic demand in order to
for their products; (b) higher costs; (c) insufficient help kick-start the revival process. The austerity mea-
credit; and (d) other supply considerations. sures t aat have severely depressed demand and squeezed
Corporates' Views of the Constraints to Recovery 33
TABLE 2.13
Ratings of factors for the worsened export performance
Country Poor demand Unstable markets Price competitiveness Imported inputs Credit constraints Design
Korea 3.7 3.6 3.3 2.7 2.3 2.0
MaLaysia 4.3 3.3 3.5 3.6 0.0 2.7
ThaiLand 3.9 4.0 3.8 3.8 3.1 0.0
Average 4.0 3.6 3.5 3.3 2.6 2.3
Source: WorTd Bank, Firm-LeveL Survey.
credit should be adjusted. Lower interest rates, though Conclusions
necessary, may be futile on their own, as consumer
demand is also influenced by other factors such as This paper has both confirmed and rejected the many
employment and income uncertainties, while new bank perceptions surrounding the "whys" and "whzrefores"
lending is likely to be limited by the weak capital bases of the economic crisis. On the one hand, there is clear
and low asset quality. A combination of increased mon- evidence that capacity utilization declined across all
etary and fiscal stimuli, and a relaxation of certain rules countries and sectors of industries, driven largely by the
and regulations relating to consumer expenditure contraction of domestic demand. In addition, the firms'
should significantly help raise domestic demand. export performance was generally in line with the sub-
In terms of credit and liquidity dimensions, additional dued macroeconomic export numbers, with only about
credit facilities should be urgently provided to exporters half of the exporters claiming that their performance in
to help relieve their liquidity positions. This could be volume terms had improved. On the other hand, how-
done through government-owned financial institutions ever, inadequate liquidity was not generally perceived to
such as export-import banks and development banks. be a major problem, and its cause was heavily weighted
The authorities should also actively support the small on the side of the demand for goods rather than the sup-
and medium enterprises as they represent a large part of ply of credit-which indicates an urgent need to boost
the industrial sector. In relation to this, the process of domestic demand. Indeed, there was an insufficient sup-
corporate debt restructuring should be promoted and ply of credit, but it cannot be confirmed that there was
supported by the necessary legal infrastructure, as there technically a credit crunch. Finally, while several of the
appeared to be some evidence that high interest rates surveyed firms held the view that the worst of the crisis
and burden of debt servicing had affected capacity uti- is over, there is also an implied notion that e xporters
lization. may not be able to provide an immediate engine for eco-
Finally, in response to the complaints on cost and sup- nomic recovery, unless certain constraints are removed.
ply factors, the authorities should strive to maintain It must be made clear, though, that views expressed in
currency stability, since this would provide confidence the surveys and the conclusions reached cannot in any
and predictability in the computation of cost and rev- way be interpreted as a judgment of the authorities' pol-
enue-a vital consideration for businesspeople and icy response to the crisis. One must be particularly care-
entrepreneurs. As for longer-term considerations, the ful not to merely draw conclusions from a subjective
authorities should undertake to facilitate the firms' perspective. In other words, it cannot simply be con-
access to management expertise and technology by cluded that the stabilization policy of high interest rates,
increasing investment in education, training, and for example, has failed or even that it has inflicted more
research and development in order to enhance compet- harm than good on the economy by depressing domes-
itiveness and truly reflect labor costs. tic demand, making loans more costly, and increasing
These general recommendations are broadly in line debt servicing costs. In principle, the time dimension
with the current policy directions, but each should be must also be considered and, in doing so, will alter this
further fine-tuned and tailored according to the circum- conclusion considerably. Specifically, as the currencies
stances in each country. have now stabilized and confidence somewhat
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resumed, the authorities should take a proactive role in Note
relieving the painful pressure faced by corporates,
brought on by the abrupt adjustment process. Demand This paper was the resuLt of a joint colLaboration effort undertaken
stimulus and continued restructuring of the economy by Dr. Atchana Waiquamdee, Mr. Soravis Krairiksh, and Dr. Wasana
are necessary measures to promote a recovery. Phongsanarakul of the Economic Research Department, Bank of
ThaiLand.
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Macroeconomic Views
of the East Asian Crisis:
A Comparison
Yoon Je Cho
Changyong Rhee
T The financial crisis has brought unprecedented economic and social
distress to the Asian economies. The average growth rates in
Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, and Thailand had been well above
7 percent during the early 1990s but they dropped dramatically to -13.7, -5.7
and -6.5 percent, respectively in 1998. No one had expected such a severe con-
traction of the Asian economies. Only in the second half of 1998 did the East
Asian countries start to move from the free fall to stabilization. But the recov-
ery has been quite moderate and uneven across countries.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the role of the macroeconomic envi-
ronment in the adjustment prccesses of the East Asian crisis. We first document
the macroeconomic adjustment in the five East Asian countries (Indonesia,
Korea, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines) and contrast the degree to
which each country has been affected by macroeconomic constraints. Based on
the observation of what has occurred so far, we attempt to identify which fac-
tors contributed most to such a severe contraction and uneven recovery.
Our findings can be sumrmarized as follows. The severe downturn was
caused mainly by the precipitous drop in investment and, to a lesser degree,
consumption. Many factors contributed to the sharp fall. The magnitude of
capital flow reversal was remarkable and the concurrent huge depreciation of
the currencies worsened the balance sheets of financial institutions and cor-
porations that had large unhedged foreign-currency liabilities. To prevent
depreciation-inflation spirals, some period of tight monetary policy was
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inevitable but the resulting high interest rates had a process. Based on the developments so far, the subse-
profound effect on the credit crunch and corporate quent section attempts to make preliminary assess-
bankruptcies. The negative effect was exacerbated ments on what caused such a severe economic
because the stabilization policy was imposed in con- contraction and recent recovery in this region. The final
junction with rapid financial restructuring. section concludes and draws some policy implications.
Ironically, it was the sharp economic downturn that
contributed to the stabilization of the exchange rates Macroeconomic development
and interest rates in the second half of 1998, and
thereby laid the ground for recovery. The sharp fall in InitiaL conditions
demand and the resulting decline in imports brought
about a drastic reversal of current account positions The East Asian crisis has many common features-
and in turn helped to build up a substantial increase in weak financial systems, excessive unhedged short-term
foreign reserves. This speedy adjustment to stabiliza- foreign borrowing, lack of transparency in business
tion was possible since the East Asian countries were practices, and so on. Nonetheless, there exist significant
more open and private sector-oriented. This was taken differences between the countries regarding the origins
into account in the design of the International and the preconditions. 2 Among these countries, the
Monetary Fund (IMF) adjustment program. The signs of deteriorating economic conditions and over-
essence of the IMF adjustment program is to stabilize heating pressures were most visible in Thailand. Key
the exchange market in the short run through belt-tight- macroeconomic indicators were stronger in Korea, but
ening-and the private sector's belt is easier to tighten the country could not sidestep the crisis because of its
than the government's. Also the recession in the domes- serious liquidity problem: the ratio of short-term exter-
tic market could generate a larger improvement in cur- nal debt to official foreign reserves in Korea exceeded
rent account balances since these economies were more 100 percent from the mid-1990s onward. Recently, the
open and export-oriented. 1 Philippines has been recovering from its decade-long
Despite the common characteristic of a sharp initial economic crisis after gaining political stabilitv in 1992.
downturn, the adjustment process varied widely across Indonesia's macroeconomic performance was also
the countries. The example of Indonesia shows that a strong until mid-1997. But it had its own structural
policy for stabilization cannot be effective if structural weakness, which exposed Indonesia to the contagion
problems remain unsolved. Uncontrolled monetary from the Thai and Korean crises in the latter half of
expansion in bailing out troubled financial institutions 1997. Short-term external debt had been rising rapidly
not only delayed recovery but also brought Indonesia to and the country's weak financial system cast cLoubts on
the verge of hyperinflation. The Malaysian case also the government's ability to defend the currency peg. In
shows that the belt-tightening policy alone is not suffi- addition, political uncertainty arising from the elec-
cient in stabilizing the exchange rate market and that tions in late 1997 and the presidential election in
the resumption of foreign capital inflows is essential for March 1998 compounded economic problems. El
recovery. Until mid-1998, Malaysia adopted a "virtual Nino's effects included forest fires and caused a long-
IMF" policy package of austerity but, unlike Korea and lasting drought, inflicting serious damage on the
Thailand, it failed to stabilize the foreign exchange mar- forestry and agricultural sector, reducing exports, and
ket. This may be a reflection of the difference in the raising food prices.
availability of external financing opportunities through Prior to the crisis, the Malaysian economy had
official program loans or private capital inflows. showed the strongest macroeconomic pernormance
The paper is organized as follows. In the following among the five East Asian countries. It had enjoyed the
section we briefly review the macroeconomic develop- highest growth rates of 8-9 percent with the lowest
ment after the crisis and the recovery prospects for the inflation of around 3 percent, and virtually ful. employ-
region. Next comes a section in which we discuss the ment. Only the widening current account deficits in the
role of monetary and fiscal policy in the adjustment mid-1990s showed signs of imbalance, but these were
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regarded as inevitable and sustainable considering the Capital flows, exchange rates, and stock markets. In
country's high levels of growth and investment. Also, the 1990s, almost two-thirds of all private capital flows
unlike Korea and Thailand, the current account deficit to developing countries flowed into East Asia. Table 3.2
was covered mostly by long-term capital (primarily for- summarizes capital flows as a percentage of each coun-
eign direct investment) rather than short-term capital. try's GDP during the 1990s.4 The reversal of the foreign
Moreover, the financial system in Malaysia was known capital flows in 1997 was remarkable. The most extreme
to be in better shape than those of other Southeast Asian cases were seen in Thailand and Malaysia. Annual capi-
countries, even though the belief must be questionable tal inflows into these two countries averaged over 10 per-
in hindsight.3 cent of GDP during the 1990s, and at one point they
reached 13 percent and 17 percent of GDP. However,
Sharp economic contraction and the reversal capital inflows abruptly changed direction in 1997. For
of the current account position examp]e, in Thailand, capital outflows reached 11 per-
cent of GDP in 1997 alone. Therefore, between 1996
Reflecting these differences in preconditions, the adjust- and 1997, Thailand experienced a sudden reversal of
ment processes also were uneven in these Fast Asian private capital inflows amounting to about 20 percent of
countries. Nevertheless, there were substantial com- GDP. T'he other countries faced a similar fate.
mon trends in the adjustment processes. First, they all The large capital outflows depreciated the currencies
experienced severe economic contraction and a drastic precipi:-ously and the stock markets in the region plum-
reversal of current account balances. Second, they all meted. Between January and December 1997, the
geared their macroeconomic policy stance toward Korear won was depreciated by 121 percent and its
expansion starting in the middle of 1998, cutting inter- composite stock price index declined by 50 percent. The
est rates and expanding fiscal deficits. Third, the signs value of Thailand's baht and composite stock price
of recovery have been evident (starting late in 1998), index cleclined by 139 and 52 percent respectively dur-
but it is still premature to judge whether they will ing a similar period. In Indonesia, Malaysia, and the
become a trend. Philippines, the exchange rate depreciated by 85, 40,
Economic contraction. As can be seen in table 3.1, and 44 percent, respectively, against the dollar between
the economic slowdown in these countries was histori- mid-1997 and 1998. Their stock markets fell by more
cally unprecedented. The average growth rates in these than 53, 50, and 40 percent, respectively, during a sim-
countries had been well above 7 percent prior to the cri- ilar period.
sis. But in 1998, the rcal gross domestic product (GDP) Inflation and interest rates. The sharp depreciation
declined by 15, 6, 6, and 7 percent in Indonesia, Korea, provided inflationary pressure. Together with the
Malaysia, and Thailand, respectively. These drops con- increase of import prices, expected inflation soared,
stitute the countries' worst postwar economic records. since the market participants anticipated that the cen-
The growth rate dropped from 5 percent in 1997 to -0.4 tral banks of these countries would inject massive liq-
percent in 1998 in the Philippines. The fall of industrial uidity 5upport to save the banking system. The inflation
production was even more dramatic. In the first quarter rates irn Thailand, Korea, and the Philippines increased
of 1998, industrial production indexes in Thailand and swiftly almost twofold by the first half of 1998, reach-
Korea declined by 18 and 8 percent, respectively, com- ing 10, 9, and 10 percent, respectively. The inflation
pared with those of the same period in 1997. rate in Indonesia soared to 58 percent in 1998 from 6
The financial meltdown in these countries resulted in percenie in 1997. In Malaysia, the inflation rates soared
more people losing their jobs and being forced into to 5.3 percent from 2.7 percent during the same period,
poverty. The unemployment rates in Indonesia, Korea, even though expansionary monetary policies now being
and Thailand reached 8-10, 8, and 4.4 percent, respec- pursued could accelerate inflation to a much higher
tively, at the end of 1998. Prior to the crisis, these coun- level (see table 3.3).
tries, except for the Philippines, enjoyed virtually full Owing to higher inflation and tight monetary poli-
employment. cies, nominal interest rates drastically increased. At its
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TABLE 3.1
Growth and unemployment
I Real GDP growth rates
(percent change over the same perod of the previous year)
1996 1997 1998
1Q 2Q 30 40 AVG 1Q 2Q 3Q 40 AVG 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q AVG
Indonesia 5.7 6.7 8.4 10.3 7.8 7.7 6.6 3.3 2.4 5.0 -6.4 -16.8 -17.4 -19.5 -15.0
Korea 7.6 6.7 6.6 7.4 7.1 5.7 6.6 6.1 3.9 5.6 -3.9 -6.8 -6.8 -- -5.8
Malaysia 8.3 8.4 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.5 8.4 7.4 6.9 7.8 -2.8 -6.8 -8.6 -- -6.1
Philippines 5.3 6.1 6.9 4.9 5.8 5.5 5.6 4.9 4.8 5.2 1.6 -0.8 -0.7 -1.9 -0.4
Thailand - - - - 5.5 - - - - -0.4 - - -
II IndustriaL production index growth rates
(percent change over the same period of the previous year)
1996 1997 1998
1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q AVG IQ 20 3Q 4Q AVG IQ 20 30 ZQ AVG
Indonesia - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Korea 9.2 9.6 8.0 8.3 8.8 4.4 6.2 7.2 3.4 5.3 -6.1 -12.1 -10.9 -0.1 -7.3
Malaysia 11.6 9.8 10.7 12.0 11.0 11.5 11.6 9.7 10.1 10.7 -0.8 -6.0 -10.5 -5.6 -5.7
Philippines 11.5 2.5 4.9 -1.9 4.2 -3.2 3.6 6.5 13.9 5.2 -3.0 -9.3 -13.0 -- -8.4
Thailand 8.0 6.0 9.7 9.3 8.3 7.0 7.6 -4.1 -11.3 -0.2 -17.0 -15.4 -9.9 -- -14.1
Note: Indexes of ThaiLand and Philippines are manufacturing production indexes.
III Unemployment rate
(percent)
1996 1997 1998
1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q AVG 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q AVG 1Q 20 3Q 4Q AVG
Indonesia - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- -
Korea 1.8 2.0 2.0 2.2 2.0 2.5 2.6 2.4 2.6 2.5 4.7 6.9 8.4 -- 6.7
Malaysia - - - - 2.9 - - - - 3.0 - - - --
PhiLippines 8.3 10.9 7.7 - 9.0 7.7 10.4 - 7.9 8.7 - 7.3 8.9 9.6 8.6
Thailand - - - - 1.5 - - - - 1.9 - - - -- 4.4
Note: Existing monthly value is used as the data for that quarter.
Sources: International FinanciaL Statistics, IMF
JP Morgan 1999.
Bank Indonesia, Indonesian CentraL Bureau of Statistics.
Bask Negara Malaysia (Central Bank of Malaysia).
Bank of Korea, Korea National StatisticaL Office.
Bank of Thailand.
Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas (Central Bank of Philippines).
highest, the benchmark corporate bond yield rates in and robust otherwise. Bankruptcy and unemployment
Korea rose to above 30 percent from their precrisis rates skyrocketed.
average of 12 percent. In Thailand, Malaysia, and the Current account. The magnitude of the economic
Philippines, the interbank lending rates increased to 24, slowdown during the crisis was most visible in the dra-
11, and 19 percent from their precrisis level of 10, 7, matic responses of current account adjustment. In
and 11 percent, respectively. Indonesia's interest rates Malaysia, the current account surplus is expected to be
rose to above 70 percent from their precrisis level of 12 about 7 percent of GDP in 1998, increasing from its
percent. The punitive level of interest rates strangled 1997 value of -5 percent. The surplus is likely to reach
businesses, including those that would have been viable 14 and 9 percent of GDP in Korea and Thailand,
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respectively (see table 3.4).5 The sharp improvement of in 199?, the private investment demand declined by 28
the current account was forced by harsh recessions. It percent, whereas consumption declined by 12 percent
was mainly due to the decrease in imports rather than in the first half of 1998 in Korea.
the increase in exports. In Korea, imports declined by In Inionesia, despite the sharp recession, export per-
more than 23 percent in the first half of 1998 while formance did not significantly improve, and the current
export growth remained stagnant. 6 The decline of accouni: surplus in 1998 is expected to be only 5 percent
imports was mainly attributable to the precipitous fall of GD]', which is significantly lower than those in
of investment demand. Compared with the same period Thailan d and Korea. The poor performance shows that
TABLE 3.2
Capital flows, exchange rates, and stock prices
I Capital fLows
(percent of GDP)
1997 1998
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 Ql 02 Q3 04 Q1 Q2
Indonesia Capital fLows 3.6 2.2 5.1 5.1 -0.3 7.2 4.1 3.3 -15.8 -29.5 1.0
Use of fund credit - - - - 1.4 - - - 5.6 - 4.7
Change in reserves -0.4 -0.4 -0.8 -2.0 2.3 -1.4 -4.2 2.4 12.2 23.2 -9.7
Korea Capital flows 1.0 2.8 8.5 5.0 -2.1 3.8 6.1 0.7 -18.9 -6.5 -0.3
Use of fund credit - - - - 2.5 - - - 10.0 5.3 2.5
Change in reserves -0.9 -1.2 -1.5 -0.3 2.7 3.0 -3.6 2.3 9.0 -12.2 -14.7
Malaysia Capital flows 16.8 1.8 8.5 9.5 2.8 - - - - - -
Use of fund credit - - - - - - - - - - -
Change in reserves -17.7 4.4 2.0 -2.5 3.9 - - - - - -
Philippines Capital flows 6.0 8.0 7.2 11.5 6.1 9.4 14.6 7.5 -6.9 5.0 -
Use of fund credit 0.2 -0.3 -0.5 -0.4 0.6 -0.2 -0.3 3.2 -0.3 -0.1 -
Change in reserves -0.8 -3.3 -1.2 -4.8 3.1 -2.0 3.4 1.3 9.8 -3.6 -
Thailand Capital flows 8.4 8.4 13.0 10.7 -10.3 6.5 -10.3 -15.1 -22.1 -17.5 -12.0
Use of fund credit - - - - 5.4 - - 12.4 9.3 8.1 1.8
Change in reserves -3.1 -2.9 -4.3 -1.2 6.4 0.3 15.3 5.1 5.1 -1.7 3.0
Note: 1. QuarterLy figures are the ratios of capitaL fLows to one-fourth of annuaL GDP.
2. Use of Fund Credit incLudes exceptionaL financing.
3. Minus sign in change in reserves signifies the increase of foreign reserves.
II Exchange rate
(period average, national currency unit per dollar)
1996 1997 1998
10 2Q 3Q 4Q AVG 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q AVG 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q AVG
Indonesia 2318.2 2344.0 2350.0 2357.0 2342.0 2403.0 2437.2 2791.3 4005.7 2909.0 9433 10460 12252 - 10715
Korea 782.9 786.2 817.1 831.6 804.5 869.4 8917 899.6 1143.9 949.9 1612.0 1395.0 1324.9 1281.5 1403.2
Malaysia 2.5480 2.5012 2.4952 2.5193 2.5159 2.4898 2.5081 2.7771 3.4818 2.8132 3.9960 3.8451 4.0570 - 3.9660
Philippines 26.190 26.187 26.212 26.276 26.216 26.330 26.371 29.798 35.384 29.471 40.693 39.379 42.865 - 40.979
Thailand 25.25 25.31 25.33 29.54 25.36 25.91 25.90 34.31 42.37 32.12 45.56 40.31 40.63 36.48 40.75
III Stock market index
1996 1997 1998
10 20 30 40 AVG 1Q 20 3Q 40 AVG 1Q 2Q 3Q 40 AVG
Indonesia - - - - - 686.2 690.9 597.3 434.6 599.9 503.2 442.2 366.8 361.7 418.5
Korea 868.6 900.5 797.6 711.8 819.6 679.9 735.1 699.5 418.3 630.7 535.8 350.4 321.3 472.6 420.0
MaLaysia 1096.3 1155.6 1107.4 1210.9 1142.6 1230.2 1087.4 877 601.5 949.1 687.1 540.0 359.7 497.6 521.1
PhiLippines - - - - - 3320.1 2755.6 2231.8 1819.8 2531.8 2150.9 1984.3 1353.2 1899.7 1847.0
Thailard - - - - - 740.3 595.0 570.0 405.1 575.3 494.3 335.0 245.0 350.0 356.1
Sources: International FinanciaL Statistics, IMF; JP Morgan 1999.
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TABLE 3.3
Inflation and interest rates
I Nominal interest rate
(percent per year)
1996 1997 1998
1Q 20 3Q 4Q AVG 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q AVG 10 2Q 3Q 412 AVG
Indonesia 16.24 15.41 14.76 13.31 14.93 13,25 13.69 23.48 28.50 19.74 47.00 59.80 69.65 37.50 53.48
Korea 11.8 11.6 12.2 12.6 12.1 12.7 11.7 12.4 24.3 15.3 19.0 16.6 12.5 8.3 14.1
Malaysia 7.11 7.33 7.36 7.33 7.28 7.28 7.53 8.03 9.08 7.98 10.85 11.10 7.15 6.25 8.83
PhiLippines 12.88 13.07 11.59 11.68 12.31 9.72 10.97 14.96 18.10 13.43 15.78 15.00 13.80 13.50 14.52
ThaiLand 6.58 8.78 12.93 12.12 10.10 8.34 15.10 23.87 21.70 17.26 20.57 18.60 7.17 2.63 12.24
Note: 1. Indonesia-1-month interbank deposit rate
2. Korea-yield rate on corporate bond with 3-year maturity
3. MaLaysia-3-month interbank rate
4. PhiLippines-91-day treasury bill rate
5. Thailand-weighted average interbank lending rate
II Inflation
(CPI, percent change over the same perod of the previous year)
1996 1997 1998
1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q AVG 1Q 20 3Q 4Q AVG 1Q 2Q 30 42 AV6
Indonesia 12.5 9.9 8.9 8.2 9.9 4.5 4.9 6.4 9.2 6.2 27.7 49.7 76.3 78.4 58.0
Korea 4.7 4.9 5.1 5.1 4.9 4.7 4.0 4.0 5.0 4.4 8.9 8.2 7.0 6.0 7.5
Malaysia 3.4 3.7 3.6 3.3 3.5 3.2 2.5 2.3 2.7 2.7 4.3 5.7 5.7 5.4 5.3
PhiLippines 11.0 10.4 8.1 6.7 9.1 5.3 5.3 5.9 7.2 5.9 7.9 9.9 10.4 10.6 9.7
Thailand 7.4 6.2 5.2 4.6 5.9 4.4 4.3 6.2 7.5 5.6 9.0 10.3 8.2 5.0 8.1
Source: JP Morgan 1999.
TABLE 3.4
Current account balances
(percent of GDP)
1996 1997 1998
1Q 20 3Q 40 AVG 1Q 2Q 3Q 40 AVG 1Q 2Q 3Q 4(l AVG
Indonesia -3.6 -4.6 -3.7 -1.9 -3.4 -4.3 -2.1 -2.6 -0.4 -2.3 4.8 3.2 - -- 4.0
Korea -3.6 -4.2 -6.0 -5.2 -4.7 -6.6 -2.5 -1.9 3.6 -1.8 14.2 14.3 12.4 - 13.6
Malaysia - - - - -4.6 - - - - -4.9 - - - - 7.5
Philippines -3.7 -9.3 -0.2 -5.7 -4.7 -2.5 -8.0 -7.0 -3.3 -5.2 -0.4 - - - -0.4
ThaiLand -7.3 -10.6 -7.8 -5.9 -7.9 -5.5 -8.1 -1.9 7.5 -2.0 14.2 9.4 11.5 - 11.7
Sources: JP Morgan 1999.
Bank Indonesia, Indonesian Central Bureau of Statistics.
Bank Negara Malaysia (Central Bank of Malaysia).
Bank of Korea, Korea National Statistical Office.
Bank of ThaiLand.
Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas (Central Bank of Philippines).
Indonesia is suffering from the worst crisis among the and industrial production figures improved, rotably in
five East Asian countries and its economy has not been Korea. By the end of 1998, over half of the sharp initial
stabilized yet. exchange rate depreciation had been reversed in Korea
and Thailand. Compared with the level in December
Stabilization and the prospects for recovery 1997, the stock price index in Korea increased by 49
percent. And most important, foreign investors' confi-
Korea and Thailand. After the free fall in the first half, dence improved and foreign private capital inflows
rnacroeconomic indicators started to stabilize in the resumed. The yield spread between a dollar-denomi-
second half of 1998 in Korea and Thailand. Real GDP nated Korean government bond and the U.S. Treasury
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bond was reduced significantly in the second half of considering the nature of previous fire sales and the
1998, reflecting the decline of sovereign risk. The infla- export of raw materials. If so, the inventory stocking
tion rates were also well contained and became lower would have a larger negative impact on current
than the precrisis level. High nominal interest rates, account balances instead of having a positive effect on
which strangled these highly leveraged countries, have production.
since dropped drastically owing to the relaxed mone- Indo;nesia. Unlike Thailand and Korea, Indonesia
tary policy. In Thailand and Korea, the interest rates in showecl no sign of recovery even as of the second half of
the last quarter of 1998 were significantly lower than 1998.9 Political uncertainties seem to play an important
their precrisis values. Only the performance of unem- role in undermining reform progress and delaying
ployment rates had yet to show signs of improvement, recovery in Indonesia. For example, the implementa-
but it is understandable that employment would require tion of the IMF program was derailed by severe civil
a more sluggish adjustment process on the road to unrest, which led to the resignation of President
recovery.7 Suharto in May 1998. However, it was the mismanage-
Despite the recent signs of stabilization in Korea and ment of monetary policy that prevented recovery and
Thailand, it is still premature to conclude that recovery brought the danger of hyperinflation in Indonesia.
has developed into a trend. There is reason for concern. Facing ;he financial sector strain and the danger of bank
The improvement in the growth rates of real GDP and runs, the Bank of Indonesia injected massive liquidity
industrial production in the last quarter of 1998 might supporn- to troubled financial institutions and made a
be only a statistical phenomenon that is attributable to limited effort to sterilize it. Between November 1997
a sharp recession at the beginning of the crisis. Also, the and March 1998, the increase in net domestic assets of
recent GDP growth was mainly due to the changes in the certral bank amounted to more than twice the
inventory investment. Figure 3.1 shows the movement entire stock of base money in the beginning of that
of the ratio of inventory investment to GDP during the period. 10 The growth rate of M2 rose to 80 percent in
crisis in Korea. After the crisis erupted, inventory the second quarter of 1998, well above its growth rate
investment fell sharply to -15 percent of GDP. The in 1997, which was 25 percent. Uncontrolled monetary
sharp decline in inventory investment was historically expansLon with no progress in structural reform pushed
unprecedented in Korea and quite different from the the eco aomy to the verge of a vicious circle of hyperin-
stylized cyclical pattern observed in the literature.8 It flation and currency depreciation. Indonesia's experi-
clearly indicates how panicky the businessmen felt ence highlights the fact that relaxed macroeconomic
because of the crisis; the decline was largely associated
with fire sales and exports of existing stocks, especially
raw materials. High interest rate expenses, exchange
rate depreciation, and the lack of cash flows must have FIGURE: 3.1
forced the disposal of existing stocks.
After the free fall, the inventory investment reached Inventory investment to GDP
almost zero in the last quarter of 1998. The concurrent percent
increase in inventory investment from -15 percent of 10
GDP to zero (not the increase in inventory stock) was 5
the main factor behind the sharp increase in the recent 0
GDP growth rate. It is not certain at this stage whether .D S ..> 4 4
inventory restocking and thereby production increase -5 t @o @t@o40Q
will follow in the near future. If the prospect for eco- -10
nomic recovery is not bright, sellers might not want to V .
rebuild inventory stocks, and production would stag-
nate. Even if recovery is a reality, there is a possibility -20
that inventory restocking can be done through the Source: WorLd Bank, Firm-LeveL Survey.
increase of imports. This negative scenario is likely-
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policies can aggravate the crisis if structural problems Changing the policy focus from stabilization to expan-
remain unresolved. sion could provide short-term relief to Malaysia.
Malaysia. Until mid-1998, Malaysia's response to the However, it should not be forgotten that resumption of
crisis can be described as the "virtual IMF" policy pack- foreign capital inflows is critical for bolstering the econ-
age of austeritv measures-except that the country tried omy in the long run. Whether foreign capital will return
to cut imports by increasing import duties and impos- despite the experience of capital controls is a key risk fac-
ing other regulations.1" In December 1997, Malaysia ing the country. Also, completing corporate and financial
announced a program to slow down the economy and sector reforms while providing liquidity supoorts is a
to raise foreign investors' confidence to cope with the major challenge. The outcome of the capital ccntrol pol-
regional crisis. The growth outlook was adjusted down- icy in Malaysia will be an interesting touchstone for eval-
ward and the current account deficit was targeted to uating the standard IMF policy in the future.
decrease to 3 percent of GDP. Public expenditures The Philippines. The Philippines were also severely
including mass development projects were reduced and damaged by the spillover effects of the Thai crisis, but it
reprioritized with significant budget cuts of 18-20 per- was able to at least sidestep the free fall of economic
cent. Monetary policy was tightened, credit expansion activity. Even though the real GDP growth rate dropped
was placed under control and the benchmark interest from 5 percent in 1997 to -0.4 percent in 1.998, this
rate was raised. In sum, the same prescription of the reflected more the impact of the disastrous weather
standard IMF package was implemented in Malaysia than of the regional crisis. Excluding the agricultural
until mid-1998 without being officially bound by IMF sector, the Philippine real GDP would have grown 1.1
conditionalities. percent, instead of -0.4 percent. The structural reform,
However, the tight monetary and fiscal policies failed particularly the financial sector reform, which had been
to stabilize the Malaysian economy in the first half of steadily pursued from the early 1990s protected the
1998. The resulting credit crunch slowed economic Philippines from the full brunt of the regional crisis,
growth and aggravated the recession. Despite the even though its external debt-to-GDP ratio was the
higher adjustment of interest rates, the exchange rates highest among these five countries. I lowever, despite
were steadily depreciated and remained volatile. relatively less severe economic contractions, the
Frustrated with the worsening economic performance, prospect of recovery for the Philippines is not necessar-
Malaysia decided to reverse the policy direction toward ily brighter. While the external situation has showed
expansion. In July 1998, it announced the National some improvement in the second half of 1998, it is still
Economic Recovery Plan (NERP), which focused on beset with ongoing problems such as a high budget
easing monetary and fiscal policy to provide a stimulus deficit, rising inflation, and increasing poverty. The cur-
to economic activities. In order to alleviate the credit rency depreciation also increased debt-servicing costs
crunch, prudential standards were relaxed even though significantly and could delay its recovery.
they remained tighter than precrisis levels. In
September, the government introduced capital controls Monetary and fiscal policies in the
on outflows of capital and fixed the exchange rates at adjustment process
3.805 rupiah to the dollar. It intended to gain flexibility
for easing monetary policy. Following the adoption of The severe contraction of the East Asian countries
these measures, the interest rates were reduced to the raised serious questions as to whether the initial
precrisis level. response of the IMF packages was unnecessarily tight
There are some recent signs that after the introduc- for these countries. The critics argue that instead of hav-
tion of this expansionary policy, the economy started to ing favorable impacts on foreign investors' confidence,
stabilize in Malaysia. However, reaching judgment on the stringent macroeconomic policies and tie conse-
this would still be premature, given the short span of quent high interest rates have had a negative effect on
time in which the new policies were introduced. The these highly leveraged countries. This section reviews
consensus on capital control seems to be that it could the magnitude and the impact of the tightened mone-
bring benefits in the short run, but not in the long run. tary and fiscal policies in the evolution of the crisis.
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Monetary policy money. M2 and domestic credit deflated by the con-
sumer price index (CPl).12 Several features are appar-
Figure 3.2 shows the movement of monetary aggre- ent. In Indonesia, they increased significantly in the
gates in Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Thailand, and the first half of 1998, showing that the Indonesian govern-
Philippines. They are the monthly stock of reserve ment was losing control of the money supply in bailing
FIGURE 3.2
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out troubled financial institutions and preventing bank of inflation made real interest rates low immediately
runs. In contrast, real M2 and credit in Malaysia after the crisis erupted. But soon after the onset of the
steadily decreased in 1998. Even after abandoning the crisis, real interest rates soared to a historical high. The
"virtual IMF" policy in July 1998, there was no sign of increase was highest in Korea where real interest rate
significant monetary expansion in Malaysia until the rose from 7.2 percent prior to the crisis to 20 percent at
very end of the year. It is harder to judge how tight the its peak. In Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines, the
monetary policies in Korea, Thailand, and the increase was relatively mild, from 5 to 10 percent in
Philippines are by looking at the figures. Reserve money Malaysia, from 5 to 14 percent in Thailand, and from 5
and M2 decreased little or grew at slightly slower rates to 10 percent in the Philippines.
than previously in the first half of 1998. But from the Lane and others (1999) argue that these initial
second half of 1998, there was no sign of monetary con- increases in real interest rates were not atypical com-
traction, particularly in Korea. In sum, real monetary pared with those seen in other crisis-hit countries.
aggregates and credit in Korea, Thailand, and the However, even though it is true that the magnitude of
Philippines did not seem to be severely contracted the increase was not exceptional, high interest rates
except for the brief period at the beginning of 1998. imposed a crushing burden on real economic activity.
Initial monetary policies were tight and caused a Highly leveraged corporate structures made these
credit crunch. Based on the fact that the slower growth economies extremely vulnerable to the increase of inter-
rates of real money and credit were not dramatic, some est rates. Especially, business investment demand col-
raised doubts about the view that the tight monetary lapsed. Moreover, the interest rates in figure 3.3
policy was the main cause of the sharp economic down- underestimate the severity of the credit crunch. To truly
turn in the East Asian countries.13 However, quantity evaluate the severity of the credit crunch, we have to
changes in monetary aggregates may not be fully ade- measure the increase of interest rates that marginal
quate in reflecting the severity of credit tightening. firms are facing. Given the lack of adequate data that
Despite the decrease in supply, the equilibrium quantity measure the interest rates prevailing at the secondary
of monetary aggregates may not change much if the market, it is hard to evaluate rigorously the degree of
demand for credit does not change and becomes inter- the credit crunch in these East Asian countries. But
est-inelastic. Needless to say, the firms' investment there is ample anecdotal evidence that it was wide-
demand fell drastically after the crisis erupted, but it spread. For example, as shown in figure 3.4, only the
was only a part of the demand. Facing increasing uncer- very large conglomerates with low bankruptcy proba-
tainties, precautionary demand for credit increased to bilities were able to issue corporate bonds after the cri-
prepare for the anticipated loan recall, loss of trade sis erupted in Korea. The share of corporate bonds
credit, expected increase in interest rates and operating issued by the five largest conglomerates increased from
costs, and so on. Servicing existing debt to avoid bank- 47 percent prior to the crisis to 87 percent i-n the first
ruptcies also made the demand for credit highly inelas- quarter of 1 9 9 8 .16 There were many anecdotes showing
tic to the changes in interest rates. As a consequence, that small and medium-size firms did not even dare to
when the monetary policy tightened, interest rates sell their bonds in the market in the first half of 1998.
soared even though the equilibrium growth rate of The interest rate differentials between the corporate
credit was not drastically slowed down. Therefore, the bonds issued by the five largest conglomerates and by
changes in interest rate, not the quantity of monetary the others widened from 0.12 percent prior to the crisis
aggregates or credit, may be a better measure of a credit to 3.5 percent in March 1998. This gap still anderesti-
crunch for the duration of the crisis. 14 mates the risk premium because of the sample selection
Figure 3.3 shows the behavior of nominal and real bias, which dictated that only a few qualified medium-
interest rates in these five countries.15 In Tndonesia, even size corporations could sell their bonds in the market.
though nominal interest rates were increased signifi- Ding, Domac, and Ferri (1999) also document that the
cantly, real interest rates were consistently negative "flight to quality" phenomenon was widespread and
from late 1997 to mid-1998 owing to high inflation. In had negative impacts, particularly on small banks and
Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand, a high but brief surge enterprises in the other East Asian countries.
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Tight monetary policy alone was not able to achieve tion-inflation spirals. In hindsight, the IMF clearly
exchange rate stability. The initial tight monetary pol- underestimated the negative effects of interest rate hikes
icy ordered by the IMF was aimed at prcventing the in these highly leveraged economies. However, it is hard
large currency depreciation from initiating deprecia- to denyv that some period of high interest rates must
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have been unavoidable in order to stabilize the ning of 1998, the riggit started to depreciate again and
exchange rates. Two channels had been important in remained volatile until Malaysia introduced its own ini-
achieving this goal. First, the increase in interest rates tiated policy in July 1998. As figure 3.3 shows, the real
was called for mainly to stem the outflow of capital. interest rate started to fall only after the government
The high interest rate failed to restore foreign investors' started to regulate interest rates and introduced capital
confidence and bring back capital inflows in the midst controls.
of the crisis, but it was effective in preventing a sharp The Malaysian case shows that tight policy alone is
increase in demand for foreign currency by domestic not sufficient to restore exchange rate market stability.
firms and individuals. Second, the severe recession Stemming capital outflows and building foreign
induced by the tight monetary policy was a main factor reserves by belt-tightening is not enough to reduce the
in reducing imports and rapidly improving current panic. Resumption of capital inflows, especially private
account balances in Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand. capital inflows, seems to be the key factor. Korea and
Without a significant current account surplus, restock- Thailand benefited from official program loans by the
ing foreign reserves and restoring foreign investors' IMF and other international financial irnstitutions
confidence would not have been possible. immediately after the crisis erupted. The Korean gov-
The tight monetary policy, however, did not succeed ernment also succeeded in rolling over the short-term
in stabilizing the exchange rate market in all of the external debt of the banking sector in March 1998.
countries. In Korea and Thailand, the exchange rate Thanks to the private debt rescheduling, the proportion
market started to stabilize steadily in the second quar- of short-term debt in Korea decreased from 60 percent
ter of 1998, allowing room for the government to relax to 21 percent and significantly alleviated liquidity prob-
the monetary policy. Consequently, these countries' lems. In contrast, a "virtual IMF" package imple-
interest rates in the last quarter of 1998 became even mented by Malaysia did not benefit frorn official
lower than their precrisis levels, leading the recovery of program loans. The country's political instability and
real activities. However, the "virtual IMF" policy in the restrictive government policy in capital flow prob-
Malaysia failed to stabilize the exchange rate market. ably deterred the resumption of private capital
After showing a brief sign of stabilization at the begin- inflows. The lack of capital inflows im,plies that
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Malaysia had to achieve a more drastic current account Korea, Malaysia and Thailand amounted to about -7,
adjustment and face a deeper contraction even though -5, -1, and -4.5 percent of GDP.
its precrisis economic environment was better than that However, so far the fiscal expansion has not been as
of Korea and Thailand. effective as the increased budget deficit figures suggest.
Relaxed monetary policy proved effective only when Instead of being a discretionary change, they were
accompanied by structural reforms. The relaxed mon- mostly induced by the fall of tax revenues owing to the
etary and fiscal stance since the second half of 1998 severe economic downturn and sharp exchange rate
contributed to the rapid decline of interest rates and the depreciation. In fact, even though budget deficits were
recovery in Korea and Thailand, where corporate and widened, instead of increasing, the government con-
financial reforms have been progressing significantly. sumption expenditures decreased by 9 percent in Korea
However, it should be emphasized that expansionary in 199 S. Also, among government expenditures, the
macroeconomic policy alone cannot have a large impact proportion of transfer payments increased owing to the
if structural problems remain unsolved. In Indonesia, increas,- in demand for social expenditures. As long as
uncontrolled monetary expansion not only delayed transfer payments have a smaller multiplier effect than
recovery but also brought the country to the verge of government purchases of goods and services, the
hyperinflation. By contrast, the rapid decline of interest expans ionary effect of the increased budget deficits
rates and fast recovery in Korea was the result of the must be limited.
progress in the country's structural reform as well as the Irrespective of their effectiveness in boosting the
expansionary monetary policy. The reform progress econonmy, budget deficits in these Asian countries are
reduced sovereign risk premium and inflation expecta- likely ta grow in the near future. The unemployment
tion by offsetting the initial worries that the government problern will not be resolved any time soon and the
would monetize bailing-out costs for troubled financial demand for social expenditures will rise. More impor-
institutions. As little as the origin of the East Asian cri- tant, the governments' support is essential in financial
sis has to do with macroeconomic imbalances, it is restrucl:uring. Considering the upcoming need for more
understandable that macroeconomic policy alone can- government expenditures, it is fortunate that the East
not solve its problems. Eventually the recovery must Asian countries had maintained nearly balanced bud-
depend on the structural reform that addresses the roots gets priDr to the crisis. It made it possible for these coun-
of the problems that caused the crisis in the first place. tries to allow temporal budget deficits in the future
without incurring negative side effects.
FiscaL policy
Assessment of the adjustment process
In the same fashion as monetary policy, tight fiscal pol-
icy was initially tried in the East Asian countries after Many factors contributed to the sharp fall of economic
the crisis erupted. The initial tight fiscal policy was activities in these countries. Among them, our previous
introduced to improve current account balance by discuss:.on highlighted the three most important factors:
increasing government savings, and to alleviate the need (a) drastic reversal of capital flows, (b) tight monetary
to squeeze private savings excessively. It also aimed at policy, and (c) uncertainty caused by financial restruc-
securing noninflationary funds for financial restructur- turing. It is hard to deny that some period of tight
ing. But starting in early 1998, the severity of the eco- macroeconomic policy was unavoidable to prevent
nomic downturn made it necessary to expand the fiscal depreciation-inflation spirals and eventually the recov-
stance. As the effectiveness of the monetary policy was ery should depend on the progress of financial reform.
constrained by the credit crunch, the fiscal policy had to However, in the short run, these three factors exacer-
play a greater role. As a result, budget deficits increased bated the degree of the credit crunch and their contrac-
in these East Asian countries in 1998. Prior to the crisis, tional impacts were greater than anyone, including the
government budgets were in balance or in surplus in IMF, had imagined. Only at the end of 1998 did signs
these countries. But in 1998, budget deficits in Indonesia, of recovery became visible in the region, particularly in
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Korea and Thailand. In this section, we review some from -11 percent to -0.6 percent of GDP. This fast
forces behind the recent recovery. response happened because the economy became more
open and private-sector oriented. Unless the economy
High market sensitivity of the open and is led by the private sector and export-oriented, we
private sector economies believe that such a dramatic improvement in the current
account positions as experienced in Korea and
The quick response to stabilization as well as expan- Thailand in 1998 would be virtually impossible.
sionary policies was possible since the East Asian coun-
tries were more open and private sector-oriented. The Favorable development of the external
crisis in East Asia was caused by private sector overin- environment
vestment, not by public sector overexpenditure, and the
adjustment of the private sector under the changed The favorable turn in the external environrnent also
macroeconomic circumstances tends to be much helped bring about a quick recovery of these economies.
quicker than that of the public sector. Also, the reces- The appreciation of the Japanese yen with three con-
sion in the domestic market could generate a larger secutive cuts in U.S. interest rates starting in mid-1998
improvement in current account balances since these allowed Korea and Thailand to cut domestic interest
economies were more open and export-oriented. rates substantially without destabilizing their exchange
Table 3.5 shows the degree of difference in the open- rates. The Japanese yen appreciation also re(duced the
ness and private sector orientation between East Asian possibility of the Chinese yuan's devaluation and indi-
and Latin American economies. Mexico is a good rectly contributed to the stabilization of the exchange
example. In the 1982 crisis, Mexico was less open and market in Korea and Thailand.
more public-sector dominated. After the crisis, its cur-
rent account balance improved owing to severe reces- PoLicy implications and concLudinig
sion but the change was not as fast as those of the East remarks
Asian cases. The current account balance was -7.9 per-
cent of GDP in 1981,-3.8 percent in 1982, and 4.3 per- In our review of the adjustment processes of the five
cent in 1983.17 By contrast, in 1994 Mexico had a East Asian countries since the currency crisis erupted in
smaller budget deficit and became more open after the Thailand in 1997 we observe that after covering enor-
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was mous economic and social costs, the real wages have
passed. In the 1994 crisis, the real GDP growth fell from been substantially reduced, interest rates have dropped
4.5 percent in 1994 to -6.2 percent in 1995 and the cur- below the precrisis level, currency overvaluation has
rent account deficit improved sharply within a year been corrected-perhaps somewhat excessively-and
TABLE 3.5
Openness and private sector orientation in selected countries
(percent)
Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Thailand Mexico Brazil Argentina chile
1996 1996 1996 1996 1996 1982 1995 1982 1995 1982 1995 1982 1995
40.8 57.8 158.0 65.8 69.1 21.3 32.7 13.8 14.2 16.9 14.7 30.0 49.0
Note: (Export + Import)/GDP
Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Thailand Mexico Brazil Argentina Chile
1996 1996 1996 1996 1996 1982 1995 1982 1995 1982 1995 1982 1995
14.6 18.3 22.6 18.5 16.1 30.0 16.1 9.1 14.0 20.3 14.5 36.0 19.9
Note: Government Expenditure/GDP
Source: IMF, InternationaL FinanciaL Statistics.
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rental costs have plummeted in these countries. This these economies will be realized only after these prob-
development now provides a much more favorable lems have been properly resolved.
business environment in these economies that had been Second, resumption of capital inflow will be a key
suffering for a while from the weakening competitive- factor for the fast recovery of these economies.
ness of their exports and structural inefficiencies owing Malaysia adopted a less tight monetary policy than
to the rigidity in the labor and financial markets. Korea (lid in the first half of 1998, but its economic con-
Nevertheless, there still remain formidable con- traction was at least as severe as Korea's and its
straints to recovery. Among other things, the list exchange market remained more unstable. If Malaysia
includes continuing low aggregate demand in both had been able to receive external financial assistance
domestic and foreign markets; a persistent credit crunch organi2ed by the IMF or another institution, it could
that is attributable to the unresolved financial instabil- have avoided such a severe economic contraction.
ity; weakness in the corporate financial structure and Judging from this experience, the right mix for the
overcapacity; and lack of foreign capital inflow. In con- economies in this region may have been a less strict sta-
nection with these constraints, the following policy bilization policy package and a larger amount of finan-
implications may follow from the review and the com- cial assistance that was heavily front-loaded. Since it
parison of the adjustment experiences of these would be hard to expect a quick resumption of the pri-
economies so far. vate capital inflow to a crisis-hit country, there is an
First, accommodative macroeconomic policies will be urgent aeed to expand the available financial resources
needed for a while to prevent further contraction in through multilateral and regional financial institutions.
domestic demand and weakening of the corporate In thi s regard, it is encouraging to see recent discus-
financial structure. This is also important in preventing sions on the expansion and establishment of emergency
asset deflation, which would have a significant adverse financing facilities such as the contingent financing
impact on the corporate and financial restructuring facility under the IMF and the enhancement of its role
process. Since the corporate sector of these economies, as an effective lender of last resort in the international
particularly in Korea and Thailand, is highly leveraged, capital market (see Fischer (1999), and McKinnon
a tight monetary policy would accelerate corporate (1998)). Discussions on the establishment of regional
bankruptcies and asset deflation. This would then financing facilities are also an encouraging step toward
impose a heavier burden in resolving financial instability. this end. However, it is equally important in these dis-
However, striking the right balance between the cussions to include schemes for involving greater par-
accommodative macroeconomic policies and driving ticipation of the private sector so as to facilitate the
timely financial and corporate sector reforms will be an orderly workout of debt rescheduling, a fairer sharing
important challenge to these economies. In practice, the of losses, and quicker resumption of private capital
accommodative macroeconomic policies can give sig- inflows.
nals to corporate firms to be complacent and hang on Third, more serious and comprehensive efforts are
to their overcapacity. The experience of Indonesia has necessary to encourage the development of the capital
made it clear that the expansionary monetary policy markets in these economies. One of the key factors in
without necessary financial and corporate sector achievinig successful corporate restructuring-which
reforms is ineffective in bringing recovery-and it will facilitate full economic recovery, particularly in
causes hyperinflation. Through the experience of the Korea and Thailand-is to reduce the corporate lever-
Philippines, we can glimpse the importance of the qual- age rati o. Substantial inflow of foreign capital, particu-
ity and sustainability of recovery. What shielded the larly foreign direct investment, will be necessary to this
Philippines from the full brunt of the regional crisis was end, especially when the prospect of the new domestic
its structural reform, particularly the financial sector funding is poor as it is now.
reform, which had been steadily pursued starting in the However, given the huge size of the overall debt of the
early 1990s. Because the root cause for the financial corporate firms in these economies, this ultimately will
instability in this region was the structural weaknesses have tc be achieved by a substantial conversion of debt
of the corporate and financial sector, full recovery of to equity, and the change of domestic financial market
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structure to support this conversion. Corporate finan- N otes
cial structure mirrors the structure of the financial mar-
ket and patterns of financial savings of households in an Yoon Je Cho is with the Graduate SchooL of Internation aL Studies atSogang University in Seoul, Korea, and Changyong Rhee with the fac-
economy. Improvement in corporate financial structure uLty of Economics at SeouL NationaL University, Korea. The authors are
could hardly be expected unless there is concomitant grateful to Dominique Dwor-Fr&aut, Mary HaLlward-Driemeier, the
change in the domestic financial market structure. participants of the conference for their vaLuabLe comments, and
Chung-ChuL Chung, Han Kyu Lee, Sam Ho Lee, and Sun Hyeong Lee for
Therefore, serious efforts have to be made to expand exceLLent research assistance. Any errors in the text, however, remain
the equity market in these economies by encouraging the responsibiLity ofthe authors.
collective investment vehicles, including mutual funds 1. Mexico is a good exampLe. In the 1980s, when Mexico had a Largegovernment budget deficit, the stabiLization poLicy was not very effec-
and investment and trust businesses. Further stabiliza- tive in curtaiLing current account deficits. In 1994, when Mexico had
tion of domestic interest rates will play a crucial role for a smaller budget deficit and became more open after the North
this purpose. American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was passed, the stabilization
poLicy brought sharp swings in the current account balance.
Finally, we may draw some lessons for reference in 2. The structural weaknesses were of a different nature as weLL. In
future currency crises. The experience of the East Asian Korea, the poor governance of corporate and financiaL sectors was the
economic adjustment suggests that policy packages to main cause of the country's structuraL weakness. In Thailand, the lib-
.ustment suggests that pol' y packages to eraLization of the financiaL system and the external capil:aL accounts
be imposed on the crisis-hit countries will need to be without an adequate reguLatory and supervisory system pLayed a more
better tuned to individual market circumstances. In significant role.
economies such as Korea and Thailand, which are quite 3. The Bank for InternationaL SettLements (BIS) (1997) official esti-
e o s ha quite mates for actuaL nonperforming Loans in MaLaysia n 1996 Nas 3.9 per-
open, private-sector oriented, and have a very high cent of totaL Loans, which was significantly Lower than those of
leverage ratio in the corporate sector, the sensitivity to a ThaiLand (7.7 percent) and Indonesia (8.8 percent). But ii: was higher
stabilization package could be higher than in other than those of Korea (0.8 percent). The other estimates show that the
ratios were not significantLy Lower in MaLaysia than in the other cri-
economies. sis-hit countries in 1997 and 1998. See table 5 in GoLdstein (1998).
The main purpose of the stabilization policy in the 4. The financial capitaL flows in table 2 are not totally private. They
economies facing currency crisis is belt-tightening and incLude portfoLio investment and direct investment by the govern-
strengthening the foreign in ~~~ments.
strengthening the foreign debt service capacity. But m 5. The ThaiLand figure is the most recent estimate of the IMF, and
these economies, the stabilization policies may far over- is different from the number in tabLe 4, which does not cover the Last
shoot their original goals. Sharply increased interest quarter of 1998.
6. It is true that the export voLume increased significantLy after the
rates and depreciated exchange rates in the initial stage initiaL depredation of the Korean won. But its growth slowed down
have enormous balance sheet effects on highly lever- quickly thereafter. Moreover, there was no improvement of exports in
aged economies and lead to drastic declines in domestic doLlar-denominated rms.
7. See Lee and Rhee (1998) for the stylized pattern of employment
investment and employment. Furthermore, the stabi- growth in previous IMF program countries and its policy irnpLications.
lization policy package that is implemented in conjunc- 8. When an unanticipated emand shock occurs, production usuaLLy
tion with the tight schedule of bank restructuring can foLLows final demand with a Lag, implying that inventory stocks risein the short run. See Bernanke and GertLer (1995), Christiano,
accelerate the credit crunch and systemic corporate Eichenbaum, and Evans (1994), and Sims (1992).
bankruptcies. This tight monetary policy is inevitable in 9. OnLy very recentLy did the Indonesian crisis start to show signs
order to be able to prevent further deterioration of for- of abating.
10. In December 1997, the Bank of Korea aLso injected massive Liq-
eign exchange market stability in the earlier stage of the uidity support (more than one-third of reserve money) in preventing
currency crisis. But here again, the maintenance of a the coLLapse of the banking system. However, in contrast to Indonesia,
c1areful balance between the conflicting goals of stabi- the Bank of Korea sterilized the injection.
11. See Yusof (1998) for a detaiLed expLanation of l:he shift inlizing the exchange rates and preventing massive bank- MaLaysian economic poLicy from mid-1997 to the end of 1998.
ruptcies and rapid aggravation of financial instability is 12. For comparison, the graph shows the indexes whose average
essential to avoid severe economic contraction and value in 1996 is equal to 100.
13. Lane and others (1999) pointed out that the degree of mone-
resulting social problems. tary tightening in the East Asian countries was not as draconian as in
the cases of other countries facing an exchange rate crisis;. For exam-
ple, the growth rate of real money in Mexico declined b y almost 26
percent in 1995. Dollar and Hallward-Driemeier (1998) also provide
microeconomic evidence that shows onLy weak support of a credit
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crunch story. Using the survey resuLts of 1200 manufacturing firms in 15. ReaLinterest rates are constructed by subtracting a three-month
ThaiLand, they concLuded that the faLL in demand, not the restricted moving average of monthLy CPI infLation rates (previous month, cur-
access to credit, was the main constraining factor in sLowing down the rent morth, and one month ahead) from nominaL interest rates.
ThaiLand economy. 16. Tco prevent he concentration of the funds in the five Largest
14. The fact that the issuing of corporate bonds increased whiLe congLomerates, the government started to reguLate the maximum
domestic redit by the banking sector decreased in Korea can be indi- amount 3f corporate bonds issued by the five Largest congLomerates
rect evidence that the suppLy of credit, not the demand for credit, is that financiaL institutions coutd hoLd, starting with October 1998.
a constraining factor. ALso, monetary and credit aggregates do not Therefore, the figures after October shouLd be interpreted with care.
indicate how credit is aLLocated within the economy, which is a main 17. The country's reaL GDP growth rate was 8.5 percent in 1981 but
theme of this conference. it dropped to -0.6 percent in 1982 and -3.5 percent in 1983.
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The New Miyazawa
Initiative and Response
to the Corporate Debt
Problem
Kiyoto Ido
T - he currency and financial crisis that started in Thailand in July 1997
had a major impact not only there and in neighboring Asian coun-
tries, but on the global economy as a whole. Various causes for this
crisis have been identified, such as a rigid exchange rate system, short-term cap-
ital flows as typified by hedge funds, and fragility in the private financial sec-
tor-and included with them is also the lack of corporate governance. Soon it
will be two years since the currency crisis erupted, and we are now seeing some
hopeful signs in the economies involved in the crisis. However, it would be dif-
ficult to claim that adequate progress has necessarily taken place with regard
to the corporate debt problenm.
Given this situation, it is very good timing, indeed, that the present confer-
ence sponsored by the World Bank offers us an opportunity to discuss issues of
corporate governance.
In what follows, I would like to address how the problem of corporate debt
should be dealt with and what the New Miyazawa Initiative currently being
implemented by the Japanese government can do to assist with this problem.
Basic perspectives
As indicated in table 4.1 and figure 4.1, even among countries that experienced
the same currency crisis, corporate debt problems differ by country in, among
other things, their scale (relative to GDP and total external debt) and in the
composition of indebted corporations (domestic financial institutions, foreign
financial institutions, nonfinoncial institutions, and so on). Therefore, specific
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FIGURE4 .1i that end, it is not enough to just reduce their burden of
d e bt. The underlying premise of the so ution is corpo-
Debt to Bank fo nertona ete ns rate restructuring and the question we must bear in
mind is how to ensure an appropriate capital flow to
Percent these corporations. ln this sense, we must not cnly work
100 X X X g Wto restore sound management in the financial institu-
80 XOM W S g tions I mentioned, but we must grapple with the devel-
70 opment of capital markets in the medium and long run.
50
40 Issues for the promotion of debt
30
20 restructuring
10
Indonesia Korea MaLaysia PhiLippines ThaiLand To achieve a resolution of corporate indebtedness along
these lines, we will be required to tackle the problem
from a number of different angles. With respect to the
Percent
14.2 restructuring of corporate debt currently underway in
each country, a variety of bottlenecks have been identi-
fied. Here, I would like to point out some items that
must be considered in connection with the promotion
of debt restructuring.
15.1
Establishing relationships of mutual trust
between debtors and creditors
In order to move negotiations toward a successful con-
70.6 clusion, it is vital for the parties involved to establish
relationships of mutual trust. To that end, it is necessary
that they share information, and it is essential that there
Banks * Public sector m Nonbank private sector be a greater degree of transparency and disclosure on
the part of the indebted corporations as a group, includ-
Source: World Bank, Firm-Levet Survey. ing the activities, assets, and liabilities of overseas cor-
porations. I would also like to add that when people
responsible for decision-making at indebted corpora-
measures applicable to actual situations must be taken tions take part in discussions, it is important for them to
in each country. respond to their creditors with responsibility and good
Most cases have one thing in common, however: the faith.
handling of corporate indebtedness is closely tied to the
problem of bad debt among domestic financial institu- Improvement of the legaL environment
tions. Early resolution of corporate indebtedness is
essential for the recovery of function in the financial sys- Inadequacies in the basic legal framework relating to
tem, and it is necessary to tackle the corporate debt the execution of obligations, such as bankruptcy laws
problem at the same time as the problem of nonper- and accounting systems, have delayed resolution of the
forming loans in the financial sector. problem of corporate indebtedness. The provision of a
At the same time, ensuring that the debtor corpora- legal environment and the creation of an atnmosphere
tions themselves engage in proper activity is also of the that will facilitate the progress of negotiations on
greatest importance for macroeconomic recovery. To restructuring are important tasks.
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On this point, we welcome Thailand's efforts to Moreover, the substance of restructuring should not
amend its bankruptcy laws (which have passed its upper rely oni such methods as uniform debt reduction to
house) and other progress in developing a legal system. enlist the support of debtors. Rather it should present a
It is important for the future not only to enact and flexible menu of voluntary options that reflect the spe-
amend laws and ordinances, but also to reinforce cific needs of different situations. It is important in these
capacity building as necessary among those who are in cases thlat the schemes make it easier for debtor corpo-
charge of conducting business, and in such ways that rations to continue obtaining domestic and interna-
would establish effective operation of the system. tional capital for their continuing survival.
Clear setting of the framework for Provision of working capital
negotiation
When zorporations are making proper efforts to revive
For solving the debt problem, initiation of bankruptcy themselves and are carrying on a restructuring of debt
proceedings should be the last recourse. Prior to that, as described above, it is important to serve an environ-
negotiation should be sought between creditors and ment in which appropriate working capital can be
debtors on the basic premise that indebted corporations extended to corporations. In this respect, multilateral
should be preserved. From this perspective, the kind of agency assistance and bilateral support can be effective
comprehensive framework for promoting negotiations as well. As I will explain next, Japan is also implement-
on indebtedness that we find in the Bangkok Initiative ing assistance through the New Miyazawa Initiative to
and Jakarta Initiative are of great importance. It is provide capital to manufacturing industries.
essential on these occasions to make clear to the parties
involved the procedures for implementation and Approaches to the corporate debt
authority of reform, and to make it possible for both problLem under the Miyazawa Initiative
creditors and debtors to participate in the scheme with-
out apprehension. Negotiation is a matter that princi- As corporate indebtedness is a problem that occurs in
pally involves the creditors and debtors, but the private enterprise relationships, it should basically be
government of the countries concerned must also pro- settled within the private sector. However, it should also
vide the leadership needed to bring both sides together be noted that when the governments of Asian countries
on a level playing field. affected by the currency crisis are making comprehen-
sive eficorts to deal with the problems of corporate debt
TABLE 4.1
External debt of four Asian countries
(biLlions of U.S. dolLars)
Thailand Indonesia Malaysia b Korea, Rep. of
Dec. 1997 Dec. 1998 Dec. 1997 Mar. 1998 Dec. 1997 Sept. 1998 Dec. 1997 Dec. 1998
External debt 93.4 86.2 137.4 138.0 43.6 39.6 158.1 149.4
Short-term debt 34.8 23.5 n.a. n.a. 11.2 7.0 63.2 30.8
Private sector debt 69.1 54.7 74.0 72.5 26.8 22.9 135.8 112.9
Corporate debt 29.5 25.7 58.8 64.5 18.4 18.3 46.2 41.0
Extemal debt per GDP (percent)0
External debt 60.7 56.0 63.9 64.2 44.5 40.4 35.7 33.8
Short-term debt 37.3 27.2 n.a. n.a. 25.7 17.7 40.0 20.6
Private sector debt 74.0 63.4 53.8 52.5 61.4 57.8 85.9 75.6
Corporate debt 31.6 29.8 42.8 46.7 42.2 46.2 29.2 27.4
a. Per nominal GDP in 1997.
b. Corporate debt for MaLaysia s figured by subtracting short-term banking sector debt from privatE sector debt.
Sources: Official data by each individual country.
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and the financial sector, considerable amounts of lion for a banking system reform project intended to
resources will be required. take a further step in structural reinforcement of the
As you are aware, in October 1998, Japan announced banking sector and avert worsening of the domestic
a New Initiative to Overcome the Asian Currency Crisis credit shortage. In addition, JEXIM is providing the
("the New Miyazawa Initiative"), to solve the eco- equivalent of US$500 million in untied two-step
nomic difficulties of Asian countries affected by the loans to the Development Bank of the Philippines to
recent crisis and to stabilize international financial mar- make capital available for investment in plant and
kets. Specific support measures have been decided for working capital in the private sector.
the five countries, and we are working steadily to imple- * Republic of Korea. JEXIM is providing the yen
ment those measures. equivalent of US$1.3 billion in untied two-step loans
The object of this scheme is to help fulfil the financial to the Industrial Bank of Korea to make capital
needs of the following measures for recovery of the cri- available to small and medium-sized enterprises for
sis-hit countries' real economies: investment in plant and working capital.
* Providing support for corporate debt restructuring Japan has been supporting these countries' efforts to
in the private sector and measures to make financial overcome the problem of nonperforming assets by con-
systems sound and stable; tinuing to give careful scrutiny of their capital needs.
* Strengthening the social safety net; Moreover, as we work for close cooperation among the
* Stimulating the economy (promoting public works countries and multilateral agencies involved, we are
to increase employment); and studying such policies as the following.
* Taking measures to address the credit crunch (facil- First, in order to facilitate fundraising by the Asian
itating trade finance and assisting small and medium- countries in international financial markets, JEXIM
sized enterprises). will guarantee sovereign bonds issued by these coun-
To deal with the problem of corporate debt and credit tries. Guarantees from JEXIM will make it possible for
crunch that are linked with each other, the following them to issue bonds at higher ratings and lower cost,
support measures have been declared under the New and so promote the smoother acquisition of capital. It
Miyazawa Initiative. will be necessary to amend the law before JEXIM can
* Thailand. To sustain the reform of the financial and guarantee bond issues, and such a revised law is now
industrial sectors and strengthen the competitive being presented to the legislature. It is hoped that in the
fundamentals of the economy, Japan is providing the long run this scheme will lead to the establishment of a
yen equivalent to US$600 million for economic and new international guarantee institution focused on the
financial adjustment in cofinancing with the World Asian countries.
Bank's Economic and Financial Adjustment II Second, in order to provide guarantees and interest
(EFAL II) program. In addition, the Export-Import subsidies, Japan will establish and fund an Asian
Bank of Japan (JEXIM) is providing the yen equiv- Currency Crisis Support Facility. This facility will guar-
alent of US$50 million in untied two-step loans to antee loans to Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines,
the Industrial Finance Corporation of Thailand and Thailand, and other countries affected by the currency
the Krung Thai Bank to make capital available in the crisis provided through cofinancing by the Asian
manufacturing sector for investment in plant and Development Bank (ADB) and private financial institu-
working capital. tions, as well as bonds issued by countries receiving
* Malaysia. A yen loan in the amount of approxi- ADB support. The facility will also provide capital for
mately Y16.3 billion is being provided to the Fund bond guarantees and interest subsidies to reduce the
for Small and Medium Scale Industries to make cap- burden of repayment for countries that receive loans
ital available to small and medium-sized enterprises cofinanced by ADB and JEXIM or private financial
for investment in plant and working capital. institutions. It is our intention in Japan to make this
* The Philippines. A loan cofinanced with the World Support Facility into an open framework that is also
Bank will provide the yen equivalent of US$300 mil- accessible to other Asian countries not affected by the
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recent currency crisis, and we hope to see more coun- ever, we also seek efforts on the part of recipient coun-
tries participate. tries tD establish transparency in their markets and
shareholder-oriented corporate governance.
The Asian Growth and Recovery
Initiative (AGRI) Transparency in markets
The Asian Currency Crisis Support Facility is to be uti- In several crisis-hit Asian countries, collusive relation-
lized in part for the Asian Growth and Recovery ships between corporations and financial institutions
Initiative (AGRI). Japan, the United States, the World have produced a fundamental lack of transparency.
Bank, and the ADB are the core members of the initia- Consequently, the financial institutions failed to con-
tive, and the AGRI aims to help facilitate Asian coun- duct adequate reviews, and this resulted in loans and
tries' efforts to finance restructuring of financial unplanned capital investment by corporations, which in
institutions and the corporate sector. This was turn brought about the accumulation of nonperforming
announced jointly by Prime Minister Obuchi and loans and excessive debt. When accurate information
President Clinton on the occasion of the Asia-Pacific on a corporation's activities and financial situation are
Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit on November made available in a timely fashion within an environ-
16, 1998. ment that provides sufficient transparency, internal and
This initiative has four major components: the Asian external checking mechanisms can function properly
Growth and Recovery Program (AGRP) that assists the and this enables firms to avoid problems such as expe-
financing of Asian countries to promote restructuring rienced currently.
of financial institutions and private sector corporations;
expansion of trade finance; mobilization of private sec- Establishing stockholder-oriented corporate
tor capital; and enhancement of technical assistance. gover-nance
The AGRP component aims to mobilize $5 billion
through guarantees, loans, and bond purchases. A part As ariother matter related to the question of trans-
of the Asian Currency Crisis Support Facility will be uti- parency, the clarification of stockholders' rights and the
lized for this program. protection of those rights will enable stockholders to
To promote implementation of this initiative, Japan, function as a restraining influence on top management.
the United States, the World Bank, and ADB, as well as This is also important in terms of fostering sound cor-
potential donor and beneficiary countries, and porate management.
Germany, which is chairing the Asia-Europe Meeting,
have been invited to participate in a meeting in Conclusion
Singapore on April 12, 1999. At this meeting, the cur-
rent status of restructuring efforts will be presented by The corporate debt problem, which was brought to
Thailand, Korea, and Indonesia; and the overview of light by the Asian crisis, is in some respects rooted in
AGRP and multilateral development banks' (MDBs') business practices that could be characterized as
policies concerning guarantees and related matters will "Asian," and reform and improvement of this deep-
be explained by the World Bank and ADB. rooted issue will require considerable time and cost.
However, the goal is to have the Asian countries achieve
Transparency in markets and sustainable growth for the coming twenty-first century,
stockholder-oriented corporate and not to fall behind other emerging economies. In
governance order to accomplish this goal, we must take this oppor-
tunity to work out methods for dealing with corporate
Up to this point, I have spoken about issues of corpo- debt and establishing proper corporate governance.
rate debt restructuring in Asian countries, and Japan's CorpDrate governance, in particular, is an issue that
support in that regard. In providing this support, how- Japan also must address. In this regard, too, the Japanese
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government recognizes that the Asian countries must
reinforce their cooperative framework further.
Note
Kyoto Ido is a Deputy Director GeneraL with the International
Bureau, Ministry of Finance, Japan.
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Asian Corporate Credit
Needs and Governance
Dominique Dwor-Fr6caut
Mary Hallward-Driemeier
Francis X. Colaqo
T he nature of corporate finance and its governance has been consid-
ered to be at the core of the major economic downturns in all five
East Asian "crisis' countries-Indonesia, the Republic of Korea,
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand. It has been argued by some that the
structure of corporate finance, in particular high exposure to short-term debt
(principally loans from banks) and high debt-equity ratios (or leveraging), has
made it extremely difficult for East Asian corporates to manage the turbulence
in financial and currency markets of recent years.' Also, the slow pace of cor-
porate recovery in these countries has been attributed primarily to a continu-
ing lack of credit for financially and economically viable projects and firms, at
prevailing interest rates. These hypotheses can now be examined directly with
firm-level data that have recently become available.
The five "crisis" countries surveyed a total of 3,700 manufacturing firms
between November 1998 and February 1999. The quantitative indicators in
the surveys include information for 1996, the first and second halves of 1997,
and the first half of 1998, while the qualitative information refers to the firms'
views in the period from November 1998 to February 1999. The quantitative
information deals with production, employment, and balance sheet indicators.
The qualitative questions that were answered by the owner or senior manager
of the firm in a personal interview dealt with views regarding the prospects for
recovery and the impediments to it. This information provides for the first time
a basis for examining the structure of domestic finance prior to the crisis at the
firm level-not just for firms listed on the stock exchange, but also for unlisted
companies and small and medium enterprises. It also provides a valuable
source for the qualitative views of the sample firms on what problems they con-
front and on what needs to be done to accelerate corporate recovery.
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The sample was designed in conjunction with the sta- put. Less than 20 percent export the majority of their
tistical agency in each country. The firms were selected production. A quarter of the firms have a foreign part-
from the principal manufacturing sectors in each coun- ner holding at least a 10 percent ownership stake. The
try. The sectors selected were auto parts, chemicals, ownership structure varies across countries: on average
electronics, food processing, garments, machinery, and 20 percent of the firms are publicly listed, 55 percent are
textiles. The sectoral composition differs across coun- private corporations, and the remainder are partner-
tries, but each sector was chosen by at least three coun- ships, single proprietorships, cooperatives, and other
tries, thus providing a basis for regional comparisons. A forms of business.
random sampling technique was used to select firms, in This paper, drawing on the surveys, presents in the
order for the survey to be representative of the popula- next section the structure of corporate finance prior to
tion of firms in each sector of each country. the crisis and in mid-1998 in the five crisis countries,
Approximately two-thirds of the resulting sample, including leveraging (or debt-equity ratios) of the firms
drawn from firms with more than 20 employees, com- included in the surveys. It considers issues relating to
prises small and medium enterprises (firms with fewer the allocation of credit, and the financing of the firms'
than 150 employees), and one-third is made up of large requirements for working capital, investment, and
firms (see table 5.1). Just over one-half of the firms in exports. In particular, it examines the role of short-term
these tradable goods sectors export some of their out- debt and of financing by domestic and foreign banks.
TABLE 5.1
Characteristics of the sample
(percent)
Size Export orientation FDIfirm Sector Totat
Small Large Nonexporters Exporters No Yes Food Text. and garments Electr. Mach. Chem. Auto.
Country
Indonesia 56 44 64 36 82 18 32 26 12 30 - 816
Korea, Rep. of 65 35 25 75 83 17 - 23 35 28 14 857
MaLaysia 74 26 53 47 74 26 26 31 20 20 4 693
PhiLippines 48 52 48 52 64 36 26 37 21 16 - 564
Thailand 63 37 43 57 70 30 10 54 16 20 659
Sector
Food 66 34 64 36 84 16 - - - - - 649
Textiles and garments 63 37 48 52 82 18 - - - - - 1194
Electronics and
electricaL machinery 58 42 29 71 61 39 - - - - - 752
Chemicals 61 39 44 56 73 27 - - - - - 717
Auto parts 63 37 44 56 75 25 - - - - - 277
Size
SmaLL - - 60 40 85 15 19 34 20 20 8 2077
Large - - 24 76 62 38 16 33 23 21 8 1257
Export orientation
Nonexporters 80 20 - - 90 10 25 35 14 19 8 1629
Exporters 46 54 - - 64 36 12 33 28 20 8 1923
FDIfirms
No 69 31 54 46 - - 20 36 17 20 8 2792
Yes 38 62 19 81 - - 12 25 33 22 8 889
Indebtedness
Low 63 37 49 51 73 27 17 33 22 20 8 1204
High 55 45 36 64 76 24 12 35 24 19 9 772
Foreign borrowing
No 67 33 49 51 80 20 16 36 21 20 8 1911
Yes 37 63 13 87 58 42 6 29 30 21 13 700
Total 2000 1221 1570 1861 2688 872 649 1194 752 717 277 3589
Note: Percentages represent he share of the row variabLe that has the corresponding coLumn characteristic.
Source: World Bank, Firm-LeveL Survey.
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With this factual basis, the paper next explores a central Corporate finance: liquidity, credit, domestic
issue that is important for policy: is corporate recovery and foreign debt
constrained by the availability of credit? The following
section takes up a selected number of issues regarding Before examining issues of credit availability, it is
corporate financial distress, including the profitability important to be familiar with the financial characteris-
of the firms, and more important, the firms' views as tics of the firms. As the database represents a set of firms
reflected in the surveys on their ability to service loan for which little prior information was available, the
repayments in the twelve months beyond the timc of the description of the financial position of firms, especially
surveys. Then the paper examines some issues that are of the small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and
important to evaluating corporate financial governance unlisted firms, is of particular intcrest in itself.
and the institutional framework in which it occurs. The
final section presents the conclusions of the analysis and Financing of working capital and investment
their implications for policy.
In analyzing corporate finances, it is important to dis-
Structure of corporate finance prior to tinguish between "liquidity" (or cash flow) and credit
the crisis and in mid-1998 (in other words, the firms' debt). The former is a
broader concept that includes internal earnings, own-
Approximately two-thirds of the firms, as noted above, ers' equity, and credit from domestic and foreign banks,
are categorized as small and medium, and one-third are financial institutions, and suppliers. Credit refers to
large (more than 150 workers). The survey sample only the latter items. The distinction will be important
includes a preponderance of unlisted firms (in other in the discussion below of liquidity problems and the
words, firms that are not listed on stock exchanges), role of credit constraints.
from which financial information has been collected for Almost 40 percent of the total financial resources
the first time. These firms do not generally have care- available to the firms in the survey, both for short-term
fully audited financial statements, and they are not financing and investment, came from internal earnings
accustomed to answering detailed questions on finan- in bot h early 1997 and in 1998 (see figure 5.1). In fact,
cial matters. The survey results on corporate finance, these ratios showed a slight increase after July 1997 as
therefore, have to be interpreted with caution. the tendency to resort to borrowing decreased.
It should also be noted that this survey, as is also true Borrowing from domestic banks and other financial
of other similar surveys, suffers from a survival bias, in institutions, which covered about 38 percent of short-
that only the firms that had survived until the end of term liquidity needs and 43 percent of long-term needs
1998 could be included in the sample. Statistical agen- in the first half of 1997, had declined to 34 percent and
cies, in order to get some measure of this bias, noted the 38 percent respectively in the first half of 1998. The
nonresponse rate of firms that no longer existed share of financing coming from internal sources is par-
because of bankruptcies or closures. On average, 10 ticularly high in Malaysia and lowest in Thailand. The
percent of the firms in the sample were no longer in extent of the reliance on internal earnings as a source of
operation at the time of the interviews.2 Thus, the funding helps explain why many firms do not regard
results are likely to represent a more optimistic view of credit constraints as the chief obstacle to recovery in
the reaction to the crisis relative to the entire population 1999.
of the firms in mid-1997. The focus of this paper is on Lookcing specifically at the sources of working capital,
the prospects for recovery of the firms that existed at the the bulk (between 50 and 65 percent) of working capi-
time of the survey. The analysis should not be affected tal requirements of the firms in Korea, Malaysia, and
by this form of bias. Nevertheless, the results are pre- the Philippines were met out of retained earnings. By
sented as reflecting a broad tendency rather than point- contrast, this ratio was 39 percent for Indonesian and
specific quantitative estimates. The qualitative answers only 27 percent for Thai firms (see figure 5.2). Around
represent a brand new source of information for how 30-40 percent of working capital requirements came
the firms see their problems and prospects. from loans in all five countries, with the remainder
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coming from informal sources of financing-family, Financing in foreign currency
partners, and informal moneylenders. In the case of
Indonesian and Thai firms, these latter sources pro- While foreign banks appear to play a small role as a
vided about one-third of total working capital require- source of credit, a distinction must be made between
ments; in the case of Korean, Malaysian, and Filipino using foreign banks and borrowing in foreign currency.
firms, only about 15 percent came from these sources. While few firms borrowed from foreign banks, the
There does not seem to be much variation across sectors share of foreign currency debt was higher-1'7 percent
in the tendency to seek informal sources of finance for on average. For large firms and exporters, the share of
working capital. Curiously, large firms seem to rely foreign debt is approximately one-quarter of their total
more on informal sources to meet their working capital borrowing. The predominance of large firms and of
needs than do small firms. exporters helps explain why foreign credit was higher in
Turning to credit, figure 5.3 illustrates the differences Korea (29 percent) than in Indonesia, Malaysia, the
between SMEs and large firms in the source of credit Philippines, and Thailand (between 6 and 14 percent).
they rely on. The chart indicates both the reliance on (See table 5.2).
credit and the shares of credit represented by domestic While foreign debt as a proportion of total debt
financial institutions, foreign banks, securities markets, declined in Indonesia and Korea from 1996 to the first
and other, more informal, channels of lending. Korea is half of 1998 and remained relatively steady in the
the only country where large firms rely less on credit Philippines, it increased in Malaysia and I'hailand.
than SMEs. Although SMEs generally have a smaller Reflecting the export-oriented nature of activities, as
share of credit in their overall financing, domestic finan- well as the existence of foreign joint-venture partners,
cial institutions represent roughly equal shares of the firms in the auto parts and electronics sectors had the
credit borrowed by SMEs and large firms. Much more largest exposure to foreign debt, which nev ertheless
striking is the large firms' share of credit from foreign represented only 21-26 percent of total debt.
banks, at four times the rate of SMEs. SMEs relied to a The relatively low exposure of the firms in r:his sam-
greater extent on more informal sources of borrowing ple-tvo-thirds of which are SMEs-to foreign financ-
for their credit needs in every country but Korea. The ing implies that the fluctuations in international
average was 21 percent of credit versus 14 percent for finance (supply, exchange rates, and interest rates)
larger firms. were primarily transmitted to the largest number of
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FIGURE 5.2
Sources of working capitaL, first haLf of 1998
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FIGURE 5.3
Sources of short-term credit, first half of 1998
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TABLE 5.2
Financial structure by firm characteristics
(percent)
Totai equityl Short-term debV Foreign debt Share of working capital
totalfinancing totat debt total debt financed with internalfunds
1998first 1998first 1998 first 1998 first
1996 1997 half 1996 1997 half 1996 1997 half 1996 1997 half
Country
Indonesia 52.7 53.7 56.3 55.4 55.1 56.2 6.9 6.0 6.1 38.1 38.3 38.5
Korea 35.3 34.7 41.9 50.9 51.9 50.0 36.9 29.7 29.2 49.7 50.1 51.9
Mataysia 44.6 46.2 45.5 52.5 53.1 52.8 8.5 9.8 10.0 64.9 64.4 64.8
Phitippines 37.6 43.9 44.3 51.3 55.8 55.5 8.7 8.9 8.8 55.9 55.5 55.6
ThaiLand 47.1 46.8 51.1 55.3 57.6 56.8 10.7 12.4 13.2 27.7 27.5 27.4
Sector
Food 48.7 50.5 51.3 53.6 54.2 53.9 5.7 5.6 5.0 51.5 51.7 52.4
TextiLes and garments 43.1 44.9 48.9 53.3 55.6 55.9 14.2 12.7 13.2 43.2 43.4 44.5
ELectronics and
eLectrical machinery 40.4 41.7 44.5 53.8 55.5 54.9 23.1 21.9 21.3 50.4 50.9 52.2
Chemicals 44.4 45.9 49.6 51.4 52.3 49.9 19.5 17.7 17.6 47.3 46.8 48.4
Auto parts 42.0 43.2 46.6 52.4 53.3 52.5 26.4 22.1 23.5 42.0 40.4 37.0
Size
SmaLl 46.6 48.2 51.6 50.2 51.4 50.9 11.6 10.6 10.7 50.8 50.5 50.2
Large 39.1 40.4 43.0 56.3 58.3 57.9 25.0 22.5 22.7 40.1 40.8 43.3
Export onentation
Nonexporters 49.4 51.1 53.7 50.2 51.9 51.8 5.1 5.6 5.3 51.5 51.0 49.9
Exporters 39.1 40.3 44.0 54.7 56.1 55.1 25.4 22.4 22.6 43.2 43.6 46.0
FDI firms
No 43.8 45.3 48.5 50.9 52.4 51.6 14.1 11.9 12.0 47.3 47.4 47.9
Yes 42.8 44.4 47.3 59.0 60.7 60.4 27.4 27.8 27.8 45.7 45.4 47.1
Totol 43.6 45.1 48.3 53.0 54.5 53.8 17.4 15.8 15.9 46.9 46.9 47.6
Source: World Bank, Firm-LeveL Survey.
firms indirectly through the domestic banks and finan- corporate financial governance is the ability to manage
cial institutions that were the major borrowers from risk through financial instruments.
foreign sources.3 The domestic financial system has
thus played a critical role in the downturn in corporate Short-term debt and leveraging
activity and must be a central factor in its recovery. For
the large firms, and those that are exporters, there was The high recourse to short-term debt and the high level
also a direct impact, since their foreign debt exposure of leveraging (debt-equity ratios) have been advanced as
was higher. characteristics of East Asian firms that reflect inade-
The major role of banks, in particular domestic quacies in corporate governance and make them vul-
banks, in financing the firms' both working capital and nerable to financial crises. The results of the surveys
investment, reflects the state of development of domes- illustrate the extent of the accuracy of this portrayal,
tic financial markets.4 It is not a reflection necessarily allowing for some important distinctions based on firm
on the quality of corporate governance by the firms characteristics.
included in this survey. The paucity of financial instru- As can be seen in table 5.2, the proportion of short-
ments and limited variety of financial institutions, as term debt in total debt was reasonably high in these five
well as the lack in many cases of bankruptcy and fore- countries-just over 50 percent for all five countries.
closure laws and institutional limitations (the predomi- Domestic banks and suppliers provided the bulk of this.
nant use of real property) on collateral, constrains the Foreign currency debt accounts for 6 to 13 percent of
ability of the firms to manage risks and returns through the total, with the exception of Korea where foreign
the use of financial instruments. The essence of good debt was almost one-third of the total debt.5 There is
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TABLE 5.3
Median debt-equity ratios by sector and size, 1997
Food Textiles and Electronics and
processing garments electrical machinery Chemicals Auto parts Country average
Small firms
Indonesia 0.6 0.3 1.2 0.7 - 0.57
Korea - 3.2 2.1 2.1 2.3 2.15
MaLaysia 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.67
Philippines 1.0 1.5 2.9 1.3 - 1.47
Thailand 1.2 1.1 1.4 - 0.8 1.10
Large firms
Indonesia 1.0 1.5 2.1 1.4 - 1.53
Korea - 4.1 1.9 1.5 2.7 2.40
Malaysia 0.7 1.0 0.9 0.9 3.3 0.96
Philippines 1.4 2.4 1.0 1.3 - 1.77
Thailand 1.7 1.9 0.8 - 1.7 1.56
Mean debt-equity ratios by sector and size, 1997
Food Textiles and Electronics and
processing garments electrical machinery Chemicals Auto parts Country average
Small firms
Indonesia 1.4 0.9 1.3 1.5 - 1.29
Korea - 4.1 2.7 2.7 2.8 2.98
MaLaysia 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.9 2.5 1.53
PhiLippines 1.7 2.4 3.3 3.7 - 2.75
ThaiLand 2.4 2.1 2.7 - 2.3 2.28
Large firms
Indonesia 1.9 2.5 2.8 2.3 - 2.37
Korea - 4.6 3.3 2.3 4.2 3.47
MaLaysia 2.5 3.1 2.3 3.0 3.6 2.80
PhiLippines 2.6 4.0 1.6 3.2 - 2.95
ThaiLand 2.5 2.6 2.2 - 2.9 2.53
Source: World Bank, Firm-Level Survey.
not much variation in the reliance on short-term debt On average for all firms included in the surveys, debt
across sectors. However, exporters and large firms do represented 55 percent, and equity 45 percent, of total
have somewhat higher ratios. The average short-term financing. However, there is considerable variation
debt in this sample is just over 50 percent of the total, across countries, sectors and firm size (see table 5.3).
compared with about 25 percent for firms in the United Overall, the median ratios are lower than the means,
States and 45 percent for firms in Germany. Country indicating a skewed distribution with some firms hav-
variation was greater in the use of suppliers' credits, a ing quite high debt-equity ratios.6 Korean firms stand
form of self-liquidating short-term debt. It represented out as having higher debt-equity ratios, with signifi-
30 to 40 percent in Thailand and Indonesia, and over cantly higher median ratios than the other countries.
50 percent in the other three countries, reaching 65 per- The median ratio is 2.19 and the mean is 3.13 in Korea
cent in the Philippines. One consequence of the crisis is compared with a median of 0.88 and mean of 1.78 in
that the share of both inputs and outputs financed with Indonesia, or of 0.67 and 1.99, respectively, in
suppliers' credits declined (11 percent and 4 percent, Malaysia. In almost every category, large firms have
respectively) between the first half of 1997 and the end much higher debt-equity ratios than small firms. The
of 1998, as firms that found themselves in tight liquid- overall mean for small firms is 2.19 versus 2.77 for large
ity positions restricted their provision of credit. This firms. This reflects the greater access large firms have to
was true across all sectors. external financing, particularly to foreign banks and to
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equity and bond markets. Across sectors, electronics, reflecting the fact that the sector experienced the
auto parts, and textiles have higher debt-equity ratios, sharpest fall in domestic demand. The firms in food,
reflecting the greater capital intensity of these indus- and textiles and garments experienced smaller declines,
tries. While not reported in table 5.3, there is a shift in while the firms in electronics and electrical machinery,
the ratios over time. The pattern appears to be an initial and chemicals actually saw their average profitability
increase in 1997 relative to 1996, followed by a decline rise. The most important predictor for whether a firm's
in 1998. This can be explained by the initial rise in debt profit margin fell was its level of indebtedness. Highly
owing to both exchange rate effects on foreign currency leveraged firms were significantly more likely to have
liabilities and the firms' borrowing more to finance the lower profits, consistent with the need to cover larger
higher cost of imported inputs. However, with the rise interest payments as interest rates rose sharply follow-
in interest rates and the decline in domestic demand, the ing the implementation of stabilization programs.
demand for loans declined. This was coupled with a
decreased willingness to lend on the part of the financial Determining whether credit availability
sector. From 1997 to 1998, the amount of debt did is a constraint o corporate recovery in
decline on average across all countries. Asia
The above debt-equity ratios compare with 1.03 for
listed firms in the United States and 1.51 for those in Firms ia the crisis countries have been hit by a combi-
Germany. The leverage ratios of firms included in this nation of collapse in domestic demand, currency depre-
East Asian sample are higher than those of firms in ciations, and increases in interest rates following the
more industrialized countries and even of those of large implementation of stabilization programs. The declines
firms in Latin American countries.7 These high leverag- in domestic demand, except for the firms that have been
ing ratios indicate the riskiness of the financial struc- able to shift sales to foreign markets, have resulted in
tures of the East Asian firms included in the surveys, reductions in sales revenues, the principal source of liq-
and their vulnerability to financial fluctuations and uidity. Currency depreciations have substantially
movements in interest rates and exchange rates. For increased input costs and reduced profit margins and
example, the rapid increase in interest rates following available retained earnings. Higher interest rates have
the adoption of stabilization programs by these coun- increased debt-service payments, especially for firms
tries, as discussed below, put severe strains on the that borrowed heavily from domestic banks for work-
capacity of the firms to maintain required debt-service ing capital and investment needs. These factors have
payments and simultaneously to generate the funds to strained the liquidity positions of the firms, particularly
cover working capital needs. as banks and other financial institutions have become
more selective in credit provision.
Corporate profitability A much-debated issue of significant policy importance
is whether at the time of the survey (from November
In a recent paper using data only for listed companies in 1998 to February 1999) the sample firms' recovery was
1996 (that is, prior to the onset of the crisis), Claessens, being constrained by the availability of credit. The five
Djankov, and Lang (1999) conclude that in terms of country papers on Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the
return on assets, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Philippines, and Thailand, prepared for the Conference
Thailand had the most profitable firms in their on Corporate Recovery, all come to the same conclu-
Worldscope sample of 46 countries, with Malaysia fol- sion. Firms included in the surveys see the collapse in
lowing close behind. With the onset of the crisis this demand and the high cost of inputs, resulting from the
performance changed dramatically. The survey data increases in interest rates and the major currency deval-
indicate that profit margins declined between 1996 and uations, as significantly more important factors
the first half of 1998 in all five countries. The declines accounting for their present predicament than aggregate
were smaller in Indonesia and Korea, and up to 5 per- credit availability. Broader studies by the Economic
cent in Thailand. The sample firms in the auto parts sec- Research Department of the Bank of Thailand 8 and
tor suffered the largest declines in profitability, Swati R. Ghosh9 come to a similar conclusion.
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However, policymakers have in some cases been per- firms and projects that are not viable at prevailing inter-
suaded that increases in aggregate credit availability are est rates-it leads to financial crises. There is evidence
necessary, and may even be critical, for corporate recov- that it was this kind of behavior by financial in stitutions
ery. In this section we examine the evidence from the that contributed to the recent financial crises in East
survey data on this important issue. Asia and elsewhere. In this case, increases in r.he aggre-
In the earlier discussion, a distinction was made gate supply of credit are not the recommenced policy
between "liquidity" or cash flow and credit-it was noted because they might lead to further expansions in loan
that the former is a broader concept that subsumes the portfolios, worsen problems of capital inadequacy, and
latter. Here the concern is with credit, or the availability delay financial and corporate restructuring. Rather,
of financing from sources external to the firm, be they increases in the pool of viable projects are to be fostered
domestic or foreign. The issue, at one level, is whether by stimulation of aggregate demand accompanied by
in the aggregate the demand for credit for viable pro- financial and corporate restructuring.
jects exceeds its aggregate supply at prevailing interest It could be, however, that when interest rates are high,
rates.1 0 At another level, and one to which the survey there is adverse selection and an exaggerated perception
data are specifically relevant, the issue has to do with of risk by lending institutions. This could arise because
the allocation of credit and the availability of credit to of imperfections in information about the true quality
specific firms and projects at prevailing interest rates. of firms and projects, or owing to lending institutions'
In formulating policies it is important to understand exaggerated aversion to risk. In such a case, improve-
the nature of an aggregate credit availability constraint, ments in transparency and information availability,
if it exists. The very fact that the aggregate supply of through improved accounting and auditing, could
credit has decreased does not, in and of itself, imply that reduce perceived risks. Also, institutional improve-
there are viable firms and projects that are not securing ments, such as required legal changes for ba.nkruptcy
credit at prevailing interest rates. It is important to and foreclosures, and mergers and acquisitions would
examine both the supply and demand for credit for facilitate required corporate and bank restructuring.
viable projects at prevailing interest rates. The firms' Nevertheless, to the extent that there is a group of
demand for credit depends on their production and firms and projects, within the total set of firms and pro-
sales prospects. There could simultaneously have been jects that are economically and financially viable at pre-
an even larger decrease in demand in response to the vailing interest rates, that are not receiving required
decrease in demand for the firms' output-such that credits, special measures may be required. Such mea-
there would be, at prevailing interest rates, an excess sures, however, should be carefully designed to meet the
supply, rather than a shortage of credit. If, however, specified needs of the adversely affected groups of firms
there is an excess demand for credit, then measures to and projects, while maintaining lending standards, and
increase liquidity are required. Increases in liquidity not retarding bank and corporate restructuring.
would also have the impact of lowering interest rates. Information of the kind collected in the present surveys
The trajectory of nominal interest rates could thus be could be useful in coming to judgments about required
an indicator of the tightness of credit conditions. Rising measures.
nominal interest rates would be an indicator of excess The next two sections of this paper will examine the
aggregate demand for credit, while falling interest rates evidence on the role of credit availability as a constraint
would indicate excess aggregate supply of credit. to corporate recovery in 1999 for firms in the sectors
Credit aggregates, however, do not indicate whether and countries included in the surveys. We will start by
there is rationing of credit, or inefficiencies in the allo- examining the evolution of aggregate supply of credit to
cation of credit. Credit rationing is a normal function of the private sector, as well as the evolution of nominal
financial institutions. Credit rationing involves the and real interest rates, both of which have important
selection of viable firms and projects for financing at implications for the viability of firms and projects. We
prevailing interest rates. It is thus a desirable role for will then present the firms' views on the impact of liq-
financial institutions. If this principle is systematically uidity availability on their ability to expand output and
violated-that is, if credit is systematically provided to exports.
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Aggregate supply of credit to the private domestic credit to the private sector is shown in figure
sector and interest rates 5.4; credit to the private sector declined between mid-
1997 and mid-1998 in Indonesia, the Philippines, and
Despite a reversal in capital flows, which represented Thailand.12 This decline is mirrored by the decline in
on average 10 percent of the gross domestic product industrial production.
(GDP) in the five countries, there was no commensurate The crisis and the stabilization programs that were
decline in credit to the private sector.1 The evolution of adopted in the immediate aftermath greatly curtailed
FIGURE 5.4
Real domestic private credit and industrial production, 3-month moving average 1996-98
(Index July 1997=100)
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the availability of credit. Bank liquidity and capital countries, real interest rates by the end of 1998 were
were severely affected by mounting stocks of nonper- below their precrisis levels.
forming loans. Estimates of peak nonperforming loans
ranged from 30 percent of the total loan portfolio of Liquidity constraints and output and exports
banks in Korea to 75 percent in Indonesia, while the
banking sector in the Philippines did not experience The surveys included qualitative questions. These asked
systemic difficulties.13The credit constraint was exacer- firms to rank on a scale from 1 (least important) to 5
bated in the immediate postcrisis period by the tighten- (most important), the factors that accounted for the
ing of capital adequacy and loan classification rules that decline in output and exports. These qualitative ques-
were implemented. Obviously, and consistent with his- tions were asked in the period between December 1998
torical experience in financial crises, risk aversion by and January 1999, 18 months after the onset of the cri-
banks increased. This issue of credit allocation, how- sis. The results are summarized in figure 5.6. Surveyed
ever, cannot be examined with aggregate data. The sur- firms in all countries expressed the view that the col-
vey data indicate (as discussed below) that some firms lapse of domestic demand was the most important fac-
felt severely credit-constrained in undertaking viable tor leading to declines in output; this was followed by
projects. the increased costs of inputs and by the high cost of
The evolution of nominal interest rates is an indicator credit. The lack of working capital, of credit 1for expan-
of the balance between the supply and demand for sion, and the debt burden seem to have played a lesser
credit over time. The main impact of the reversal of cap- role.14
ital flows has been on domestic interest rates. The evo- In the case of exports, their decline was attributed to
lution of nominal and real interest rates over the period a combination of loss of competitive advantage, credit
1997-98 is shown in figure 5.5. Nominal interest rates constraints, and to higher import costs associated with
rose sharply soon after the crisis hit, in mid-1997 in currency devaluations.15 The survey asked whether the
Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand, and at the end firms encountered problems in having adequate liquid-
of 1997 in Korea, indicating an excess demand for ity to finance production. On average 40 percent of the
credit at prevailing interest rates. In Malaysia, which firms in the five countries reported experiencing liquid-
had lower short-term foreign indebtedness, nominal ity constraints.
interest rates rose progressively starting in mid-1997, Figure 5.7 and table 5.4 show the breakdown of the
but by much less than in the other countries. In the five sample firms by various categories. About one-half of
countries, nominal interest rates declined in the second Korean and Thai firms claimed to be experiencing liqui-
half of 1998; in Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand they are dity problems. Such problems were most acute in the
now below their precrisis levels. This supports the view auto parts sector and least acute in the food products
that in the period after the second half of 1998, a period sector. Small firms, nonexporters, and firras selling
when the current survey was undertaken, excess credit mainly to the domestic market were more a:5fected by
demand had been met. liquidity difficulties, than were large firms, exporters,
The behavior of real interest rates-that is, nominal or those that had foreign direct investment. Firms that
interest rates adjusted with the producer price index- were highly indebted were more liquidity-con-strained,
however, was somewhat different. Real interest rates while there was little difference in the firms' exposure to
rose sharply immediately after the crisis hit and then foreign debt. This latter finding, while puzzling given
began a rapid decline, particularly in Indonesia, owing the extent of the depreciation, is consistent with the fact
to the surge of inflation, which occurred following the that larger, exporting firms with foreign partners were
currency devaluations. Inflation then slowed markedly predominantly those that borrowed in significant
in the second half of 1998, and real interest rates rose in amounts in foreign currency. However, even if they
the five countries, except for the Philippines. While were not severely liquidity-constrained, there are still a
nominal interest rates were at historical high levels but number of large firms, exporters, and more dynamic
declining in 1998, real interest rates remained negative firms complaining that credit constrained their ability
through most of 1998 in these countries. In all five to export.
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FIGURE 5.5
Nominal and real interest rates, March 1997-December 1998
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Sources of output decline Sources of export decline
Importance to output decline (1=not important, 5=important) Importance to export decline (1=not important, 5=important)
5 5
4 4
3 3
2 21
2 1
Source: WorLd Bank, Firm-LeveL Survey. Source: World Bank, Firm-Level Survey.
FIGURE 57 ~~~~~~~~~noted earlier, relied on retained earnings to finance
almost one-half of the total. Thus, factors that affected
Sources of inadequate liquidity cash flow rather than credit received the most attention
Contribution to inadequate liquidity (1=no contribution, by these firms. Firms in Thailand, the country that has
5=major contribution) seen the largest decline in capacity utilization. gave the
5 highest score to lower revenue. Thailand is also the
country where loans finance the largest share of work-
4 _ ing capital-and Thai firms complained the most about
the lack of loans for working capital. Similarly, firms in
3 the auto parts sector, which also saw the largest sectoral
decline in capacity utilization, also gave the highest
2 _ _ _ _ _ _ scoretorevenue factors.
A policy implication of these survey results is that,
I even though there is no evidence that at the time of the
,o$9 9s9. . surveys (from November 1998 to February 1999) there
't4 N9%Z0" @ tsG 99s >'stz was in the aggregate a shortfall of credit availability,
Source: World Bank, Firm-Level Survey. credit allocation from domestic and foreign sources is
inefficient. Small and medium firms, which constitute
two-thirds of the sample, have traditionally hlad diffi-
culties in getting credit from the banking sys:-em. The
When asked about the causes of their liquidity prob- surveys indicate that this problem has been exacerbated
lems, the firms listed in declining order of importance by the crisis. Also, many viable firms complain that they
the following: the decline in revenues, higher input costs are squeezed out of credit while their working capital
that had raised the need for working capital and the needs have increased and other sources of liquidity have
burden of servicing outstanding debt, and the lack of decreased. Policy and institutional changes to address
loans for working capital. These answers reflect the these problems, some of which are long-standing, are
sample firms' structure of working capital, which as required along with selective credit measures.
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TABLE 5.4
Source of liquidity problem
Share claiming
inadequate liquidity
(percent) By source of problem
Yes Lower revenue High input costs DE bt burden Insuff. wk. cap. Insuff. sup. crd. Others
Country
Indonesia 35 3.5 3.7 - 2.9 2.5 1.8
Korea 48 4.1 3.4 3.1 3.2 2.5 2.5
Malaysia 25 4.1 4.0 3.3 3.3 2.9 1.8
Philippines 23 3.8 - - 3.3 2.8 2.3
Thailand 56 4.4 4.3 3.9 3.7 3.2 4.2
Sector
Food 28 3.7 3.7 3.3 3.0 2.5 2.0
TextiLes and garments 42 4.0 4.0 3.5 3.4 2.9 2.4
ELectronic and
electricaL mach. 37 4.3 3.7 3.2 3.3 2.7 2.0
Chemicals 33 3.8 3.7 3.3 3.1 2.6 2.0
Auto parts 61 4.6 3.9 3.6 3.5 2.8 3.0
Size
Small 42 4.2 3.8 3.3 3.2 2.7 2.1
Large 32 3.8 3.8 3.7 3.4 2.8 2.3
Export orientation
Nonexporters 41 4.1 3.9 3.4 3.2 2.6 1.9
Exporters 36 4.0 3.8 3.5 3.4 2.9 2.5
FDI firms
No 41 4.1 3.8 3.4 3.3 2.7 2.1
Yes 30 4.0 4.0 3.6 3.2 2.7 2.4
indebtedness
Low 34 4.1 4.0 3.4 3.3 2.7 1.9
High 44 4.2 3.9 3.5 3.5 3.0 2.5
Foreign borrowing
No 40 4.2 3.9 3.4 3.4 2.9 3.1
Yes 40 4.0 3.7 3.6 3.4 2.6 2.7
Total 38 4.1 3.8 3.4 3.3 2.7 2.2
Source: WorLd Bank, Firm-Level Survey.
The firms' views on Loan repayment this category are 10-15 percent of the firms in Thailand
prospects and Malaysia, 20 percent in Indonesia and Korea, and
one-thi]-d in the Philippines. A third category is of firms
The questionnaires, as noted earlier, in addition to seek-
ing quantitative information from the firms, sought their FIGURE 5.8
qualitative views on their ability to meet required loan
payments, if interest rates remained at current-that is, Abilitll to meet loan payments, by country
end-of-1998 to early 1999-levels. The questions asked 100
the firms to indicate their perceived ability to meet 90
80
required loan payments, by three-month intervals, over 70
the next twelve months and beyond. About 2,000 firms 60
50in the five countries responded to this question. 40
The firms' responses are shown in figure 5.8. In the 30
five countries, a first category of firms that indicate that L
they do not expect to have problems in servicing their 0 K
loan repayments range from over two-thirds in Korea,
Malaysia, and Thailand, to one-half in Indonesia and T Can pay for up to 3 months
a Can pay for 3 months to 1 year
the Philippines. A second category indicates that the El Can pay for more than 1 year
firms expect to be able to meet loan payments for the Source: WorLd Bank, Firm-LeveL Survey.
following twelve months but not beyond that period. In
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that have indicated that they are currently having diffi- of 1997. About three-quarters of Malaysian firms and
culties in meeting loan repayments, or expect to be able two-thirds of Thai and Indonesian firms in this category
to meet loan repayments only for the next three months reported low levels of overall indebtedness. By contrast,
and not beyond. About 25 percent of the firms in two-thirds of Korean firms and one-half cf Filipino
Indonesia and Thailand, 20 percent in Malaysia, and 10 firms report high overall indebtedness. The majority of
percent in Korea fit this category. firms in this category, except for those in Korea and
Firms in the first category-in other words, those Thailand, indicate that securing adequate 1:iquidity is
that do not expect to have loan repayment difficul- not an issue. Despite high levels of indebtedness,
ties-are mainly small (see table 5.5) especially in Korean firms in this category indicate fewer difficulties
Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand, and less so in Indonesia in securing external financing. Thai firms. however,
and the Philippines. The majority of these firms in despite having lower indebtedness levels than those in
Korea, Malaysia, and the Philippines are exporters; Korea, indicate difficulties in securing bank financing
Thai firms are evenly distributed between exporters and and required liquidity for production. This could be an
nonexporters, and Indonesian are mainly oriented to indication of the different pace of corporate and bank
the domestic market. On average, capacity utilization restructuring.
for this group had declined by 15 percentage points Firms in the second category-those that do not
since 1996 and 11 percentage points since the first half expect to be able to meet loan payments beyond 12
TABLE 5.5
Profile of firms with different expectations on remaining current on debt payments
(Percentage of firms in each category)
Firms that expected to remain currentfor more than 1 year
Indonesia Koreo Malaysia Philippines Thailand Average
Experienced output decline 80 70 71 77 73 74
Capacity utilization a 59 71 69 70 64 66
SmaLL size 51 67 63 54 64 57
Exporter 45 63 51 55 42 49
Low indebtedness 67 37 75 47 63 60
Foreign debt 17 44 20 14 28 27
Liquidity is a probLem 36 60 23 28 55 42
Firms that expected to remain currentfor more than 3 months and less than 1 year
Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Thailand liverage
Experienced output decline 76 72 86 81 73 77
Capacity utilization a 63 67 64 61 60 63
SmaLl size 55 77 76 53 68 64
Exporter 38 65 48 41 69 51
Low indebtedness 71 54 91 40 66 62
Foreign debt 10 40 20 11 28 22
Liquidity is a problem 30 58 46 36 69 44
Firms that were not current or did not expect to remain currentfor more than 3 months
Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Thailand Average
Experienced output decLine 80 73 73 81 88 81
Capacity utilization' 56 69 58 62 52 57
SmaLL size 62 42 71 49 62 57
Exporter 38 85 52 50 52 51
Low indebtedness 62 42 72 57 45 55
Foreign debt 21 54 12 23 28 26
Liquidity is a problem 45 70 62 43 85 61
a. Average capacity utilization.
Source: World Bank, Firm-LeveL Survey.
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months following the surveys-are relatively few, par- * Are financing a greater portion of their working cap-
ticularly in Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand, and even ital with retained earnings (Filipino firms are an
less so in the Philippines and Indonesia. On average, exception); and
they are evenly distributed between exporters and non- * Have experienced far fewer difficulties in securing
exporters, with country differences: about two-thirds adequate amounts of liquidity for production.
are exporters in Korea and Thailand, but only about 40 The above information indicates that the sample
percent in Indonesia and the Philippines. On average, firms in the five countries see themselves at various
capacity utilization has declined by 18 percentage stages in the recovery process, as well as in their access
points since 1996 and 13 percent since the outset of the to liquidity required for production. The bulk of the
crisis. About two-thirds of Thai and Indonesian firms, firms ir Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand consider them-
over half of Korean firms, and 90 percent of Malaysian selves to be in good financial condition. This is less the
firms in this category reported low levels of indebted- case in Indonesia and the Philippines. There remain,
ness. However, 60 percent of Filipino firms in this cate- however, a significant number of firms in all five coun-
gory reported high indebtedness. The majority of the tries that were either experiencing loan repayment dif-
firms in this category reported that securing adequate ficulties at the time of the survey, or thought that they
liquidity was not an issue, except for those in Korea and would find themselves in that situation in the not too
Thailand. distant future. This financial fragility of a significant
Firms in the third category-those currently having proportion of firms in the five countries is linked both
or expecting in the near future to have loan repayment to macroeconomic conditions and the pace of bank and
difficulties-are mainly nonexporters in Indonesia, pre- corporate restructuring.
dominantly (85 percent) exporters in Korea, and
divided equally between exporters and nonexporters in Issues in corporate financial
the other three countries. In Malaysia, Thailand, and governance
Indonesia the great majority are small firms, while in
Korea they are mainly large firms. On average, capacity The surveys included a number of questions on corpo-
utilization for the firms in this group has decreased by rate financial governance, use of audited financial state-
20 percentage points since 1996, and 15 percentage ments, and the nature and use of collateral. This
points since the first half of 1997. About 60 percent of information has to be interpreted with caution, taking
the firms in this group also reported difficulties in secur- into account the nature of the firms included in the sam-
ing adequate liquidity for production-70 percent in ple and the institutional context in which they operate.
Korea, 85 percent in Malaysia and Thailand. In The samples contain a predominant number of small
Indonesia and the Philippines, the majority of the firms and mcdium-size firms that find it costly and difficult to
in this category did not report liquidity access problems, produce good-quality financial information. Instead
perhaps because the demand for their production had they anrd their credit sources tend to rely on well-estab-
declined substantially and they were not seeking access lished and long-standing relationships that have
to liquidity. Finally the majority also report low levels proved reliable for credit decisions. As firms grow,
of indebtedness. A high debt stock, with the exception however, the more formal instruments and organiza-
of the firms in Korea, does not seem to have been a tional arrangements become mechanisms for ensuring
major factor in loan repayment difficulties. greater transparency.
A comparison of the firms in the first and third cate-
gories indicates that, on average, the firms that are not Audited statements
reporting loan repayment difficulties:
* Have experienced smaller declines in capacity uti- The surveys asked whether the firms were required to
lization (Korean firms are a significant exception); produce audited statements when they applied for
* Are exporting more (Korean and Thai firms are loans. There is considerable variation across countries
exceptions); in the responses. The audit rate is highest in the
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Philippines (65 percent), Korea (63 percent), and FIGURE 5.10 0 
Malaysia (61 percent)-and below 40 percent in .
Thailand and Indonesia (see figure 5.9). These audit auditing requirements
rates, however, give no indication of the quality of Percent
auditing standards across countries. 90
It is not the case, however, that firms without audited 80
statements do not have access to bank credit. For firms 70
that receive at least 20 percent of their credit from 60
banks or finance companies, over one-third do not use 50
audited statements. The numbers are the same for both
short-term working capital and longer-term investment 40
financing. Within this group, Malaysian firms are most 30
likely to have audits, with over 80 percent reporting 10
that they provide audited statements, while the propor- 0
tion is two-thirds for Korean and Filipino firms, and Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines ThaiLand
less than one-half for the Indonesian and Thai firms. Ž Audits required U Audits not required
Audited firms are, in principle, better informed of Source: World Bank, Firm-LeveL Survey.
their financial positions, and disclosing this informa-
tion to potential creditors should reduce the risk
assessed with the loan, making access to credit some- emerges from the related issue of auditing practices in
what easier. However, the surveys do not reveal this pat- firms with inadequate liquidity. In Indonesia and
tern across all countries (see figure 5.10). While this Korea, those with liquidity problems are less likely to
pattern does hold in Indonesia and Korea, in Malaysia, audit their statements, while in the other three coun-
the Philippines, and Thailand, firms that are not tries, those with liquidity problems are more likely to be
required to provide audited statements are less likely to required to submit audited statements.
report having adequate liquidity. A similar pattern In all countries, highly leveraged firms with substan-
tial access to bank credit are more likely to have audits
than is the average firm (see figure 5.1 1). However, only
FIGURE 5.9 in Indonesia is the difference between highly leveraged
Share providing audited statements firms and low-leveraged firms very striking. Within thisIShare providing audited statementsI
and collateral, by country and size of firm group of highly leveraged firms, however, there are still
significant proportions-40 percent in Indonesia and
100 Korea, and 60 percent in Thailand-that do not pro-
90 vide audits.
70 While highly leveraged firms are more likely to pro-
60 vide audited statements, there is surprisingly no clear
50 relationship between the maturity of the credic obtained
40 and whether audited statements are required. Thus, the
30 firms that have a substantial share of long-term credit20
10 3are not more likely to have been requirecL to have
0 .~audited statements than the firms without long-tcrmn/ &<9s¢\@a >S8^2 <st$ 9>OxWagS9 > | debt. Likewise, the firms that are requirecL to havel e 49 e $ audited statements do not have significant differences in
SmaLl Large the share of long-term debt to total debt than the firms
U ColLatera[ provided C1 Audits required that are not so required. This may also reflect the fact
Source: World Bank, Firr-Leve. Survey. that long-term investments are often financed by rolling
1 ______________________________________________________ _ 1 over short-term credits.
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The more striking difference is for firms that borrow CoLlatfral
in foreign currency. Here the pattern is more similar
across countries. Such firms are significantly more Land and physical assets are the principal form of col-
likely (85 percent) to have audited statements. The lateral :.n these countries, representing at least part of
same is true for large firms and exporters. the collateral in 90 percent of the cases in which collat-
The legal organization of the surveyed firms is also eral is provided. Machinery and equipment is the sec-
correlated with whether or not they audit their financial ond most common form, and in Korea the use of
statements. Partnerships and single proprietorships (20 financial instruments is starting to increase. The use of
percent of the sample) are much less likely to do so; collateral in securing loans is by far the most common
two-thirds of incorporated companies, however, have in Korea where 90 percent of firms have collateralized
external audits. In Korea, almost all private corpora- loans. In Malaysia, 40 percent of firms provide collat-
tions do provide the required external audits, while in eral, arid between 50 and 60 percent of firms in the
Malaysia and Indonesia only 50 percent of the corpo- other countries do so.
rations have external audits, and less than 10 percent of Firms that provide collateral are slightly less likely to
unincorporated firms have them. have liquidity problems, although this is not uniformly
The correlation between legal organization and size is the case. In fact, two-thirds of the firms with collateral
also reflected in the survey data. Three-quarters of the in Thailand are facing liquidity problems. In Indonesia,
large firms provided audited statements versus 40 per- Malaysia, and the Philippines, two-thirds of the firms
cent of the small firms. For the smaller firms, develop- with collateral are not liquidity-constrained. In Korea
ing a relationship with the creditor is often seen as more the ratios are even.
reliable than the system of accounts used in such firms. Other than in Malaysia, highly indebted firms are sig-
Small firms have dealt with their primary creditor for nifican:ly more likely to have to provide collateral for
70 percent of the life of the firm. (The high is 88 percent loans. B3ut as with the auditing results, there are still
in Thailand and the low is 60 percent in Indonesia). over 301 percent of highly indebted firms in each coun-
Thus small firms that do not provide audited statements try, except Korea, that qualify for loans without collat-
are often characterized as having a long-standing rela- eral. In Indonesia and Malaysia, firms that rely to a
tionship with their primary creditor. major extent on short-term debt are less likely to pro-
vide collateral, although little difference is discernible in
Korea and Thailand.
FIGURE 5.11 The information on collateral usage needs to be sup-
FIGURE 5.11 plemented with other information available to lenders.
Share required to have audited statements for Other questions in the survey indicate that financial
bank loans, by degree of leverage institutions do have information about their clients that
Percent they m:.ght be using instead of relying on collateral. On
80 average, sample firms have worked for over nine years
70 with their primary financial institution. These tradi-
60 tional relationships may be efficient substitutes for
50 some of the more common financial reporting require-
40 - * * ments, in view of the high cost of reducing information
30 asymmetries for small and medium-size firms.
20 Governiance
10
Inoe. r y p Only one-third of the firms in Korea have independent
Indonesia Korea MaLaysia PhiLippinesThailand directors on their boards. In Indonesia the correspond-
Source: World BnHighly Leveraged y Low leverage ing figure is 10 percent, in Thailand 14 percent, in the
Source: World Bank, Firm-LeveL Survey. Philippines 20 percent, and in Malaysia 25 percent.
Asian- Corporates' Credit Needs and Governance 79
Employee representation on boards is highest in the small subset of large firms is short-term foreign cur-
Philippines at 18 percent, almost triple the rate in the rency debt a significant share of total debt. The sur-
other four countries. Only in Malaysia and the veyed firms, with the exception of those in Korea,
Philippines, however, is the board likely to have a dom- had relatively low exposures to foreign financing,
inant say in decisions. In Korea, management has the and relied primarily on domestic banks and finan-
dominant role. In Indonesia and Thailand, the original cial institutions for their credit needs. The higher
owners control the firms. exposure to foreign finance by banks, combined
In a sample of listed companies analyzed by Claessens, with their less than careful approach to loan evalu-
Djankov, Fan, and Lang,1 6 there are significant cross- ation, has resulted in overexposed positions, and
ownership links between firms and financial institu- consequent reluctance to lend.
tions, which could lead to preferential access to credit. * The firms do not think that there is an aggregate
In this sample, on first evidence and without detailed shortage of credit relative to their needs for financ-
examination, it seems that only 3 percent of the firms ing viable projects. In other words, at prevailing
have reported financial institutions with an ownership interest rates, credit availability in the aggregate is
stake in them. not seen by the surveyed firms as being a major
However, there is a heavy concentration of owner- impediment to corporate recovery. Their principal
ship, as also evidenced in the sample provided by concern is with the low level of domestic demand.
Claessens and others (1999). Approximately 20 percent The surveys, however, offer evidence that there are
of the firms have 1O or more shareholders. Among these inefficiencies in the allocation of credit, and that
firms, the top 10 shareholders own three-quarters of the some firms, including small and medium-size firms,
firm. This concentration raises issues about minority feel credit constrained.
shareholder rights. * The great majority of the sample firms in Korea,
Malaysia, and Thailand believe they will be able to
Concluding comments meet loan repayments as required. This is less the
case in Indonesia and the Philippines. However,
This paper has analyzed the evidence regarding corpo- there remain significant numbers of firms in all five
rate credit needs and governance from the surveys of countries that were either experiencing loan repay-
some 3,700 firms in five countries-Indonesia, Korea, ment difficulties at the time of the survey, or thought
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand, covering that they would find themselves in that situation in
major manufacturing and export sectors. The surveys the near future if prevailing macroeconomic condi-
were completed in February 1999. The quantitative tions persisted. This weak financial cond&tion of a
information relates to the period between 1996 and the significant proportion of the firms is linked to both
first half of 1998; the qualitative information covers the macroeconomic conditions and the pace of bank
survey period from November 1998 to February 1999. and corporate restructuring. Traditional relation-
The survey sample includes firms that are listed on ships are important between small and medium-size
stock exchanges, as well as those that are not; the latter firms and their lenders, and have compersated for
represent 80 percent of the sample. For this latter group weaknesses in commonly accepted aspects of corpo-
of firms in particular, financial information has been rate governance, including availability and utiliza-
collected for the first time, and therefore may not be of tion of audited financial statements, collateral
the same quality as for the listed firms. Accordingly, the requirements, and corporate management struc-
survey results are presented as gcneral indications of tures. Improvemcnts in financial transparency are
tendencies rather than as point estimates. required for more efficient allocation of credit and
The principal findings of this paper are as follows: reduction in its cost.
* The international financial fluctuations of recent * The corporate recovery is taking place at an uneven
years were transmitted to the firms primarily pace between countries, sectors, and firms, with sig-
through their impact on domestic banks. Only for a nificant weaknesses remaining.
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Notes eign bor-owing, so certainly some of the exchange rate shocks were
transmitt:ed irectLy to the corporate sector.
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Financial Sector
Restructuring: Progress
and Issues
Javad K. Sbirazi
his paper provides a review of the progress and the key issues inT restructuring the financial systems of the countries at the center of the
1997-98 East Asian crisis-Indonesia, the Republic of Korea,
Malaysia, and Thailand.1 The first section contains an overview of the genesis
of the crisis. The paper then examines the restructuring and recapitalization of
these countries' financial institutions. This is followed by a section summariz-
ing the steps taken to strengthen the prudential standards and the legal frame-
works to facilitate debt recovery and restructuring. Then a brief discussion on
interest rates, spreads, and loan growth is included. The final part of the paper
attempts to draw some conclusions and lessons from the Asian crisis and the
steps taken to restore health to the financial sector The paper is not intended
to be an exhaustive survey.
The genesis of the crisis
In early 1997, despite signs of mounting currency pressures in Thailand, few-
if any-observers could have predicted that East Asia would face a financial
and economic crisis of the intensity and duration that it has. With a stellar
growth performance spanning two decades, and a sustained record of broadly
prudent economic management, the region was the envy of the developing
world and attracted substantial and growing inflows of international capital
from the industrial countries as a sign of confidence. What led to the unprece-
dented crisis that engulfed the region?
While much has been written on the origins of the crisis,2 its root causes can
be summarized simply as follows:
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* Private investment booms in the 1990s and the asso- The unprecedented capital inflows into the region
ciated asset bubbles that were fueled by (perceived) played a critical role in fueling the rapid growth of
cheap foreign credit, mostly in the form of short- banks' and other financial intermediaries' balance
term bank lending to both financial institutions and sheets. The quality of assets being acquired was often
corporates; poor and there was inadequate appreciation of, and
* Large (Malaysia and Thailand) and growing pricing for, liquidity and credit risks. The massive cred-
(Indonesia and Korea) current account deficits, its extended to the real estate sector are indicative of this
incurred under fixed or nearly fixed exchange rate phenomenon. As the exchange rate crises unfolded and
regimes with the exchange rate pegged to a rising the interest rates were raised, the impact on the balance
dollar; sheets of financial institutions and corporations was
* Declining productivity of investment, as manifested severe. The subsequent contraction of economic activ-
in rapidly rising incremental capital-output ratios, ity exacerbated the damage. Ironically, the large-scale
and erosion of export competitiveness, particularly capital inflows, which were in part attracted by sound
in Thailand, caused by real wage increases signifi- macroeconomic policies, led to the buildup of external
cantly outstripping productivity growth; and domestic financial imbalances that made the sys-
* Weak and inadequately regulated financial systems, tems highly vulnerable to loss of confidence, speculative
which could not handle the rapid growth of domes-
tic credit and price risks appropriately; and
* Questionable and nontransparent corporate prac- F 6.1
tices and governance. Net private capital fLows of Asia 5
Once the financial turbulence began in one country, $US billions
the contagion effects were strong, generating a wide- 100
spread crisis of confidence and ensuing panic, which on 
the whole was clearly unwarranted on the basis of the 80
"fundamentals," but perhaps not irrational from the 60
vantage of individual market players, given the rapidly 40
growing realization of actual and perceived systemic 20
vulnerabilities.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to examine in any 9 s0 91 92 93 94 95 96 \7 98P 9 9f
detail all of the above factors;3 however, two aspects -20 \
that are particularly relevant to the subject matter under -40
discussion-the financial sector-need to be high- 4t
lighted. The first is the scale of external capital inflows, f. forecast
Source: 1990-94 data: IMF 1998.
and the second, the pace of expansion of domestic 1995-99 data: Deutsche Bank Research 1998.
credit (to the private sector). Net private capital inflows
into Asia 5 (Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines,
and Thailand) totaled some $US178 billion in 1995 and
1996, exceeding the combined flows of the preceding TABLE 6-1
five years (see figure 6.1). Productive absorption of Domestic redit and growth rates
these flows proved to be infeasible. The countries also Credit CAGR
experienced rapid expansion of domestic credit relative (percent of GDP) (percent)
to output growth. By 1997, credit-GDP ratios were in Country 1991 1997 1P91-97
the range of 1.4-1.6 in all of these countries except for Indonesia 50.3 65.4 21.5
Indonesia, which had levels substantially higher than at Korea 94.5 137.9 19.0
Malaysia 116.7 165.4 1.9.9
the beginning of the 1990s (see table 6.1). By contrast, ThaiLand 96.3 147.7 19.1
in Mexico, at the time of its banking crisis, the credit- CAGR: Compound AnnuaL Growth Rate.
GDP ratio was less than 0.5. Source: Deutsche Bank Research 1998.
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attacks, and strong contagion effects. Credit as a per- and to strengthening the developing countries' eco-
centage of GDP rose particularly rapidly between 1991 nomic policymaking and monitoring institutions. This
and 1997, despite the strong growth of nominal GDP strategy will enable us to reduce the risks of future crises
(see table 6.1). in an increasingly globalized setting in which markets
In an earlier paper,4 the author argued that the rever- can inflict disproportionate punishment for policy mis-
sal of capital flows after the onset of the crisis was par- takes and reassessed structural weaknesses.
ticularly punishing and laid the grounds for the
subsequent economic dislocations experienced. In Restructuring and recapitalization
1997, the reversal amounted to more than 10 percent of
the combined preshock GDP of Asia 5. The large real The sc:ale of the problem and the fiscal
exchange rate depreciations, the financial sector and impact
asset price distress, the collapse of investment activity,
and the erosion of incomes and consumer confidence By any standard, the scale of the financial sector distress
must be seen and understood in light of this extraordi- in East Asian countries is large. Given the dynamic of
nary reversal of external flows. In a comparative per- the crisis in East Asia, the moral hazard problems that
spective, what happened in East Asia in 1997 is arise from weak bankruptcy and foreclosure laws and
tantamount to a reversal of $800 billion or about 70 their enforcement, and uncertainty over the timing and
percent of an entire year's private capital formation in strength of recovery, estimation of the health of bank
the case of the U.S. economy. Paul Krugman, in a recent portfolios in a dynamic sense is fraught with uncer-
paper, attempted to shed light on the East Asian crisis tainty and could embody significant margins of error.
by formally modeling the large required adjustments in Nevertheless, many estimates are available from private
the current account through real exchange rate depreci- and official sources and all indicate that the scale of the
ation, recession, or both, and the consequent erosion of problem and the fiscal impact are extremely large. As
the firms' balance sheets.5 It is this dynamic that lies at indicat,d in table 6.2, peak nonperforming loans
the heart of the financial sector and corporate distress (NPLs) as a percentage of loan portfolios are estimated
faced in these countries. The fragility that may have to range from 30 percent in Korea to 75 percent in
existed in the financial sector and corporate balance Indonesia. In relation to GDP, the projected net losses
sheets received a large shock caused by the very policies range from 16 percent in Korea to 34 percent in
put in place to cope with the precipitous fall in the Thailand. The sharp currency depreciation and decline
exchange rate and to restore external balance stability. in asset values combined with a strong downturn in eco-
Krugman's tentative conclusion, which merits serious nomic activity led to a mounting deterioration in bank
reflection, is that "even a very clean and prudent bank- asset quality throughout 1998. For example, estimated
ing system may not be enough to protect open NPLs fDr Thai banks rose from 43 percent at the end of
economies from the risk of self-reinforcing financial Septem ber to 49 percent at the end of the year (see table
collapse."16 6.3). Many observers, however, feel that NPLs will peak
Accordingly, the conventional wisdom about the during the first half of 1999 in most of the crisis-
Asian crisis that generally apportions much of the affected countries.
blame to weaknesses in the financial sector and corpo- Converting NPLs into estimates of ultimate losses
rate governance is at best simplistic. Belatedly, there is a involves a number of assumptions, including those on
welcome recognition in western policy circles that the peak NPLs and recovery rates from the disposal of col-
root cause was not so much the weaknesses of the finan- lateral. One set of projections, prepared by Deutsche
cial sectors (a common feature in developing Bank Research, indicates that the total loan net losses
economies), but rather the excessiveness of capital could range from 16 percent of GDP in Korea to 34 per-
inflows relative to the system into which they must be cent in Thailand, based on the June 1997 portfolio data.
absorbed. 7 This recognition is particularly important in In aggregate terms, potential losses on NPLs would
terms of shifting the emphasis of the current discussions exceed by varying margins the total capital of the
to reforming the international financial architecture financial institutions in these countries, with Indonesia
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TABLE 6.2 debt-GDP ratios were relatively modest in these coun-
Peak nonperforming loans and tosses tries will help mitigate the future debt-servicing burden.
NPFs Net loss
(percentage of (percentage of Losses/capital Restructuring approaches and country
Country loan portfolio) GDP) (percent) experiences
Indonesia 75 30 474
Korea 30 16 126 The financial sector crisis in Indonesia, Korea,
MaLaysia 35 20 120 Malaysia, and Thailand has clearly proved to be a sys-
ThaiLand 50 34 248 temic one that requires major restructuring. Broadly
Note: Assumptions on recovery rates are 25 percent for Indonesia, 30 percent for
Thailand; and 50 percent for Malaysia and Korea. "Net Loss" i  defined as the dete- speakig, the approaches adopted in the four countries
rioration in bank capital resulting from the impLied writedown of Loans. June 1997 have been similar and have involved elemenms of both
baLance sheet data on Loans and capital are used as a base.
Source: Deutsche Bank Research 1998. the "flow" and "stock" solutions, with the emrphasis on
the latter. The former has entailed injection of central
TABLE 6.3 bank liquidity (for example, through the Financial
Institutions Development Fund in Thailand) and regu-
latory forbearance (Indonesia and Malaysia in particu-
NPLs/loans (percent) lar). The "stock" solutions have focused on thle closure
Financial organization Sept. 1998 Dec 1998 of deeply insolvent financial institutions, takeovers,
Thai banks 43 49 carving out and transferring bad assets to a central
Private banks (8) 37 42 agency, and capital injection from private and public
State-owned banks (8) 55 63 sources.
Foreign banks 8 10
TotaL banking system 38 44 Given the scale of the fiancal managemert distress,
Finance ompanies (35) 61 70 governments have had to inject substantial sums to pre-
TotaL financiaL system 40 46 vent a complete collapse of the payment systems and to
Source: Bank ofThailand. speed up the rehabilitation process. In this respect,
Korea has acted expeditiously. By the end of 1998, pub-
and Thailand affected particularly heavily. (This does lic funds injected into the banking system since the
not, of course, imply that all the financial institutions inception of the crisis amounted to nearly US$31 bil-
are insolvent.) Estimates of the fiscal and quasi-fiscal lion, with an additional US$18 billion programmed for
costs of restructuring will depend not only on the ulti- 1999. The Korean Asset Management Company
mate levels of NPLs and recovery rates, but also on the (KAMCO) and the Korean Deposit Insurance Company
loss-sharing arrangements between the government and (KDIC) are the two institutions engineering the removal
the private sector. Projections by multilateral institu-
tions and private analysts indicate a range of 10-20 per- TABLE 6.4
cent of GDP for Malaysia and Korea, and 30-40 Government debt as percentage of GDP
percent for Indonesia and Thailand. Assuming that Country 1996 1999o 20000
government bonds at market interest rates are used to
. . . . ~~~~~~~~  ~~Indonesia 51.1 93 98.3finance the recapitalization, the annual government Domestic 25.1 57 64.3
interest expense would range from about 1.5 percent to Foreign 26 36 34
3 percent of GDP in these countries. The government Korea 28.2 41.3 40.7Domestic 19.2 25.3 24.7
outlays and obligations for financial sector restructur- Foreign 9 16 16
ing, deficit spending for other purposes, and the other MaLaysia 47.7 59.5 63.3
Domestic 31.7 36.5 39.3
crisis-related fiscal costs will sharply raise government Foreign 16 23 24
indebtedness in the four countries (see table 6.4). While Thailand 11 55.4 52.7
the debt projections are subject to the usual uncertain- Domestic 2 26.4 24.7
ties, the pace of buildup is alarming, particularly in Foreign 9 29 28
a. Projected.
Indonesia and Thailand. The fact that the precrisis SOurce: World Bank.
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of NPLs from the banks and their disposition. Bonds in 25 percent of book value of the assets sold. Another
exchange for bad assets have been the main instrument auction covering about US$6 billion of the loans of the
for the asset swaps. KAMCO has disposed of the defunct finance companies was held on March 19,
acquired assets in a variety of ways, including auctions 1998. Reportedly, the bids averaged 18 percent of the
and direct sales. KDIC has covered the deposits of the face value of the loans and AMC purchased over three-
16 merchant banks that were shut down and has quarters of the value of the assets auctioned.
injected new capital to facilitate the acquisition of the To deal with the restructuring and recapitalization of
nonviable banks by viable institutions and to prepare the barLking sector, the Thai government unveiled a plan
the sale of Korea First Bank and Seoul Bank, both of in Augast 1998. This plan offered public funds as capi-
which were acquired by the government at the onset of tal injeztion for banks that were prepared to restructure
the crisis. Fifty-one percent of the shares of the former up front, accelerate corporate debt restructuring, and
has been acquired by a U.S. investment company and undertake new lending. The support facilities provide
70 percent of the latter is reported to have been both Tier I and Tier II capital, involving funding on a
acquired by a foreign bank. These sales were effected matching basis to that of new private capital. Losses are
through international auctions. The Korean strategy, to be borne fully by existing shareholders up to their
which has involved nationalization, closures, disposi- equity limits, with additional losses, if any, to be shared
tion of NPLs, and injection of capital by specialized by the government and new investors. The plan also
agencies, mergers and subsequent privatization, has includes the purchase of preferred shares by the gov-
been adequately funded and rapidly implemented as ernment to bring Tier I capital up to 2.5 percent. Above
market conditions permitted. In moving forward to that level, the government will match the amount
establish "clean banks," the authorities have applied injected by private investors. About 200 billion baht
stringent safeguards to minimize moral hazard and have been earmarked for Tier I. However; financial
public losses. instituiions must fully meet the central bank's loan loss
Thailand's approach to financial sector restructuring provisioning requirements and submit an acceptable
has entailed two distinct components: the finance com- plan for organizational restructuring. For Tier II capi-
panies and the banks. In the case of the former, by tal, the plan calls for placing some 100 billion baht of
December 1997, all but two of the 58 finance compa- nontradable government bonds in exchange for bank
nies suspended earlier in the year had been closed down. debentures for a maximum of two percent of risk-
An independent entity, the Financial Restructuring weighted assets. The amount of funds available would
Agency (FRA), was set up in October 1997 to deal with hinge on write-downs of earnings resulting from corpo-
the 58 suspended finance companies, and an Asset rate re,tructuring and the expansion in new loans to the
Management Corporation (AMC) was formed to man- private sector.
age and dispose of the bad assets of the banks. The Despite the massive losses suffered by Thai banks in
assets of the 56 closed finance companies amounted to 1998 (see table 6.5) and the rising levels of NPLs, banks
371 billion baht at face value. Financial Institutions have not availed themselves of the facilities set up by the
Development Fund (FIDF) outlays to these entities govermment (particularly the Tier I facility), because
exceeded 1 trillion baht or the equivalent of about 18 they are reluctant to write down their capital in return
percent of the 1998 GDP. for public money and accept the dilution of the owner-
On December 15, 1997 the FRA auctioned over ship that comes with the deal. Thus far, only one bank
US$11 billion of the commercial and real estate loans (Siam Commercial Bank) has formally requested Tier I
from the 56 finance companies that had been closed support. Thai Farmers Bank has raised capital through
down. The auction, which included both foreign and the issuance of linked preferred stocks and subordi-
Thai bidders, generated only 11.66 billion baht (about nated debentures. Two other banks are following a sim-
US$3 billion) for 9 tranches (out of the 45 tranches ten- ilar approach. These new instruments are perceived as
dered). Negotiations following the auction raised the temporary solutions and there is concern about the
total disposed to 41 percent of the portfolio initially extent of fresh money actually raised since over one-half
offered. The FRAs realization is reported to have been of the buyers are depositors of the issuing bank or other
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TABLE 6.5 It was only on March 12, 1998 that the government
Net profit (loss) and assets of Thai banks announced a much-awaited comprehensive bank
restructuring and recapitalization plan. Thirty-eight
Net profit (toss) Assets Losses/assets banks were closed down, their assets to be managed by
(Baht mittions) (Baht millions) (percent) IBRA. Seven banks were taken over by the go vernment
Bank 1997 1998 Sept. 1998 Sept. 1998 in order to facilitate the payment system. Seventy-three
banks with capital asset ratios equal to or greater than
Krung Thai Bank 210 (60,079) 1,143,637 5.3
Bangkok Bank 4,057 (49,500) 1,302,192 3.8 4 percent will remain open. The government will issue
Thai Farmers Bank 801 (39,883) 733,272 5.4 bonds in order to provide up to 80 percent of the financ-
Siam CommerciaL Bank 3,194 (12,861) 699,658 1.8 ing for the recapitalization of nine banks. The remain-
Bank of Ayudhya 1,962 (9,203) 482,527 1.9
Thai Military Bank 1,368 (7,700) 361,596 2.1 ing 20 percent will be provided by the owners of these
Source: Far Eastern Economic Review 1999. banks. The terms of the government's interest in these
nine banks will be restricted to decisions on strategic
issues, leaving the day-to-day affairs to the private own-
Thai banks.8 The five state-owned commercial banks ers. The original shareholders will have the opportunity
are raising capital from the government. to buy back their shares within three years. C)therwise
It would be fair to conclude that the Thai experience the government will sell its shares in the open market
thus far points to a restructuring process for commer- over the next two years. The gross cost of the restruc-
cial banks that is moving rather slowly and hence can turing package is estimated at 300 trillion rupiah (30
impede the restoration of normalcy in the financial and percent of the fiscal 1998 GDP). The recapitalization of
corporate sectors. Recent statements by the authorities the nine private banks amounts to less than 10 percent
have indicated that Bank of Thailand may take further of the total cost with the liquidation of the 38 banks and
steps to accelerate recapitalization if the voluntary the recapitalization of the central bank responsible for
actions fall short of the central bank's expectations. the lion's share of the expenses. Some 73 private banks
This would be justified given broader concerns about that were not closed down or marked as candidates for
economic recovery and the role of the banking system recapitalization assistance will be closely supervised.
in that process. Compared with Indonesia and Thailand, Mvalaysia's
Indonesia's banking system, though smaller in terms banking sector difficulties were less pronounced before
of assets relative to GDP, is clearly the most distressed the crisis began to unfold. The risk-weighted capital
in the region because of weaker precrisis conditions, the adequacy ratio of commercial banks was 10.8 percent
sharper depreciation of the currency in a setting in at the end of 1996. As the regional crisis unfolded, non-
which the private sector has very large external liabili- performing loans rose from 8 percent of total loans at
ties, and the worst contraction in economic activity the end of 1997 to 13.6 percent at the end of 1998
experienced in 1998 by any country in the region. (measured on a three-month classification standard), as
Several early steps to restructure the banking system reported by Bank Negara Malaysia (Central Batnk). The
were taken in the early phases of the crisis. These overall capital-adequacy ratio at the end of 1998 was
included the formation of a bank restructuring agency reported to have fallen to 8.7 percent. Between October
(the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency or IBRA), 1997 and March 1998, the authorities announced a
the closure of 23 private banks, the placement of 61 pri- series of measures that involved tightened regulations
vate banks under the supervision of IBRA, and the for- regarding loan classification and higher capital ade-
mation of a new bank (Bank Mandiri) to absorb four quacy ratios, but the new norms were subsequently
state banks. After the initial progress, however, the pace relaxed in September 1998 (see the section on strength-
of restructuring proved to be sluggish, owing largely to ening prudential standards and the legal frameworks
the sheer size of the problem coupled with political below). The government then took the initiative to
uncertainty and interference in the decision-making establish entities similar to those set up in Korea.
authority of IBRA. Danaharta, an asset management company, was set up
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in May 1998 with a total funding of 15 billion ringgit, introduced the tighter norms in a phased manner. In
and is mandated to acquire NPLs from financial insti- Korea, the Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC)
tutions and to maximize their recovery value. By the has spearheaded the introduction of international stan-
end of 1998, it had acquired 8.11 billion ringgit of NPLs dards for accounting and reporting.9 In June 1998, all
at an average discount of 61 percent. Additionally, financial institutions were required to follow a step-by-
Danaharta managed 11.62 billion ringgit of bad loans step schedule to switch over to a mark-to-market basis
in 1998 and expects to complete the acquisition of the for accaunting for securities. By July 1998, loan classi-
remaining bad loans in the system by June 1999. fication procedures had been revised to fully reflect
A second agency, Danamodal, was established in capacity to pay. In addition, it became mandatory for
August 1998 with an expected funding of 16 billion banks to disclose connected lending information and
ringgit (10.7 billion has been raised so far). Danamodal manag,- their foreign exchange exposure in order to
is expected to recapitalize and consolidate the banking avoid maturity mismatches. The calculation of capital
sectoL Institutions availing themselves of the assistance asset ratios was modified in order to incorporate a more
of Danamodal are required to sell to Danaharta their conservative standard-loan provisions classified as
NPLs in excess of 10 percent of their loan portfolios. substandard or lower were deducted from Tier II capi-
Thus far, Danamodal has injected 4.5 billion ringgit tal. Thailand has set a legal minimum for capital ade-
into nine financial institutions in the form of quacy :;atios of 8.5 percent for banks and 8 percent for
Exchangeable Subordinated Capital Loans. Danaharta's finance companies, with January 15, 1999 as the dead-
estimated funding was derived based on the basis of the line. Thai authorities have also shortened the basis
more lenient six-month classification of NPLs. Based period for mandated disclosure of NPLs from 12 to 6
on the three-month definition, the funding require- months, though eventually they plan to establish a
ments would have been larger. Malaysia's approach to three-month basis by the year 2000.
restructuring centers on balance sheet cleanup-but not In Indonesia, the authorities announced a sharp
liquidity injection, since the payment for NPLs is in the increase in minimum capital requirements for banks
form of long-dated zero coupon bonds. and tightened loan classification and provisioning
A major difference in the financial sector restructur- guidelines in January 1998. However, the increase in
ing strategy of Malaysia compared with the three other capital requirements was later reversed. Current stan-
countries has been its reluctance to close or nationalize dards are a minimum capital-asset ratio of 4 percent, to
banks and finance companies. With the exception of be increased to 12 percent by 2001. The three-month
MBf Finance Bhd and Kewangan Bersatu Bhd, 2 inde- definition for overdue loans will be in effect by then as
pendent finance companies that were taken over by well. In January 1998, Malaysia tightened loan loss
Bank Negara in January 1999, Malaysia has been provisioning standards by establishing a three-month
unable to complete its plans for the consolidation of 40 classification and higher capital adequacy ratios for
finance companies into 8. In all likelihood Danamodal finance companies in order to strengthen the banking
could end up bearing more of the burden of recapital- system. However, in September 1998 the government
ization than shareholders, unless the government takes rescinded some of these banking regulations to reduce
a firmer stand in its position regarding closures. the severity of the credit crunch, which they believed
had been caused by the new regulations. The classifica-
Strengthening prudentiaL standards tion of NPLs is once again based on a six-month rather
and the legal frameworks than a three-month standard (see table 6.6).
In comparison to the other countries facing financial
As a central feature of financial restructuring in the cri- sector distress, Malaysia ranks fairly high in having a
sis-affected countries, all the countries have moved viable legal framework for bankruptcy and foreclosure.
toward adopting international standards for loan classi- The Indonesian and Thai legal systems, by contrast,
fication, income recognition, and minimum capital-ade- have required major changes to facilitate bank and
quacy ratios. The general approach has understandably corporate restructuring. In the former much remains to
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TABLE 6.6 FIGURE6.2
Prudential standards Interest rates
Definition of NPLs Copital-asset rotio Percent
Country (months overdue) (percent) 18
17 %
Indonesia 3 (by 2001) 4 (12 by 2001) 16
Korea 3 8 15
Malaysia 6 8 (10 by 1999) 14
ThaiLand 3 (by 2000) 8.5 13
Source: Country authorities. 12
11
be done. In Thailand, the signing of a bill in February to 10
establish a Bankruptcy Court paved the way for the J une Sept. Dec. Mar. June Sept. Dec.
reform of the legal system. In mid-March, the Thai 1997 1997 1997 1998 1998 1998 1998
Senate approved the pending revisions in the remaining Korea -Thailand Malaysia
key bankruptcy and foreclosure laws (the Bankruptcy Note: Korean rates are lending rates on general Loans for up to one /ear. Thai
Bill, the Petty Cases Bill, and the Foreclosure Bill), rates are minimum lending rates for commerciaL banks. MaLaysiar ates are
average Lending rates for commercial banks.
which were subsequently ratified by the Lower House. Source: Bank of Korea, Bank of ThaiLand, and Bank Negara MaLaysia.
These new legislations, which are major achievements,
provide the impetus for speedier resolution of NPLs.
However, their ultimate effectiveness will depend heav- FIGURE 6.3
ily on the efficacy of the judicial system to move the Spreads
process forward. prent
In Korea, corporate restructuring has been tradition- 7
ally handled through workouts rather than the legal 6
process. In February 1998, exit barriers were dimin- 5
ished through a simplification of the legal procedures 4 .
applicable to corporate restructuring and bankruptcy. 3 / /
Interest rates and loan growth 1
Broadly, the crisis countries have experienced a similar OJune Sept. Dec. Mar June Sept. Dec.
pattern with respect to lending volumes and interest 1997 1997 1997 1998 1998 1998 1998
rate movements-that is, there has been a sharp slow- -Korea ThaiLand Malaysia
down in credit growth and rising spreads even as nom- Note: Korean spreads are the difference between Lending rates on generat Loans
inal interest rates were being lowered in response to the for up to one year and fixed deposit rates for between one and two tears. Thai
spreads are minimum tending rates for commerciat banks minus depcsit rates.
stabilization of the currencies, falling inflation rates and Malaysian spreads are the difference between average tending rates for
commercial banks and one-year fixed deposit rates.
the need to stimulate economic activity (see figure 6.2). Source: Bank of Korea, Bank of ThaiLand, and Bank Negara Malaysia.
Because of mounting NPLs, however, banks have
tended to opt for higher spreads to cushion, at least in a
modest way, the impact of rising losses. Thai spreads, high, are not sufficient given the level of NPLs and the
defined as the difference between the minimum lending recapitalization requirements. To stay financially
rate and a weighted deposit rate, rose from approxi- viable, banks would need to maintain spreads as high as
mately 4.25 percent in July 1997 to 4.75 percent a year 12 percent, which would be infeasible.
later, reaching 7 percent in September 1998, before Loan growth in Thailand in January 1999 relative to
declining to 5.5 percent (see figure 6.3). An unofficial a year earlier had slowed to 2.5 percent (see figure 6.4).
survey done by the Bank of Thailand in October 1998 A similar pattern has emerged in Malaysia, where the
estimated that the current spreads, though historically loan volume, which grew 26 percent in 1997, barely
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increased in 1998 (see figure 6.5). The Malaysian credit a grovith of 15 percent in 1997. In Indonesia, where the
crunch was very likely exacerbated by tighter banking inflatian rate and nominal interest rates were very high
standards introduced in October 1997, which the gov- during much of 1998, the spreads between lending and
ernment then rescinded in September 1998. deposIt rates rose sharply between July and December
Recognizing the fact that high interest rates were con- 1998 'from about 9 percent to over 14 percent).
tributing to the credit crunch, the government lowered
interest rates and directed banks to reduce their maxi- Conclusions and lessons
mum spreads over the base lending rate to 2.5 percent.
In Korea, though deposit rates have come down, lend- The pace of financial sector restructuring, recapitaliza-
ing rates remain relatively high, reflecting built-in risk. tion, and return to some semblance of "normalcy" has
Loan growth (adjusted for NPLs bought by the govern- been slower than envisaged in all of the crisis countries,
ment) was essentially stagnant in 1998, compared with with rhe possible exception of Korea. This is under-
standable given the extent of distress in the sector and
FIGURE 6.4 the deepening economic dislocation during most of
ThaiLand. toan growth 1998. Just as the magnitude of the economic contrac-
ThaiLand-loan growth tion unleashed by the events of 1997 was repeatedly
Percent underestimated by international institutions and
12 domestic policymakers, as well as many private ana-
10 lysts, the scale of asset destruction in the financial sec-
8 tor was also inaccurately predicted. These two
6 misjudgments were of course not unrelated.
4 The initial optimism about market-based solutions,
2 particularly a recapitalization strategy predicated on
0 prival:e sector funding, has proved unjustified. Despite
Jan. May Sept. Jan. May Sept. Jan. some early successes in Thailand, it has increasingly
1997 1997 1997 1998 1998 1998 1999 becore evident that the investor appetite for Asian
Source: Deutsche Bank Research; Asia Economics Weekly 1999. become evit tat te inveso aetiter Asia
________________________________________ banks' equity was very limited. Hence, greater public
sector involvement in recapitalization has become
FIGURE 6.5 essenrial. An earlier appreciation of this reality would
have perhaps led to the design and implementation of
Bank lending and NPLs, Malaysia resolution packages with greater emphasis on closures
Biilions of ringitts Percent of deeply insolvent institutions and on government par-
422 16 ticipation in recapitalizing potentially viable ones (as
420 14 was done in Korea, for example), as well as a more
12 forceFul way of inducing bad debt recognition and
418 10 write-offs on the part of private shareholders.
416 8 The extent of domestic debt overhang (essentially the
414 6 losses in the banking and corporate sectors) has been
412 4 simp]y too large to allow for governments to avoid2 socializing the vast bulk of the costs of asset quality
410 D b A 0 deterioration. An earlier realization of the dynamics set
1997 1998 1998 1998 1998 1998 1998 in motion by the pernicious combination of large cur-
- Total oans (billions of ringitts) rency depreciation, high interest rates engineered to
NPLs/total loans (percent) deferd the currencies, declining terms of international
Source: Bank Negara Malaysia. Ratios of NPLs to totaL Loans are computed on trade, and the sharp decline in domestic demand (par-
a net basis-specificaLly, Net TotaL oans equaL Outstanding Gross Loans minus tiCUILrly investment spending), would have led to more
Interest-in-Suspense and Specific Provisions.
realistic external financing, fiscal stance, and financial
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sector restructuring strategies (including judicious use prove to be destabilizing in the medium term.
of forbearance). These in turn could have mitigated the Therefore, privatization of public enterprises and steps
extent of the loss of wealth and output. designed to broaden the tax base and strengthen tax
International experience indicates that countries are administration have particular importance for manag-
far more successful in restoring the solvency of their ing the medium-term fiscal consequences of the crisis.
banking systems than in engineering increases in prof- The crisis underscores the need for redoubling efforts
itability. Thus far, there is no evidence suggesting that to develop domestic debt markets. The underdeveloped
the East Asian experience will prove to be different. debt markets led to excessive reliance on banks and
The rapid decline in domestic inflation rates and the finance companies as the principal vehicles for term
deflationary pressures affecting export prices do not financing during the crisis. More developed domestic
bode well for the remaining agenda of cleaning up the debt markets would have lowered the risks of maturity
banking systems and corporate debt restructuring. mismatch faced by banks and also would have reduced
Stagnant or falling wholesale prices have offset the the probability of sharp and sudden reversals of capital
decline in nominal interest rates, implying a rise in the flows, as the debt markets would have more effectively
firms' debt burden in real terms. Given that the opera- intermediated the surge in inflows.
tional restructuring (in other words, measures aimed at In the early 1990s, it had become an article of faith
increasing efficiency) of the banking system has barely among most economists that developing countries
begun, and considering the need to generate margins needed to generate fiscal surpluses in order to accom-
that facilitate recapitalization, the prospects for easing modate the absorption of private capital inflows. As
the debt burden of the borrowers are not bright. long as external capital inflows (equity or debt) were
In this context, accelerating the overhaul of bank- being utilized to finance private investment, it was
ruptcy and foreclosure laws and, more important, argued, the authorities did not need to be concerned
putting in place effective implementation mechanisms, with the volumes and maturities of these inflows. The
are critical for separating expedient defaulters from naivete of this view-particularly in terms o f under-
others and for facilitating debt-equity swaps. This is an standing institutional weaknesses in credit allocation
aspect of the financial sector-corporate restructuring and risk management in developing economies-has
nexus that has moved forward at an extremely slow been starkly exposed by the experience of the past two
pace. years. Policymakers are once again reminded of the
Dealing with the inevitable large increases in the gov- close linkages between the management of clomestic
ernment debt burden arising from financial sector financial markets, international private capital flows,
restructuring and with the other aspects of the crisis can and overall country debt management.
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Annex 6.A . The Korean asset management corporation,
(KAMCO) had disposed of NPLs with a face value
of 12.6 trillion won by the end of 1998, with an
Financial restructuring in East additional 1S.4 trillion won scheduled for 1999.
Asia at a glance . A second agency, KDIC, injected 21 trillion won of
func.s into the financial system, of which one-third
covered the deposits of 16 distressed merchant
Indonesia banks closed by the government, another third cov-
ered losses for viable financial institutions (mainly 5
* Until recently, the Indonesian Bank Restructuring banks), and the rest was channeled toward mergers
Authority (IBRA) had not been funded or given of banks that were not considered viable.
proper authority. However, 23 private banks have * The government has privatized two of its banks. The
now been closed, 61 have been placed under the sale of 51 percent of Korea First Bank to Newbridge
supervision of IBRA and 5 state banks have been Capital has been finalized and a memorandum of
merged under a new entity called Bank Mandiri. understanding has been signed for the sale of 70 per-
* On March 12, 1998 the government announced a cent of Seoul Bank.
restructuring and recapitalization package, the cost * The FSC has also set a strict timetable for the adher-
of which is estimated to be 300 trillion rupiah (30 ence of commercial banks and non-banks to 8 per-
percent of the fiscal 1998 GDP). cent capital ratios by the year 2000, as well as to
• The largest part of the cost will be the liquidation other international standards.
and closure of 38 banks and the recapitalization of
the central bank to compensate it for large liquidity Malaysia
injections incurred in 1998.
• Nine banks will be recapitalized up to 80 percent of * The Malaysian government has set up two agencies
the amount needed to resume a Tier-I capital ratio to aid in the financial sector restructuring:
of 4 percent, with the original shareholders con- Danaharta (an asset management company) and
tributing at least 20 percent in cash at a cost of about Danamodal (to provide liquidity and recapitaliza-
10 percent of the recap package. tion).
e 73 banks with capital ratios equal to or greater than * Danaharta has purchased 8.11 billion ringgit of
4 percent will remain open. nonperforming loans at a discount of 61 percent, for
* Seven large private banks (with 80,000 or more which it paid 4.26 billion ringgit out of its total
deposit accounts) will be taken over by the govern- funding of 15 billion. Danaharta also managed
ment to minimize disruption to the payments sys- 11.62 billion ringgits of bad loans in 1998.
tern. * Daramodal has injected 4.5 billion ringgit into nine
* The government has set new capital adequacy tar- financial institutions in the form of Exchangeable
gets-banks must achieve a capital-adequacy ratio Subordinated Capital Loans. The government has
of 4 percent, 8 percent, and 10 percent by the end of estimated that Danamodal would require approxi-
1998, 1999, and 2000, respectively. mately 16 billion ringgit, of which it has raised 10.7
so far.
Korea - Two finance companies, MFf Finance Bhd and
Kewangan Bersatu Bhd have been taken over by
* The Korean government has mobilized 64 trillion Bank Negara.
won in capital for the recapitalization and disposal * Prudential standards were tightened in April 1998.
of nonperforming loans. By the end of December Nonperforming loans were defined as those loans
1998, 41 trillion won had already been spent. that: were three months overdue.
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* In September 1998, standards were relaxed again TABLE 6.A.I
and the definition of nonperforming loans changed The consolidation of banks and finance companies
to six months overdue.
Intervened
or under To be
ThaiLand Country supervision cdosed Merged Nationalized Sold
Indonesia 57a 61' 4' i1 o
* The government unveiled a financial restructuring Korea 17 i 6e glf 2 09
plan on August 14, 1998, which pledged a total of Malaysia 0 0 0 2 0
300 billion baht in Tier I and Tier II capital to under- Thailand 0 56 3 4 2
capitalized banks. For both schemes, a capital ade- Notes to table
quacy standard of 4.25 percent is required.
* In the Tier I scheme, banks are required to first write a. PLaced under IBRA. SharehoLder rights were suspended and a
down their capital by recognizing losses upfront and state-owned bank appointed to manage and control the bank.
then change management in return for official b. Depositors' accounts were transferred to the Largest state bank.
money. Siam Commercial Bank (SCB) has applied c. Four state banks are being merged into one entity along with the
for Tier I capital, and another application is being corporate section of Bank Rakyat Indonesia.
considered. d. Three commerciaL banks are stilL under the supervision of FSC; 14
• In Tier II, incremental government capital is pro- merchant banks have to comply with a timetable to achieve capitaL
vided to individual banks depending on the bank's adequacy ratios.
corporate restructuring performance. Two applica- e. Sixteen merchant banks were cLosed.
tions for Tier II capital assistance have also been f. This number refers to 5 commercial banks whose proposals were
approved-for TFB (Thai Farmer's Bank) and SCB. rejected, 2 that were able to merge and 4 others that did not meet
• Thai Farmer's Bank and Bangkok Bank have inde- capitaL adequacy standards.
pendently raised Tier I capital through issues of pre- g. None have been soLd yet but a Memorandum of Unclerstanding
ferred shares, debentures, refinancing and has been signed between Korea First Bank and Newbridge Capital, and
recognizing capital gains. between Seoul Bank and a British bank.
* Krung Thai Bank has merged with First Bangkok h. Of these 56 finance companies, 12 have been merged under
City Bank and taken over Bangkok Bank of Krungthai Thanakit.
Commerce and received 77 billion in assistance from
the FIDF, with an additional 108 billion forthcom-
ing after its restructuring plan is approved.
* The FRA auction held in December 1998 resulted in
sales of 41 percent of the commercial and real estate
loans worth a total of 371 billion baht. FRA's
receipts amounted to nearly 25 percent of the book
value of the assets. Another auction ($6 billion in
loans) was held on March 19, 1999.
* Legislature pertaining to Bankruptcy Court has
already been ratified. Three bills-Bankruptcy,
Foreclosure, and Petty Cases Bills-were passed in
mid-March by the Senate and the Lower House, giv-
ing a major boost to progress in the reforms that are
critical to Thailand's financial and corporate
restructuring.
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Notes small private externaL debt and Low debt-equity ratios aLso made the
system less susceptibLe to shocks.
The author is a regional head of Deutsche Bank in Asia. The views 2. SeE, for exampLe, World Bank 1998 and IMF 1998.
expressed in this paper are solely those of the author. They should not 3. For an elaboration, see Shirazi 1998.
be attributed to the WorLd Bank, to the financiaL or other cosponsors 4. Shirazi (1998).
of the Conference or to Deutsche Bank, with which the author is cur- 5. Krugman (1999). A concise summary of Krugman's paper is pro-
rentLy affiLiated. The author wishes to thank Shonar LaLa for research vided by the Deutsche Bank's Angus Armstrong (see Armstrong 1999).
assistance in the preparation of this paper. 6. SeE Krugman (1999), p. 20.
1. The PhiLippines are not covered in this paper, as its banking sys- 7. See, for example, Larry Summer's remarks in Tokyo on February
tem, which had gone through a restructuring exercise afew years ear- 26, 1999 as reported in Sunday (Singapore) Times 1999.
Lier, was not significantLy affected by the crisis. The authorities 8. WorLd Bank (1999).
implemented a number of precautionary steps in 1998. The country's 9. See for detaiLs, RepubLic of Korea 1998.
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Stijn Claessens
Simeon Djankov
sing a database of 5,550 publicly-listed corporations in nine East
m |r Asian economies over the period 1988-1996, we find large differ-
%'j ences in performance and financial structures across economies.
Profitability, as measured by r eal return on assets in local currency, was rela-
tively low in Hong Kong, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Singapore
throughout the period, whilc corporates in Indonesia, the Philippines, and
Thailand had high real return:;-on average twice as high as those recorded in
Germany and the United States. Nominal returns in dollars were high as well
in the region, but reflected in part the real appreciation of currencies. During
1994-1996, measured perforrmance declined in several economies, especially in
Japan and Korea. This did not show up as much in terms of a decline in sales
growth because investment rates were high and they continued to drive output
growth rates in many economies. The combination of high investment and rel-
atively low profitability in some economies meant that much external financ-
ing was needed. As outside equity was used sparingly, leverage was high in most
East Asian economies relative to other economies, and on the rise in Korea,
Malaysia, and Thailand. Shcrt-term borrowing became increasingly impor-
tant, especially in Malaysia, Taiwan (China), and Thailand. Some of the vul-
nerabilities in corporate financial structures that have now become a highly
visible factor in triggering and aggravating the East Asian financial crisis were
thus already in existence in the early 1990s. As a result of these vulnerabilities
the impact of interest and exchange shocks has been large-43 percent of the
corporations in our sample are estimated to face liquidity problems and 17 per-
cent face solvency problems.
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The East Asian financial crisis has in part been attrib- Asian miracle was indeed based on a vibrant corporate
uted to the weak performance and risky financial struc- sector.
tures of corporates. In retrospect, it has become clear However, the combination of high investment and
that the operational performance of East Asian corpo- relatively low profitability in some economies meant
rates was indeed not as stellar as many had thought and that much external financing was needed. Since outside
in fact involved investments with high risks. Also with equity was used sparingly, partly because stock markets
hindsight, it has become apparent that the financial were depressed (as was the case in Japan) or insiders
structures of many East Asian corporates were not preferred to retain control, leverage was high in most
strong enough to withstand the combined shocks of East Asian economies and on the rise in Korea,
increased interest rates, depreciated currencies, and Malaysia, and Thailand. This created large risks as
large drops in domestic demand. This poor perfor- short-term foreign exchange borrowing became
mance and these risky financing structures were not, increasingly important in the last few years, especially
however, notably featured by observers writing on East in Malaysia, Taiwan (China), and Thailand. Some of
Asia prior to the financial crisis. Quite to the contrary, the vulnerabilities in corporate financial structures that
East Asian corporates were considered an important have now become a highly visible factor in triggering
contributing part of the region's miracle and were gen- and aggravating East Asia's financial crisis, were thus
erally viewed as highly competitive and adept at already in existence in the early 1990s.
exploiting new market opportunities; they consequently As a result of these vulnerabilities, the impact of inter-
attracted considerable amounts of foreign capital. est and exchange shocks over the last year has been very
Reconciling the differences between these ex post and large. Using the balance sheet and profit and loss state-
ex ante views will likely be a topic of much future ments for a subset of corporations in our sample, we
research.' In this short paper, we are less ambitious and quantify the impact of the currency and interest rate
start with documenting the basic record in corporate shocks on individual firms' liquidity and solvency. We
performance and financing structures for a number of find that 43 percent of the firms in the five most affected
large, publicly listed East Asian corporates over the last economies (Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the
decade. Specifically, we use a database of balance sheet Philippines, and Thailand) are currently illiquid and 17
and income statement data for 5,550 East Asian firms percent could be technically insolvent. Worst affected is
listed on stock exchanges in nine economies over the Indonesia with 64 percent of its firms illiquid and 53
period 1988-1996 for establishing the stylized facts on percent insolvent, followed by Korea and Thailand.
corporate performance and financing structures. The Malaysia has the smallest proportion of insolvent firms,
main data sources are the annual reports of the compa- 1.5 percent, but 41 percent of its firms are illiquid,
nies filed with the major stock exchanges in the region. which is about the same percentage as in the Philippines
We find large differences in performance and finan- and Thailand. While these amounts are substantially
cial structures across economies. Profitability, as mea- lower than those in the spring of 1998, when interest
sured by real return on assets (ROA) in local currency, and exchange shocks were much worse, financial dis-
was relatively low in Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, and tress in East Asia's corporate sector is still of systemic
Singapore throughout the period, while corporates in proportions. Furthermore, about one-third of solvent
Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand had high firms are illiquid, and risk insolvency unless their liq-
returns, on average twice as high as those recorded in uidity constraints are relieved.
Germany and the United States over the same period. In
the years 1994-1996, measured performance declined The data
somewhat in several East Asian economies, especially in
Japan and Korea. These differences in performance did The data come from annual reports of the companies
not show up as much in sales growth, as investment listed on the major stock exchanges in the region and
rates were high and continued to drive output growth also from Worldscope and Extel databases. The data
rates in all economies. These facts suggest that the East sets are unbalanced-that is, the number of observa-
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tions varies from year to year. We excluded companies TABLE 7.1
that reported data less than three times over the period Summary statistics of size, 1996
1988-96. We excluded also financial and banking insti- (Medians, sales, and assets are in US$1,000)
tutions (Standard Industrial Classification [SIC] Number
6000-6999). Finally, in any given year, we excluded Economy of firms Sales Assets Employment
companies that did not include all of the following vari-
Hong Kang 463 202,124 121,387 2,194
ables-net sales, net income after taxes, cost of goods Indonesia 264 91,254 54,284 2,675
sold, total assets, and the value of common equity. The Japan 2,234 488,076 457,648 1,436
data set consists of 588 companies in Hong Kong, 317 Korleysia 258 502,486 411,116 1,631
companies in Indonesia, 2,526 companies in Japan, 392 Phitippines 146 108,776 52,344 2,232
companies in Korea, 772 companies in Malaysia, 170 Singapore 283 142,789 86,248 1,416Taiwan, China 222 284,717 180,624 966
companies in the Philippines, 348 companies in Thailancl 427 69,712 45,582 1,587
Singapore, 265 companies in Taiwan (China), and 564 Source: W)rLd Bank, Firm-LeveL Study.
companies in Thailand.
Several caveats apply to the data. First, the statistics
we report do not attempt to correct for cross-economy Frecaut, M Hallward-Driemeier, and F Colaco; and
differences in industrial structure. If an economy data other papers submitted to this conference. Table 7.1
set has many utility firms, for example, average leverage shows that our sample of companies in East Asian
might be higher and profitability lower. The data also economies complements these authors' sampling of
cover mainly large firms-the median size of the 5,550 smaller and medium-size firms, as the average size is
firms is 1,612 employees, with the largest company much larger and the number of employees per firm
employing more than 150,000 employees. This selec- about 10 times as high.
tion pattern arises since the firms have to be listed on a
stock exchange in order to enter the database, and listed Performance measures
companies tend to be large.
Table 7.1 provides descriptive statistics on the size of As our first measure of performance we use the real rate
the firms in our sample, broken down by country or of return on assets in local currency. This is calculated
economy. We use three measures of size: sales revenue, at the firm level as the earnings before interest and taxes
the value of fixed assets, and employment. Japanese and (EBIT) in local currency over total assets, minus the
Korean firms have the largest sales revenue and assets. annual inflation rate in the economy. The advantage of
The median firm in these two countries produces half a this measure is that it is not influenced by the liability
billion U.S. dollars worth of goods or services, and uses structure of the corporate, as it excludes interest pay-
slightly less than half a billion dollars of assets. In con- ments, financial income, and other income or expenses.
trast, the median Indonesian, Malaysian, and Thai firm Table 7.2 shows that across economies, East Asian cor-
has less than 100 million dollars in sales revenue and porates have had quite different ROAs. Relatively low
only about 50 million dollars in assets. The ranking in profitability rates have been recorded by corporates
sales and asset size is not matched by a ranking by from Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, and Singapore, with
employment. Indonesian and Philippine firms have real ROAs averaging about 5 percent. High-profitabil-
now the largest number of workers, more than 2,000, ity economies, at least for most of the period we study,
while the median firm in Taiwan (China) has less than have been Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand.
1,000 employees. This of course reflects the differences Corporates in these economies averaged real ROAs of
in capital- versus labor-intensity across our sample of about 9-10 percent for the whole period. ROAs for cor-
economies with very different levels of economic devel- porates in Malaysia and Taiwan (China) fall in between
opment. We can compare our sample with those used these two groups, but their returns of about 7 percent
by M. Kawai, H. Hahm, and G. larossi; D. Dwor- are still closer to the high performers. These ROAs can
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be compared to ROAs of about 5 percent in Germany Next we calculate the return on assets in U.S. dollars,
and the United States,2 providing support to the notion adjusted for the effects of currency movements (see
that the corporate sector contributed significantly to the table 7.3). This measure of performance presents the
so-called "East Asian Miracle" during most of this point of view of an international investor whc can allo-
period. cate resources across several economies. With the
As a further comparison of the performance of East exception of Japan (6.6 percent) and Taiwan, China
Asian corporates, we plot the average 1988-96 ROA (8.4 percent), all East Asian economies have ROAs in
for corporates in all other economies that report to U.S. dollars that are higher than the U.S. median (8.7
Worldscope (see figure 7.1). Thailand, the Philippines, percent). The Philippines (18.7 percent), Thailand (14.7
and Indonesia have the highest ROAs in this sample of percent), and Indonesia (13.0 percent) have the highest
46 economies, while Taiwan (China) and Malaysia are average returns over the 1988-96 period.
close behind. At the other end, Korea and Japan have The high returns in table 7.3 are driven to some
the lowest ROAs in the sample, together with Norway, extent by the real exchange rate appreciation in the
Sweden, and Austria. Singapore and Hong Kong have respective economies. Correcting for the real exchange
also relatively low ROAs in real local currency. rate appreciation in relation to the U.S. dollar, we find
TABLE 7.2
Return on assets for nine Asian economies, Germany, and the United States
(percent, medians, in real LocaL currency)
Economy 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1988-96
Hong Kong 5.1 5.3 4.9 4.8 4.5 3.8 3.9 3.9 4.1 4.6
Indonesia - - 9.4 9.1 8.6 7.9 7.4 6.2 6.5 7.1
Japan 5.7 5.4 4.6 4.7 4.8 4.5 4.1 3.8 3.6 4.1
Korea 4.4 3.9 4.1 4.0 3.9 3.6 3.4 3.6 3.1 3.7
Malaysia 5.4 5.6 5.4 6.2 6.0 6.5 6.3 6.1 5.6 6.3
PhiLippines - - - 7.1 6.4 8.1 8.5 6.8 8.4 7.9
Singapore 4.9 4.5 4.2 3.9 5.2 4.6 4.5 3.9 4.0 4.4
Taiwan, China - - - 5.1 6.2 6.5 6.8 6.5 6.6 6.7
ThaiLand 10.8 11.0 11.7 11.2 10.2 9.8 9.3 7.8 7.4 9.8
United States 4.7 4.8 5.1 4.9 5.2 5.4 5.3 5.2 5.2 5.3
Germany 5.3 5.5 5.5 5.7 5.6 5.2 5.1 4.9 5.0 4.7
- : not avaitable
Source: World Bank, Firm-Level Survey.
TABLE 7.3
Return on assets for nine Asian economies and the United States
(percent, medians, in nominal U.S. doLLars)
Economy 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1988-96
Hong Kong 8.0 8.4 7.2 12.9 14.3 12.5 11.5 8.0 10.3 10.3
Indonesia - - 16.0 13.7 12.6 15.3 11.7 10.7 11.2 13.0
Japan 6.5 -6.0 13.3 14.8 7.0 16.2 15.6 1.0 -9.2 6.6
Korea 25.1 10.3 7.3 7.2 6.4 5.9 12.1 9.9 -1.0 9.2
MaLaysia -0.8 8.8 7.2 9.9 14.8 6.1 15.5 12.2 9.5 9.2
Philippines - - - 23.2 21.2 5.4 29.4 7.5 16.5 17.2
Singapore 8.9 9.4 15.6 13.6 6.9 9.3 16.4 9.0 6.8 10.7
Taiwan, China - - - 6.2 12.0 4.6 12.4 6.3 8.9 8.4
ThaiLand 13.9 14.6 19.3 16.9 13.4 13.1 16.6 13.2 11.5 14.7
United States 8.7 9.6 10.5 9.1 8.3 8.4 7.9 8.0 8.1 8.7
-: not availabLe
Source: World Bank, Firm-LeveL Survey.
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FIGURE 7.1
International comparison on return on assets
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significantly lower ROAs. For example, the return in of good sold, as a share of sales (see table 7.4). The lia-
U.S. dollars once a correction is made for real currency bility structure or other income and expenses of the cor-
appreciation is 8.4 percent in Korea in 1988. porate do not influence this measure either, but the
Mathematically, this is the sum of the real ROA in capita] intensity of the individual corporate does. The
Korean won (4.4 percent) and the inflation rate in the operational margin measure shows less cross-economy
United States (4.0 percent)-all other terms cancel out differences and has been stable for most economies
in the calculation. This implies that the relative com- throughout the period. The cross-economy differences
parisons of the ROAs corrected for real exchange rate may indicate that firms across East Asia were exposed
appreciations are the same as those in table 7.2. to differing degrees of (international) competition.
Our third measure of profitability is operational mar- Relativrely lower-margin producers seem to be
gin, calculated as the difference between sales and costs Singap ore, followed by Hong Kong, Malaysia, and
Publically Listed East Asian Corporates: Growth, Financing, and Risks 101
Korea. Surprisingly, Japanese firms have higher margins table 7.5). Most East Asian corporates recorded on
on goods sold ratios than these developing economies, average high, real sales growth over the period.
which may reflect the high capital intensity of Japanese Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand stand out, with
firms and the lower level of competition within Japan, averages of 11.9, 10.6, and 9.7 percent, respectively,
as is often argued. Relatively high-margin producers are followed by Taiwan (China) with 9.3 percent. Other
the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand, which may economies also had high sales growth rates, which are
reflect the degree of domestic competition, lower about double those of Germany (2.6 percent) and the
wages, and the high share of natural resources in their United States (3.7 percent). The economy with the low-
exports (the last factor is especially prominent in the est corporate sales growth in East Asia is Japan, aver-
case of Indonesia). No strong trend appears over time; aging 7.7 percent. These high sales growth rates mirror
however, there is some decrease in operational margins the high growth in export and domestic demand that
for Hong Kong, Indonesia, and Singapore. This may be has characterized this region over the last decade. We
reflective of these economies' higher wage growth coin- do observe some slowdown in 1996, however, in sales
ciding with their facing increased competition. growth for Indonesia, Japan, Singapore, Taiwan
The cross-economy differences in returns on assets do (China), and Thailand, possibly reflecting low er export
not reflect themselves directly in differences in sales growth rates.
growth, which are also more variable over time (see
TABLE 7.4
Operational margin for nine Asian economies, Germany, and the United States
(percent, medians)
Economy 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1988-96
Hong Kong 23.5 19.5 22.2 19.6 17.4 16.6 17.3 14.6 14.2 18.7
Indonesia - - - 35.7 33.3 34.4 32.8 31.2 30.6 32.9
Japan 22.2 22.7 22.9 22.4 21.9 21.8 21.8 23.1 23.3 22.1
Korea 13.7 16.8 17.3 16.9 19.2 18.7 19.6 21.4 22.1 19.6
Malaysia 16.4 16.3 17.1 17.3 17.6 17.4 18.4 19.5 25.5 18.1
PhiLippines - - - 36.1 26.4 26.4 27.5 30.8 33.3 27.7
Singapore 17.3 16.7 16.8 15.5 15.5 15.2 14.1 13.6 13.1 14.9
Taiwan, China - - - 25.4 21.4 22.7 22.6 22.3 21.9 22.6
Thailand 21.9 24.3 25.7 27.3 25.9 25.1 24.9 24.7 22.7 25.2
United States 14.1 13.9 14.1 14.3 15.5 14.0 14.7 14.8 14.6 14.4
Germany 13.2 13.4 13.7 13.5 13.8 14.1 15.6 16.7 17.1 14.6
-: not avaiLabLe
Source: World Bank, Firm-Level Survey.
TABLE 7.5
Real sales growth (year-on-year) for nine Asian economies, Germany, and the United States
(percent, medians)
Economy 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1988-96
Hong Kong 10.1 11.6 10.2 12.4 9.8 9.4 9.7 11.8 9.2
Indonesia - - - 10.7 12.1 12.4 9.4 8.3 10.6
Japan 7.4 8.2 8.4 8.3 8.8 8.5 7.2 4.3 7.7
Korea 8.4 8.7 8.2 8.3 7.6 7.3 7.2 8.6 8.2
Malaysia 9.7 12.3 11.8 12.7 13.1 12.6 11.7 11.9 11.9
Philippines - - - 8.4 6.7 7.6 10.6 12.2 8.2
Singapore 8.4 8.6 8.1 9.4 11.6 11.8 10.2 7.7 8.7
Taiwan, China - - - 7.1 11.3 10.3 9.7 8.4 9.3
Thailand 11.6 10.3 10.8 9.6 8.3 10.1 10.7 5.7 9.7
United States 4.3 3.4 -1.8 4.3 2.8 6.9 4.1 4.3 3.7
Germany 5.0 4.4 5.1 1.1 -4.2 2.3 1.3 4.7 2.6
-: not availabLe
Source: WorLd Bank, Firm-LeveL Survey.
102 Asian Corporate Recovery: Findings from Firm-Level Surveys in Five Countries
TABLE 7.6
Capital investment for nine East Asian economies, Germany, and the United States, 1988-1996
(percent, medians)
Economy 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 j 993 1994 1995 1996 1988-96
Hong Kong 14.3 16.6 8.3 7.6 7.2 19.8 7.6 5.8 9.3 8.3
Indonesia - - - 12.4 13.4 8.6 15.8 13.8 11.8 12.7
Japan 11.6 14.2 8.3 4.6 7.6 6.8 7.3 7.5 7.1 8.0
Korea 15.6 13.8 13.2 19.6 11.6 11.2 12.2 12.4 13.7 13.6
MaLaysia 8.6 7.6 8.9 9.6 11.3 13.4 15.2 14.6 16.1 10.7
Phitippines - - - 9.1 8.9 7.8 13.5 14.1 14.5 10.8
Singapore 7.8 7.6 7.4 8.8 9.6 11.3 13.4 12.5 13.5 10.4
Taiwan, China - - - 14.3 8.2 8.4 8.7 11.2 8.6 8.7
Thailand 10.4 12.9 12.3 15.0 14.9 15.0 14.7 14.5 5.8 13.8
United States 3.8 4.1 3.0 -1.4 4.0 2.6 6.4 3.7 3.8 3.4
Germany 4.9 4.8 4.2 5.0 0.9 -3.8 2.1 1.3 4.6 2.5
-: not available
Source: WorLd Bank, Firm-Level Survey.
TABLE 7.7
Leverage for nine Asian Economies, Germany, and the Unitedl States
(percent, means)
Economy 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1988-96
Hong Kong 1.832 2.311 1.783 2.047 1.835 1.758 2.273 1.980 1.559 1.902
Indonesia - - - 1.943 2.097 2.054 1.661 2.115 1.878 1.951
Japan 2.994 2.843 2.871 2.029 2.042 2.057 2.193 2.367 2.374 2.302
Korea 2.820 2.644 3.105 3.221 3.373 3.636 3.530 3.776 3.545 3.467
MaLaysia 0.727 0.810 1.010 0.610 0.627 0.704 0.991 1.103 1.176 0.908
Philippines - - - 0.830 1.186 1.175 1.148 1.150 1.285 1.129
Singapore 0.765 0.922 0.939 0.887 0.856 1.102 0.862 1.037 1.049 0.936
Taiwan, China - - - 0.679 0.883 0.866 0.894 0.796 0.802 0.820
ThaiLand 1.602 1.905 2.159 2.010 1.837 1.914 2.126 2.224 2.361 2.008
United States 0.798 0.848 0.904 0.972 1.059 1.051 1.066 1.099 1.125 1.034
Germany 1.535 1.552 1.582 1.594 1.507 1.534 1.512 1.485 1.472 1.514
- : not avaiLabLe
Source: WorLd Bank, Firm-LeveL Survey.
That these sales growth rates were maintained at such Finaticial structures
a high level-and at rates that are extremely similar
across economies-reflects in part the high investment The degree of riskiness inherent in the liability struc-
rates in this region (see table 7.6). We measure invest- tures cf East Asian corporates is evident from the data.
ment growth in new dollar investments as a share of The high investment rates, and relatively low ROAs for
existing fixed assets. Over this period, Indonesia, some economies, meant that external financing had to
Korea, and Thailand stand out, with investment rates of be large, as internal sources of capital-in other words,
up to 13 percent (and in some years even more), fol- retained earnings-were limited. This high external
lowed by Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore, financng, mostly from the banking systems, has been
with rates averaging about 10 percent. Hong Kong, always a characteristic of the "East Asian Miracle."
Japan, and Taiwan (China) had growth in investment in Leverage, defined as total debt over equity, also has
fixed assets of about 8 percent. Japan has had low remained high for many East Asian economies, much
investment rates, particularly since 1990. This probably above that observed in other developing economies and
reflects in part its sustained financial and corporate cri- many industrial economies (see table 7.7). The highest
sis since the early 1990s. leverage over this period was in the case of Korea-
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about five times that of the lowest, Taiwan (China). It and loans were rolled over in the later part of the
was also low in Malaysia; but rising in the Philippines, period. Leverage consequently rose. The rise in leverage
where it was still much below that of Indonesia and in the Philippines is probably the result of its r eforms in
Thailand. the mid-1980s, which led to revived corporate and
Most East Asian economies saw some increase in financial sectors and better financing possibilities.
leverage in the last few years: this was most notable for To study the riskiness of the financial structures of
Japan, Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand. Japan had seen East Asian corporates, we next compare their average
some de-leveraging earlier in the decade-possibly 1988-96 leverage ratios with the leverage ratios in the
owing to some financial retrenchment in the early other Worldscope economies (see figure 7.2). Korean
1990s-but lack of equity and corporate sector diffi- and Japanese firms have the highest leverage among all
culties may have meant that no new equity was raised corporates in this group of economies, while companies
FIGURE 7.2 X 5 ;FP M; m ;
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in Thailand, Indonesia, and Hong Kong also have The international comparison of the maturity of debt
among the ten highest leverage ratios. At the opposite structu re (see figure 7.3) reveals that most East Asian
extreme, firms in Taiwan (China) show relatively low econoniies rank below European and Latin American
leverage ratios. Firms in the Philippines, Singapore, and econonmies in their share of long-term debt.3 Among
Malaysia also have below-average ratios. The pattern East Asian economies, only corporations from the
across other regions is also interesting. Western Philippines have an average share of long-term debt
European economies typically display high leverage that is greater than 50 percent. There is a general ten-
ratios, with Swiss firms having leverage almost as high dency for corporates in richer economies to have larger
as Japanese firms. In contrast, corporates in South long-term debt. Some other, low-income Asian
American economies (Peru, Chile, Argentina, economies (Sri Lanka, Pakistan, China, for example)
Venezuela, and Colombia) have low leverage, reflecting have indeed low shares of long-term debt. But many of
the less deep banking systems of these economies. the hig]-er-income East Asian economies are outliers to
Long-term debt (as a share of total debt) has been low this pattern, as they rely less on long-term debt than
throughout the 1988-96 period in all East Asian whatwould be expected on the basis of their per capita
economies (see table 7.8). Malaysia, Taiwan (China), income level. Japan, for example, ranks below many
and Thailand stand out with less than a one-third share. other developed economies. Among developing
Japan and the Philippines have the highest share at one- econonmies, Chile stands out as one with an extremely
half, while the others have their proportion at about high share of long-term debt.
0.43. In contrast, about three-fourths of U.S. corporate The Structure of debt (domestic vs. foreign; and short-
debt is long-term, while in Germany the ratio is 0.55. In vs. long-term) was different across economies, however.
spite of the considerable attention given to the role of Figure 7.4 reports the distribution of debt across these
short-term debt in the East Asian financial crisis, these four categories in 1996 for the six economies most
data do not suggest a massive buildup in short-term affected by the crisis. Korea has the highest share of for-
debt for the East Asian economies, at least up to the end eign short-term debt share, followed by Malaysia and
of 1996, but rather a consistently low share of long- Thailand. In contrast, the Philippines and Taiwan
term debt. In fact, only Japan saw some decrease in the (China) have the largest share of domestic long-term
share of long-term debt. As these data do not distin- debt.4
guish foreign exchange from domestic debt, it can of The data also suggest large differences across
course be that the composition may have shifted away econoraies in interest payment coverage. This is calcu-
from short-term domestic debt toward short-term for- lated as the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes
eign exchange debt. (but adding back depreciation)-that is, EBITDA or
TABLE 7.8
Long-term debt share for nine Asian economies, Germany, and the United States
(percent, medians)
Economy 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1988-96
Hong Kong 59.7 59.5 53.8 56.5 44.7 44.7 40.7 37.3 36.4 44.9
Indonesia - - - 52.4 40.8 39.6 41.6 41.8 43.3 43.1
Japan 49.9 54.1 53.8 49.9 49.4 51.7 47.7 44.4 40.8 48.4
Korea 55.7 47.2 49.8 49.8 44.2 43.7 41.4 40.4 41.5 43.7
MaLaysia 35.8 35.5 32.5 27.1 26.9 26.6 27.2 27.8 29.9 29.2
Philippines - - - 57.2 53.1 50.3 50.2 49.8 51.4 52.2
Singapore 57.2 55.4 54.1 33.8 33.8 33.9 40.2 38.6 41.1 43.3
Taiwan, China - - - 53.9 44.4 32.8 34.6 34.3 38.9 35.9
ThaiLand 58.1 49.8 38.8 34.3 25.2 26.4 27.6 32.9 32.8 30.9
United States 77.7 77.2 76.3 76.7 75.8 76.2 75.2 74.6 74.1 75.9
Germany 56.8 55.4 54.5 53.9 55.2 55.4 55.4 55.3 54.7 55.3
- not avaiLabLe
Source: WorLd Bank.
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operational cash flow-to interest expenses (see figure Effect of exchange rate and interest rate
7.5). With the low interest rates in Japan, Japanese cor- shocks
porates needed to devote only a small fraction of
EBITDA on interest payments, so the interest coverage We next assess the impact of the currency and interest
ratio is about 8 in 1996, followed by Taiwan (China) rate shocks these economies have experienced since the
with 6.1. Thai and Korean corporates had the lowest second half of 1997 on firm liquidity and solvency.S We
interest coverage ratios-about 2.7 and 2.1, respec- start by describing the exchange rate and interest rate
tively. Corporates in Hong Kong, Malaysia, Indonesia, shocks we use. For each economy, we calculate the aver-
and the Philippines averaged between 3 and 4 while age exchange rate over the period February 15-March
Singaporean firms averaged 4.5. 1, 1999, and compare that with the average exchange
FIGURE 7.3
International comparison of long-term debt share
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FIGURE 7.4 first hal: of 1997, again taking it as the precrisis value.
We also revise upward the interest rate paid on foreignForeign versus domestic and
currency debt by a factor proportional to the increase in
shrcnt- versus tong-termthe spread between the economy's rate on U.S. dol-
lar-denominated sovereign bonds and the rate on U.S.
oa0 | | gTreasurr bonds of analogous maturity.6
90 | | Next, we compute the impact of these shocks in terms
80 g of corporate financial obligations using the end-of-
70 1996 balance sheet figures and 1996 profit and loss
statements. We define firms as technically insolvent
60 when the increase in financial obligations calculated at
50 new exchange and interest rates exceeds the corpora-
40 tion's end-of-1996 equity. We define firms as illiquid
30 when 1996 EBIT falls short of debt-service obligations
projected at new exchange and interest rates. We use
20 | | | | | | both exchange rate and intercst rate shocks at the same
10 time.
o The in-crease in financial obligations attributable to
Indonesia Korea Malaysia PhiLippines Taiwan, Thailand the two shocks is computed as follows. The exchange
CDetlohIoeica shortrate shock is calculated as the increase in the value of
.Foreig Long F Forein short end-of-1996 foreign currency debt-assumed to be
* Foreign long N1 Foreign short
entirely denominated in U.S. dollars-that is attribut-
able to the domestic currency devaluation. 7 The interest
rate shock is computed by (a) applying the estimated
FIGURE 7.5 increase in domestic corporate borrowing rates to the
Interest coverage in nine Asian economies, 1996 end-of- 1996 debt denominated in domestic currency;8
and (b) applying the estimated (as described above)
Percent of EBmTDA increase in corporate foreign currency borrowing rates to
8 the end-of-1996 debt denominated in foreign currency.9
7 1 m | Table 7.9 reports the share of firms that are techni-
6 cally insolvent, illiquid, or both after the two shocks.
5 On average for the five affected East Asian economies,
4 the share of insolvent firms is 17.3 percent. Indonesia is
3 by far the hardest-hit economy-more than half of its
2 firms are estimated to be insolvent, with the damage to
I 1 i 1 00 t the corporate sector mainly stemming from the large
I 111|1 | 1111 1111 1111 1111 11|11 1111 1111 I depreciation of the currency. In Korea, about 14 percent
I 4 ep ,9 < ;. bs of the corporates are technically insolvent at current
'• o ' v interest and exchange rates. In the Philippines and
'| sF N ' <t |Thailarnd, about 6 and 8 percent, respectively, of the
firms are insolvent. Finally, it is worth noting that very
Source. World Bank, Firm-Level Survey. few firms in our sample would be technically insolvent
in Malaysia and none in Taiwan (China).
rate in March 1997, taken as the precrisis value. For the Table 7.9 shows also the share of corporates that have
interest rate shocks, we compare the average of the become illiquid after the shock. Illiquidity is much more
domestic currency bank lending rate over the first two pervasive than insolvency. In the postcrisis scenario, 64
months of 1999 with the average lending rates in the percent of Indonesian firms, 28 percent of Korean
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TABLE 7.9
Firms facing illiquidity or insolvency
(percent of all firms in the sample)
Illiquid and Illiquid and Liquid and Liquid and Total
Economy insolvent solvent solvent insolvent Illiquid Insc Ivent
Indonesia 51.2 12.4 34.6 1.8 63.6 53.0
Rep. of Korea 10.5 17.1 68.4 3.9 27.6 14.4
Malaysia 1.5 39.3 59.2 0.0 40.8 1.5
Philippines 4.1 35.0 58.9 2.0 39.1 6.1
ThaiLand 6.4 35.1 57.2 1.2 41.5 7.6
Five Countries 14.7 27.8 54.9 2.6 42.5 17.3
Taiwan, China 0.0 16.7 83.3 0.0 16.7 0.0
Source: World Bank, Firm-LeveL Survey.
firms, 41 percent of Malaysian firms, 39 percent of had to remain high in most economies with high lever-
Philippine firms, and 42 percent of Thai firms are illiq- age, as outside equity was used sparingly. 'While there
uid-that is, their earnings do not cover interest pay- were no strong trends in the early 1990s, leverage did
ments. Even in Taiwan (China), approximately 17 increase in Korea and Thailand in the later vears-sig-
percent of the firms face illiquidity problems. Across the naling the vulnerability in corporate financial struc-
five economies most affected by the crisis, 43 percent of tures, which now has become a highly visibtl factor in
the firms are illiquid on average, and approximately 17 triggering and aggravating the financial crisis. Across
percent are insolvent. economies, the share of foreign short-term debt varied
It is useful to focus on the differences between illiq- considerably in 1996, as did the ability of the sample
uidity and insolvency problems. Table 7.9 shows that firms to cover interest payments through earnings. The
the share of firms that are illiquid but technically sol- underlying causes of decreased profitability and
vent is rather large: it averages more than one-third of increased leverage are multiple, with financial liberal-
all firms in the three most affected East Asian ization, macroeconomic policies, poor corporate gover-
economies (Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand), nance, and weak financial discipline by domestic and
and is between 12 and 17 percent in the other three foreign lenders playing a role-but the exact contribu-
economies. This implies that many solvent firms are at tion of each of these, and other factors, are currently
risk of insolvency as their liquidity positions are weak, unknown. But, owing to these vulnerabilities the
in the sense that they cannot even cover current debt- impact of interest and exchange shocks since mid-1997
service payments from earnings. These firms may have has been large on corporations' solvency and liquidity
difficulty obtaining outside financing for working capi- positions.
tal that would enable them to maintain ongoing opera-
tions, and they may be running at (too) low operating Notes
levels. Restoring credit flows to these solvent firms
would be important for restarting growth in these The authors are with the World Bank. Opinions expressed do not
economies. necessarily reflect hose of the WorLd Bank. We wouLd Lke to thank
Jerry Caprio, Stanley Fischer, Jack GLen, Ejaz Ghani, Guy Pfeffermann,
Summary S. Ramachandran, CharLes Woodruff, Masahiro Kawai, Dom'nique Dwor-
Frecaut, and Hongjoo Hahm for hetpful suggestions onthis and reLated
There were large differences in performance across work.
economies as measured by return on assets. These dif- 1. Five companion papers use the same data to study specific
ferences did not show up as much in sales growth, as aspects of the behavior of corporations in East Asia. Tie paper by
investment rates were high and those rates drove output Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (1999) studies the ownership and con-
rates in many economies. The high investment and rel- troL structures of East Asian corporations. The paper by Claessens,
atively low profitability meant that external financing Djankov, Fan, and Lang (1999a) investigates the pattern of diversifi-
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cation into verticaLLy related, complementarily reLated, and unreLated in financiaL distress was consequentLy much larger (about 63 percent
businesses. The paper by Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang (1999b) of the firrns in the five most affected economies were estimated to be
looks at the reLation between ownership structure and diversification iLLiquid arid 30 percent echnically insoLvent).
decisions and performance. The paper by CLaessens, Djankov, Fan, and 6. Aga n, the precrisis sovereign spread was that observed at the
Lang (1999c) examines the Link between ownership structure and the end of March 1997 and the postcrisis sovereign spread was that
expropriation of minority shareholders. FinaLLy, CLaessens, Djankov, observed at the end of February 1999.
and Ferri (1998) had Looked at the impact of exchange and interest 7. Notice that, owing to data avaiLabiLity, we couLd not compute
shocks of the firms'soLvencyand Liquidity positions as of the faLL1998. the positve effect of the devaLuation i terms of increased value of
2. For aLL companies Listed on the DAX in Frankfurt, and for all NYSE assets denominated in foreign currency. NegLecting this effect may
companies in the United States. Lead one to overestimate insoLvency. We shouLd, however, stress that
3. We present he share of long-term debt rather than the share of our anaLysis neglects aLso the negative demand shock triggered by the
short-term debt-the Latter can underestimate he amount of LiabiLi- crisis, a shock that LikeLy outweighs any positive effect stemming from
ties with a short maturity, as it excLudes, for exampLe, trade credits. the revaLuation of foreign currency assets.
4. Most of the data in this section refer to a more Limited sample 8. To account for the repricing of Loans, we appLy the increase
that we also use for our simuLation exercise on the effects of interest entirely to short-term domestic urrency debt, but we apply onLy one-
and exchange rate shocks, third of the increase to Long-term domestic currency debt. This
5. CLaessens, Djankov, and Ferri (1998) undertook a similar exercise amounts to assuming that Long-term domestic currency debt pays
in mid-1998 on the basis of the average xchange rate over the period fixed rates and has a three-year maturity.
September 1-13, 1998 compared with the average xchange rate in 9. Again, to account for the repricing of Loans, we appLy the increase
March 1997, and the average domestic urrency bank Lending rate over entireLy t3 short-term foreign currency debt. We appLy onLy one-third
the first haLf of 1998 compared with the average Lending rates in the of the increase to Long-term foreign currency debt-that is, we assume
first half of 1997. As exchange rate and interest rates shocks were that long-term foreign currency debt aLso pays fixed rates and has a
much larger in the fall of 1998, the percentage of firms found to be three-year maturity.
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Corporate Foreign Debt
in East Asia: Too Much
or Too Liittle?
Masabiro Kawai
Hongioo J. Hahm
Giuseppe Iarossi
T E his paper examines a sample of corporate financial data obtained
from five East Asian countries-Indonesia, the Republic of Korea,
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand-during the period 1996-98.
We find that the levels of foreign debt owed by manufacturing and
mostly unlisted, small and medium-size nterprises in these countries were, in
general, quite low. We find the patterns of foreign debt to be different across
countries and sectors. Korea stands out-Korean corporations borrowed more
from abroad across almost a]l sectors compared with their Southeast Asian
counterparts. In Southeast Asia, larger firms, export firms, and firms with for-
eign direct investment (FDI) partners borrowed more from abroad. As a rule,
larger firms in Southeast Asia were better able to access foreign funds during
the crisis; exporters were better hedged against foreign exchange shocks; and
firms with FDI partners were better able to use foreign debt financing. Overall,
the size of short-term foreign debt was not large, by international comparisons.
But the level of short-term foreign debt as a percentage of total foreign debt was
high, and almost all of the debt was unhedged. Profitable export firms proved
to be the most resilient sample group throughout he crisis. They were best able
to weather the devaluation and interest rate shocks. An interesting result is that
the less profitable firms in our sample borrowed more from abroad compared
with their more profitable cownterparts.
Introduction
Since most crisis-affected countries maintained strong macroeconomic policy
fundamentals before the crisis-low inflation, disciplined fiscal positions (sur-
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pluses or minimal deficits), and low public debt to gross account of the patterns of foreign debt by types of man-
domestic product (GDP) ratios-academics and policy- ufacturing firms in five East Asian countries-
makers alike have increasingly pointed to the private Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and
sector as the chief culprit in the crisis. Private banks and Thailand. Furthermore, the paper examines the links
corporations are seen to have borrowed excessively, between foreign debt financing and the profitability of
especially from short-term external sources, and to have corporations as well as the links between foreign
misallocated those resources in the real estate sector and exchange risk management and corporate external
in inefficient manufacturing firms-with adverse trade and financing activities.
impacts on productivity and competitiveness. No The paper is organized as follows. In the next section,
doubt, structural problems in the banking sector-such we describe the survey technique and data source,
as interest rate ceilings, government-directed lending, including caveats to the data. This is followed by a sec-
relationship-based activities, weak accounting and dis- tion in which we present a summary description of the
closure practices, and the lack of effective supervisory data that points out the main characteristics of the firms
and regulatory framework-contributed to the misallo- engaged in foreign financing. First, we present data on
cation of resources. However, the real force behind the foreign financing broken down by types of corporate
crisis emanated from structural weaknesses in the cor- borrowers: exporting versus nonexporting firms, firms
porate sector. Restructuring financially distressed pri- with or without FDI partners, and medium-size to large
vate corporations and putting good governance in place versus small firms. Second, we present dac:a on the
are viewed as the way out of the East Asian crisis and financing mode (debt versus equity), the maturity com-
the way forward to sustained growth. position (short versus long), and the currency composi-
It is important to examine the extent of structural tion (domestic versus foreign) of the firms' total
weaknesses in the corporate sector. Claessens, Djankov, liabilities, and offer some analytical interpretations of
and Lang (1999), using a comprehensive database of the results. In three subsequent sections, we examine
listed, large East Asian firms in nine countries over the the extent of short-term versus long-term debt financ-
period 1988-96, showed that there were large differ- ing, in both domestic and foreign currencies; we exam-
ences in corporate performance across countries, as ine the extent of hedging undertaken by corporate
measured by returns on assets. They demonstrated that borrowers; and we investigate the relationship
East Asian corporate performance began to deteriorate between foreign debt financing and corporate prof-
even before the outbreak of the crisis, that corporate itability, as measured by returns on equity. Ir the final
debt-equity ratios were already high compared with section, we conclude by providing policy prescriptions
international norms, and that reliance on external debt and recommendations that result from our anialysis of
financing was significant. Steep exchange rate depreci- the survey data.
ation and significant interest rate hikes suddenly
inflated external debt, measured in local currencies, and The survey data
increased both domestic and foreign debt servicing
obligations of corporations. The domestic demand con- The collection of firm-level data in Indonesia, Korea,
traction that followed the currency crisis drove the cor- Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand was motivated
porate sector into further financial difficulties.1 by the desire to improve the availability of corporate
However, information and reliable data on how East financial information in these countries. In the last quar-
Asian corporations have reacted to and fared in the ter of 1998, survey interviews of about 800 to 1,000
midst of the financial crisis have been scarce. manufacturing firms were conducted in each of the five
The objective of this paper is to examine the extent of countries. The sample of firms was put together ran-
and changes in patterns of external financing by private domly from the registry of enterprises maintained in
corporations during the period 1996-98. Using each country. The firms drawn, therefore, included a few
microlevel survey data, this paper provides a descriptive large but many small and medium-size enterprises; the
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majority of the sample was made up of unlisted corpo- for increased exports; and (3) determinants of the
rations. The sample was confined to the most important upgrad ing of industry. In this paper, we focus our atten-
geographic regions that are major centers of manufac- tion on the firms' financial structure, particularly for-
turing or industrial activity. The manufacturing subsec- eign corporate financing. With regard to the issue of
tors covered in the survey include: Autos and auto foreign financing, the sample firms were asked ques-
parts, Chemicals, Construction materials, Electronics, tions about the amount and maturity composition of
Food, Garments, Machinery, Textiles, and Wood. foreign debt and hedging practices over the period from
We categorize these firms with respect to their size, 1996 to 1998.3 The paper provides a descriptive analy-
their export orientation, and their foreign control. sis and interpretation of these data.
Specifically, a firm is defined as an "exporter" if it We note ex ante some caveats to the data. First,
exports any amount of its sales; a firm is defined as although much time has been spent cleaning up the data
"medium to large" if it has 150 or more employees; and and eliminating major outliers and inconsistent data
a firm has "FDI partners" if it receives 10 percent or entries, the survey data have all the usual survey biases
more in foreign direct investment. Overall, about two- of under- or overreporting a firm's true financial posi-
thirds of the sample is comprised of small firms (with tion. We have also found changes in the data over the
the exception of the Philippines); a little over half of the three-year period, 1996-98, to be minimal, with many
sample is comprised of exporters (with the exception of firms reporting the same or very similar data for suc-
Korea where 75 percent of the sample is made up of cessive years. Second, the survey was conducted only
exporters) and 25 percent of firms with FDI partners. for ma nufacturing firms, excluding the service sector
Our analysis is based on data made available as of and other nonmanufacturing activities. This presents a
February 16, 1999 (table 8.1). The survey data draw on sample bias, and examining external liability positions
approximately 850 Indonesian firms; 860 Korean of surv2yed firms may mask the true state of corporate
firms; 820 Malaysian firms; 570 Filipino firms; and 660 external financing undertaken collectively by all corpo-
Thai firms in manufacturing. The questionnaire was rations in the country as a whole. Finally, the most
developed in close cooperation with the authorities of important caveat is a winner bias; that is, the survey
each country. Over 80 percent of the questions are the only ccvers firms that are still in existence today. It is
same for all five participating countries, allowing the thus biased toward firms that have managed to survive
possibility of cross-country comparison. 2 The major until February 1999, and does not include others that
areas covered by the questionnaire are (1) bottlenecks have gone bankrupt as a result of the crisis. For all these
to corporate recovery; (2) the firms' response to the cri- reasons the results stemming from these data should be
sis, financial structure, employment practices, prospects examired with a certain degree of caution.
TABLE 8.1
Sample characteristics
Size Export orientation Foreign control
Small Medium to lorge Nonexporter Exporter Non-FDI FDI Total
Indonesia 410 315 474 266 684 144 853
Korea 537 286 213 632 711 146 857
Malaysia 555 202 427 388 602 213 815
Philippines 241 259 257 278 358 198 566
Thailand 357 210 285 374 455 190 664
Total 2100 1272 1656 1938 2810 891 3755
Note: Breakdown umbers do not always add up to 'total" because of incomplete or no responses.
Source: World Bank, Firm-Level Survey Data (see the data description in the text for a more detailed documentation).
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Foreign debt financing FIGURE 8.1
Share of foreign debt as a percentage of totalEast Asian corporations in our sample, on aggregate, liabilities, 1996-mid-1998
did not rely heavily on foreign debt financing, with the
exception of Korea. Domestic debt financing and equity Foreign debt/total liabilities (percent)
financing, including retained earnings, were predomi-
nant (table 8.2). This is because most firms in our sam- 20 M Long-term
ple are unlisted, small and medium-size enterprises, ElShort-term
with limited access to foreign financing. Over 80 per- 15
cent of the firms in our sample did not employ the ser- 10
vices of foreign banks. Though equity financing was 0 I
dominant in a few countries and in certain subsectors 5
(table 8.3), we believe that outside equity was used o
sparingly because insiders preferred to retain control of 0 s 9 0 9 SN
their own corporations. 4 Indonesia Korea MaLaysia Philippines Thailand
The share of foreign debt, as a percentage of total lia- S nurc eWr a Forev Survy.
bilities, is uniformly low for most countries over the
three-year period from 1996 through 1998 (table 8.2
and figure 8.1). In Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia, 1998. In the Philippines, the share of foreign debt as a
the average firm-level share of foreign debt did not percentage of total liabilities was moderately higher at
exceed 5 percent as a percentage of total liabilities in about 7 percent in 1996, increasing to 10 percent in
1996 and increased by only 1 percentage point in 1998.
TABLE 8.2
Estimated shares of domestic debt, foreign debt and equity as percentage of total Liabilities
Domestic urrency debt Foreign currency debt Equity
Short-term Long-term Short-term Long-term Foreign Domestically
debt debt Total debt debt Total owned owned Total
1996
Indonesia 25 18 43 2 2 4 9 44 53
Korea 33 16 49 4 13 17 9 25 34
MaLaysia 25 26 51 1 3 4 14 31 45
Philippines 24 29 53 5 2 7 19 21 40
ThaiLand 28 20 48 3 2 5 10 37 47
1997
Indonesia 25 18 43 3 3 6 8 43 51
Korea 34 16 50 5 13 18 8 24 32
Malaysia 24 24 48 2 4 6 15 31 46
PhiLippines 29 27 56 7 3 10 19 15 34
ThaiLand 28 18 46 4 3 7 10 37 47
Mid-1998
Indonesia 24 18 42 3 3 6 8 44 52
Korea 32 6 38 5 16 21 8 32 41
MaLaysia 25 23 48 2 4 6 16 30 46
Philippines 28 22 50 7 3 10 22 19 40
ThaiLand 26 16 42 3 3 6 11 41 52
Note: 1. The foreign and domestic components of equity have been caLcuLated from the FDI share, on the assumption that equity is domestic currency-denominated, whether
domestically or foreign-heLd. 2. Equity includes retained earnings.
Source: World Bank, Firm-LeveL Survey Data (see the data description in the text for a more detaiLed documentation).
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TABLE 8.3
Domestic and foreign equity ownership by sector, percentage of total liabilities
Domestic owned equity Foreign owned equity
Chemicals Machinery Auto Gorm. & textiles Electronics Chemicals Machinery Auto Garm. & textiles Electronics
1996
Indonesia 43 - - 45 26 9 - - 9 20
Korea 36 46 35 44 36 12 5 9 2 11
Malaysia 25 0 42 40 - 18 39 6 8 -
PhiLippines 24 - - - 7 18 - - - 30
ThaiLand - - 37 - 22 - - 11 - 26
1997
Indonesia 45 - - 42 26 7 - - 8 18
Korea 35 44 41 39 36 13 6 6 2 11
MaLaysia 25 -2 45 43 - 19 41 6 8 -
PhiLippines 30 - - - 0 17 - - - 35
ThaiLand - - 38 - 22 - - 11 - 26
Mid-1998
Indonesia 48 - - 44 29 8 - - 9 17
Korea 47 50 51 50 42 9 10 5 3 17
MaLaysia 25 -3 46 41 - 19 42 7 8 -
PhiLippines 35 - - - 7 19 - - - 34
Thailand - - 39 - 20 - - 13 - 31
-: not available
Note: 1. The foreign and domestic components of equity have been calcuLated from the FDI share, or the assumption that equity is domestic currency-denominated, whether
domestically or foreign-heLd. 2. Equity includes retained earnings.
Source: World Bank, Firm-leveL Survey Data (see the data descrption in the text for a more detailed documentation).
It was higher in Korea at about 17 percent in 1996, substantial foreign debt financing. In Thailand, mainly
rising to 18 percent in 1997 and to 21 percent in 1998. the electronics sector (12 percent) borrowed from
The firms generally relied on domestic debt as well as abroad.
equity financing rather than foreign debt financing In the four Southeast Asian countries, there were sig-
throughout the three-year time period covered by our nificant differences in the size of foreign debt between
survey data. exporters and nonexporters, between medium-to-large
The sectoral characteristics of the firms that engaged and small firms, and between foreign joint venture
in foreign debt financing appear to reflect each coun- firms and fully locally owned firms. Many exporting
try's specific conditions (table 8.4). The predominant firms were larger and tended to have FDI partners. Not
industries in this financing category in Korea, for exam- surpris ingly, foreign debt financing was more predomi-
ple, were the machinery and tools sector (in which some nant among export-oriented firms than among nonex-
30 percent of financing was in the form of foreign debt), porters in all five countries.5 Exporters borrowed
the garments and textiles sector (24 percent), the auto- externally on average 10-15 percentage points more
mobile sector (20 percent), the electronics sector (19 than nonexporters in Indonesia, Malaysia, and the
percent), and the chemicals sector (about 16 percent) in Philippines, and 7 percentage points more in Thailand
1998. In Indonesia, foreign debt financing was pre- and Korea. Firm size also mattered. In all countries,
dominant in the electronics sector (13 percent) and the larger firms exhibited more foreign debt financing than
garments and textiles sector (9 percent). In Malaysia, smaller ones. Medium-size and large firms financed at
the machinery and tools sector (14 percent) was the least 14) percentage points more than small firms from
major borrower in the foreign debt market. In the overseas sources in Southeast Asia, and 2 percentage
Philippines, the electronics sector (16 percent) and the points more in Korea. The difference is starker for firms
garments and textiles sector (12 percent) engaged in that had FDI partners, as they universally engaged in
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TABLE 8.4
Share of foreign debt as a percentage of total liabilities by sector
Chemicals Machinery Auto Garments and textites Electronics
1996
Indonesia 3 - - 7 10
Korea 12 29 15 20 13
MaLaysia 5 14 1 5
PhiLippines 8 - - 9 11
ThaiLand - 7 4 10
1997
Indonesia 5 - - 8 13
Korea 13 29 15 22 14
MaLaysia 7 13 1 6
PhiLippines 7 - - 9 15
Thaitand - 7 5 12
Mid-1998
Indonesia 5 - - 9 13
Korea 16 30 20 24 19
Malaysia 6 14 2 7
Philippines 7 - - 12 16
Thailand - 8 5 12
-: not avaiLabLe
Source: World Bank, Firm-level Survey Data (see the data description in the text for a more detaited documentation).
more foreign debt financing. In Indonesia, Malaysia, hedged against foreign exchange risks; and firms with
and the Philippines, the difference in foreign debt FDI partners were better able to utilize foreign debt
financing by FDI firms in comparison to non-FDI firms financing.
was about 15-20 percentage points; and in Thailand,
about 12 percentage points. Only Korea had almost no Short-term versus long-term debt
difference, at about 1 percentage point (table 8.5).
To summarize, the patterns of foreign debt financing Given the notorious role attributed to short-term exter-
were quite different across countries and sectors. Korea nal debt in the East Asian financial crisis, we now exam-
stands out as an exception, distinguishing itself from the ine the term structure of total liabilities by East Asian
other Southeast Asian countries. First, Korean corpora- corporations. First, we take up the level of short-term
tions financed more from abroad in the form of debt debt (both domestic and foreign) of East Asimn corpo-
across almost all sectors than their Southeast Asian rations.
counterparts. Second, in Korea the machinery and tools Our data suggest that the overall size of short-term
and the garments and textiles sectors financed their debt was not large, when compared with international
debt externally more heavily, while in Southeast Asia, norms. In fact, the ratio of short-term debt tc' total lia-
the electronics sector followed this route more than any bilities (including net worth) is estimated to be 32 per-
of the other sectors. Third, exporters, larger firms, and cent for U.S. manufacturing firms,6 which is
firms with FDI partners financed their debt more from approximately the same as in our sample. The short-
abroad in Southeast Asia, while only exporters fit this term debt to total liabilities ratio remained relatively
trend in Korea-without exhibiting any difference constant in East Asia throughout the period 1996-98.
based on firm size or the presence of FDI partners. As a In Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand
rule, larger firms were better able to access foreign debt this ratio was about 25-30 percent, while in Korea it
financing during the crisis; exporters were naturally was higher at close to 40 percent (figure 8.2). The use of
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TABLE 8.5
Share of foreign debt as a percentage of total liabilities by firm characteristics
Size Export orientation Foreign control
Medium to large Small Exporter Nonexporter FDI Non-FDI
1996
Indonesia 9 1 10 0 14 3
Korea 18 16 18 11 17 17
Malaysia 11 2 9 0 14 1
PhiLippines 11 3 14 0 17 3
ThaiLand 12 2 10 1 14 3
1997
Indonesia 12 2 16 1 23 3
Korea 20 17 19 12 18 18
Malaysia 12 2 9 1 15 2
Philippines 13 5 15 3 20 4
Thailand 14 2 10 2 16 3
1998
Indonesia 12 2 15 1 21 4
Korea 21 21 22 16 20 21
Malaysia 13 2 10 0 16 2
Philippines 13 4 17 1 20 4
ThaiLand 12 2 9 3 15 3
Source: WorLd Bank, Firm-Level Survey Data (see the data descrption ir the text for a more detailed documentation).
short-term debt financing appears to be above the U.S. Focusing on the relative size of short-term compared
norm for large firms, export firms, and firms with FDI with lcng-term debt, Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand
partners, all of which show an average ratio of almost had larger shares of the former, while Malaysia had a
40 percent. larger share of long-term debt. The Philippines experi-
enced an increase in the share of short-term debt over
FIGURE 8.2 the per.iod 1996-98. In terms of short-term versus long-
term debt as a percentage of total liabilities for each
Share of short-term debt as a percentage of ,onr~Krassottrmbroigwsaot3
total liabilities,1996-mid-1998 countr,, Korea's short-term borrowng was about 37perceni: and long-term 22 percent (the relative ratio
Short-term debt/total liabilities being 1.7); respectively, these figures were 29 percent
40 and 19 percent (1.5) for Thailand; 35 percent and 27
30 | l perceni: (1.3) for the Philippines; 27 percent and 21 per-
cent (1,3) for Indonesia; and 27 percent and 27 percent
(1.0) for Malaysia in 1998.
20 The higher dependence on short-term debt is often
explairned by the high credit risk that creditors are
10 unwilling to take. Creditors, as a result, would prefer to
extend short-term loans, frequently (and sometimes
0 A\ i A 2 b A systematically) rolling over these loans. The inability of
SqA S9 % SS S% *% 4z 4, N49 the sample firms to access long-term funding is also due
Indonesia Korea Malaysia PhiLippines Thailand in part to limited market infrastructure, such as the lack
U Domestic short-term U Foreign short-term of long-term financial instruments, accounting stan-
Source: World Bank, Firm-Level Survey. dards, and portfolio risk management. However, the
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fact that large firms, export firms, and firms with FDI Interestingly, the degree of hedging did not change in
partners tend to borrow more short-term debt than any substantive way from 1997 to 1998, and it did not
firms in other categories may suggest that the former change significantly across countries except in the case
types of firms have easier access to domestic suppliers' of the Philippines. This was probably because of the
credit, export-import credit, and FDI partner credit. In higher cost of buying hedging contracts in the aftermath
this sense, their reliance on short-term debt financing at of the crisis. While the degree of short-term foreign debt
a time of crisis may have increased their ability to with- financing was low in general for our sample firms, the
stand a crisis. more a firm borrowed short-term from abroad, the
Next, for all countries, short-term debt financing was more it also tended to hedge (figure 8.4).
by and large from domestic sources. Distinguishing
short-term domestic versus foreign debt, the relative ProfitabLe versus Less profitabLe firms
ratios were about eight to one. In terms of percentage
ratios of total liabilities, Thailand borrowed short-term Using returns on equity as a measure of profitability, we
about 26 percent from domestic sources and 3 percent have divided our sample into profitable firms and less
from foreign sources; respectively, Korea borrowed 32 profitable firms using the Box-Cox transformation
percent and 5 percent; Malaysia 25 percent and 2 per- technique. 7 Only 25 percent of our cross-country sam-
cent; the Philippines 28 percent and 7 percent; and ple falls under the profitable category using this tech-
lndonesia about 24 percent and 3 percent in 1998. nique, and the remaining 75 percent is categorized as
less profitable.8 This skewed distribution shows that the
Unhedged short-term foreign debt: too majority of the sample firms were already in financial
much or too little? distress before the crisis, and that the distress situation
was aggravated by the crisis itself. In fact, whiLe over 25
In our sample, over 80 percent of the firms do not percent of the firms overall reported profits "above"
employ foreign bank services, and only a very small average before the crisis, this ratio went down -o 20 per-
proportion borrows in foreign currency. We therefore cent after the crisis.9
examine the ratio of short-term foreign debt over total Examination of the distribution of profitable and less
foreign debt to take into account only those firms that profitable firms across export orientation, not surpris-
finance in foreign currency. The overall average ratio of ingly, reveals that export firms proved to be more prof-
short-term foreign debt to total foreign debt is 48 per- itable than nonexport firms. Export firms are more
cent, with the Philippines' ratio the highest at about 70
percent and Korea's ratio the lowest at about 25 percent FIR 8.3
(figure 8.3). Share of short-term foreign debt as a percentage
A striking though not surprising finding is that very of total foreign debt, 1996-mid-1998
few borrowers hedged foreign exchange risk. Clearly, Short-termforeign debtltotalforeign debt
de facto pegged exchange rate regimes and a quarter 80
century of uninterrupted economic growth encouraged 70
short-term foreign debt financing without hedging. In 6
Korea, the country with relatively large foreign debt 60
financing, less than 7 percent of the firms that engaged 50
in foreign debt financing hedged their loans. The ratios 40
were only marginally higher for three of the other coun- 30
tries and much higher for the Philippines. In Malaysia, 20
11 percent of the firms hedged; in Indonesia, 14 per- 10
cent; and in Thailand, 19 percent, all in 1997. In the 0
Philippines, almost 30 percent hedged their foreign Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines lhailand
exchange exposure, which was high among East Asian U 1996 U 1997 El Mid-1998
* .1,, t * * , , , ~~~~~~~~~~Source: WorLd Bank, Firm-Lev LSurvey.
countries, but still low by international standards.
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FIGURE 8.4
Hedging ratios and short-term foreign debt ratios in five E1ast Asian Countries, 1997-1998
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Source: World Bank, Firm-Level Survey.
resilient and have managed to weather the crisis better. higher returns. Throughout the 1996-98 period, these
While the percentage of profitable exporters remained ratios did not change much. Most less profitable firms
unchanged before and after the crises, the percentage of continued to borrow relatively heavily in the short term
profitable nonexporters fell from 35 percent to 21 per- in foreign currency. Reliance on short-term foreign debt
cent. This is an indication of the role played by the drop was accompanied by low levels of hedging across the
in domestic demand caused by the crisis, which severely board. When we examine the level of short-term foreign
affected nonexporting firms. debt by export orientation, the data show that less prof-
An interesting result is the difference in the level of itable exporters, on average, financed their debt from
foreign debt between profitable and less profitable abroad 10 percent more than profitable exporters
firms. Firms that were nonprofitable financed more in throughout the 1996-98 period (figure 8.5).
the form of short-term debt from abroad compared
with their more profitable counterparts. On average, Conclusions
the ratio of short-term foreign debt to total foreign debt
for less profitable firms was about 44 percent, com- This paper examined a sample of corporate financial
pared with 37 percent for profitable firms. Foreign data obtained from five East Asian countries during the
creditors were more willing to lend to riskier firms with period 1996-98. We find that the levels of foreign debt
short-term rather than long-term maturity, expecting by manufacturing and mostly unlisted, small and
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0fFIGURE 8.5<i$0\; 0 In the light of the analysis of survey results, we can
provide three simple policy prescriptions. First, in order
Short-term foreign debt ratios by profitable to secure credit lines and liquidity and to continue oper-
and less profitable exporters, 1996-mid-1998 ..
ations at times of crisis, corporations may wish to shift
Short-term foreign debt/total foreign debt at least part of their products to foreign markets or find
55 FDI partners. Second, corporations that depend on for-
50 eign debt financing must find better ways to hedge
against exchange risk. Third, corporations that borrow
45 short-term from abroad should make every effort to
increase efficiency and rates of return on equity because
40 these firms tend to be less profitable.
35 _ _ R _ We also provide three broader policy recoinmenda-
tions. First, it is important to develop financial markets
30 further to mobilize long-term savings for investment in
1996 1997 Mid-1998 productive corporate activity. Financial market deepen-
9 Profitable exporters U Less profitable exporters ing that would facilitate the growth of long-term capi-
Source: WorLd Bank, Firm-Level Survey. tal markets is corollary to this prescription. Second, it is
important to deepen the foreign exchange niarket to
enable firms to access foreign currency hedging facili-
medium-size enterprises in these countries were, in gen- ties. Third, it is important to strengthen corporate gov-
eral, quite low. Furthermore, the patterns of foreign lia- ernance so that corporations can prudently manage
bilities were quite different across countries. Korea their own financial risks and conditions. The three gen-
stands out: Korean corporations financed more in the eral recommendations are common to all five
form of foreign debt across almost all sectors compared economies, and are important prerequisite institutional
with their Southeast Asian counterparts. In Southeast requirements for sustained growth.
Asia, larger firms, export firms, and firms with FDI
partners relied more on foreign debt for their financing Notes
than other categories of firms, while in Korea only
export firms tended to finance from abroad. In The authors are with the World Bank. They are thankfuL to Arvind
Southeast Asia, as a rule, larger firms were better able Gupta, Mary HalLward-Driemeier, Margaret Miller, and other conference
to access foreign debt financing during the crisis; participants for valuable suggestions and comments on the earlier
exporters were better hedged against foreign exchange drafts, and to David Bisbee for editorial assistance. The findings, inter-
shocks; and firms with FDI partners were better able to pretations, and concLusions expressed in this paper are thiose of the
use foreign debt financing. authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the World Bank,
Overall the size of short-term debt was not large, by its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent.
international comparisons, but the level of short-term 1. See World Bank (1998) and Furman and Stiglitz (1999).
foreign debt as a percentage of total foreign debt was 2. Though data for construction materials were collected for
higher, especially for exporters, large firms, and firms MaLaysia, this report does not examine this subsector owing to insuf-
with FDI partners. The degree of currency hedging was ficient data in other countries.
quite limited. Export firms that were profitable proved 3. Note that the data for 1998 refer to the first haLf of the year.
to be more resilient through the crisis, because they 4. The survey data contain information on the amounts of equity
were better able to weather the devaluation and interest and debt and amounts of short-term and long-term liabilities. The data
rate shocks early in the crisis period. Although firm size do not indicate these amounts' respective breakdowns into domestic
helped, it was not a significant factor in affecting firm and foreign components. It is believed, however, that equity falls
profitability during the crisis. An interesting result is that largely into the category of long-term domestic liabilities on the
firms that were less profitable financed more in the form assumption that equity is domestic currency-denominated.
of foreign debt than their more profitable counterparts. 5. This concLusion is simiLar to the findings of Dollar, Hallward-
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Driemer, Iarossi, and Chakraborty (1998) who studied industriaL firms 8. The onLy exception to this pattern is found in MaLaysia. This couLd
in ThaiLand. be becaise in Malaysia no negative profit vaLues were reported. ALL
6. Dun & Bradstreet Credit Services (1999). firms in MaLaysia reported positive profits for the three-year period
7. Our initiaL attempt to divide the sample of firms using a sample 1996-98. This phenomenon, aLthough not completeLy impossibLe,
mean was hampered by the presence of large outLiers. To mitigate the seems irmplausible. As a consequence, the anaLysis of this section did
effects of outLiers, we used the Box-Cox transformation technique. This not incLude MaLaysian data.
technique basicaLLy assumes that the true distribution of profitability 9. We define 1996 for Thailand and 1997 for Indonesia, Korea,
is normally distributed and transforms the skewed actuaL distribution MaLaysia, nd the PhiLippines as "before the crisis"; and 1997 for
into a normaL one. The sampLe mean of the normalized istribution is ThaiLand and 1998 for Indonesia, Korea, MaLaysia, nd the PhiLippines
then used to separate the profitabLe firms from the Less profitabLe as "after the crisis."
ones.
Corporate Foreign Debt in East Asia: Too Much or Too Little? 121

Co7orate Employment
an Pblic Policy
Xin Meng
Ron Duncan
O ne of the outstanding features of Asian economic growth has been
m its rapid development of labor-intensive xports. This has affected
Asian economies in several important ways. During the process of
economic growth, hundreds of thousands of once-unskilled laborers were
trained to handle recently introduced modern technology. Thus, human capi-
tal accumulation has been fast in these economies. Since the driving force for
the rapid growth was labor-intensive xports, growth brought about faster
increases in labor income relative to capital income. This, in turn, brought
about a relatively equal income distribution.
The crisis suddenly slowed down markedly these countries' economic
growth-and had a substant:ial impact on employment. While the adverse
impact on employment is obvious, the details are not known. For example,
who are the most severely affected workers? Which categories of workers were
laid off? To answer these questions and to design necessary policy responses,
one needs to understand the r esponse of economic agents, especially firms, to
the shock. Using the surveys carried out in the crisis countries as a basis, this
paper throws some light on how corporate firms reacted to the Asian crisis
from the viewpoint of their employment practices. In particular, the following
questions are addressed:
* Which particular groups oi employees have been most severely affected by
the changes in production;
* How have the sample firms reacted to minimize human capital losses?
* How are reductions in the work force associated with demand or labor cost
constraints? To what extent have labor costs changed and in what direc-
tion? and
* How have labor market institutional factors affected the behavior of sur-
veyed corporate firms in dealing with the crisis?
The next section discusses the background of the five crisis countries, in par-
ticular their economic achievements before the crisis, how badly the countries
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have been affected by the crisis, and the differences in TABLE 9.1
labor market institutions. The next three sections are Change in real GDP: 1991-1998
devoted to the questions of employment change and its
contributing factors, the particular groups of employees Real GOP growth rndonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Thailand
that have been affected, and the firms' behavior with 1990 9.0 9.7 9.7 2.7 11.7
respect to minimizing human capital losses. The final 1991 8.9 9.2 8.8 -0.2 8.0
1992 7.2 5.0 7.8 0.3 8.1
section discusses the relationship between firm behav- 1993 7.3 5.8 8.4 2.1 8.3
ior and labor market institutional settings, and provides 1994 7.5 8.4 9.4 4.4 8.8
some policy imp ations. 1995 8.2 9.0 9.4 4.8 8.7
some policyimptlications. 1990-95 avg. 8.0 7.5 8.7 2.3 8.4
1996 8.0 7.1 8.6 5.5 5.5
Background information 1997 5.0 5.5 8.0 5.1 -0.4
1998 -10.0 -2.5 3.0 3.3 -1.5
Source: Garnaut (1998).Four of the five economies had consistently fast eco-
nomic growth for a long period before the Asian crisis. has estimated that the "true" level of unemployment is
Table 9.1 shows the real GDP growth of the five coun- double the official rate. This "true" rate is a reflection
tries since the beginning of the decade. The average real of the large number of people who have dropped out of
GDP growth in the first half of the 1990s for four of the the labor force, or who are working without pay in fam-
countries (Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, ily businesses, and casual workers who have not been
and Thailand) was above 7.5 percent. Even the Philip- paid for over a month.
pines, which previously had relatively poor growth, began While Malaysia saw almost a doubling of its unem-
to register reasonably strong growth from 1994 on, and ployment rate from 1997 to 1998, its rate is low when
by 1996 its real GDP growth had reached 5.5 percent. compared with much of the rest of East Asia. This is
The GDP growth for all five countries, however declined partly attributable to the fact that before the crisis
in 1997 and fell further in 1998. Indonesia, Korea, and Malaysia was experiencing an extremely tight job mar-
Thailand experienced negative growth in 1998. ket. Urban unemployment rates were believed to be
As a result of the declining economic growth, unem- much lower than the official rate. The government
ployment in all five countries has increased sharply (see noted at the time that skilled and semi-skilled workers
figure 9.1). The reported changes in Indonesia, Korea, were becoming scarce (EIU 1998b).
and Thailand are dramatic. In percentage terms, unemployment in the Philippines
In Indonesia, the pressure on employment is not only has risen the least of the countries in the study. This is
attributable to the shrinking domestic labor demand, partly because the Philippines is one of the last c ountries
but also to the repatriation of Indonesians working in in East Asia seemingly affected by the current financial
other parts of East Asia (Economist Intelligence Unit crisis. It was only in the second quarter of 1998 that the
[EIU] 1998a). country recorded negative growth. This decline, how-
The lack of reliable information makes any estimates ever, was seen by many as the result of the drought con-
of the unemployment rate in Thailand suspect. The fig- ditions brought on by El Nino and not the result of the
ure of 6 percent used in figure 9.1 is based on an esti- crisis. Confirmation of this analysis can be semn in the
mate by the International Labor Organization (ILO). employment figures for the second half of 1998 when
The National Statistics Office and the Ministry of employment rebounded strongly in the agricultural sec-
Labor in Thailand have made other estimates that range tor, bringing the national unemployment level down to
up to 10 percent. What can be concluded with certainty around 10 percent from 13 percent (EIU 1998c).
is that the number of Thailand's unemployed has Employment at firm level is heavily influenced by
increased sharply (EIU 1998d). labor market institutions. Hence, understanding the
In Korea, many workers have dropped out of the degree of flexibility of the labor markets in each of the
labor force, a fact which has affected the official unem- five countries helps one identify the differences in the
ployment figures. The Confederation of Trade Unions firms' employment behavior during the crisis.
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FIGURE 9.1
Changes in unemployment rate across the five countries
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Note: The unemployment ra es for Indonesia, Malaysia, nd Thailand for September 1998 are only estimates.
Source: IMF (1999).
Of the five countries, Korea has the strongest union less unionized they are likely to be more flexible in
movement. Even though on average only 10 percent of responding to economic changes.
its labor force is unionized, a much higher unionization During the crisis, unions in Korea once again demon-
rate is found in the manufacturing industry. In addition, strated their power. For example, when the Hyundai
the unionization rate is highly correlated to firm size. automobile factory in Ulsan decided to implement a
The average firm size in this study is 314 employees, redundancy plan, the workers orchestrated a takeover
and all the firms are from the manufacturing industry. of the factory, causing US$650 million in lost produc-
According to Lee and Kim (1997), the unionization rate tion costs and driving several suppliers to the edge of
is 26 percent in firms with 100-299 employees and 36 collapse. The end result was an agreement allowing the
percent in firms with 300-499 employees. This implies company to lay off 1,300 workers, mostly female cafe-
a 30 percent unionization rate for the firms covered in teria staff, and permitting another 1,200 workers to go
this study; which may be the highest unionization rate on voluntary unpaid leave (EIU 1998d). Recently, new
among the five countries. But because smaller firms are legislation that allows employers to lay off workers en
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masse was implemented. In the negotiations that led up (Veale 1999). However, it is reported that the two major
to this change, labor won a promise from employers union groups see this as giving in to the demands of
that workers would not be "recklessly" laid off. In employers instead of having firms adopt job-sharing
return, the unions agreed that they would work with programs and shorter working days.
management to adjust wages and working hours (Lee
1998:17). Employment performance across
Unions are virtually nonexistent in Malaysia. They countries, sectors, and the export
were banned until 1988, after which only in-house status of the firms
unions were allowed at plant level, rather than at indus-
try level. Industrial relations legislation provides for Across the five countries, 50 percent of the surveyed
compulsory arbitration of disputes and prohibition of firms reduced employment. The most widespread
the right to strike in sectors providing "essential ser- reductions were in Korea-over 60 percent.
vices" (Athukorala 1998). Indonesia has only one, gov- Employment reductions appear to have been 'largest in
ernment-run, union. According to Agarwal (1 995), it is Korea and Thailand, judging by the reports that
more of a government organ than a representative body upwards of 27 percent of the firms in these countries
for workers. reduced employment by more than 25 percent.
Although unions are prevalent in the Philippines and Malaysia had the smallest proportion of firms reducing
Thailand, they have lacked bargaining power in both employment by more than 25 percent.
places. In Thailand, the legal requirement for any strike Figure 9.2 summarizes the employment changes in
action is support from a majority of workers, which the five crisis countries in broad magnitudes (increased,
makes such actions extremely difficult (EIU 1998e). In unchanged, and decreased). On average, employment
the Philippines, the lack of bargaining power of unions fell in about 48 percent of the surveyed firms. Of the five
can be seen in their inability to hold employers to legis- countries, Korea was the most severely affected with
lated minimum wages (EIU 1998c). about 62 percent of the firms experiencing employment
On the minimum wage front, Thailand, Indonesia, reductions. Thailand and Indonesia were next in this
and the Philippines all have legislation. In some cases, ranking. Although employment was not as seriously
however, the minimum wage level is set rather low so affected in the Philippines and Malaysia, more than 30
that it is not effective, and in others, governments have percent of the sampled firms in these countries reduced
no adequate method to reinforce the legislation (EIU their employment levels.
1998a, c, e). Malaysia does not have minimum wage
legislation (Athukorala 1998). Korea introduced a min-
imum wage law in 1987; it was initially applied to man- FIGURE 9.2
ufacturing enterprises employing over 10 workers. In
1990, it was extended to include all industries with over Employment changes by country
10 workers. About 2.1 percent of total workers were Percentage offirms with employment changes
estimated ~~~~~~~~~~~~70
estimated to be covered by minimum wages (Kim, Mg Increase * Decrease l Sama
Rhee, and Lee 1992), a rather low coverage rate. 60
Although minimum wages may have little application 50
in Korea, the Labor Standard Law introduced in 1953 40
and reinforced in 1987 has played an important role in
the Korean employment system. Employers were pre- 30
vented from laying off or dismissing workers except for 20
the "right causes." A thirty-day advance notice was 10
legally required. A mandatory employer-financed sever- 0
ance pay scheme was also required (Lee and Kim 1997). Indonesia Korea MlaLaysia Philippines Thailand TotaL
In early 1998, the government legalized layoffs to help Country
.. Source: World Bark, Firrn-Level Survey.
employers cope with the pressure imposed by the crisis
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At the industry level, auto parts, electronics, and FIGURIE 9.4
machinery are the sectors that have had the largest
employment loss (see figure 9.3). In the auto parts Employment change, by export status
industry 73 percent of the firms have reduced employ- Percentage offirms
ment, while the equivalent figures for the electronics 60
, , . ., . C~~~~~~~~~~E Decrease U1Same O Increase
and machinery industries are 56 and 55 percent, respec-
tively. The auto parts and electronic industries also have 50
the highest percentage of firms that have reduced
employment by 25 percent or more. While the garments 40
and textiles and chemicals industries have a smaller per-
centage of firms with large reductions in employment, 30
the absolute number of firms adversely affected is much
higher than in other industries. Garments and textiles 20
are also likely to have a high percentage of female
employees. 1
Given that foreign direct investment fell dramatically
during the crisis, one might expect that export-oriented D
firms would have been most adversely affected. From Domestic Sector Totat
another perspective, as the crisis resulted in huge cur- Source: worLd Bank, Firm-Leve[ Surey.
rency depreciations, the export sector may well have
expanded. Thus, whether the crisis has adversely
affected the export or domestic sector the most is in the export sector increased employment than in
largely an empirical question. It can be observed from domestic firms.
figure 9.4 that an equal percentage of firms from the Even though many firms have reduced employment,
domestic and export-oriented sectors reduced employ- they may still have job vacancies that cannot be filled by
ment. However, a significantly greater number of firms redundant workers for various reasons, such as mis-
match.-s in skills. It should be expected that the more
capita. - and skill-intensive firms, owing to their being
FIGURE 9.3 involvzd in more dynamic technologies, would be more
Employment change, by industrial sector likely to fill vacancies while letting workers go. In the
Percentage af firms survey, the firms were asked whether they were filling
80 vacancies as people left their jobs. The summary of the
70 l Decrease I Same o Increase responses to this question by country and export status
is reported in table 9.2. Of the four countries respond-
60 ing, Korea has the highest proportion of firms that
501 | X g g g | answered positively-at 46 percent. If we take into
40 1 | gilw s s 3 | 11 | account that 62 percent of Korean firms have reduced
employment since the Asian crisis began in mid-1997,
30 11 s s a the high proportion of firms filling vacancies may also
20 | l l f l l l kindicate that there may be a shift in demand from one
10 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~kind cf labor to another.
o l When it comes to laying off workers, firms adopt dif-
o°6sP9W'9 &' <& cf >xO' 4' |ferent practices. Some enforce layoffs, while others
4$jqo& <>^StN </ ,,/, t$? 9& 4encourage workers to quit voluntarily. Some pay redun-
, rv, Sector dant workers severance pay; others do not. This vari-
Source: WorLd Bank, Firm-LeveL Survey. ance i3 firm behavior also reflects labor legislation and
S has implications for the social impact of the crisis.
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TABLE 9.2
Filling vacancies during retrenchment, by country
Response Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Thailand Total
Yes (number of responses) - 392 79 214 96 781
Yes (percent) - 46.34 29.81 39.34 28.66 39.25
No (number of responses) - 454 186 330 239 1,209
No (percent) - 53.66 70.19 60.66 71.34 60.75
TotaL (number of responses) - 846 265 544 335 1,990
-: not availabLe
Source: World Bank, Firm-Level Survey.
TABLE 9.3
Employment practices, by country
Laid off workers Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Thailand Total
Yes (percent) 38.89 43.65 20.38 29.23 15.98 33.05
No (percent) 61.11 56.35 79.62 70.77 84.02 66.95
Total (number of responses) 378 850 265 544 338 2,375
Severance pay paid Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Thailand Total
Yes (percent) 67.02 _ 24.15 60.55 49.04 52.92
No (percent) 32.98 75.85 39.23 50.96 47.01
Total (number of responses) 373 - 265 469 314 1,421
-: not available
Source: WorLd Bank, Firm-LeveL Surveys.
In the survey questionnaire, the firms were asked the tices (see table 9.4). A higher percentage of exporting
following questions: firms lay off workers, have workers leaving voluntarily,
(a) Are you laying off or retrenching your workers? and compensate on retrenchment. These features may
(b) Does your firm pay severance compensation? indicate that the export sector is more dynamic and has
The answers to these questions are summarized in a higher labor turnover rate.
table 9.3. Korea has the highest proportion (43 percent)
of firms that laid off or retrenched workers. This is Causes of employment changes
rather interesting considering that the enforcement of
the Labor Standard Law in Korea has been rather Changes in employment may result from both demand-
strong. However, it is not clear whether the impact has and supply-side factors. However, in the current con-
been mostly felt since layoffs were legalized. In text, labor demand should be the main factor. In this
Indonesia and the Philippines the percentage of firms section, the main causes of employment change over the
laying off workers is 39 and 29 percent, respectively. crisis period are studied. In particular, the data are ana-
Surprisingly, Thailand, with the second highest propor- lyzed to determine whether the reduction in employ-
tion of firms with reduced employment, has a very low ment was caused by the reduction in production or by
percentage (16 percent) of firms laying off workers. an increase in labor costs.
Once employees are laid off, do firms compensate To investigate the impact of output and wage changes
them? In Indonesia 67 percent do so, while in the on employment, data on changes in producticn capac-
Philippines and Thailand 60 and 49 percent of the sam- ity utilization (measured as the amount of output actu-
ple firms, respectively, provide compensation. Only 24 ally produced relative to the maximum amount that can
percent in Malaysia receive severance pay. be produced), changes in the percentage of wage and
In cases in which the firms' export status is con- nonwage labor costs in total production costs, and the
cerned, there is some difference in employment prac- variable "the proportional change in employment as
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TABLE 9.4 FIGURI. 9.5
Employment practices, by export status(percent) Changle in capacity utilization over time,
by country
Firm retrenched workers Nonexport Export Total Change in capacity utilization, percent
Yes (number of responses) 308 454 762 O
Yes (percent) (30.68) (35.17) (33.2) -1
No (number of responses) 696 837 1533
No (percent) (69.32) (64.83) (66.8) -2
Total (number of responses) 1,004 1,291 2,295 -3
Employee l ft voluntarily
-5
Yes (number of responses) 608 863 1471 *6
Yes (percent) (80.64) (85.45) (83.39) -6
No (number of responses) 146 147 293 -7
No (percent) (19.36) (14.55) (16.61) -
Total (number of responses) 754 1,010 1,764 -8
-9
Firm paid severance pay Indonesia Korea MaLaysia PhiLippines Thailand Total
-10«v Country
Yes (number of responses) 378 333 711
Yes (percent) (50.27) (54.77) (52.28) U capacity utilization change 971-96
No (number of responses) 374 275 649 * Capacity utilization change 972-971
No (percent) (49.73) (45.23) (47.72) E capacity utilization change 981-972
Total (number of responses) 752 608 1,360
Source: WorLd Bank, Firm-LeveL Survey.
Source: World Bank, rirm-Level Surveys. _
compared with the employment level before the crisis" FIGURE 9.6
are used. Correlations between changes in employment
Figure 9.5 shows the changes in the capacity utiliza- and in capacity utilization
tion rate across the five countries. Over the 1996-98
period, Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia experienced Change in capacity utilization
the largest reductions in capacity utilization. Korea and
the Philippines did relatively better. However, the coun- -2
tries experienced different degrees of reduction during
different periods. Four of the five experienced progres- -6
sively larger reductions. Thailand was the exception,
experiencing the greatest reduction at the beginning of -10
the crisis. Korea, by contrast, experienced its largest 14
capacity reduction in 1998. This pattern may simply
indicate that the crisis hit the five countries at different -18 E Decrease * Same 01 Increase
times.
Figure 9.6 presents the correlations between the -22 Indonesia Korea Malaysia PhiLippines Thailand
changes in employment and in capacity utilization. The Country
decline in capacity utilization (and presumably, there- Source: WAorld Bank, Firm-Level Survey.
fore, in output) has had its greatest impact on employ-
ment in Indonesia and Thailand. The low level of labor hoarding is evident, particularly in Indonesia,
correlation in Korea suggests that reductions in capac- Thailand, and Malaysia. Labor hoarding is indicated by
ity utilization cannot have played a large part in the firms with decreased capacity utilization maintaining
comparatively large reduction in employment in that levels of employment. For example, in Indonesia,
country. In general, there is a positive correlation among the 310 firms that did not experience a change
between changes in the two variables. Nevertheless, in employment, average capacity utilization reduction
Corporate Employment and Public Policy 129
was around 10 percent. The figure is about 7 percent FIGURE 9.7
for Thailand and Malaysia. A surprising observation is
tha inIndnesa, ore, ad Mlayia,som fims Correlations between employment changes and
thatin Idonsia,Kore, ad Maaysi, sme frms changes in the share of labor cost in total cost
increased their employment level when their capacity
utilization declined. Change in the share of labor costs
Labor hoarding is more obvious in the nonexport sec- 2
tor than in the export sector. For example, in 657 non- 1.5
exporting firms with no employment change and 77
firms with an increased employment level, the capacity 1
utilization fell by 8 and 6 percent, respectively. 0.5
Labor hoarding can be caused by different factors.
First, it may result from inflexible labor market institu- O onesia orea alaysia Thailand
tions. If there are labor laws preventing employers from -O 5
laying off workers or high redundancy costs such as sev- . Decrease
erance pay, one may observe at least short-run labor -1 * Same
hoarding. Second, the practice may be a rational strat- C1 Increase
egy, in response to what is expected to be a short-run 1.5
shock, for profit-maximizing employers who want to -2 Country
avoid human capital loss. Source: WorLd Bank, Firm-LeveL Survey.
As regards the impact of changes in labor costs on
changes in employment, one needs a proper measure- strong positive correlation, particularly with r egard to
ment of labor costs. At this stage, however, the labor firms that increased employment. Assuming that Korea
costs variable is replaced by the share of labor costs in has the least labor-intensive industrial sector among the
total production costs, acting as a proxy. In general, five countries,1 its firms' labor costs account for a
from the limited information available, there has not smaller share of total costs. If we assume that in the
been much change in the five countries in the share of short run the firms' total costs are fixed, the strong pos-
labor costs in total costs. Table 9.5 presents the changes itive correlation between the two variables i.n Korea
in this share during the periods 1996-1997 and may imply that the wage level is relatively inflexible and
1997-1998. In all cases, the change is less than one per- that the employment effect dominates any adj astments
centage point. Nevertheless, the standard deviations in labor costs. This could explain why the redaction in
reported are rather high, indicating considerable diver- capacity utilization appears to be less important in Korea
sity across firms. in terms of explaining the employment reducticns.
Correlations between the change in employment and Interestingly, although there has been little change in
the change in the share of labor costs in total costs are the share of labor costs in total costs, some firms have
presented in figure 9.7. Korea stands out as having a complained that the increase in labor costs was one of
TABLE 9.5
Change in the Share of Labor Costs in Total Costs
1996-97 1997-Mid-98
Country Mean S.D Number Mean S.D N,imber
Indonesia - - - -0.05 8.76 613
Korea -0.29 5.25 751 -0.67 6.43 i'51
Malaysia 0.68 4.02 697 0.08 4.97 691
PhiLippines - - - - - -
Thailand - -- 0.15 6.20 '63
TotaL 0.18 4.72 n.a. -0.15 6.68 n.a.
-: not available
Note: S.D. stands for Standard Deviation.
Source: World Bank, Firm-LeveL Survey.
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the main reasons for their reduction in capacity utiliza- cific and general human capital and in creating social
tion. In response to the question "What are the main hardsh ip, it is important to understand which groups of
causes for the reduction in capacity utilization?" the people were most affected. In this section we study the
firms were asked to rank seven factors on a scale of 1 to profiles of workers who left the surveyed firms.
5, with 1 indicating "not important" and 5 indicating
"very important." Here, the five values are grouped The aige profile of workers who left the
into three categories: 1-2 (not important), 3 (average), samplLe firms
and 4-5 (very important). Table 9.6 reports the firms'
ranking of the importance of an increase in labor costs The firms were asked to state the average age of people
in contributing to their reduction in capacity utilization. who had left the firm. Answers were given in terms of
About 50 percent of the firms in the Philippines and five age groups: under 20, 21-30, 31-40, 41-50, and
Thailand thought the increase in labor costs was an above 50. To make full use of the answers, one also
extremely important factor in their reduction of capac- needs to know the average age of all employees in the
ity utilization. The figures for Indonesia, Korea, and firm. For example, if the average age of all employees is
Malaysia are 27, 8, and 26 percent, respectively. 31 to 40 years, whereas the average age of people leav-
Assuming that the firms identifying high labor costs ing the firm is 21-30 years, we may conclude that
as one of the main contributors to the reduction in young people are being retrenched disproportionately.
c apacity utilization actually did have increased labor However, data on the average age of all employees are
costs during the crisis period, the question is why, with not available. Below, we present summaries of the
such large currency depreciations, labor costs in these answers to the question broken down by country and
firms still increased. One explanation may be that nom- by industry (see figures 9.8 and 9.9). While it is hard to
inal wages are indexed to the Consumer Price Index judge whether a particular age group was dispropor-
(CPI). With a currency depreciation, the prices of tionately retrenched, some cross-country and industry-
imports and import-competing goods increase, and related differences are identified and some conjectures
hence the CPI increases. This was apparently true in the provicled.
case of the Philippines (See Country Report for the Figure 9.8 indicates that apart from Korea, the other
Philippines). However, to understand the real reason for four countries mainly retrenched 21-30 year-old work-
the complaints, one needs to ascertain whether the ers. Workers who were made redundant in Korea were
firms that complained about increases in labor costs mainly 31-40 years old. It may be observed that the
actually did have these increases. four countries that mostly fired workers in the 21-30
age group have the more labor-intensive industries and
The characteristics of workers leaving the pioportion of production labor is relatively high
the firms (see table 9.7). If we assume that production workers
are younger than managerial and technical workers, the
Because employment reductions are costly both to the fact that the 21-30 age group was more likely to be
firms and society from the viewpoint of losing firm-spe- retrenched suggests that production workers are the
TABLE 9.6
Contribution of increase in labor cost to reduction in capacity utiLization
(percentage of firms, totals)
Survey response Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Thailand
Not important 44.13 66.06 50.63 29.28 33.18
Average 28.52 25.45 23.52 24.64 15.14
Very important 27.35 8.48 25.85 46.09 51.67
Total number. of firms 596 495 557 345 449
Source: World Bank, Firm-Level Survey.
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TABLE 9.7
Occupational distribution, by country
Average number of Percent of managerial Percent of Percent of
employees perfirm and technical staff production workers nonproduction workers
Country 1997 Mid-1998 1997 Mid-1998 1997 Mid-1998 1997 Mid-1998
Indonesia 350 319 6.77 7.40 74.83 75.57 18.40 17.02
Korea 354 328 16.65 16.59 55.26 54.86 28.10 28.55
MaLaysia 166 155 18.60 19.34 70.23 68.00 11.18 12.66
Philippines 421 386 8.69 8.56 81.84 82.40 9.47 9.05
Thailand 249 236 10.73 11.00 76.17 75.35 13.10 13.65
Total 301 278 11.90 12.18 70.48 70.18 17.62 17.64
Source: World Bank, Firm-Levei Survey.
ones who suffered the most from the crisis. This can be portion of total labor. If the assumption made above
verified when the occupational profile of retrenched also applies in Korea's case-that is, that production
workers is studied.2 workers are relatively younger-we may observe that in
Korea, however, has a somewhat different industrial Korea it is the relatively older and more skilled age
structure. Relative to the other four countries, produc- group that has suffered most from the employment
tion labor in Korean firms accounted for a lower pro- reduction.
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We also examined the age profile of leaving workers firm-specific skills. In this subsection, we look more
by their industry classification (see figure 9.9). It can be closely into the firm-specific skills, measured by length
seen that apart from the machinery and chemicals of tenure, of retrenched workers.
industries, all other industries mainly lost workers Table 9.8 shows the percentage of firms that reduced
whose age was 21-30 years. The machinery and chem- employment, broken down by worker tenure. More
icals industries were the most prominent in terms of than 70 percent of the firms in Indonesia, Malaysia, and
reducing their workers aged 31-50 years. It is possible Thailand retrenched workers whose average length of
that these industries are mainly located in Korea, but it tenure was less than three years. For the Philippines this
is hard to confirm whether this is a country-specific figure was 45 percent, and for Korea, 57 percent. In the
phenomenon based on the available data. Philippines and Korea more than 20 percent of the firms
retrenched workers whose average tenure was more
The tenure of workers who left the sample than s.ix years; in the case of the Philippines the figure
firms was 38 percent. Another 20 percent of the firms in these
two countries fired workers whose average tenure was
In the previous subsection we implied, perhaps opti- four to five years.
mistically, that young employees who had been laid off These findings indicate that firm-specific human cap-
would most likely have been those with lower levels of ital losses may have been more serious in the Philippines
FIGURE 9.9
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TABLE 9.8
Tenure of workers who left firms, by country
(percent, totals)
Tenure Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Thailand Total number of firms
Less than 1 year 18.36 15.83 33.33 20.12 55.85 7:35
1-3 years 50.62 41.69 42.8 25.15 35.76 984
4-5 years 17.62 22.03 14.02 16.7 4.59 387
6-10 years 6.95 15.17 6.82 15.29 2.53 253
More than 10 years 6.45 5.28 3.03 22.74 1.27 195
Total number of firms 403 758 264 497 632 2,554
Source: World Bank, Firm-Levet Survey.
TABLE 9.9
Tenure of workers who Left firms, by sector
(percent, totals)
Less than 1-3 4-5 6-10 More than Total number
Sector 1 year years years years 10 years offirms
Food processing 28.09 31.17 13.89 10.49 16.36 324
Garments and textiles 37.58 36.24 12.19 7.16 6.82 894
Construction 33.87 38.71 14.52 9.68 3.23 62
Chemicals 18.79 37.35 19.26 13.69 10.90 4:31
Machinery 21.89 40.80 20.40 13.93 2.99 201
ELectronics 23.20 46.39 15.46 9.54 5.41 388
Auto parts 27.50 44.17 16.25 10.00 2.08 240
TotaL number of firms 730 982 386 252 195 2,545
Source: World Bank, Firm-Level Survey.
and Korea. But why did more firms in these two coun- The occupational status of retrenched workers
tries prefer to retrench workers with longer tenure? One
possible explanation may be related to labor market It was assumed above that retrenchment was mostly
institutional settings. If a country has more rigid labor concentrated on production workers, as they :.-ormally
market institutions, the labor turnover rate will be account for the largest proportion of occupations. In
lower on average than in a country where labor market this subsection the question of whether worker; in some
institutions are more flexible. Thus, the average firm occupations were made redundant disproportionately
tenure of workers should be longer in a more flexible is examined. Below, the average percentages of
labor market. If this is the case, one may conclude that retrenchment across occupations are reported in table
a higher percentage of firms in countries with less flex- 9.l10.3 From the figures presented, it can be seen that
ible labor market institutions fire workers with longer production workers were the major group of workers
firm tenure than firms in countries with more flexible made redundant. However, in Korea and the
labor market institutions. Philippines, the proportion of production workers
We also looked to see whether there were any firm- made redundant was smaller than the proportion of
related differences across industries (see table 9.9). It production workers in the total work force. Indonesia
can be seen that the chemicals industry has the highest and Thailand, however, lost disproportionately more
percentage of firms that have fired workers with a high production workers than workers in other occupations,
average length of tenure. About 44 percent of the sur- but only slightly. Nonproduction workers suffered dis-
veyed firms in this industry laid off workers whose aver- proportionately in Korea and the Philippines.
age tenure was four years or more. The food processing Managers and technical staff only suffered Icsses dis-
and machinery industries were also more likely to fire proportionately in the Philippines.
workers with longer average tenure.
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TABLE 9.10
Occupational distribution of workers who left the firms, by country
(percent)
Indonesia Korea Philippines Thailand
Occupation Total Left the firm Total Left the firm Total Left the firm Total Left the firm
Managerial and technical staff 7.4 4.48 16.6 11.43 8.6 9.55 11.0 4.10
Production workers 75.6 77.09 54.9 43.71 82.4 76.62 75.4 77.86
Nonproduction workers 17.0 15.13 28.6 32.50 9.1 12.92 13.7 8.27
Source: WorLd Bank, Firm-LeveL Survey.
TABLE 9.11
Occupational distribution of totat employees and of those wlho left the firms, by industry
(percent)
Managerial nd technical staff Production workers Nonproduction workers
Industry Total Left the firm Total Left the firm Total Left the firm
Food processing 9.03 5.19 69.42 71.02 21.55 14.56
TextiLes 8.56 3.47 81.35 83.04 10.08 8.93
Garments and textiles 6.20 2.34 84.96 83.86 8.84 6.84
Garments 6.42 5.03 77.70 65.49 15.88 22.99
ChemicaLs 13.49 10.59 62.52 45.25 23.99 37.99
Machinery 22.48 12.47 61.84 59.92 15.68 26.34
ELectronics 15.43 10.45 69.97 57.57 14.60 14.64
Auto parts 15.33 9.37 57.78 70.22 26.88 12.47
Source: World Bank, Firm-LeveL Survey.
In cases in which the sector of production is con- possessed more human capital, especially firm-specific
cerned, it is seen that for auto parts, a domestic mar- human capital. Nevertheless, loss of human capital is
ket-oriented industry, retrenchment was most severe on inevitable when firms have to retrench workers. In this
production workers (see table 9.11). The garments, section we examine how firms have tried to rebuild
chemicals, and machinery industries disproportionately their human capital stock in the face of employment
retrenched nonproduction workers. decline. In particular, how have their training programs
Tablc 9.12 lists the occupational distribution of total functioned during the crisis?
employees and those who left the firms, broken down Tables 9.A1, 9.A2, and 9.A3 in the appendix present
by export and nonexport sectors. It shows that the data describing the average firms' involvement with
export sector disproportionately cut nonproduction formal training programs, by country,4 industry, and
workers, whereas this is the case for production work- export status. The Philippines appear to have the highest
ers in the nonexport sector. These details appear to line --
up with the sectoral impact, as chemicals and machin- TABLEo9.12up sectora~~ ' . Occupational distribution of total employees and
ery are likely to be export-oriented, while auto parts is those Nho left the firms, by export status
primarily oriented to the domestic market. (percentl
The firms' reactions to the loss of Export NonexportLeft the Left the
human capital Occupation Total firm Total firm
Layoffs can be extremely costly for firmns. In the previ- Manageal and technical staff 12.37 7.75 11.67 5.72
Production workers 70.82 64.42 65.17 74.02
ous section we observed that our sample firms in gen- Nonprodiction workers 16.81 19.40 23.16 14.67
eral had behaved rationally in favoring workers who Source: WcrLd Bank, Finr-LeveL Survey.
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proportion of firms that have a formal training pro- staff may have been induced by the crisis, since the
gram. Of the nine industry categories, the more capital- sharp reduction in domestic and foreign demand
or technology-intensive ones, such as chemicals, required managers to adopt new strategies.
machinery, electronics, and auto parts, have a higher When examining the firms' training behavior across
percentage of firms with formal training programs. In industries, it is found that training managerial staff was
addition, export-oriented firms are more likely to have the priority task in all industries for both years (see table
these programs than nonexport firms. 9.14). The electronics, garments and textiles, and auto
The survey also sought information on the number of parts industries trained more than 50 percent of their
employees trained in 1997 and 1998. Unfortunately, managerial staff in one of the two years. Apart from
there is information on only two of the five countries. textiles and electronics, almost all industries increased
Table 9.13 presents the percentage of employees trained their efforts in training managerial staff in 1998. In par-
in 1997 and 1998 broken down by occupational cate- ticular, the auto parts industry trained 10 percent more
gories for Malaysia and Thailand. The surveyed firms managerial staff in 1998 than in 1997.
in these countries put the greatest emphasis on manage- Surprisingly, the export sector trained a lower per-
rial level training, with the firms in Thailand training centage of managerial staff, but a higher percentage of
more than half of their managerial staff in both 1997 production and nonproduction workers than the non-
and 1998. The emphasis on the training of managerial export sector (see table 9.15). This may be because the
TABLE 9.13
Percentage of employees trained in 1997 and first half of 1998, by occupation
Malaysia Thailand
Occupation Trained in 1997 Trained in 1998 1998-1997 change Trained in 1997 Trained in 1998 1998-i 997 change
ManageriaL staff 35.92 39.20 3.29 56.07 56.19 0.11
TechnicaL staff 34.64 30.31 -4.32 14.96 14.85 -0.11
Production workers 6.60 6.11 -0.48 8.12 6.87 -: 25
Nonproduction workers 7.11 6.97 -0.14 28.53 29.18 (1.65
Source: World Bank, Firm-Level Survey.
TABLE 9.14
Employees trained, by occupation and industry, 1997 and first half of 1998
(percent)
Garments and
Food Textiles textiles Construct. Chem. Mochry. Electron. Auto parts Garments
1997
Managerial 41.86 46.59 48.70 37.23 40.84 38.71 58.51 51.55 39.14
TechnicaL 31.01 14.34 8.63 19.08 35.33 40.68 25.26 15.57 27.19
Production 7.04 5.71 3.02 2.82 11.78 14.53 17.11 8.58 3.15
Nonproduction 8.87 14.75 24.54 1.11 12.93 12.19 35.84 24.52 2.66
1998
Managerial 47.47 44.23 51.43 45.16 41.80 40.30 56.91 61.74 32.97
Technical 27.93 10.47 10.45 33.14 32.28 32.48 20.95 13.88 21.81
Production 5.18 4.07 2.98 1.99 9.12 17.48 14.18 8.78 2.43
Nonproduction 8.09 10.67 28.98 1.87 11.06 13.87 38.80 23.89 3.49
1998-1997
(change)
Managerial 5.60 -2.36 2.73 7.93 0.96 1.59 -1.60 10.19 -6.16
Technical -3.09 -3.87 1.82 14.06 -3.04 -8.20 -4.31 -1.69 -5.38
Production -1.86 -1.64 -0.05 -0.82 -2.66 2.94 -2.93 0.20 -0.72
Nonproduction -0.78 -4.07 4.44 0.76 -1.87 1.68 2.97 -0.63 0.83
Note: Malaysia and Thailand only.
Source: World Bank, Firm-Level Survey.
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TABLE 9.15 employment levels in Thailand, for example, increased
EmpLoyees trained, by occupation and by export their managerial training by 5 percent. Firms whose
status, mid-1988 employment has been adversely affected by the crisis
(percent) have not yet begun to put increased effort into reducing
Nonexport Export their human capital losses, although firms with a
Occupation 1998 1998 reducecl employment level in Thailand did train about
60 percent of their managerial staff in both years.
Managerial 54.70 45.27
TechnicaL 16.25 19.85
Production 3.53 9.25 Summary and policy implications
Nonproduction 6.82 14.38
Note: Malaysia and ThaiLand only. In this the degree to which the crisis has affected
Source: World Bank, Firm-LeveL Survey. paper,
employment and human capital accumulation, the
export sector has more expatriates working in manage- causes of the employment reduction, and the possible
rial positions who receive training overseas. In addition, social impact of the employment reduction have been
in 1998 the training effort in the export sector did not studied. Below, the main findings are summarized and
change as much as it did in the nonexport sector. The policy implications discussed.
domestic sector may have been under greater pressure Acro,s the five countries, 50 percent of the sample
to shift its market focus because of the relatively larger firms reduced employment, while the rate of employ-
downturn in domestic demand than in export markets. ment reduction averaged around 15 percent. The most
The relationship between the firms' employment widespread reductions were in Korea where around 60
change and their training behavior was also examined. percent: of the firms reduced employment and the total
Table 9.16 presents the percentage of each occupational employment reduction was around 19 percent.
group trained broken down by decreased, unchanged, Thailand and Indonesia also had highly significant
and increased employment levels for both countries in declines in employment.
both years. Firms with an increased employment level It is found that the decline in capacity utilization and
increased their level of training in 1998 relative to 1997, presumably in output has had its greatest impact on
as might be expected. This is especially true for man- employment in Indonesia and Thailand. However, the
agerial and technical staff. Firms with increased reduction in capacity utilization does not seem to be
TABLE 9.16
Correlation between employment change and training
(percent)
Malaysia Thailand
Employment change 1997 Mid-1998 Mid-1998-1997(chonge) 1997 Mid-1998 Mid-1998-1997(change)
Decreased employment
Managerial 36.53 38.40 1.87 59.06 58.87 -0.19
TechnicaL 34.24 30.39 -3.85 16.77 16.57 -0.20
Production 9.87 8.99 -0.88 8.72 7.82 -0.90
Nonproduction 8.28 9.03 0.75 33.49 33.80 0.31
Unchanged employment
ManageriaL 33.12 38.01 4.89 55.46 53.97 -1.49
TechnicaL 33.51 30.45 -3.06 12.31 10.75 -1.56
Production 3.78 3.52 -0.26 7.71 5.53 -2.18
Nonproduction 5.29 4.85 -0.43 24.62 26.87 2.25
Increased employment
Managerial 40.70 44.76 4.06 48.89 54.29 5.40
Technical 40.98 31.33 -9.64 16.79 20.57 3.79
Production 12.56 11.99 -0.57 9.40 9.05 -0.35
Nonproduction 12.61 11.04 -1.57 25.92 23.99 -1.93
Source: WorLd Bank, Firm-LeveL Survey.
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able to explain the dramatic decline of employment in Although it is impossible to disentangle the impact of
Korea. One suggestion yet to be tested is that the greater the change in total cost from the change in labor cost,
inflexibility of wages in Korea may have been the cause we think that in the short run, given fixed capital costs,
for the greater-than-average reduction in employment. the positive relationship may imply relatively inflexible
More rigid labor markets in Korea and the Philippines wage settings.
may also be responsible for the fact that these countries The analyses of the characteristics of workers who
retrenched workers with longer firm tenure than the left the sample firms revealed interesting patterns. In all
other countries. countries except Korea, younger workers with short
An alternative explanation of the relatively greater firm tenure-and production and nonpioduction
redundancies among older, more highly skilled workers workers rather than managerial and technical work-
in Korea is that there is a restructuring of firm activities ers-were more likely to be retrenched. The implication
underway, perhaps triggered by the financial shock. of this behavior is twofold. First, if we assume that firm-
This restructuring may involve changes in the labor- specific human capital accumulation is associated with
capital relativity in producing the same products or a firm-specific work experience, the loss of younger
shift to new products. Another hint of restructuring in workers with fewer years of firm tenure implies a loss of
Korea is the disproportionate loss in the share of non- less skilled workers. In addition, production and non-
production workers, who may be thought of as over- production workers are less skilled when compared
head. Further support for this hypothesis can be found with managerial and technical workers. Thus, the pro-
in the relatively higher proportion of firms in Korea fill- files of retrenched workers indicate that firms reacted to
ing vacancies when people leave. the crisis in a rational way-by attempting to minimize
Somewhat surprisingly, the firms in Thailand show their loss of human capital.
less evidence of restructuring than in the other coun- Second, if we assume that younger people have fewer
tries. This is surprising because rising labor costs in family responsibilities, the profile of the retrenched
Thailand have been held to be partly responsible for workers implies that the social pressure that was attrib-
triggering the crisis through the erosion of competitive- utable to the crisis was minimized. Moreover, younger
ness (see Thailand Country Report). If there is a need people will find it easier to learn new skills. Iherefore,
for firms in Thailand to shift to higher-valued products it will be less costly for industry or govermment to
requiring higher labor skills, the shift has not yet begun. retrain them so that they can fit in with new trends in
Interestingly, while 50 percent of the surveyed firms labor demand.
have reduced their employment level, it is found that However, things are gloomier in Korea, where work-
labor hoarding is a common phenomenon in all of the ers aged 30-50 years, with tenure of between 4 and 10
five countries studied. This is indicated by the fact that years were more likely to be laid off. In addition, about
firms with reduced capacity utilization kept the same I l percent (the highest among the five countries) of the
level of employment or even increased employment. laid-off workers were managerial and technical staff.
Labor hoarding may be the result of two different fac- This profile indicates that Korea suffered serious
tors. First, it may be caused by the inflexibility of labor human capital losses owing to the crisis, and. that the
market institutions. Labor laws may restrict employers social consequences were also more serious.
from laying off workers. Second, it may also be a ratio-
nal course of action on the part of employers who want
to minimize human capital losses. To understand the
reasons for labor hoarding in each country, more thor-
ough analysis is needed.
The relationship between the change in employment
and the change in the share of labor costs in total costs
is also studied. While there is a positive relationship
between these variables in Korea and Malaysia, there is
a negative relationship in Thailand and Indonesia.
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Appendix ),.A
The frequency of use of formal training
programs during the cnisis
TABLE 9.A1
Use of format training, by country
(percent, total)
Country Firms with training program Firms without training program Total number of firms
Indonesia 26.08 73.92 740
Korea 31.9 68.1 840
MaLaysia 22.09 77.91 815
PhiLippines 51.47 48.53 544
ThaiLand 27.19 72.81 629
Total number of firms 1,092 2,476 3,568
Source: World Bank, Firm-LeveL Survey.
TABLE 9.A2
Use of formal training, by industry
(percent, total)
Industry Firms with training program Firms without training program Total number of firms
Food processing 31.13 68.37 604
Textiles 29.69 70.31 229
Garments and textiles 26.79 73.21 321
Construction 11.57 88.43 121
Chemicals 34.48 65.52 670
Machinery 36.81 63.19 288
ELectronics 46.45 53.55 422
Auto parts 37.59 62.41 266
Garments 15.37 84.63 605
Totat number of firms 1,084 2,449 3,533
Source: WorLd Bank, Firm-LeveL Survey.
TABLE 9.A3
Use of formal training, by export status
(percent, total)
Training Nonexport Export Total number offirms
Firms with training program 18.57 41.16 1,084
Firms without training program 81.43 58.84 2,454
TotaL number of firms 1,648 1,890 3,538
Source: WorLd Bank, Firm-LeveLSurvey.
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Notes
The authors are with the National Center for Development Studies,
Austra[ia National University, Canberra, Australia.
1. This should be a reasonable assumption given that Korea is the
most developed country and has the highest per capita GDP among
the five countries studied. The assumption can be easily tested once
the necessary data become available.
2. Another possibLe explanation might be that many rural migrants
are employed in the industrial sectors. Rural migrants are often
younger than local workers. Layoffs may have been concentrated on
workers from rural areas. However, because there are too many missing
values, the location profile of redundant workers is hard to determine.
3. Malaysia did not report on this question.
4. Data for Indonesia re not availabLe.
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Indonesia: The Impact
of the Ecconomic Crisis
on Industry Performance
National Development Pianning Agency (BAPPENAS)
t After two decades marked by remarkable rates of economic growth and
structural transformation, fortunes reversed for the Indonesian econ-
4 omy in 1997 with the onset of the financial and banking sector crisis.
The crisis quickly spilled over into the real sector, and by early 1998 Indonesia
was in its worse economic recession since the 1960s. To better understand the
impact of this financial crisis on the real sector and how Indonesian firms are
responding to the changed economic onditions, an Indonesian Competitiveness
Study is being undertaken by BAPPENAS and the Central Bureau of Statistics
with assistance from the World Bank. The project is collecting a unique data-
base of detailed information en about 1,200 firms in five broad sectors: food
processing (International Standard Industrial Clasification [ISIC] 31), gar-
ments (ISIC 322), textiles (ISI]C 321), chemicals and processed rubber (ISIC
35), and electronics (ISIC 383). It includes data on firm behavior during the
two years preceding the financial crisis in 1997 as well as the first two years of
the crisis. This paper presents the preliminary results of 562 responses.
The analysis provides a nurnber of important findings. First, the impact of
the crisis on the firms' economic performance appears to be mixed. While
many firms have been adversely affected by the crisis to varying degrees, some
are better off because of the depreciation of the rupiah. This depends on the
type of industry, whether or not a firm exports part of its production, and dif-
ferences in the regions' resource endowment. The results of the survey show
that domestic-oriented firms had greater reductions in capacity utilization rates
and employment levels than medium and large exporting firms and FDI firms.
Even within the domestic-oriented group of firms, the impact of the crisis is
mixed. The food processing sector had a smaller reduction in capacity utiliza-
tion rates and employment levels than the other sectors included in the survey.
More than one-third of the domestic-oriented firms in the food sector reported
no change in production or an increase in production in 1998. Conversely,
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most domestic-oriented firms in electronics reported measured by changes in capacity utilization rates and
reductions in production. Among other factors, this employment. The section analyzes changes in these real
arises because of differences in price and income elas- sector variables by firm type-ownership, firm size,
ticities of demand for the goods produced by the five exporting status-and by region within Indonesia. The
sectors. Processed food, for example, is generally more two subsequent sections analyze the firms' financial
income-inelastic-and thus is relatively less affected by position, and examine the relationship between specific
falls in real incomes of domestic consumers. The elec- financial indicators and firm performance. The final
tronics sector, by contrast, generally has higher income section summarizes the main findings of the study and
elasticity of demand, and thus is more likely to be provides several policy recommendations for ciscussion.
adversely affected by falls in real incomes and expendi-
ture switching by consumers. The firms operating in The economic crisis
Java had greater reductions in capacity utilization rates
and have smaller workforces (as of 1998) compared While the study is primarily concerned with the impact
with those operating outside Java. This provides some of the crisis on the firms' responses to the crisis and
support for recent evidence that the regional economies identifying impediments to economic recovery, one
of the outer islands are faring better than Java's. would be well-advised to keep in mind thie overall
The second important finding is that it is unclear to macroeconomic context as it affects relative prices,
what extent the firms' financial position affected their interest rates, aggregatc demand, and investment
economic activities. The results of the survey actually behavior. Without macroeconomic stability, efforts to
show that highly leveraged firms or firms with foreign improve firm performance will face difficulties.
currency liabilities had, on average, smaller reductions Although a lot more analysis of Indonesia's crisis is
in capacity utilization rates and employment levels than still being undertaken, several tentative conclusions
did firms with low debt-equity ratios. This arises because have been put forward on the causes. While the Thai
a large proportion of the firms in the former group are crisis was clearly the trigger for the regional financial
also relatively efficient medium and large-scale exporters. crisis, there were several macro- and microeconomic
These firms are less affected by the economic crisis. factors that combined to exacerbate Indonesia's eco-
Finally, the surveyed firms identified the sharp decline nomic crisis. These included inconsistent monetary and
in domestic demand and the effect of the depreciation exchange rate policy, weak supervision of the banking
of the rupiah in raising input costs (and presumably its and financial sector, accumulation of foreign cur-
volatility) as the major causes of the fall in output levels rency-denominated debts, and the presence of policy
in 1998. The high cost of capital was cited as the third distortions in the economy that misdirected resources to
most common cause; access to credit and guarantee of less profitable uses.
letters of credit were not rated as major causes at the At the macroeconomic level, Bank Indonesia's com-
end of 1998. mitment to use monetary policy to target an inflation
Indonesian firms have adopted different strategies to rate, while at the same time maintaining a s:able real
cope with the economic crisis. Some have shifted from exchange rate partly contributed to the financial crisis.
supplying the domestic market to export markets. With relatively high interest rates and a managed
Other firms rely more on informal sources of short- exchange rate, it was cheaper for domestic firms to bor-
term finance such as family, partners, and shareholders row abroad without hedging. Coinciding with the eco-
rather than banks. nomic boom, particularly in nontradable sectors, there
This chapter is organized as follows: the next section was a rapid buildup of private external debt in recent
briefly reviews the background and context of the years. Between 1992 and July 1997, about 85 percent
Indonesian economic crisis. This is followed by a sec- of the increase in external debt was due to private sec-
tion describing the competitiveness survey, then another tor borrowing. The average maturity of the credit
section presenting a descriptive analysis of the immedi- extended to Indonesia's private sector declined sharply
ate impact of the economic crisis on the real sector, as in the last few years; by December 1997, USS20.8 bil-
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lion had to be paid back in one year or less. While the Real wages fell in 1998 and investment slowed to a
accumulation of external short-term debt itself is not a trickle. Coupled with the adverse effect of the El
direct cause of the crisis, it certainly made corporations Nino-related weather conditions on farmers' incomes,
vulnerable to changes in outside perceptions. There this led to a fall in real aggregate demand. Real GDP is
may have also been a moral hazard problem in that estimated to have declined by a massive 14 percent in
large corporations and banks, mistakenly or not, may the 12 months prior to December 1998. Construction,
have believed that the government would rescue them if manufacturing, and banking and finance sectors were
there were a financial crisis. hit hardest in terms of the fall in real value added.
Second, well-recognized flaws in the banking system Within the manufacturing sector, construction materi-
and weak bank supervision meant that numerous banks als, steel production, transportation, and wood prod-
were undercapitalized, and some even insolvent, well ucts recorded the greatest decline in real value added,
before the crisis began. Excessive intergroup lending betweeni -23 and -55 percent. Indicative of the sharp
practices often resulted in resources not being put to decline in aggregate demand, imports fell by 36 percent
their most productive use. The depreciation of the in the 10 months leading up to October 1998 compared
rupiah and resulting capital flight exacerbated the prob- with the same period in 1997. While total US$ value
lems of these banks and other corporations that were exports showed a decline in the eight months prior to
heavily exposed to foreign exchange risk. Another pos- August 1998, nonoil exports showed robust growth in
sible cause of the crisis was the prevalence of policy dis- US$ terms and certainly more so in rupiah value terms.
tortions that misallocated resources in the economy. In Agriculture exports grew by 23 percent in US$ values
the past, several sectors were artificially made prof- and no noil manufacturing exports grew by 6.4 percent
itable as a result of protection from imports or other in the first nine months of 1998 compared with the cor-
forms of assistance. This diverted resources away from responding period in 1997. The slower growth in
more profitable uses. This structure of protection, while nonoil manufacturing exports was due to the fall in ply-
substantially reduced in recent years, hampered the effi- wood exports from US$3.2 billion in the first three
ciency of the industrial sector. quarteis of 1997 to US$1.8 billion in 1998, and to
While further investigation regarding the causes of falling terms of trade.
the crisis is needed, its effects on the economy are much However, recent tentative evidence suggests that the
clearer (table 10.1). The dramatic depreciation of the impact of the crisis on economic activity and people's real
exchange rate and the collapse of confidence in the incomes is heterogeneous and differs by income group
financial and banking sector triggered capital flight in and region. Not surprisingly, given the origins of the
late 1997 and early 1998. This exacerbated difficulties financial and economic crisis in the formal sector, eco-
in the banking sector. The financial crisis quickly spilled nomic activities and real incomes of people in the urban
over to the real sector. Domestic prices of tradable areas have been hit harder than those of people in the
goods adjusted upwards toward higher world prices (in rural areas. The recession appears to be more severe for
rupiah terms), as a result of the dramatic depreciation the Javanese economy than those of the outer islands,
of the exchange rate. This resulted in substantial price particularly in comparison with those regions abundant
inflation in the domestic economy; the consumer price in natural resources and export commodities.
index more than doubled during the first 18 months of
the crisis. Bank Indonesia raised commercial interest Overview of the competitiveness tudy
rates in an effort to arrest the depreciation of the rupiah
and to control inflation. Bank Indonesia's SBI* rates The Indonesian government conducted the competi-
reached a peak of around 70 percent in October 1998, tiveness study for two purposes. First, to gauge the pat-
but have subsequently declined to 37 percent (as of tern and magnitude of the impact of the economic crisis
January 1999). High interest rates coupled with diffi-
culties in the banking system led to a reduction in pri- *
*Sertifikat Bank Indonesia, short-term notes issued by the
vate-sector borrowing during this period. Indonesi3n Central Bank to manage domestic liquidity
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TABLE 10.1
Macroeconomic indicators
Economic growth 1995 1996 1997a 1998b
AgricuLture, Livestock, forestry, and fisheries 4.38 3.14 0.72 0.43
Mining and quarrying -11.11 27.65 1.71 -11.16
Manufacturing industry 10.88 11.59 6.42 -15.91
Oil and gas industry -4.74 11.05 -1.97 0.91
Nonoil and gas manufacturing 13.09 11.66 7.42 -17.73
1. Food, beverages, and tobacco 16.52 17.16 14.91 -4.90
2. TextiLe, Leather products, and footwear 10.45 8.71 -4.44 -20.17
3. Wood products 3.01 3.21 -2.09 -23.50
4. Paper and prnting 13.53 6.85 8.95 -15.02
5. Fertilizers, chemicals, and rubber products 11.93 9.05 3.36 -24.20
6. Cement nonmetalLic minerals 20.14 10.98 4.46 34.17
7. Iron and basic steel 18.65 8.04 -1.41 -32.72
8. Transport equipment, machinery, and other apparatus 7.73 4.60 -0.41 -55.19
9. Other manufacturing products 8.86 9.73 6.02 -25.41
ELectricity, gas, and water suppty 15.91 13.63 12.75 3.28
Construction 12.92 12.76 6.43 -37.49
Trade, hotels, restaurants 7.94 8.16 5.80 -19.28
Transport and communication 8.49 8.68 8.31 -11.84
Financial, ownership, and business services 11.04 6.04 6.45 -18.24
Services 3.27 3.40 2.84 5.51
Gross domestic product (GDP) 6.55 9.51 4.91 -14.14
GDP nonoil and gas 9.24 8.16 5.45 -14.53
Inflation 14.7 11.8 22.0 77.6
Growth in nonoil exports 15.1 9.0 9.8 1.5
Agriculture 2.5 0.8 7.5 23.8
Mining 49.5 12.2 2.9 -21.0
Industry 14.1 9.5 8.9 6.4
Total growth in nonoit imports - - - -36.0
-: not availabLe
a. PreLiminary estimates.
b. Very preliminary estimates.
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics.
on firms and therefore industry performance, and to bet- and should be treated as tentative (see below).
ter understand how firms are coping with the economic However, the results do illustrate clear relationships
crisis. And second, to identify long-term impediments between performance and firm and industry character-
to resource mobilization. With the assistance of the istics and provide insights into both short- antd long-
World Bank, a detailed survey was designed to learn term impediments that are pertinent to economic
about participating firms' production, labor force, recovery and growth.
export performance, and financial structure before and Table 10.2 shows the characteristics of the sample.
during the economic crisis. The surveys gathered infor- Five sectors were selected based on their impcrtance to
mation for the period 1996 to October 1998. The sur- the economy in terms of value added, exporr orienta-
vey was conducted during November and December of tion, and employment, as well as being represe:itative of
1998, and the process of collecting the questionnaires Indonesian manufacturing. All but one of these indus-
from 1,200 firms is near completion. At the time of tries were included in similar, recent surveys of other
writing this report, just under 700 questionnaires had Association of South East Asian Nations ASEAN)
been collected. countries. These five industries are food processing
This report uses the information from 562 firms to (ISIC 31), textiles (ISIC 321), garments (ISIC 322),
analyze the impact of the crisis on firms operating in chemicals and processed rubber (ISIC 35), and elec-
Indonesia.' The results presented here are preliminary, tronics (ISIC 383). All sectors are well represented. Just
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under half of all firms export some of their production, over 20 percent of total employment in the sample. FDI
although the share of exporters varies across industries. firms a:-e concentrated in electronics, followed by gar-
Garments and electronics have the greatest number of ments a nd textiles. The tie to a foreign firm is an impor-
exporters: two-thirds of the firms export part of their tant factor in providing firms with access to capital and
production, while less than 30 percent of all firms in export markets. In the sample, close to 78 percent of the
processed foods and chemicals export a proportion of FDI firms exported part of their production, compared
their production. In this regard, the sample is represen- with 27 percent of wholly domestic-owned firms.
tative of Indonesian manufacturing-garments and Care was taken to include firms from outside Java, as
electronics are export-oriented industries, while chemi- these have apparently been less negatively affected by
cals and processed foods are more domestic-oriented or the economic crisis. Twenty-five percent of all firms in
import-competing industries. The distinction is impor- the samnple operate outside Java. Outer Java provinces
tant in understanding the varying impacts of the crisis coverecl in the survey are North Sumatra, Riau, South
on industry performance and how the firms were able Sumatra Lampung, and South Sulawesi. Slightly less
to respond to the crisis. than 50 percent of these firms exported part of their
The size distribution of the sample firms is reasonably production in 1998.
representative of Indonesian manufacturing. Small Befoie the results of the analysis are presented a few
firms (defined here to include firms that employ less notes of caution need to be made. First, there is the pos-
than 150 workers) account for about 60 percent of the sibility of sample selection bias in the study. Firms sur-
survey sample. This is similar in all industries except for veyed by definition are the ones that have survived the
electronics and textiles, which have a higher proportion crisis. Unfortunately, the survey was unable to include
of larger firms. Textiles and electronics are typically char- firms that closed down during 1998. Second, response
acterized as large-scale firms. More large firms under- rates for several important questions included in the
took export activities in 1998 than smaller firms-58.0 survey were disappointing. The survey consisted of two
percent and 13.6 percent, respectively. questionnaires. The first consisted of both qualitative
About 12 percent of the surveyed firms are classified and quLantitative questions on production, capacity,
as FDI firms (defined here to include all firms with more exports, and employment, and was carried out through
than 10 percent foreign ownership), accounting for interviews. The second questionnaire consisted of a
TABLE 10.2
Characteristics of the sample
By size By export orientation By voLume of exports FDIfirm
Aver. no Totat no.
Large Small Exporters Nonexporters Small Medium High Yes No of employees of firms
Sector
Chemicals and rubber products 65 97 76 86 31 32 13 15 147 212 162
Electronics 33 28 45 16 14 7 24 24 37 323 61
Food 66 117 73 110 35 28 10 14 169 237 183
Garments 38 39 45 32 12 6 27 9 68 300 77
TextiLes 41 38 35 44 15 16 4 10 69 274 79
Age
New 56 81 80 57 25 20 35 38 99 223 137
Old 187 238 194 231 82 69 43 34 391 262 425
Location
Java or Baii 183 253 204 232 89 70 45 48 388 254 436
Other isLands 60 66 70 56 18 19 33 24 102 259 126
Totat 243 319 274 288 107 89 78 72 490 255 562
Note: "Small firm" is defined as a firm with tess than 150 workers; "Large firm" as a firm with more tian 150 workers. "Exporter" is defined as a firm that derives some rev-
enue from exporT sales. "Large xporter" is defined here to incLude firms that earn at Least 35 percent of revenues from export sales, "medium exporter' is defined as a firm
that derives between 5 and 35 percent of revenues from export sales. "SmaLL exporter' is defined here to incLude firms that derive between 0 and 5 percent of revenue from
export sates.
"FDI firm" is defined here to incLude firms with at Least 10 percent foreign ownership.
Source: World Bank. Firm-Level SLrvey.
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series of questions on the firms' financial condition, smaller sample of 581 firms instead of about 1,200. In
including balance sheet data. This questionnaire was this regard, the results are preliminary and should be
filled out by the firm and collected by or mailed to the treated as tentative.
Central Bureau of Statistics. While the response rate for
the first questionnaire was high, the response rate for Impact of the crisis on firm
the second, financial questionnaire was poor, possibly performance
reflecting the different interview methods used in the
study and also the sensitivity involved in disclosing One of the immediate concerns of policymakers is to
financial data. Less than 50 percent of the firms pro- gauge the impact of the crisis on domestic demand, pro-
vided answers to many of the major financial questions. duction, and employment. The sample firms vvere asked
Even fewer firms provided complete information on about how capacity utilization has changed, and
their financial position. Furthermore, several questions whether they employ fewer workers now relative to the
are open to alternative interpretations and this makes it precrisis 1997 situation. The firms were also asked to
difficult to derive clear conclusions. 2 This limits our attribute current difficulties facing them to different
scope for detailed analysis of the impact of the crisis on sources including domestic demand, foreign demand,
the firms' financial positions and the impact of this on interest rates, and access to capital.
their economic activities.3 Finally, the survey was only
carried out in November 1998 and, while collection Capacity utilization
and processing of the data have been timely, the process
was not completed at the time of writing this paper. As Figure 10.1 shows the average firm capacity Lutilization
indicated earlier, the results of this paper are based on a rates in the five sectors over the period frorm 1996 to
FIGUR 10.1
Capacity utiLization rates, 1996-98
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FIGURE 10.2
Capacity utilization rates, 1996-98
(by firm characteristics)
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1998. Figure 10.2 shows the average firm capacity uti- Firm characteristics provide insights into which sec-
lization rates by firm characteristics. The majority of tors have been hit hardest by the economic crisis. In gen-
the firms reported operating at lower capacity in eral, large and medium-scale exporters are operating at
October 1998 than they had been a year before. much higher rates of capacity utilization, and have
However, capacity utilization rates also fell in the first experieniced less of a drop in 1998 compared with the
half of 1997, indicating a possible slowdown in aggre- other firms. In particular, large-scale exporters (those
gate demand prior to the financial crisis erupting in July that export more than 35 percent of their output)
1997. Dramatic decreases in capacity utilization rates reported capacity utilization rates of 15 percentage
occurred in all industries in the first half of 1998, as the points higher than nonexporting firms in the third quar-
financial crisis accelerated and the economy recorded ter of 1998. Foreign firms also reported higher than
its third consecutive quarter of negative economic average capacity utilization rates, and less of a drop in
growth. Capacity utilization continued to fall in the sec- 1998 compared with non-FDI firms. This is mostly due
ond half of 1998, but at a much lower rate than the pre- to the fact that the bulk of the FDI firms in the sample
vious two quarters. It is still too early to know whether are alsc, large exporters of their production. Compared
capacity utilization has stabilized, although more than with snmaller firms, large firms are also operating at a
60 percent of the surveyed firms did not anticipate fur- higher r ate of capacity utilization and have experienced
ther reductions in output in the first quarter of 1999. less of a decline. Again, this difference is primarily
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attributable to the fact that larger firms in the sample pared with a year earlier. The fall in employment is not
are bigger exporters of their products. Controlling for as stark as the fall in capacity utilization rates. Less than
exports, size does not appear to be a determining factor 50 percent of all sample firms are currently employing
in the impact of the crisis on production. There is a clear fewer workers in the third quarter of 1998 they they did
regional difference in capacity utilization rates. Firms immediately prior to the crisis. The pattern of employ-
operating in regions outside Java experienced a lower ing fewer workers differs by type of firm, industry, and
decline in capacity utilization than did those operating region. Consistent with the pattern of change in capac-
in Java, providing some support for recent evidence that ity utilization rates, the firms that export a proportion
the outer islands are less adversely affected by the eco- of their production reported lower rates of wvorker lay-
nomic crisis. This is particularly the case for regions that offs; 40 percent of the exporting firms reported employ-
have abundant resources and produce export com- ing fewer workers in the third quarter of 1998 relative
modities. These regions have benefited from the depre- to the precrisis situation. This compares with around 55
ciation of the real exchange rate.
Even though average capacity utilization rates F 3
declined across sectors, at least a quarter of the firms Share of firms with fewer workers in mid-1998
reported either no change in production levels or (by firm characteristics)
increased production in 1998. More than 45 percent of Percent of firms
the exporters reported that they were better off in terms 60
of increased production in 1998. Similarly, one-fifth of
the domestic-oriented firms reported either no change
in production or increased production during this 40
period. There are differences across sectors. Around 30
one-third of all domestic-oriented firms in the food-pro- 20
cessing sector were better off in 1998. In electronics, 1l*
however, less than 15 percent of the domestic-oriented 10
firms wcrc better off in terms of increased output levels 0< < g . s s 2,,s
in 1998. In contrast, over 40 percent of the electronic k9 d4 '
firms exporting part of their production reported that i
they were no worse off or better off than they had been Source: World Bank, Firm-LeveL Survey.
a year earlier. This indicates that the large drop in
capacitv utilization rates in the electronics industry in FIGUR 10.4
1998 was primarily attributable to the fall in domestic S .fEShare of frms with fewer workers in midl-1998 1
sales for these products. The firms responded in differ- (by sector)
ent ways to the fall in domestic sales. From the survey, Percent of firms
we identified that about 5 percent of the exporters were 70
newcomers to the category in 1998, indicating that
some firms were able to shift sales from the domestic 60
market to export markets in response to the fall in local 50
demand. Unfortunately, the survey did not tell us 40
whether those firms had shifted to new products in
response to declining demand for their established 30
products. 20
Emptoyment 20
ChemicaLs ELectronics Food Garments TextiLes Total Sector
Figures 10.3 and 10.4 show the percentage of the sam- Source: WorLd Bank, Firm-LeveL Survey.
ple firms that employed fewer workers in 1998 com-
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percent for nonexporters. Also consistent with the pat- incomes of households. Electronics, by contrast, gener-
tern of change in capacity utilization rates, a greater ally has higher income elasticity and, thus, is more likely
share of the firms operating in Java reported smaller to be affected by falls in real incomes of consumers.
work forces by the end of 1998 than those operating The sample firms operating in Java were more
outside Java. Comparing across sectors, more elec- adversely affected by the economic crisis than those
tronic firms reported smaller work forces. Around 65 operating outside Java, providing evidence that the neg-
percent of the electronic firms reportedly downsized ative effects of the crisis are greatest in Java.
their work force in 1998. This is primarily due to the
fall in domestic sales of electronics in 1998. Conversely, Perceived causes of the fall in output in 1998
less than 40 percent of the firms operating in the
processed food sector reported smaller work forces at This section examines the respondents' perceived
the end of 1998. causes of their output decline in 1998. Before discussing
The results for capacity utilization and employment the survrey results, a few comments on the questionnaire
suggest that the impact of the crisis on firms and indus- are warranted. The firms were asked to rank the sever-
try performance is mixed. While many firms are ity of p ossible causes of their output decline. They were
adversely affected by the crisis to varying degrees, some asked to rank a list of 12 factors on a scale of 1 to 5,
are actually better off than they had been before the cri- with 1 representing no problem at all and 5 a severe
sis. Exporting firms are less adversely affected by the problern. This question is somewhat problematic,
economic crisis than domestic-oriented firms. At least because the firms could list more than one factor as a
45 percent of the exporters either reported no change or major cause of their output decline. It would have been
increased capacity utilization in 1998. Even within the preferable if they had been asked to give the major cause
domestic-oriented group of firms, the impact of the cri- of their fall in output. Bearing this in mind, figure 10.5
sis on economic performance is mixed. Many firms pro- represents the average scale for the most important per-
ducing in the food processing and chemical-rubber ceived causes of output decline. The scale ranges
sectors appear to be less negatively affected by the eco- between 1 (minor cause) and 5 (major cause). Table 10.3
nomic crisis than the other three sectors included in the presents the percentage of the firms that rated the factors
sample. One-third of the firms in the food-processing as their most severe problems (for example, those firms
sector either experienced no change or increased their that rated factors as number 4 or 5 on the scale).
production in 1998. Among other factors, this arises The sharp decline in demand for the firms' products
because of differences in price and income elasticities of and the effect of the depreciation of the rupiah in rais-
demand for the goods produced by the five sectors. ing input costs (and presumably its volatility) were con-
Processed food, for example, is generally income-inelas- sidered as the major causes of output decline during
tic and, thus, is relatively less affected by falls in real 1998. The high cost of capital was rated as a distant
TABLE 10.3
Perceived causes of the fatl in output
(percentage of firms that rated causes as 4 or 5 on a scale of 1 to 5)
Major causes
Domestic Foreign Access to Rupiah Interest Labor
Sector demand demand credit depreciation rates costs
Food 53 8 18 60 46 26
Garments 61 18 23 70 57 27
TextiLes 68 24 27 78 57 32
Chemicals and rubber 64 12 24 76 51 33
ELectronics 58 17 25 56 40 29
Exporters 48 33 25 60 47 20
Nonexporters 64 6 20 71 50 33
Source: WorLd Bank, Firm-Level Survey.
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FIGURE 10.5
Perceived causes of the decline in output
Major
problem
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Source: World Bank, Firm-Level Survey.
third major cause of the fall in output, whereas access banking sector and the attention in the media to the
to credit was not rated as a major cause. This pattern of notion of a credit crunch that was supposed to be stran-
perceived causes is fairly uniform across different types gling firms. However, this is not to say that access to
of firms and sectors. For domestic-oriented firms or credit is not a longer-term bottleneck, although this will
nonexporters and small exporters, the fall in domestic depend on the speed and success of the government's
demand and the rupiah depreciation were rated as the bank recapitalization program. It appears that among
major causes of their output decline, swamping all the short-run difficulties, access to credit is swamped by
other possible causes. Similarly for medium-scale the immediate effect of the fall in domestic demand and
exporters (those firms that export between 5 and 35 the volatility of the rupiah. Similarly, letters of credit
percent of their output), the fall in domestic demand guaranteed by domestic banks were not rated as a
and the rupiah depreciation were rated as the major major problem for exporters, regardless of whether
causes of their output decline. For large exporters, the they were small or large firms.
fall in foreign demand was considered the major cause.
These results are consistent with the responses detailed The financial position of the firms
above regarding changes in capacity utilization rates
and employment changes. Given that the crisis began as a financial one in the pri-
Access to credit was not rated as a major cause of vate sector, it is important to examine in some detail the
decline in output by the firms in this sample, whether financial structure of the sample firms and to analyze
exporting part of their production or not. This is some- how this structure has been affected by the financial cri-
what surprising given the severe problems facing the sis. This may provide answers to two important ques-
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tions: (1) to what extent financial distress has affected problemn for those domestic-oriented firms that have
the firms' economic activities, and (2) how the firms not hedged their positions. Of those with foreign cur-
have coped with the their changed financial conditions. rency debt, only 27 percent said that they had hedged
To answer these questions, we investigated two areas: some cf this debt. Furthermore, firms with foreign cur-
(1) the impact of the crisis on the firms' debt structure, rency dlebts are more leveraged than the ones that do
including share of foreign currency liabilities and debt- not have foreign currency debts-an observation that
equity ratios; and (2) sources of funds and their changes applies both before and after the crisis.
during the crisis. The section below on financial char- An important question is whether the firms were able
acteristics and the impact of the crisis attempts to link to alter their exposure to foreign currency risk by reduc-
the firms' financial positions with their economic per- ing their foreign currency debt levels or, if possible,
formance-capacity utilization, employment, and hedging their positions. Examining changes in the
exports. However, one must repeat the caveat that the firms' foreign currency liabilities between 1996 and
survey results on the firms' financial positions are con- 1998, i:here is little evidence to indicate that the firms
sidered weak and, thus, the results presented in this significantly altered their exposure to foreign currency
paper are very tentative. risk. Of those firms that provided information on their
liabilities, only a small number had reduced their for-
Impact of the firms' debt structure eign currency debt obligations. Most of these were FDI
firms and exporters, which are less exposed to foreign
Foreign currency liabilities. With the dramatic depreci- currency risk anyway. Few domestic-oriented firms had
ation of the rupiah, firms with foreign currency- been able reduce their obligations. Furthermore, 76 per-
denominated debts have experienced substantial cent o0: the firms with foreign currency liabilities still
increases in their rupiah-equivalent liabilities and debt- had not hedged their positions by the end of 1998.
servicing costs. However, the results of the survey sug- Debt-Equity Ratio. The substantial depreciation of
gest that firms with substantial foreign currency the rupiah and the relatively high domestic interest rates
liabilities were not the most adversely affected ones dur- necessary to stabilize it have important implications for
ing the crisis. Firms with foreign currency borrowings
actually had lower reductions in capacity utilization PrfLE o trr
rates and work forces compared with those with no for-
eign currency-denominated debt. This arose because Firrn characteristics Firms with foreign currency liabilities
many of the firms with foreign currency-denominated ALL firms (percent) 16
debts are also large and medium-sized exporters, which By size (percent)
were less affected by the economic crisis. Large firms 28
Table 10.4 shows foreign currency borrowings bro- SmaL firrms 4
ken down by firm categories. Of those firms that pro- By owner;hip ( ercent)
vided information on debt, 16 percent reported having Non-FDI 46
debts denominated in foreign currency. The larger bor- By exporter status (percent)
rowers in foreign currency are FDI firms and large and Exporters 23
medium-scale exporters. Forty-six percent of the FDI Large xporters 38
Medium exporters 27firms had borrowed in foreign currency and 38 percent SmaLl exporters 6
of large and 27 percent of medium-scale exporters Nonexpotters(percent) 4
reported having some foreign currency-denominated Borrowing Yes No
debts in 1998. In contrast, fewer small firms (4 percent) Financial indicators
had some foreign-currency denominated debts. ShDrt-term debt/Total debt 0.61 0.55
Debt-equity ratio 3.17 1.72For medium and large-scale exporters, foreign cur-
debts shuld notbe a majr prob- Response to the crisis (percent)
rency-denominated debts should not be a major prob- Capacity utiization rate 61 58
lem, as most of their revenues are also in foreign Fewer workers in 1998 42 54
currency. However, foreign currency debts will be a Source: Wold Bank, Firm-Level Survey.
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the cost of debt servicing for highly leveraged firms. loans. Results from the survey suggest that the sample
Debt-equity ratios show that many firms had borrowed firms are adopting a combination of these strategies.
heavily prior to the crisis. However, there is some evi- Figure 10.7 shows fund sources and how these have
dence that certain types of firms are acting to reduce changed during the crisis. Before the crisis, the firms'
their liabilities after the onset of the crisis. two major sources of short-term finance were sales rev-
At the end of 1996, debt-equity ratios were high, enue (41 percent of total short-term funds) and the
around 1.8 on average and in some cases above 6. The banking sector (32 percent). Other sources included
average ratio increased from 1.8 in 1996 to 2 in 1997, partners', shareholders', and owners' equity (11 per-
indicating that average leverage of the firms had cent), and local moneylenders and suppliers (12 per-
increased during the crisis (figure 10.6). However, by cent). Similarly, close to 70 percent of the funds for
1998, debt-equity ratios had fallen to 1.5. The degree of long-term investment was obtained from sales revenue
leverage by type of firm shows that medium-size and and banks. The structure of funding sources showed
large exporters have much higher debt-equity ratios some significant changes during the crisis. First, for
than nonexporters. Large firms have higher debt-equity both short-term and long-term financing, the propor-
ratios than small firms. FDI firms also have much higher tion of proceeds from sales increased and that of loans
ratios than non-FDI firms. This partly arises because the from domestic and foreign banks declined. It can be
many large firms and FDI firms are also medium-scale seen in figure 10.7 that the proportion of short-term
and large exporters of their products. funds from sales revenue increased from 41 percent in
As indicated earlier, average debt-equity ratios had 1996 to 43 percent in 1998, indicating that the firms
risen with the onset of the crisis. However, the trend now rely more on proceeds from sales to finance their
varies by firm type. Not surprisingly, many firms that business activities than they did before the crisis.
had foreign currency-denominated debts experienced Conversely, the proportion of short-term loans from
the greatest increases in leverage between 1996 and banks fell from 32 percent in 1996 to less than 26 per-
1998 (in rupiah terms). Large firms and exporters expe- cent in 1998. Sources from other alternative channels
rienced increases in their debt-equity ratios during this also increased during the crisis; the proportion of short-
period, whereas FDI firms, on average, experienced term funds from owners, shareholders, and family
declines-suggesting that these firms were reducing increased from 1 percent in 1996 to almost 14 percent
their liabilities during the crisis. Small firms also had in 1998.
slight declines in their debt-equity ratios. This could be
evidence consistent with either a fall in the demand for FGUE 10.6
credit or a liquidity crunch story-the firms' debt posi-
tions being lower in keeping with the loans not being
rolled over. Debt-equity ratio
2.5
Sources of short-term funds
2
High interest rates and problems in the banking sector
mean that the firms have to look for other ways to sup- 1.5
plement cash flow or to repay outstanding obligations.
There are several possibilities. The firms could rely 1
more on proceeds from sales and increase the rate of
turnover of working capital every month. They could 0.5
inject equity from their own sources, family, or share- o
holders, or find a new partner. They could also sell 1997 Mid-i998
nonessential assets to supplement cash flow or to repay Source: WorLd Bank, Firm-LeveL Survey.
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FIGURE 10.7
Sources of finance: precrisis and crisis period
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Source: World Bank, Firm-Level Survey.
This change in the structure of financing is consistent that the firms have revalued their assets downxvard as a
with a number of interpretations. First, the fall in the result of the recession.
proportion of loans from banks is consistent with the
decline in the firms' demand for credit. As demand for Finaricial characteristics and impact of
a firm's products decline, so does the firm's demand for the crisis
credit at any given interest rate. Second, the result is also
consistent with the high cost of capital and the notion Table L10.5 shows selected financial indicators and eco-
of a credit crunch; if loans are not being rolled over, the nomic performance by different types of firms. Based
proportion of loans from banks obviously declines. on the table there appears to be no clear relationship
While all these factors may partly explain the fall in the between the firms' financial positions and their
proportions of funds from bank loans, we are unable to responses to the economic crisis. Firms with relatively
distinguish the most important factors causing the pro- high debt-equity ratios or foreign currency liabilities are
portional fall in bank loans. However, the results for the no more affected by the crisis than are those with low
"perceived causes of the fall in output" (discussed debt-equity ratios or no foreign currency liabilities.
above in the section bearing that title) provide some Indeed, table 10.4 shows that, on average, highly lever-
clues to the major causes. As noted earlier there, the aged firms actually had smaller reductions in capacity
firms saw the substantial fall in domestic demand as the utilization and work forces. This primarily arises
major cause of the fall in output, swamping other because in our sample a high proportion of highly lever-
causes such as the access to credit.4 aged firms or firms that have foreign currency liabilities
Many firms reported in their balance sheets a reduc- are also efficient medium- and large-scale exporters, of
tion in the value of their fixed assets and a correspond- which many are FDI firms. These firms have been less
ing reduction in liabilities. Among other factors, this negatively affected by the crisis. Conversely, domestic-
could indicate that the firms are selling some nonessen- oriented firms that are highly leveraged or have signifi-
tial assets to keep the business operating. However, we cant foreign currency liabilities are most adversely
need to be cautious in this interpretation. It might be affected by the economic crisis. These firms had greater
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TABLE 10.5
Firm profiLes
Foreign currency loans Size By volume of exports FDIfirm
Yes No Large Small Small Medium High Yes No Total
Financial indicators
Short-term debt/Total financing 0.61 0.52 0.56 0.48 0.66 0.48 0.65 0.61 0.55 0.55
Long-term debt/TotaL financing 0.39 0.48 0.44 0.52 0.34 0.52 0.35 0.39 0.45 0.45
Debt-equity ratio 4.2 1.7 2.7 1.5 3.4 2.7 2.8 1.9 1.5 1.9
Firm characteristics
Number of emp[oyees 317 249 545 58 279 453 500 434 233 255
Share of firms that export (percent) 69.1 27.1 58.0 13.6 - - - 77.8 26.5 32.9
Share of firms that are FDI (percent) 35.1 10.2 35.1 10.2 10.2 20.2 41.8 - - 13.6
Response to the crisis
Current capacity utiLization (percent) 63.1 55.3 62.5 51.2 53.6 58.0 67.6 66.6 55.0 56.1
Share with fewer workers (percent) 36.4 51.8 44.9 54.3 54.5 38.2 42.5 45.2 50.3 49.6
-: not avaiLabLe
Source: World Bank, Firm-LeveL Survey.
reductions in capacity utilization rates and work forces then be reflected in a stable foreign currency, assuming
during the crisis than other domestic-oriented firms. there are no new shocks to the economy.
To deal with the severe corporate and bank debt
The government's response to the problem, the government has introduced a number of
crisis programs. The government has played an important
role in facilitating the process between corporate
Under the "government and international donor pro- debtors and creditors for debt restructuring. To address
gram," the Indonesian government has introduced a bank problems, the government has introduced a bank
wide range of policy measures in response to the crisis. restructuring program, which includes bank. liquida-
These policy actions comprise short-term measures tions and recapitalization of banks meeting certain cri-
aimed at stabilizing the macroeconomy and dampening teria. The government is also in the process of
the adverse effects of the crisis on Indonesia's poor, and introducing more stringent prudential controls, includ-
long-term structural reforms aimed at improving the ing raising the required risk-weighted capital-asset ratio
competitiveness of the economy. of banks above its current level of 4 percent. While
Short-term measures include a tight monetary policy progress on bank recapitalization has been slow, it is
to stabilize the rupiah and to control inflation. Interest gaining momentum, and the government is expected to
rates on Bank Indonesia's SBIs peaked at 73 percent in announce further liquidations and the names of banks
October 1998, and declined to 37 percent (as of that have qualified for participation in the batik recapi-
January 1999). Accompanying tight monetary policy talization program in mid-March 1999.
have been improvemcnts in the mechanisms to achieve To dampen the adverse effects of the economic crisis
stable inflation. First, SBIs were auctioned on an open on Indonesia's poor, the government-with assistance
market for the first time in mid-1998. Second, a new from the World Bank-has implemented a social safety
central bank law was passed by Parliament, although it net (SSN) program involving a range of programs such
had not been enacted when this paper was written. The as work schemes and health and poverty alleviation
law ensures that Bank Indonesia's major purpose is to programs. These programs are currently being updated
target the rate of inflation. The tight monetary policy and redesigned to ensure effective targeting and imple-
has been relatively successful in reducing inflation from mentation as more information of the mixed mpact of
a year-on-year peak of 85 percent in September 1998 the crisis becomes available to the government.
to 53 percent at the end of February 1999. The decline In an effort to improve the competitiveness of indus-
in the rate of inflation is expected to accelerate over the try, the Indonesian government has embarked on a
next six to eight months. A stable price level should complex policy reform agenda. This includes deregula-
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tion of several monopolies and cartels, removal of bud- garments, and chemicals and rubber than they were in
get subsidies to industry, acceleration of trade liberaliza- electronics and textiles.
tion, a bankruptcy law, and a competition law. Successful
implementation of these reforms should lay down the Suminary and conclusion
foundation for a competitive, flexible conomy.
The Indonesian government conducted the Competi-
The firms' expectations for the next six tiveness Study for two purposes: first, to gauge the pat-
months tern and magnitude of the impact of the economic crisis
on firm and industry performance, and to better under-
The sample firms were asked about their production stand how firms are coping with the economic crisis;
expectations for the first half of 1999. Figure 10.8 and second, to identify long-term impediments to
shows the percentage of firms that expected their pro- resource mobilization. This latter objective will be the
duction to decrease, experience no change, or increase focus of a forthcoming conference. This section makes
during 1999. The figure shows that in all five sectors, a number of tentative recommendations for discussion
the majority of the firms expect production levels to and consideration.
remain the same as they were at the end of 1998 or
increase in the first quarter of 1999, indicating that Recovery in aggregate demand
most firms feel that the worst of the crisis has passed or
the recession has bottomed out. The firms were more The firms have reported substantial idle productive
optimistic about increases in output in food processing, capacity at the end of 1998, particularly those that sup-
ply the domestic market with non-resource-based
FIGURE 10.8
Expected changes in output in the first quarter of 1999
Percent of changes in output
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Source: World Bank, Firm-LeveL Survey.
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products. A major cause of the reported excess capac- While there has been improvement in this area, more
ity is the fall in domestic demand for the firms' prod- work is needed, in particular removing those nuisance
ucts. Economic recovery in the short run, therefore, regulations, permits, or approvals that increase the cost
essentially depends on recovery in aggregate demand, of doing business in the country.
including new investment. Recovery in aggregate
demand also depends on consumer expectations about Customs and port facilities
the economy and adjustment in their real incomes. A
key issue in restoring the flow of investment is to restore Trade facilitation is also critical to ensuring that
confidence in private sector investors-both domestic resources can shift quickly to profitable sectors such as
and foreign investors-in the economy. This is particu- exports. The sample firms reported problems with cus-
larly important given the problems in the banking sec- toms such as delays in processing imports. Therefore, it
tor and slow progress in bank recapitalization. Thus, it is paramount that problems related to customs admin-
is important for the government to maintain a stable istration and port facilities are addressed in the medium
macroeconomic framework including low inflation. A term.
,transparent investment regime that provides equal
treatment of foreign and domestic investors as well as Trade and industry policy
removing all impediments to investment goes a long
way toward restoring private sector investor confidence As indicated above, the industry and trade sectors have
in the economy. In the immediate period, the govern- undergone substantial deregulation in the last 12
ment can stimulate aggregate demand through effective months. This includes eliminating the statutory basis of
targeting of its social safety net program. several remaining monopolies and cartels, and a com-
mitment to accelerating trade policy reforms, a bank-
Removing policy impediments to resource ruptcy law, and a competition law. The government has
mobilization continued with the deregulation process. In December
1998, the government removed all subsidies given to
The study shows that resources are likely to reallocate fertilizer producers and removed quantitative restric-
to export-oriented sectors and resource-based sectors, tions on urea imports. The government is to review
as the firms in these sectors have sustained the least other distortions in the economy, including remaining
damage, and some are better off as a result of the depre- fiscal incentives such as tax holidays, in an effort to
ciation of the rupiah. It is therefore important to ensure improve the competitiveness of the economy.
that impediments to resource allocation are removed so
that firms can, where possible, shift to new markets Bank restructuring
quickly. An extensive web of regulations, approvals,
and permits is still required to establish and operate As indicated earlier, the government has introduced a
businesses at all levels of government (national, provin- bank restructuring program, which includes liquidation
cial, and local) in Indonesia. For example, more than 26 of some banks and recapitalization of other banks that
licenses, permits, and approvals are required to estab- meet certain criteria. Bank recapitalization is a neces-
lish a fishing business. This raises the cost of doing busi- sary condition for resuscitating the banking sector and
ness and impedes resource mobilization in the economy. stimulating renewed lending to the corporate sector.
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Notes gest that the firms interpreted the question as referring to the pre-
ferred source of finance in 1998.
The report was prepared by Dr. Ir. Bambang Widianto, MA and Ir. 3. As a consequence of weaknesses in the financial data, we could
Tb. A. Choesni, MA of the National Development Planning Agency not adequately explore the impact of the crisis on the firms' prof-
(BAPPENAS), based on surveys conducted by the Bada Pusat Statistik itability Thus, the analysis on that is not included in this paper.
with financial assistance of the World Bank. 4. However, caution must be exercised in interpreting the results
1. Around 80 firms were dropped because they provided incomplete presented in figure 10.7. As indicated, the figure shows that about
information. one-quarter of short-term and Long-term finance was stiLL sourced from
2. One exampLe is the question on the sources of short-term and banks ir 1998, down from above 30 percent before the crisis. This is
Long-term finance. The question was worded to inquire what the somewhat surprising given the severe problems facing the banking
sources wouLd be -if the respondent wanted to obtain short-term sector and the attention in the media to the notion of a credit crunch
finance." The potentiaL sources were Listed in the questionnaire. The strangLing viabLe firms. Figure 10.7 indicates that firms were stiLL bor-
firm was asked to give percentages for each applicabLe source both rowing 1from banks in 1998. Interpretation problems with the ques-
before and after the crisis. It is uncLear whether those firms that tionnaire may expLain this somewhat confusing resuLt; it is uncLear in
answered the question were referring to actual sources of finance or the surfey whether the firms are referring to preferred sources or
their preferred source of finance. The fact that the reported patterns actual sDurces of finance in 1998, or whether they are reporting out-
of finance before and after the crisis were similar, however, does sug- standing balances or new borrowings in 1998 (see note 2).
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A Study ofn the Crisis,
Recovery, and Industrial
Upgrading in the
Republic of Korea
Nakgyooon Choi
Du-Yong Kang
his report presents the results of a comprehensive survey-conductedT from November 1998 to February 1999-of 850 firms in key manu-
facturing sectors irL the Republic of Korea. The survey provides
microeconomic-level information on the impact of the financial crisis on out-
put, employment, corporate finance, and profitability. It also provides insights
into the efficacy of government programs, and the prospects for corporate
recovery as seen by these firms. Similar studies undertaken in Indonesia,
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand allow for regional comparisons and
the possibility to benchmark firm performance.
Since the outbreak of the financial crisis in December 1997, Korea has taken
drastic measures to consolida-e a base for economic stability. The two national
priorities have been to reform the overall economic structure and to build up
the depleted foreign exchange reserves. Through successful economic reforms,
the Korean economy has regained its vitality-as evidenced by the decreasing
exchange rates and interest rates, the increasing stock market indexes, and the
improved current account.
This study on Korea's exp2riences in the recent crisis is one of the World
Bank's series on East Asian responses to the current crisis and on long-term
competitiveness issues. In paiticular, the research examines the impacts of the
crisis and the resulting policy responses. The causes and impacts of the Korean
economic crisis have been heatedly discussed in the international trade and
financial forums, thus making it one of the most challenging policy issues.
Policymakers' responses to the crisis, however, have been constrained by the
159
paucity and inadequacy of the available economic and approximately 2,500 firms, out of which 863 sent
financial information. This paper addresses these weak- responses. The firms were selected from five industrial
nesses through the development and analysis of a data- sectors that adequately reflect the makeup of the
base consisting of information collected through Korean manufacturing sector. These sectors are gar-
firm-level interviews. ments and textiles (Standard Industrial Classification
The paper is organized as follows. The first section [SIC] code 17, 18), chemicals (SIC code 24, 25),
provides a detailed description of the survey, indicating machinery (SIC code 29), electronics and electrical
the industrial sectors covered, sample composition and machinery (SIC code 2930, 30, 32), and automobiles
distribution. This is followed by a section that investi- and automobile parts (34). They are the biggest sectors
gates issues pertaining to the impact of the crisis on the in Korea's manufacturing industries in terms of both
firms surveyed and their views on the causes of the cri- value added and exports.
sis, and another section that deals with the firms' main Within each of the sectors, firms were randomly
sources of funding and focuses on investigating the selected so that the survey would involve a representa-
extent of the credit crunch. The final section sums up our tive mix of firms of different sizes and geographic loca-
discussions and evaluates where Korea's economy is tions. We selected firms with at least 20 employees. As
headed as the crisis begins to subside. a combined set, small and medium-size enterprises
(SMEs) are defined as those having less than 300
The survey employees. A brief description of the characteristics of
the sample is shown in table 11.1. In the sample, the
In order to analyze the impact of and the response to the chemicals industry occupies the biggest proportion
crisis, we conducted a detailed survey at the firm level. (244 firms), while the automobile industry has the
The survey focuses on the change in the firms' produc- smallest (118 firms).
tion, financial structure, labor force, and technology Approximately 70 percent of the firms export at least
acquisition from 1996 to 1998. The survey was initi- some of their output, which is not surprising if we take
ated in November 1998 and was completed in into account the outward-oriented nature of the Korean
February 1999. Questionnaires were distributed to economy. The share of exporters varies across sectors-
TABLE 11.1
Characteristics of the sampLe
Average
Export By export Foreign number of IVumber of
Size orientation volume FDI firm control employees firms
Small Large Export Nonexport High Medium Small No Yes None Some Total
Industry
Apparel and
textiles 171 29 131 67 69 35 66 195 5 190 4 2 234 200
Chemicals 206 38 165 79 44 69 113 200 47 192 20 21 246 244
Machinery 149 7 107 46 29 45 66 143 13 136 10 5 203 156
Electronics 112 33 124 23 65 39 31 122 26 114 24 4 546 145
Automobiles 96 22 69 51 13 43 61 101 22 99 10 11 453 118
Age
OLd 561 122 493 193 186 195 248 604 89 580 54 36 363 683
New 171 7 103 71 34 36 88 156 23 150 14 7 127 178
Location
Seoul 500 103 425 173 162 152 231 532 77 505 51 29 375 603
Others 234 26 171 93 58 79 106 229 36 226 17 14 173 260
Total 734 129 596 266 220 231 337 761 113 731 66 43 314 663
Source: World Bank, Firm-LeveL Survey.
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it is highest in electronics and lowest in automobiles. domestic production, trade, and employment. In the
Among the exporters, the companies whose exports are survey, the firms were asked about changes that had
more than half of their sales were about 28 percent of occurred in capacity utilization, net profitability, and
the group. The firms whose exports are more than 5 employment numbers since 1997.
percent but less than 50 percent of their sales took up
29 percent, while the firms whose exports are less 5 per- Capacity utilization and exports
cent of their sales accounted for 43 percent.
About 13 percent of those surveyed are Foreign In the wake of the crisis, Korean companies suffered
Direct Investment (FDI) firms, that is, firms whose for- from dull domestic demand as well as a credit crunch.
eign ownership is imiore than 10 percent. These are Therefore, it is not surprising to find that the capacity
either part of a joint venture or the subsidiary of a for- utilization on average fell in all five industries from
eign parent. FDI firms are most common in the chemi- 1997 to the first half of 1998 (figure 11.1). In line with
cals industry and are seen least in the textile industry. this decrease in capacity utilization, production also
FDI firms tend to be larger, with an average employee dropped. Exactly two-thirds of the firms reported that
count of 493 versus 289 for non-FDI firms. Foreign ties their production had been reduced since the outbreak
could be an important factor for firms to access capital of the crisis. The highest mention of production loss
or markets overseas. was araong automobile producers (91.1 percent), fol-
Concerning the size of the firms in the survey, the lowed by the machinery producers (74.4 percent). The
sample is representative of the Korean situation since chemicals (61.7 percent), electronics (58.8 percent),
the small and medium-size companies make up a sub- and apparel and textiles (55.7 percent) sectors reported
stantial proportion of the sample. Approximately 85 production losses that were lower than the industry
percent of surveyed firms were SMEs, although thc averagz.
share of SMEs also varies across sectors. The share is Firm size provides insights into which areas of the
highest in the machinery industry (96 percent), and econorny were hardest hit by the crisis. The large firms
lowest in electronics (77 percent). were operating at a capacity utilization ratio that was
The sample is also representative of Korea's market 5.2 percent higher than the small firms in the first half
situation in terms of firm age as well as location. The of 1998. These firms experienced a significantly lower
surveyed firms are divided into "old" and "new," based drop-off in production than did the small firms. During
on the year of establishment, with the threshold being the sarme period, firms with links to foreign companies
the year 1990. About 80 percent of the firms are desig- were producing a slight 0.6 percent less than domestic
nated old in the sample, and almost 70 percent are firms, while exporters were 6.0 percent more produc-
located in or near Seoul, the nation's largest city. tive than domestically oriented producers.
In response to questions about expansion plans, 41.7
Analysis of the impact of the crisis on percent of the firms reported that they had planned to
the firms expand their facilities before the crisis occurred.
Automobile producers registered the highest propor-
The ultimate goal of the economic reforms imposed on tion of positive answers to the question at 60.2 percent.
Korea in exchange for the bailout loans from the Only 26.4 percent of apparel and textiles producers
International Monetary Fund (IMF) was to elevate for- reported their plan to expand the capacity before the
eign investors' confidence in the Korean economy and crisis. The chemicals (43.5 percent), machinery (39.7
to revive its economic growth momentum. When the percent), and electronics (45.9 percent) sectors turned
Korean economy was hit by the financial crisis, the out to be very close to the mean of the survey results.
expected disastrous effects on the domestic as well as However, when the crisis was in full swing in 1998
external sectors were not easy to figure out. This made more than two-thirds of the firms had abandoned their
the job of policymakers very difficult, and they eagerly expansion plans. Only 13 percent of the firms reported
sought information about the impact of the crisis on that they had planned to expand their capacity utilization
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during the crisis. By sector, electronics producers were 29.0 percent answered that their exports had decreased,
most ready to expand their capacity at 20.3 percent, and 10.6 percent answered that their exports had not
and automobile producers were least likely at 10.6 per- changed in 1998. These results indicated that most
cent. The apparel and textiles (10.9 percent), chemicals Korean firms have shown a relatively strong interna-
(12.1 percent), and the machinery sectors (14.1 percent) tional competitiveness in the world market, despite the
were closest to the mean of the survey results. reduced production. Rating the factors contributing to
The results mentioned above indicate that the domes- their sustained international competitiveness, the firms
tic demand was frozen in the aftermath of the crisis. selected the devalued exchange rates as the most impor-
They also reveal that automobile and machinery indus- tant factor, followed by competitiveness in price, qual-
tries were the hardest hit sectors in Korea. The automo- ity, efficient marketing strategies, and expanded market
bile industry had been suffering long before the crisis access.
erupted, owing to the collapse of KIA Motors, one of the
big three Korean carmakers along with Hyundai and Net profitabiLity
Daewoo. The machinery industry suffered since it depends
on domestic demand rather than exports. The apparel The fact that the firms had been facing reduced capac-
and textiles, chemicals, and electronics industries per- ity utilization and production, and an increased interest
formed relatively better than the manufacturing average. payment burden caused by the higher interest rates, log-
The firms were asked whether their exports in 1998 ically led to decreased profitability. The net profit-to-
had increased or decreased, compared with 1997. A full equity ratio was examined after excluding the
59.2 percent answered that their exports had increased, companies whose capital was reduced to a value below
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zero. Outliers were eliminated by excluding firms with FIGURE 11.2
a ratio that was more or less than the value of the mean
by three times the standard deviation. The survey Net profitability of aLL sectors
results reveal (figure 11.2) that the net profitability Percenm
stood at 11.5 percent in 1996, fell to 8.4 percent in 15
1997, and fell again to 5.7 percent in 1998. The standard 11.54
deviations of the survey results have increased yearly 10
since 1996 from 0.25 to 0.30 to 0.41. This shows that the 8.41
uncertainty of profit-making rose sharply after the cri- 5.72
sis, with some firms more seriously hurt than others. 5
By industry, the profitability of the automobile sector
suffered the highest drop, with -6.6 percent in 1998.
This was a substantial drop from the 11.5 percent 0 _
enjoyed in 1996 and 10.0 percent in 1997. Next, the 1996 1997 1998, first haLf
machinery sector suffered a drop of 2.7 percent in prof-
itability in 1998; this variable was 4.5 percent in 1997 -5
and 13.6 percent in 1996. On the contrary, the apparel Source: World Bank, Firm-Level Survey.
and textiles sector showed a 13.4 percent profitability
in 1998, surprisingly better than the 9.4 percent in 1997
and 13.2 percent in 1996. The profitability of the elec- are the biggest competitors have remained around 4.9
tronics sector (8.6 percent) was worse in 1998 than percent.
1996 (13.1 percent) and 1997 (11.9 percent), but it was Decreasing in all sectors in 1998 from 1996 was the
still greater than the overall average. The chemicals sec- share of firms that regard domestic producers as the
tor recorded a relatively good result with 8.2 percent in strongest competitors. For producers in apparel and
1998, which exceeds the 7.0 percent of 1997, although textiles, this drop was from 73.1 percent in 1996 to
it is smaller than the 8.6 percent of 1996. 64.2 percent and 64.2 percent in successive years. For
the ch Zmicals sector, the decline went from 71.8 percent
Competitors to 70.6 percent to 65.7 percent. The share in the case of
the machinery sector was 68.6 percent in 1996, and
The firms were asked to identify the categories of firms dropped to 62.2 percent in both 1997 and 1998. The
that were their strongest competitors. The results indi- drop for the electronics sector was from 63.5 percent to
cate that the Korean markets were more open in 1998 56.8 percent to 52.7 percent. Finally, the automobile
than 1996 and 1997 (figure 11.3). The share of firms sector responses showed a fall from 78.0 percent to
that regard the domestic producers as their strongest 75.6 percent to 72.4 percent in 1998.
competitors decreased to 63.5 percent in 1998 from 71 Firm size provides insights into the impacts of the cri-
percent in 1996. The share of firms that perceived the sis. The larger firms were more likely to choose other
domestic joint ventures as the main competitors rose domestic firms as the biggest competitors than were the
from 2.7 percent in 1996 to 4.6 percent in 1998. smaller firms. This could be attributable to the larger
The survey demonstrates that the share of firms firms being relatively better off lately in terms of pro-
regarding the low-cost producers, newly industrialized duction than the small firms. In 1998 there was a 6.2
countries, or developed countries as the biggest com- percent drop in domestic competitors' profile in the
petitors rose every year. The share of firms picking the case of large firms, and a 1.9 percent drop for small
low-cost producers as the biggest competitors went up firms. Regarding the competition in the market, the
from 5.3 percent in 1997 to 6.4 percent in 1998. The larger firms have faced tough challenges from the direct
share of firms picking the OECD countries as the comp ~tition with strong-performing foreign firms.
biggest competitors rose from 12.4 percent in 1997 to Overall, the results revealed that the Korean market
14.4 percent in 1998. Those firms that feel the NICs is more open to foreign firms than it was in the past.
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More than one-third of Korean firms now (1998) state while 79.8 percent of the large firms are employing
that joint ventures and foreign producers are their fewer workers, based on 1998 figures. The small firms
biggest competitors. have a more difficult time in an economic crisis, but
apparently they are also more reluctant to let workers
Employment go. Of automobile producers, 80.5 percent have
reduced their workforce, while this is 66.0 percent of
A full 63.5 percent of the firms are currently (1998) machinery producers, 62.5 percent of chemicals pro-
employing fewer workers relative to December 1997, ducers, 57.4 percent of electronics producers and 56.7
when the crisis hit the nation full force (figure 11.4). percent of apparel and textiles producers.
The pattern of firms that are employing fewer workers
differs slightly by firm characteristics. Exporters report-
ing the employment of fewer workers after the crisis FIGURE 11.4
accounted for 61.4 percent, while the figure for nonex- Percent of the firms with fewer workers
porters was 66.9 percent. By foreign ownership, 63.5 after the crisis
percent of the firms whose foreign ownership is less Percent
than 10 percent are employing fewer workers, while 100
this figure stands at 69.9 percent for the firms whose 79.8
foreign ownership is less than 50 percent but more than 80 66.9 63.5 69.9 
10 percent, and 60.0 percent for the firms whose for- 60
eign ownership is more than 50 percent. These results 40
might indicate that foreign-controlled firms have been 20 I
operating more efficiently than the domestic ones, and 0
have not been forced to reduce their workforce. *'
It is interesting that the share of large and small firms < k 9' 
employing fewer workers is somewhat different. Of the
small firms, 61.2 percent have reduced their workforce, Source: World Bank, Firm-Level Survey.
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The correlation analysis on the decrease in capacity they used. More than two-fifths, or 40.4 percent, of the
utilization and employment reveals a different picture. firms reduced the length of working hours and 37.6 per-
The correlation was -37 percent for the machinery sec- cent imposed pay cuts. Only 8.0 percent of the firms
tor, which was the highest, followed by apparel and tex- carried out rotational work shifts, and 6.1 percent
tiles (-30 percent), electronics (-28 percent), chemicals transformed full-time jobs into part-time work. These
(-27 percent), and automobiles (-13 percent). This results reveal that labor unions and management
analysis is not surprising since, as usual in a recession of accepted wage cuts rather than retrenchment itself as a
Korean economy, the domestic-demand-dependent sec- compromise to overcome the business crisis.
tors (such as the machinery sector) as well as the labor-
intensive sectors (such as the apparel and textiles sector) Perceived causes of the sLowdown
led the decrease in employment in this case.
Asked what percentage of the reduction in employ- The firms were asked to assess to what extent they
ment occurred in various categories, the firms answered attributed the decline in their plant's utilization-with a
that employment dropped in all categories as follows: score of "5" for "major contribution," and "1 " for "no
31.4 percent of unskilled production workers; 31.1 per- contribution." A substantial decline in domestic
cent of clerical, sales, and service workers, and 25.3 per- demand, and the effect of a high interest rate in raising
cent of skilled production workers. The firms also the costs of loan repayments were the most commonly
stated that employment figures in administrative and perceived causes of the continuing economic slowdown
managerial workers, and technical and research work- (figure 11.5). The firms emphasized somewhat the
ers were reduced by 5.0 percent and 7.3 percent, respec- effect of the depreciated won in raising input costs-
tively. This low reduction in knowledge and technical while ncreases in labor costs was the least common
workers implies that the corporate competitiveness in response.
terms of human capital was not diminished. By type of firm, exporters perceived the decline in
Regarding the reduction in employment, the firms domestic and foreign demand and the interest rate as
were also asked to state any alternative to retrenchment the contributing factors, while nonexporters blamed
FIGURE 11.5
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the decline in domestic demand, the high interest rate, Sources of funds and their changes
and the depreciated Korean won as the causes of their
economic troubles. Regardless of the firm type, the sur- The survey investigated the sources of funds and how
vey results reveal that the dull domestic market, high these changed after the onset of the crisis. Before the cri-
interest rate, and the higher cost of production factors sis (figure 1 1.6a), the biggest source of short-term liqui-
were the primary difficulties. This implies that the crisis dity, at about 49 percent, was sales, and the biggest
can be overcome by the expansion in government source of long-term funding was loans from domestic
spending and the macroeconomic stabilization policy. banks, also at about 49 percent. The next biggest
sources of short-term and long-term funds were loans
Policy response to the corporate sector from domestic banks (38 percent) and sales revenue (35
percent), respectively. More than 80 percent of firms
The Korean government provided the export credit relied mainly on sales for short-term liquidity and on
facility funds, among others, for the corporate sector. loans from domestic banks for long-term funding. In
Such policy was very important in helping the firms short, from these two sources, the firms raised most of
cope with the crisis. We will discuss the policy environ- the funds they needed. Other sources were loans from
ment in the next section. other domestic financial institutions (6 percent), loans
On the employee side, the government provided the from foreign banks (2 percent), and the bond market
social programs, including the mandated severance pay (1-2 percent).
and the six-month unemployment benefits for laid-off This structure of funding sources showed some sig-
workers. Korean law is an institutional framework set nificant changes with the onset of the crisis (figure
up to protect employees from arbitrary layoffs by man- 11.6b). First of all, in both short-term and long-term
agement. For example, Korean labor law stipulates that financing, the proportion of sales revenue rose and that
employers are not allowed to lay off employees for rea- of loans from domestic banks fell sharply. The change
sons other than a business emergency. Korea's mini- was so substantial for long-term financing that the first
mum wage law stipulates that approximately US$10 and the second biggest sources were reversed after the
per day at the minimum has to be given to the employ- crisis. That is, sales revenue became the biggest source
ees. Social programs for unemployment insurance have (44 percent) followed by loans from domestic banks (41
specified eligibility requirements and methods of percent). Before the crisis, domestic loans were the
financing job training, among other stipulations. biggest funding source (49 percent) and sales revenue
was the second largest (35 percent).
Financial position of the firms before This change can be interpreted in two ways. First, it
and after the crisis and its impact on can be considered as an outcome of the credAt crunch.
the firms' responses to the crisis Considering that the sales revenue also dropped sub-
stantially, concurrent with the progress of the financial
Since Korea's crisis has been largely attributed to the crisis and the subsequent economic recession, the
weak financial sector, information on the firms' finan- decrease of the relative proportion of loans from
cial position is of particular importance in assessing the domestic banks implies that the amount of loans fell
impact of the crisis on the firms and understanding their more sharply, serving as evidence of a significant credit
responses to the crisis. In this section, we investigate the crunch after the onset of the crisis.
firms' financial positions focusing on five areas. Those However, the drop of the proportion of loans from
are (a) sources of funds and their changes after the cri- banks can be interpreted as the result of the firms'
sis; (b) the firms' debt structure (debt-to-equity ratios, decreased demand for credit as well. As mentioned
share of foreign-currency-denominated debt, and share above, since the Korean economy fell into a sharp reces-
of short-term debt); (c) the changes in credit availabil- sion after the onset of the crisis (the GDP grcwth rate
ity after the crisis; (d) transparency; and (e) programs fell from 5.5 percent in 1997 to about -6 percent in
offering financial support to the corporate sector and 1998), we can guess that the firms'financial demand also
their effects. fell drastically. In this regard, the rise of the proportion of
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FIGURE 11.6a
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FIGURE 11.6b
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sales revenue despite reduced sales and the fall of the On the whole, it seems that these two factors played
proportion of loans from banks may be attributable to a role in bringing about the change in the structure of
the firms' efforts to cut back on their credit demands in fund sources after the crisis, although the more impor-
the face of falling domestic demand. tant contributing factor cannot be distinguished by our
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survey. Still, we can find some important clues, at least equity status, the latter can be considered as a voluntary
in the case of short-term funds. We asked the firms to reduction.
assess the contribution of each source to difficulties in Among the five industrial sectors under study, the
financing production, with a score of "5" denoting ratio was lowest in chemicals (2.62 in 1998), and high-
"major contribution" and "1" denoting "no contribu- est in automobiles (5.52 in 1998). In textiles and chem-
tion." The highest rating was lower revenue from sales icals, the ratio rose over the 1996-1997 period while
reduction (4.16), while insufficient loans was the third falling in 1998. The ratio sustained its growth over
highest (3.24), following higher costs of inputs (3.42). 1996-1998 in machinery, automobiles and ellectronics.
This seems to imply that difficulties in the relevant sec- Not surprisingly, the ratio was much higher in large
tor itself played a bigger role than the credit crunch. firms than in SMEs. Exporters had higher ratios than
nonexporters, and the correlation between export ori-
Debt structure entation and debt-equity ratio was positive. However,
there were a couple of results that contradicted our pre-
Debt-equity ratio. In the wake of the financial crisis, dictions. First of all, it is notable that firms with foreign-
the IMF advised the Korean government to reduce gov- currency debt had lower debt-equity ratios than those
ernment expenditures and to implement a very tight that borrowed only in won. More surprisingly, the ratio
monetary policy. As a result, the interest rate soared in firms with foreign-currency debt fell over
during the first half of 1998. A high interest rate was 1996-1998, although the sharp depreciation of the
considered inevitable in order to avoid capital flight and won over the period was expected to raise the ratio,
further depreciation of the Korean won. However, soar- other things being equal. Second, in spite cf the FDI
ing interest rates had an extremely negative impact on firms' easier access to foreign capital, they showed a
Korean firms. lower debt-equity ratio than local firms.
It is widely known that Korean firms had been highly Issues related to foreign-currency-denominated debt.
leveraged. This seems to be attributable to their aggres- Since the crisis came with the dramatic depreciation of
sive business behavior in an environment of rapid eco- the Korean won, it was generally expected :hat firms
nomic growth on the one hand, and the country's with extensive debt denominated in foreign currencies
underdeveloped capital market, on the other hand. would suffer more severely than those without.
According to the Bank of Korea, the average debt- However, the survey result suggests that this problem is
equity ratio of Korean manufacturing firms was 3.17 in not as serious as expected. As we mentioned in the
1996. above section, debt-equity ratio in firms with fcreign-cur-
In our sample, the average debt-equity ratio rose from rency-denominated debt was not only lower than those
3.55 in 1996 to 3.96 in 1997 and fell again to 3.70 in without, but also fell over the 1996-98 period.
1998. The sharp rise of the ratio over 1996-1997 seems
to be deeply related to the onset of the crisis, which FIGURE 11.7
began at the end of 1997. The average debt-equity ratio
in the official statistics also rose in this period, which The debt-equity ratio
seems to be the result of the massive increase of foreign 6
borrowing after Korea joined the OECD in 1996.
Meanwhile, the fall of the debt-equity ratio amidst
the crisis can also be interpreted as the result of the two 4 3.55
factors mentioned in the previous section: the credit
crunch and the decrease of the firms' financial demands 2
(figure 11.7). First, it could be considered that as loans
were not rolled over, the ratio fell. At the same time, the
ratio might also fall, because the firms' financial 0 l 1969 Md11
demands decreased with the economic recession. While 1996 1997 Mid-1998
the former is an involuntary reduction in their debt- Source: WorLd Bank, Firm-Level Survey.
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Of course, as expected, the average amount of for- out. Perhaps reflecting this relative strength, firms with
eign-currency debt rose quite rapidly over the period. foreign-currency debt showed higher capacity utiliza-
Particularly, the amount increased sharply over 1996-97 tion than firms without (see table 11.2).
as the won depreciated ramatically at the end of 1997. On thie whole, we can suppose, based on these facts,
The average amount of foreign-currency debt doubled that the existence of foreign-currency debt did not affect
from 18,240 million won in 1996 to 36,481 million the financial structure of firms with debt as seriously as
won in 1997. However, it fell again to 30,501 million had been feared. This is partly because those firms were
won during the first half of 1998, reflecting the appre- relatively stronger than others and also partly because
ciation of the won over that period. Moreover, not sur- the share of foreign debt was not very high.
prisingly, the average amount of total debt did not Share of short-term debt. Although high interest
increase as much over 1996-98. This is because the rates af-er the onset of crisis damaged highly leveraged
share of foreign debt in total debt was not very high. firms, anmong them, those with a high proportion of
The average share among relevant firms was 19.8 per- short-term debt suffered more. As the credit crunch
cent in 1998. It rose from 15.2 percent in 1996 to 24.3 emerged, raising money itself became difficult in spite of
percent in 1997 and fell again in 1998. the high interest rate. Thus, many Korean firms had dif-
In addition, for firms with foreign-currency debt, ficulties in rolling over their short-term debt.
about 42 percent of the survey respondents were larger, For the sample firms, the average share of short-term
more export-oriented, and healthier in financial struc- debt was 49.9 percent in 1998, which was about 1.5
ture than the firms that borrowed only in won. The percentage points lower than before the crisis (figure
average number of employees was 420 in firms with 11.8). The share rose slightly during 1996-1997, and
foreign-currency debt, compared with 238 in firms fell in 1998. The large firms and exporters showed
without. And the average ratio of export-to-total sales higher shares than SMEs and nonexporters, respec-
in firms with foreign-currency debt was 35 percent, tively. The share was positively correlated with export
while it was 24 percent in firms without. The average oriental:ion. Firms with foreign debt had a lower share
share of short-term debt was 49 percent in firms with of short-term debt than those without, while local firms
foreign-currency debt versus 50 percent in firms with- had a lower share than FDI firms.
TABLE 11.2
Profile of the firms
Borrow in Export Foreign
foreign currency Size orientotion control FDI firm
Yes No Small Large Export Nor export None Some Total No Yes
Financial indicators
Short-term liabilities/
total liabilities 49.5 50.2 49.0 54.1 51.3 1.6.2 48.4 51.5 53.4 49.0 55.6
Long-term liabilities/
total liabilities 50.5 49.8 51.0 45.9 48.7 53.8 51.6 48.5 46.6 51.0 44.4
Debt-equity ratio 3.53 3.86 3.59 4.18 3.87 3.25 3.82 3.37 3.81 3.75 3.37
First characteristics
Number of employees 420 238 89 1594 419 96 205 1638 255 289 493
Share of export 34.7 23.9 25.7 43.7 40.0 3.3 27.5 39.6 32.7 27.7 35.4
Share of FDI firm 16 11 12 18 15 9 n.a. 69 98 n.a. 100
Response to the crisis
current capacity utiLization 74.4 70.3 71.4 76.7 74.1 67.8 72.1 70.4 73.3 72.2 72.1
Share with fewer workers 66.6 62.3 61.3 79.8 62.1 67.2 63.7 72.7 67.4 64.3 62.5
Optimistic for future growth 34.7 36.3 35.7 35.2 34.0 40.1 37.1 25.4 27.9 36.3 31.3
Frequency 363 501 723 128 594 257 722 67 43 750 112
Total share 42.0 58.0 83.7 14.8 69.8 30.2 86.8 8.1 5.2 87.0 13.0
n.a. not appLicabLe
Source: WorLd Bank, Firm-LeveL Survey.
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Over the investigation period, the share fell more than 2.5 for all financial sources. This implies that a sig-
sharply after the crisis began in SMEs than in the large nificant credit crunch did, in fact, exist.
firms, and in nonexporters over exporters. The share in The most restrictive sources were local moneylenders
the large firms actually rose slightly after the onset of (1.9), a source that is generally considered as the most
crisis. Since there is no reason to believe that the large sensitive to the change in the money market. Relatively
firms and exporters suffered more than SMEs and non- less restrictive sources were suppliers, partner firms,
exporters from the economic recession after the out- and domestic banks. Among the financial institutions,
break of the crisis, this seems to imply that the former domestic banks were the least restrictive credit suppliers.
two groups had less difficulty in rolling over short-term In another question concerning the availability of
debt than did the latter two groups. credit, we also investigated the proportion of firms that
were declined loans by banks or other financial institu-
Availability of credit tions. The survey showed that the proportion rose
sharply following the onset of the crisis. The proportion
One of the controversial issues during the crisis was was 14 percent in the first half of 1997, rose to 27 per-
whether the credit crunch existed and how serious it cent in the second half of the year, and rose again to 38
was. Although we already discussed this issue in the percent in the first half of 1998. Both the proportion
above sections, we also directly investigated it with a and its growth rate were higher in the large firms and
survey question on the change in the availability of local firms than in SMEs and foreign controlled firms,
credit. The firms were asked to assess the change in the respectively. It is particularly remarkable that the pro-
availability of credit after the onset of crisis-with "5" portion of large firms rejected for loans rose dramati-
indicating "much less restrictive," "3" "the same," and cally from 21 percent in the first half of 1997 to 61
"1" "much more restrictive." The survey showed that percent in the same period of 1998. This doe, not sup-
the availability of credit was substantially restricted in port the general belief that SMEs suffered more severely
all financial sources (figure 11.9). The answer was less from the credit crunch.
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Transparency and disclosure how much credibility the audited statements hold and
how much importance banks attach to them in deter-
Even before the financial crisis began unfolding, the mining Loan provisions. Unfortunately, this information
East Asian financial system, not excluding Korea's, had cannot be obtained from our survey.
often been criticized for its insufficient transparency Mearwhile, on the issue of collateral, 86 percent of
and disclosure of financial information. Concerning the firms answered that they had to provide collateral
this issue, we asked the firms whether their financial to receive bank loans. This reflects the fact that Korean
statements were audited by outside accounting firms, banks t-aaditionally demand collateral to provide loans,
whether they needed audited statements to receive a particularly to SMEs. Comparing debt-equity ratios
bank loan, and whether they had to secure their loan betweeni firms that provide collateral and those that do
with collateral. not, the ratio of the former was much higher: 3.33 com-
On the issue of audited statements, about two-thirds pared with 1.88. Perhaps this is because banks are more
of the surveyed firms answered that they were audited likely to demand collateral from firms with higher debt-
by outside accounting firms. Almost all of the large equity ratios. The types of collateral are mostly real
firms and about 60 percent of the SMEs affirmed this. estate, such as buildings and land.
In order to qualify for a bank loan, approximately 62
percent of the firms needed audited statements-specif- Policy environment
ically, about 95 percent of the large firms and 56 per-
cent of the SMEs. Thus, judging by this response, it can To deal with the crisis, the Korean government has
be inferred that there is sufficient transparency and dis- implemented several policies to relieve the credit crunch
closure of financial information in Korea. Therefore, and to support firms' restructuring efforts. Expanded
the actual problem in Korea is neither whether firms are financial support and taxation relief were provided to
audited by outside accounting firms nor whether they SMEs and venture businesses, to spur exporting efforts
provide audited statements to receive a bank loan, but and corporate restructuring, mergers and acquisitions
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Availability of credit after the crisis
5
I
More
available
Other
domestic
Domestic Foreign financia[ Local money Family and Partner Bond Equity
banks banks institutions Lenders friends SuppLiers firms market market
Same 3 
__ _ _
1 2.47 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~2.54 2.44
Less229 22
avaiLabLe 1.92 2.01 2.13 2.06
Source: WorLd Bank, Firm-LeveL Survey.
A Study on the Crisis, Recovery, and Industrial Upgrading in the Republic of Korea 171
(M&As), technology development, and employment. ened economic activities with the current lukewarm
We investigated in the survey whether the firms were growth in exports. In addition, a sufficient trade surplus
aware of these policies and how they assessed their is needed to upgrade the credit rating of the Korean
effect. economy and to repay the borrowed loans from inter-
Most of the firms were well aware of these policies. national financial institutions.
Approximately 89 percent of the surveyed firms were The ultimate goal of the IMF program, imposed on
aware of financial support policy for SMEs. Only 66 Korea in exchange for the bailout loans, was to elevate
percent of firms knew about the M&A promotion pol- foreign investors' confidence in the Korean economy.
icy, which was the least well known policy among firms. The IMF program is expected to provide the Korean
Meanwhile, the proportion of firms that applied for economy with the opportunities to improve its develop-
these programs, not surprisingly, varies for each policy ment capacities through structural reforms and a bal-
program. The proportion was high in credit guarantees anced current account. In the short term, however, the
for SMEs (46 percent) and technology development IMF program has had the effect of sacrificing the coun-
funds (38 percent), while it was low in M&A promo- try's economic growth. Specifically, with overly low
tion policy (9 percent) and the corporate restructuring growth rates prescribed in its action plan, the program
fund (15 percent). Low application ratios for the latter curtailed domestic business, including facility invest-
two policies can be explained by the fact that they were ments.
restricted to only those firms that opted for M&A or According to the survey results, lower-capacity uti-
corporate restructuring. lization, declining net profitability, and recduction in
Finally, the effect of the supporting policies was employment were bad news for the Korean economy.
regarded as satisfactory. We asked the firms to assess Specifically, the impact of the crisis on the highly lever-
these policies with "5" signifying "major contribution" aged firms was devastating. Korean export capabilities,
and " 1 " "no contribution. " The answer was more than however, were shown not to have been damaged by the
3 for all of the above-mentioned policy programs. crisis. This was further evidenced by the export perfor-
Although the variance was small across each policy pro- mance of last year, which recorded US$133.2 billion in
gram, the long-term facility fund from Korea 1998. Export volume was just 2.2 percent less than that
Development Bank scored relatively high (3.91), as did of 1997, which contributed to a huge trade surplus of
the export and import financing (3.86). The firms gave almost 40 billion U.S. dollars in 1998. Export perfor-
low ratings to the M&A promotion policy (3.40) and mance and regained vitality in the manufacturing sec-
the financial support provided to venture businesses tors are signs of Korea's economic recovery in 1999.
and SMEs (3.47). It is somewhat surprising that the The survey results revealed that 36 percent of the
support for venture business and SMEs scored the sec- firms expected their output to increase in the next six
ond lowest rating, considering that this is one of the months, while only 28 percent expected their output to
most important economic policies of the present gov- decrease in this time period (figure 11.10)-35 percent
ernment. This result suggests that there might be some expected their output not to change at all. Interestingly,
problems with the efficiency of the policy. 54 percent of automobile producers answered that they
expected their output to increase in six months, and
ConcLuding remarks and only 21 percent expected their output to decrease. As
recommendations we noted in the previous sections, the automotive sector
was the hardest hit by the crisis in terms of production
Economic growth, the price level, and the balance of and employment. Of electronics producers, 37 percent
payments are among the Korean government's para- expected their output to increase in six months, while
mount concerns. For the time being, the government 29 percent thought their output would decrease. In the
agenda will focus on the challenging problem of sus- case of the apparel and textiles sector, the proportion of
taining the trade surplus. The reason for setting this pri- producers who expected their output to increase in six
ority is that the Korean economy, boosted by an months was smaller than the proportion of producers
outward-looking development strategy, faces damp- who expected their output to decline.
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Considering the debt-equity ratios of Korean firms, the people's willingness to optimize their economic
decreasing exchange rates and interest rates, the activities. The public sector played a leading role in pro-
increasing stock market indexes, and the improved cur- moting the so-called big four economic restructuring
rent account, we can interpret that Korean business will agenda in terms of financial, corporate, labor and man-
be rejuvenated owing to the economic restructuring. We agemerLt, and public-sector reforms.
note that the hard-hit automobile sector shows signs of The recent macroeconomic indicators-including the
recovery at this time. econonic growth rate, exchange rate, interest rate, and
Not surprisingly, Korean firms were alarmed by the inflation rate-demonstrate the Korean economy's
skyrocketing interest rates as a result of tightened mon- signs oj recovery from the financial crisis. At this stage,
etary policy implemented in 1998. This paper will not anti-recession measures such as a relaxed monetary
provide an in-depth analysis on whether higher interest supply and expanded fiscal spending are more desirable
rates contributed to the stabilization of the Korean than adhering needlessly to the tightened policies.
economy and the activation of foreign direct invest- Needless to say, economic restructuring measures will
ment, or whether they were conducive to the aggra- have to be implemented faithfully. Such reforms also
vated domestic business in the early stages of the confonn to the spirit of democracy and market econ-
financial crisis. However, Korea did agree that the tight- omy, which the President Kim Dae Jung administration
ened monetary and fiscal policies were necessary to ele- has adopted as a framework agenda.
vate foreign investors' confidence in the Korean Korea is eager to open its market to foreign produc-
economy and to revive its economic growth momentum ers as well as investors. To this end, it is trying to bring
in the early stages of the crisis management. its domestic regulations and institutions up to estab-
In addition, we note that the private-sector austerity lished international levels. Through its economic
program, and public-sector burden sharing programs restructuring processes, the Korean government has
were effective in tackling the crisis. Korean imports in announced drastic market opening measures including
1998 were reduced by 35 percent, which demonstrated the capital market and foreign exchange liberalization,
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and the abolition of the import diversification policy, them to ascertain what is actually occurring at the firm
among others. Still, the government will have to set up level. This project will lend support to developing a net-
long-term plans to conform to global standards. work of policymakers in East Asian countries through
Finally, we hope that this project will help strengthen the pooling of information about country experiences.
the capabilities of Korean policymakers by allowing
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Annex 11.A Technology deveLopment fund.
For the development of basic technology, two-thirds of
Government support program s the developing cost is now supported by the government.
Listed in the questionnaire Enlargement of export and import financing
EnLargement of the credit guarantee for SMEs The limit to export-import financing was abolished,
and additionally public funds totaling 5.3 billion dol-
The fund for credit guarantee was expanded from 600 lars were raised to support export-import financing.
billion won in 1997 to 1.3 trillion won in 1998 with the
fund from IBRD and ADB of about one billion U.S. dol- Long-term facility fund from the Korea
lars each. And the ceiling of guarantee for each firm was Development Bank
also raised from won 1.5 billion to won 3 billion.
Out of various government funds, loans are currently
Enlargement of the financing to venture busi- made to firms' equipment investment with a relatively
nesses and SMEs low interest rate. Although this supporting program
had long been implemented even before the financial
Loans to venture businesses and SMEs that became due crisis, the size of the fund was expanded after the onset
in 1998 were rolled over for six months. The interest of the crisis.
rate for policy loans to SMEs was lowered by 1 per-
centage point. Thirteen trillion won of special funds Note
was raised by banks for loans to SMEs.
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Activation of M&A and TradE (KIET). This paper discusses the results from an Industrial
Survey conducted by KIET with the cooperation of NICE (NationaL
Hostile M&A was allowed by the amendment of the Information and Credit EvaLuation I c.). Many thanks are owed to Dr.
law. The ceiling of treasury stock purchases was raised Mary Hatlward-Driemeier of the World Bank for her technicaL support,
to 33 percent. Ms. Linda Elmose of KIET for her enthusiastic proofreading, and the
World Bank for financiaL support.
FinanciaL support for corporate restructuring
Taxation support was given to business activities for
restructuring. For example, 50 percent of value added
tax credit was given to the sales of real estate for corpo-
rate restructuring.
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Crisis: Impact at the
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Malaysian Case
Economic Planning Unit.
Prime Minister's Office, Malaysia
T he Asian financial crisis that started in mid-1997 adversely affected
the performance of E'ast Asian economies, including Malaysia. The
effects of the financia.l crisis on the real economy became discernible
during the last quarter of 1997 when the real GDP growth rate slowed down
in comparison with that of the earlier three-quarters. In 1998, the economy
contracted for the first time since 1985. Both domestic demand and exports in
terms of U.S. dollars declined. All sectors of the economy including manufac-
turing, which is the leading sector, registered negative growth rates. The per-
formance of selected economic and financial indicators over this period was as
shown in table 12.1.
This report evaluates the impact of the financial crisis at the firm level based
on the results of the corporate sector survey on the impact of the Asian finan-
cial crisis conducted by the Gcvernment of Malaysia in collaboration with the
World Bank. The survey provides up-to-date information on the effects of the
financial crisis on the performance of the firms, particularly with respect to
their production, revenue, employment, exports, and investment capability.
The results of the survey also illustrate how firm characteristics and the policy
environment affect the vulnerability of these firms. The results can serve as a
useful input for the formulation of appropriate policies and strategies to initi-
ate the recovery of the corporate sector.
The results of the survey show that in general, most firms have been affected
by the crisis in terms of a decline in their output and net profits, with domestic-
oriented firms being more severely affected than those specializing in exports.
The firms attribute output decline primarily to softening demand and the higher
cost of input arising from the depreciation of the ringgit. Export performance
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TABLE 12.1
Selected economic and financiaL indicators, 1994-98
Estimate
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Real sector (percent change)
Real GDP 9.3 9.4 8.6 7.7 -6.7
ReaL domestic demand 12.7 13.3 7.0 6.5 -25.8
CPI inflation (period average) 3.7 3.4 3.5 2.7 5.3
Unemployment rate (percent) 2.9 2.8 2.6 2.6 3.9
Savings and investment (percent of GDP)
Gross domestic investment 40.4 43.5 41.6 42.5 25.8
Private, including stocks 27.5 30.9 30.2 30.9 14.5
Public 13.0 12.6 11.4 11.6 11.4
Gross national savings 32.7 33.6 36.7 37.3 38.8
Private 15.1 18.6 20.8 19.1 23.6
PubLic 17.5 15.0 15.9 18.3 15.2
Fiscal sector (percent of GDP)
Federal government baLance 2.3 0.9 0.7 2.4 -1.8
Revenue 26.0 23.3 23.4 23.9 20.3
Expenditure and net Lending 23.7 22.5 22.6 21.5 22.1
Overall public sector balance 3.5 3.2 4.0 6.3 -1.7
Monetary sector (annual percent change)
M3 growth 13.1 22.3 21.2 18.5 2.7*
Domestic credit growth 14.7 28.6 26.7 32.0 -1.6*
Interest rates (percent, end-period)
One-month interbank rate 5.14 6.05 7.23 8.60 6.48*
Average lending rate 11.49 11.54 11.93 12.16 9.95*
Balance of payments (USS billion)
Trade balance 1.7 0.0 4.0 4.0 17.7
Exports, f.o.b. 56.6 71.6 76.8 77.7 71.9
Imports, f.o.b. 54.9 71.5 72.7 73.7 54.2
Services account baLance -6.5 -7.7 -7.7 -7.7 -6.0
Current account baLance -5.6 -8.6 -4.8 -5.0 9.2
(% of GDP) -7.8 -9.9 -4.9 -5.1 12.9
Capital account balance 2.5 6.9 7.3 1.2 1.1
Medium- and Long-term 4.4 6.6 5.4 6.8 2.8
Short-term -3.2 1.0 4.1 -4.0 -5.5
PortfoLio capital 1.3 -0.8 -2.1 -1.6 3.8
Overall balance -3.1 -1.8 2.5 -3.9 10.3
Intemational trade (annual percent change) a
Export voLume 23.5 15.2 6.9 10.6 20.8
Import volume 32.5 25.5 1.6 8.9 -5.4
Terms of trade 2.5 5.0 -0.4 -1.4 -1.6
Gross official reserves (US$ billion) 26.0 25.4 27.8 21.0 25.4
Months of retained imports 5.5 4.1 4.4 3.4 5.7*
Extemal debt
Total externaL debt (US$ billion) 29.0 33.9 39.0 60.3 3 8.3 '
percent of GDP 40.0 38.9 39.3 61.6 54.0'
Private externaL debt' (% of total) 31.8 33.0 33.3 35.7 40.2'
Public external debtc (% of total) 49.5 47.9 40.5 38.6 42 .2 '
Short-term externaL debt (US$ biLLion) 5.4 6.5 10.2 15.5 6.8b
Debt service ratio 5.5 6.6 6.9 6.2 5.8b
Exchange rates
RM/US$ (end-period) 2.6 2.5 2.5 3.9 3.8*
NEER (1990=100, period average) 110.3 110.3 113.7 110.6 8 4.9d
REER (1990=100, period average) 102.2 102.7 107 104.5 82.81
Note: a. EPU estimates. b. September 1998. c. Medium- and long-term. d. January-October 1998, IFS. * ActuaL
Source: Economic Planning Unit, Prime Ministers Office.
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shows mixed results with almost an equal number of tive, a .ross-section of large, medium-size and small
firms experiencing an improvement and a deterioration firms; and domestic- and export-oriented firms were
of performance. In terms of employment, all categories included. The ownership and location factors were also
of firms employ fewer workers today as a result of the taken into account in constructing the sample. A total
crisis, but exporting, foreign-controlled, and large firms of 850 f irms (57 percent) responded.
exhibit this trend to a greater degree. In terms of avail- In tesms of sectoral distribution, 26 percent of the
ability of credit since the onset of the crisis, only about firms within the sample were from textiles and gar-
a quarter of the firms that rely on local banks found ments; 22 percent from the food and beverages subsec-
credit less accessible, reflecting that the problem of tor; 17 percent from electrical and electronics; 17
credit inaccessibility was not widespread. It is also percent from chemicals; and the remaining from the
noted that borrowing from local banks continues to be construction-related and auto parts subsectors (see
a major source of financing after the crisis, second only table 12.3).
to sales revenue. In terms of size based on the number of workers
The first part of the paper sets out the framework of employed, 24 percent of the firms were large' and the
the survey. The paper then follows by evaluating the rest medium and small. The electrical and electronics
impact of the crisis on firm output, profitability, export subsector followed by the chemical subsector had the
performance, and employment. It then deals specifically biggest number of large firms, while textile and apparel
with the effect of the crisis on the surveyed firms' finan- followed by the food subsector had the biggest number
cial position. The subsequent section outlines the policy of small firms. As much as 19 percent of the large and 17
responses by the government, and the paper concludes percent of the medium and small firms were new firms.2
by alluding to the perception of the firms regarding Of th2 total number of firms selected, 47percent were
immediate term prospects. export-oriented,3 with the largest number in electrical
and electronics, followed by the chemical subsector. In
Framework of the survey the category of highly export-oriented industries4 were
largely ~lectrical and electronics, and chemicals sectors;
The survey was limited to firms in the manufacturing whereas in the category of moderately export-oriented
sector, that being the leading sector of the economy, were mostly auto parts and chemicals.5 As much as 47
contributing 35.7 percent of the GDP in 1997. Thus, percent of both the old and new firms were export-orn-
the recovery of the economy will largely depend on the ented, suggesting that there is no direct relationship
revival of growth in the manufacturing sector. The sur- between the age of the firm and its export orientation.
vey covers six major subsectors within manufactur- It was also noted that both export-oriented and domes-
ing-namely, electrical and electronics; textiles,
garments and footwear; food and beverages; chemicals, TABLE 1:2.2
rubber and plastic products; construction-related man- Manufaicturing sectoral weights, 1997
ufacturing; and auto parts-as shown in table 12.2. The
Percent Percent
six subsectors were identified on the basis of their Subsector Legend to GDP to Exports
importance in terms of their value added and exports.
They constitute 83 percent of the manufacturing value 1 Food & beverages 3.2 1.8
2 Textites, garments & footwear 1.9 3.4
added and 87 percent of total manufactured exports. 3 Construction-reLated 4.3 3.7
The sampling frame was selected from the list of 2,300 4 IndustriaL chemicals, rubber &
firms used in the Linkages and Technology pLastic products 8.1 5.55 ElectricaL machinery
Development (ILTD) Study conducted in 1997. This & electronics 10.5 53.8
was done so as to complement the ILTD study and 6 Auto parts 1.7 2.2
reduce the survey time while meeting the requirements Total 29.7 70.4
of the current survey. A total of 1,500 firms were Manufacturing sector 35.7 81.0
selected and to ensure that the sample was representa- Source: Wotld Bank, Firm-LeveL Survey.
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TABLE 12.3
Characteristics of the sample
Average Total
By export no. of no. of
By employmentsizea orientation By value of exportsb Byforeign controLc FDlfirm employees firms
Jan-Aug 1998 Jan-Aug 1998
Large Small Nonexporters Exporters High Medium Small None Some Total No Yes
Sector
1. Food & beverages 20 158 127 61 17 26 6 166 13 9 164 24 71 188
2. TextiLes, garments
& footwear 41 174 154 70 44 15 2 198 6 20 196 28 158 224
3. Construction-related 30 86 60 62 27 22 5 103 10 9 99 23 137 122
4. IndustraL chemicaLs,
rubber & p[astic
products 44 84 50 92 39 36 10 77 23 42 74 68 180 142
5. ElectricaL machinery
& eLectronics 63 68 44 99 62 20 3 60 6 77 58 85 411 143
6. Auto parts 8 19 14 16 3 8 4 20 9 1 19 11 248 30
Total 206 589 449 400 192 127 30 624 67 158 610 239 165 849
Age
Newd 40 96 78 70 39 17 3 101 8 39 100 48 191 148
OLd 167 483 369 330 153 108 28 522 59 118 509 190 182 699
Location
Outside capital 167 497 391 323 157 99 23 527 52 135 518 196 168 714
Within capitale 40 84 56 79 36 27 8 97 15 23 92 43 268 135
Note:
a. "Large" if totaL empLoyment is 150 workers or more; "SmaLL' if Less than 150 workers.
b. Exports of most important product.
c. "None" if foreign ownership is less than 10 percent of equity; 'Some" if 10 percent or more but Less than 50 percent; and "Total" if 50 percent or more.
d. Established in 1990 and thereafter.
e. includes firms located in the Selangor state.
Source: WorLd Bank, Rirm-Level Survey.
tic-oriented firms are largely located outside Kuala Capacity utilization
Lumpur and the neighboring state, Selangor.
In terms of ownership, 19 percent of the firms in the All firms were operating at a lower capacity in the first
sample were foreign owned,6 8 percent had some for- half of 1998, reflecting a decline in output when com-
eign equity, and the rest were local firms. A total of 66 pared with 1996 as well as with the first and second half
percent of the firms that were foreign controlled or had of 1997 (see figure 12.1). In total, the level of capacity
some foreign equity were in electrical-electronics and utilization declined to 66 percent in the first half of 1998
chemical subsectors, while 88 percent of the local firms from 78 percent in the first half of 1997. It is noted, how-
were in the textiles and food subsectors. ever, that capacity utilization had in fact begun to decline
The highest average number of employees was for the even before the crisis-as seen in the first hal:- of 1997.
firms in the electrical and electronics subsector, fol- The fall in the level of capacity utilization in the first
lowed by the auto parts and chemical subsectors. half of 1998 when compared with the first half of 1997
was largest for auto parts (23 percentage pcints), fol-
Impact of the crisis on the firms lowed by construction-related manufacturing (20 per-
centage points), and textiles and elect ical (12
The survey shows that in general, the firms were percentage points). The fall in capacity util]zation in
adversely affected by the crisis in terms of output, prof- these subsectors correlates with the decline in their out-
itability, and export performance, and were compelled put as reflected by the manufacturing production index
to reduce the number of workers as a result. published by the Department of Statistics, Malaysia.
180 Asian Corporate Recovery: Findings from Firm-Level Surveys in Five Countries
FIGURE 12.1
Capacity utilization by sector
Capacity utilization (percent)
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Source: WorLd Bank, Firm-LeveL Survey.
The reduction in the construction-related subsector is of 1998,7 as shown in figure 12.3. With the exception
also reflective of the negative growth rate registered for of food and beverages,8 all subsectors recorded a
the construction sector since the onset of the crisis. decline in net profitability in the first half of 1998 com-
In assessing the major causes for the decline in output, pared with 1997 and 1996. Food and beverages is also
it is noted that exporting firms attributed the fall to the only subsector in which net profitability has
higher input prices arising from the depreciation of the increased steadily since 1996. In contrast, firms in the
ringgit, the drop in both domestic and foreign demand, chemicals, rubber and plastic products, and auto parts
and the higher interest rate (see figure 12.2). Insufficient subsectors, have witnessed on average a constant
credit and shortage of inputs were not perceived as decline in their net profitability since 1996. When com-
major causes of output decline. Nonexporting firms, by paring 1:he first half of 1998 with 1997, the most drastic
contrast, attributed the cause of output decline largely decline in net profitability was for construction-related
to a fall in domestic demand and the depreciation of the materials (71 percent) followed by electrical and elec-
ringgit, and similar to exporting firms, perceived supply tronics (54 percent).9 An analysis in terms of the char-
constraints as minor problems. acteristics of the firms shows that exporting firms were
more severely affected than those not exporting.
Net profitability
Expori: performance
In general, the net profitability of firms measured in
terms of the average net profit-equity ratio declined A total of 44 percent of the firms reported an improve-
from 69 percent in 1997 to 47 percent in the first half ment in export performance in the first half of 1998
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FIGURE 12.2
Perceived causes of current output decline
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Source: World Bank, Firm-LeveL Survey.
when compared with 1997; 42 percent reported that it that there was no distinct correlation between the type
had worsened, while the rest declared that there was no of industry and export performance. Within each type
change (see figure 12.4). The results of the survey imply of industry, a significant number of firms witnessed an
Net profitability over time
Average net profits/equity ratio
1.2
a .0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
beverages garments & related rubber & electronics
footwear plastic prods.
M 1996 El 1997 1H 1998
Source: WorLd Bank, Firm-Level Survey.
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FIGURE 12.4 FIGURE 12.5
Export performance 1998-97 Factors contributing to improvement in export
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Source: WorLd Bank, Firm-LeveL Survey. Source: World Bank, Firm-Level Survey.
improvement in export-performance-as was the case FIGURE 12.6
for those that saw a decline. It is noted, however, that
the subsector with the highest percentage of firms that Factors contributing to decline in
experienced an improvement in its export performance export: performance
was textiles, garments and footwear (59 percent), fol-
lowed by the auto parts subsector (50 percent).
Meanwhile, the subsector with the highest percentage lore
of firms reporting a decline in its export performance important
was construction-related (60 percent) followed bv elec- Leis
trical and electronics (45 percent).10 important
The firms that recorded improvements in export per- 2
formance attributed the increase in export revenue pri-
marily to price competitiveness, as well as strong L o H c U Inf1o P
marketing efforts and valuation gains arising from the prce of imported poLitical product demand rate effect
competitiveness inPuts and economic designi
depreciation of the ringgit (see figure 12.5). By contrast, conditions in
the firms that experienced a decline in their export per- Source: blortd Bank, Firm-Level Survey.
formance assigned it mainly to poor demand, lack of
price competitiveness, and the high cost of imported figure 12.7b). In addition, an increasing number of
inputs, as shown in figure 12.6. firms have come to perceive low-cost producer coun-
tries as the biggest competitor, while a smaller number
The competitor's profile of firms perceive newly industrialized countries (NICs)
as the bciggest competitor.
The competitor's profile has not changed significantly
with the crisis. On average, about 74 percent of the Emplcyment
firms continue to perceive other domestic producers as
their biggest competitor (see figure 12.7a). While only Overall, 32 percent of the firms at the time of the sur-
the remaining 26 percent consider firms outside the vey were employing fewer workers relative to before the
country as the biggest competitor for the domestic mar- crisis,il as shown in table 12.4. It is observed that a
ket, firms from neighboring countries continue to be larger percentage of firms that are export-oriented, for-
viewed as the dominant competitor internationally (see eign-controlled and large-as opposed to nonexporting,
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local, and small, respectively-had fewer workers after R 1'.7b
the crisis, indicating that a larger number of jobs might
have been lost in the former types of firms (see figure
12.8). Percentage of firms that consider the biggest compettor
In terms of the category of workers, on average, the 9
highest percentage of retrenchments were for produc- 8
tion workers, both skilled and unskilled as shown in fig- 6
ure 12.9. Apart from retrenchments, some firms 5
resorted to reducing the length of the work week and 43
imposing pay cuts as shown in figure 12.10. 2
1
Impact of the crisis on the financial 1996 197 lH 1998
position of the firms * Low-cost producers * Neighboring countries
IE NICs El OECD * Others
Sources of financing Note:
Low-cost producers = Firms in Vietnam, China, Cambodia, Laos, anc Myanmar.
NICs = Firms in Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong.
Prior to the crisis, the sources of short- and long-term Neighboring Countries = Firms in ThaiLand, Indonesia, nd the Philippines.
OECD = Firms in North America, Europe, Japan, and Australia.financing for the surveyed firms had predominantly Source: World Bank, Firm-Level Survey.
been sales revenue loans from local banks. This remains
the case to a large extent (see figures 12.11a and FIGURE 12.8
12.11 b). The firms continue to depend on their sales
turnover (about 56 percent) and on local banks (about Percentage of firms with fewer workers
28 percent) to meet both their short-term and long-term Percentage offirms
financing needs. The reliance on the bond and equity 44
markets to raise long-term financing was less than 1 40
percent-and it has fallen further after the crisis, reflect-
ing the potential for further development of the capital 36
market in Malaysia. 32
28
24 * * * 
0:,2~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.1 ssS0 S 10 0, SC t $t¢ 
Competitor's profile (domesticalLy) zot <tO °O' c 
Percentage affirms that consider the biggest competitor Source: World Bank, Firm-Level Survey.
80 Source:____World__Bank,___Firm-Level____survey._
70
60
50 Reliance on debt
40
30 lil The firms' reliance on debt-measured in terms of aver-
20
10 age debt-equity ratio-in the first half of 1998 was
0 higher compared with 1997, but lower than it had been
1996 1997 1H 1998 in 1996 (see figure 12.12). The higher debt-equity ratio
1 Other domestic producers * Domestic joint ventures in the first half of 1998 compared with 1997 is attrib-
Source: World Bank, Firm-Level Survey. utable to the large increase in liabilities.
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FIGURE 12.9 FIGURE 12.10
Reduction in employment, by category Measures apart from retrenchment, undertaken
Average percentage of retrenched workers by the firms
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Source: WorLd Bank, Firm-LeveL Survey. Source: World Bank, Firm-Level Survey.
FIGURE 12.11a
Sources of short- and long-term financing (before the crisis)
Percentage of total financing
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Source: WorLd Bank, Firm-LeveL Survey.
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FIGURE 12.ll b
Sources of short- and Long-term financing (after the crisis)
Percentage of total financing
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FIGURE 12.1 iUE 12.13
Average debt-equity ratio Reliance on short-term finance
Ratio Share of short-term debt (ratio)
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TABLE 12.4
Firm profiLes, first half of 1998
Borrow in By
foreign employment Bj export Byforeign
currency size' onentation control' FDIfirm Total
No Yes Large Small Nonexporters Exporters None Some Total No Yes
Finoncial indicators
Short-term debt/
TotaL financing ratio 0.31 0.61 0.51 0.30 0.27 0.46 0.32 0.46 0.45 0.32 0.46 0.36
Long-term debt/
TotaL financing ratio 0.69 0.39 0.49 0.70 0.73 0.54 0.68 0.54 0.55 0.68 0.54 0.64
Debt/Equity ratio 1.16 2.43 1.87 1.14 0.96 1.63 1.22 1.52 1.80 1.24 1.62 1.37
Firm characteristics
No. of employees 111 672 584 41 50 338 97 278 501 90 432 184
Share that export (percent to
total firms in each category) 40.1 96.7 84.5 32.7 - - 33.7 73.1 90.5 32.8 84.5 47.3
Share that are FDI (percent to
total firms in each category) 20.8 71.4 56.0 17.0 8.3 50.2 2.2 100.0 100.0 - - 28.2
Response to the crisis
Current capacity
utilization (percent) 64.8 71.7 72.7 64.0 63.6 68.9 64.9 64.1 71.8 65.0 69.1 66.2
Share with fewer workers (percent
to totaL firms in each category) 28.8 44.0 39.6 29.4 28.0 36.8 30.3 26.9 41.8 29.8 38.1 32.2
Optimistic for future growth (%
to totaL firms in each category) 22.4 26.4 31.4 20.8 18.6 28.6 21.3 34.3 26.6 21.5 28.0 23.3
-: not availabLe.
Note:
a. "Large"" if total employment is 150 workers or more; "SmalL' if Less than 150 workers.
h. "None" if foreign ownership is less than 10 percent of equity; "Some" if 10 perccent or more but less than 50 percent; and "Totar if 50 percent or more.
Source: WorLd Bank, Firm-Level Study.
The proportion of short-term to total debt in general cent) j-ound access to credit from foreign banks less
was 36 percent, as shown in table 12.4. In terms of the forthcoming. It is noted, however, that even in the case
distribution of short-term debt, it is observed that of local banks, the percentage of firms that found it
exporting, foreign-controlled, and large firms as more restrictive was less than 25 percent. This implies
opposed to nonexporting, local, and small firms rely to that w hile there was some credit squeeze, the problem
a greater extent on short-term financing, with the for- may not be as widespread or as severe as has generally
mer's share of short-term debt to total debt close to 50 been perceived,1 3 at least in the manufacturing sector.
percent (see figure 12.13).
The adequacy of working capital
Availability of credit
The s:ructure of working capital did not change after
It is observed in general that after the crisis, the firms the crisis. The firms, on average, continued to rely pre-
found the availability of credit from local banks-and domirLantly on their retained earnings (64 percent) to
to a lesser extent from suppliers-to be more restrictive finance their working capital as shown in figure 12.15,
relative to other sources as shown in figure 12.14.12 while bank loans only constituted 25 percent. On aver-
Only a small percentage of the firms (less than 10 per- age by June 1998, across sectors, almost 75 percent of
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FIGURE 1.a1t FU 12.15
Availability of credit after the crisis, by source Structure of working capital
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course of the crisis. Initially, the government ,ightened
FIGURE 12.10 both its fiscal and monetary policy in order to address
Firms with adequate liquidity to finance the concerns about inflationary pressure and the persis-
production, by sector tent current account deficit in the balance of payment.
Subsequently, in mid-1998 the government relaxed
Percentage of finns both its fiscal and monetary policy when economic
80 activities began to slow down, with the objective of
reactivating economic growth. At that time, the threat
75 * * g _ of inflationary pressure had abated and the current
70 * * * _ * * account of the balance of payments was beginning to
70- - * * * improve. The major policy initiatives, particularly those
65 targeted at reviving the performance of the corporate
sector, are summarized below. The measures address
60 the issues of accessibility to credit, stimulating output
9o°% ,, 5<<4 *,<b<,ect z06<ot $ and exports, and employment.
sF ,4" Measures to improve accessibility to credit
Source: World Bank, Firm-Level Survey. and reduce debt service burden
the firms reported that they had adequate liquidity to The following are measures taken to improve credit
finance production, as shown in figure 12.16. Broken accessibility and reduce debt service burden:
down by sector, the highest percentage of firms with
adequate liquidity was in food and beverages (78 per- (a) Reducing the statutory reserve ratio from 1a3.5 per-
cent) while the lowest was for auto parts (67 percent). cent of eligible liabilities to 4 percent to address the
issue of tight liquidity, thereby making available more
The policy response funds for bank lending;
The government introduced a series of policy packages (b) Reducing Bank Negara Malaysia's (BNMN) three-
in line with the changing circumstances during the month intervention rate so as to reduce the cost of funds
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and the debt service commitment of firms and promote MeasLires to promote conomic activity
investment activities;
The following are measures taken to promote economic
(c) Setting up Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Bbd., 1 4 an activity:
asset management company, to acquire and manage non-
performing loans (NPLs) of banking institutions, so that (a) Relaxing the equity guidelines in the manufacturing
banks can focus on lending to viable corporate ventures; sector (excluding certain activities), so that all applica-
tions received between 31 July 1998 and 31 December
(d) Setting up Danamodal Nasional Bhd.15 to recapital- 2000 are to be exempted from both equity and export
ize banking institutions so as to restore their lending conditions, implying that project owners can hold 100
capacity and facilitate the process of consolidation. The percent equity and will not need to meet any export
capital injections are in the form of equity and hybrid requirements;
instruments, and investment decisions are based on
market principles; (b) Providing tax exemption on 70 percent of statutory
income arising from the increased value of export sales
(e) Setting up the Corporate Debt Restructuring for companies granted "international trading status"
Committee (CDRC)16 to facilitate voluntary corporate that are at least 70 percent Malaysian-owned or using
debt restructuring. The CDRC is intended to minimize local facilities such as insurance, shipping and ports,
losses to creditors, shareholders, and other stakeholders and are registered with the Malaysia External Trade
through voluntary coordinated workouts; to preserve Development Corporation (MATRADE);
viable businesses that have suffered during the current
economic slowdown; and implement a comprehensive (c) Exempting stamp duty for the refinancing of loans
framework for debt restructuring; for business purposes in order to reduce the cost of
doing business;
(f) Exempting the construction of residential properties
costing less than RM250,000 from the 20 percent limit on (d) Abolishing excise duty on refrigerators, televisions,
lending, which is imposed on the broad property sector; and air conditioners to improve the competitiveness of
local firms;
(g) Requiring banking institutions to achieve a mini-
mum loan growth rate of 8 percent by the end of 1999 (e) Providing group tax relief for companies engaged in
to ensure continued funding for viable ventures; food Froduction, based on certain criteria;
(h) Reclassifying the default period for NPLs by bank- (f) Allocating 200 million Malaysian ringgit (RM) for a
ing institutions from 3 to 6 months so as to give some new micro-credit scheme to provide assistance to petty
breathing space to the corporate sector; traders and hawkers in urban areas. This scheme tar-
gets the poor and lower income group, which may
(i) Requiring banking institutions to establish Loan have suffered a drop in real income as a result of
Rehabilitation Units to facilitate more intensive man- higher prices and retrenchment. For this purpose, the
agement of problem loans; and government has established Tabung Usahawan Kecil,
which provides funding facilities up to a maximum of
(j) Setting up new and increasing budget allocations for RM20,000 and Tabung Ekonomi Kumpulan Usaha
existing specialized funds monitored by BNM to ensure Niaga, which will be expanded nationwide to provide
accessibility to credit at reasonable cost to the small and loans up to a maximum of RM10,000. Both of these
medium-size enterprises (SMEs) and selected economic funds cater to the financial needs of small entrepre-
sectors. Among the specialized funds involved are the neurs; and
New Entrepreneur's Fund, Fund for Food (Production)
and Fund for SMEs.
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(g) Allowing Bumiputera (indigenous) companies fac-
ing financial difficulties as a result of the drop in share (c) Setting up an electronic labor exchange for the reg-
value to sell their shares to non-Bumiputera on a win- istration, monitoring, and placement of workers to
win basis. facilitate greater mobility;
Measures related to the Labor market (d) Initiating a special fund of RM5.O million under the
Human Resource Development Fund (HRDF) to pro-
The following are measures taken to deal with issues vide financing for the retraining of retrenched workers;
related to the labor market:
(e) Recrediting unclaimed training funds by the HRDF
(a) Encouraging the corporate sector to increase invest- to companies to encourage them to undertake training
ment in export-oriented industries, thereby generating and retraining of their workers;
additional employment opportunities;
(f) Exempting companies from contributing to the
(b) Amending the Employment Act 1955 to encourage training levy for a certain period; and
employers to institute part-time employment or flexible
working hours and introducing guidelines on retrench- (g) Setting up a graduate entrepreneur scheme to provide
ment that include pay cuts and reducing working hours basic training in entrepreneurship for the purpose of
(or days) and shifts instead of retrenchment; developing entrepreneurs among unemployed graduates.
FIGURE 12.17
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FIGURE 12.18 Conclusion
Prospects for exports in 1999 The results of the survey show that the Asian financial
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70 extent of the impact of the crisis, however, varied (albeit
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50 general, all firms experienced a reduction in output,
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FIGURE 12.19
Current account (percentage to GDP) and index of exports (1990=100)
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involved the highest percentage of firms that expressed this product, its domestic sales may not have been severely affected.
optimism, while auto parts were produced by the 9. The drastic reduction in the net profits-equity ratio for firms in
largest percentage of firms that expressed pessimism. construction-reLated materiaLs and electrical and eLectronics is attrib-
In terms of the prospects for exports in 1999, 40 per- utable to the combined effect of a decline in net pronts and an
cent of the firms expected an improvement, 25 percent increase in equity.
foresaw no change, while the rest believed that exports 10. NationaL Trade Statistics show that the value of expc rts in terms
would decline. Ranked by subsector, auto parts had the of the ringgit increased by 41 percent during January-June 1998 com-
highest percentage of firms that envisaged an improve- pared with the corresponding period in 1997, and the value for 1998
ment in export performance, followed by textiles, gar- as a whole was about 30 percent higher than that for 199,7. The value
ments and footwear, while the construction-related of exports increased for aLL the six subsectors covered by the survey.
subsector had the highest percentage of firms that were Significant increases in export vaLue were recorded for seLected con-
pessimistic. struction-related materials such as iron and steel, nonferrous metal;
More recent trends in macroeconomic and financial food and beverages; and textile and apparel.
indicators show, however, that signs of recovery are 11. Principal features of the Employment Policy
already becoming evident, mainly in response to the * In MaLaysia, wages are determined by market forces and are
measures introduced since mid-1998. Malaysia is pro- closeLy Linked to worker productivity and company performance.
jected to achieve a turnaround and register a positive There is no poLicy defining a minimum wage, except for vuLner-
growth in 1999. The growth of the manufacturing sec- abLe occupations such as shop assistants and stevedores.
tor is also expected to revert to a positive. * Employment Legislation, among others:
- Stipulates basic requirements on terms and conditions of ser-
Notes vice incLuding hours of work, overtime, overtime payments, and
benefits incLuding termination benefits, annuaL Leave, pubLic
1. The term "large firms" refers to those empLoying 150 and more hoLiday, sick Leave, limit on pay deductions, ancl minimum
workers; while "medium and small" refers to those empLoying Less than standard of housing (for those empLoyers providinq housing).
150. - Provides protection for women and chiLdren.
2. The term "new firms" refers to those established in 1990 and - Provides avenues for resoLving disputes through the referral of
thereafter. cases to the Labour Court, IndustriaL ReLations Department,
3. "Export-oriented" refers to firms that export some of their output. and the IndustriaL Court.
4. "HighLy export-oriented" refers to firms that derive more than 50 - Provides for the right to organize, which is governed by the
percent of their saLes revenue from exports. Trade Union Act 1959.
5. "Moderately export-oriented" refers to firms that derive 5 or more - Provides for social security mainLy through the SociaL Security
but Less than 50 percent of their saLes revenue from exports. Act of 1969. It provides protection to workers for contingen-
6. The term "foreign-owned firms" refers to those with foreign cies such as empLoyment injuries, occupationaL diseases, per-
equity of 50 percent or more, "some foreign equity" refers to those manent disabiLity, death, and promotes accident prevention
with more than 10 but Less than 50 percent foreign equity, and "local" and work safety. Among the sociaL security schemes are the
firms are those with less than 10 percent foreign equity. EmpLoyment Injury Scheme and InvaLidity Pension Scheme.
7. The assessment of net profitabiLity is based on the responses from 12. A totaL of 24 percent of the firms that use credit from Local
onLy 157 firms or 24 percent of the sampLe size, as the rest did not banks found it more restrictive, while 18 percent of the firrrms that use
answer this question. The concLusions derived, therefore, shouLd be suppLier credit found access to supplier credit more restrictive.
viewed with caution. 13. This finding is supported by the response to a related question
8. The increase in the net profit-equity ratio for food and bever- that required the firms to answer "yes" or "no" to whether a bank or
ages is attributed to an increase in net profits. The increase in net financiaL institution decLined to grant a loan to them. OnLy 14 percent
profits may be supported by the fact that the vaLue of food exports of the firms had their Loans rejected during the first haLf oi: 1998, 10
(incLuding animaL and vegetabLe oiLs and fats) increased significantLy, percent during the second haLf of 1997, and 6 percent during the first
close to 50 percent in 1998 compared with 1997. The increase in value haLf of 1997. Data at the macroeconomic leveL, however, appear to
is attributed mainly to vaLuation gains from the depreciation of the indicate the presence of a credit squeeze from the supply side par-tic-
ringgit. Furthermore, owing to the Less elastic nature of demand for uLarLy during the first haLf of 1998, when totaL outstanding Loan
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growth from commercial banks (including Loans for the manufacturing
sector) decelerated rapidLy and the interest rate spread widened.
Notwithstanding, it must be noted that the decLine in loan growth may
aLso have been in response to a decline in demand for credit as the
firms were cutting back on output because of falling demand and
deferring investments owing to increasing underutilized capacity.
14. As of 31 December 1998, Danaharta had acquired 8.1 bilLion
MaLaysian ri ggit in gross vaLue of nonperforming Loans and managed,
on behalf of Bank Negara MaLaysia , 11.6 biLLion ringgit in gross value
of nonperforming Loans. ExcLuding what was acquired from offshore
banks and development finance institutions, the amount of NPLs that
were acquired and managed represents approximateLy 22 percent of
the totaL NPLs in the banking system based on the six-month cLassi-
fication. This also amounts to 4.8 percent of the total Loan portfolio
in the banking system.
15. As of 17 March 1999, Danamodal had injected a totaL of RM6.2
biLLion into ten banking institutions in the form of exchangeable sub-
ordinated capitaL Loans.
16. As of 15 March 1999, the CDRC had received 46 applications
invoLving more than RM24.7 biLLion.
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here already exists a plethora of studies on the sad performance of the3 Philippine economy in the wake of the Asian financial crisis.1
-> However, most, if not all, of these studies have examined the impact
of the crisis from a macroecortomic perspective. Certainly the crisis' impact will
vary based on the size of a firm and the economic sector it is in; accordingly,
different firms will have diffirent responses to the crisis. Fairly detailed and
accurate knowledge of these issues can greatly help in fine-tuning the govern-
ment policies and programs cLesigned for staging a rapid economic recovery in
the short term. This, however, requires good firm-level survey data. Such data
had been unavailable prior tc this study, which attempts to analyze the impact
of the Southeast Asian financial crisis on the Philippine industry and the indus-
try's initial responses to the crisis to stay alive. The data for this study come
from a sample of manufacturing firms.
Although the study uses purely descriptive analyses, the results it yields can
provide insights that are useful for policy formulation. 2 The survey results
clearly show that the capacity utilization rate of Philippine enterprises started
to decline even before the crisis struck in July 1997, and it continued to drop
as the crisis deepened. This, however, varied across sectors, with the electrical
machinery sector being the hardest hit in the most recent period. Nonexporters
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and small firms were more adversely affected by the cri- textiles, apparel and footwear, chemical and rubber
sis compared with exporters and large firms. The firms' products, and electrical machinery.
net profitability declined along with the capacity uti- More detailed descriptions of each sector in terms of
lization rate. Although labor layoffs could not be the 1994 Philippine Standard Industrial Classification
avoided under this unfavorable circumstance, a large are given in annex A. These particular manufacturing
proportion of the firms resorted to other measures, such sectors are among the top 10 contributors to manufac-
as cutting down on work hours and days, to preserve turing output. In addition, electrical machinery (the sec-
some jobs. tor that includes semiconductors and electronics) and
The structure of the firms' sources of short- and long- food products sectors rank high among both import-
term funds did not significantly change before and after dependent and export-oriented industries.
the crisis-reliance to a great extent on income from Standard sampling methodology for Philippine estab-
sales and bank loans to finance operations being the lishment surveys utilize a List of Establishments (LE)
general trend. The overall average debt-equity ratio compiled and updated by the National Statistics Office
inched up a little in 1997, but declined in the first half (NSO). The sampling frame of the survey of Philippine
of 1998 as the firms reduced their outstanding debt. At industry was the 1997 updated version of the LE, which
the time of the survey, the share of short-term debt in included about 3,800 establishments belonging to the
total financing had not changed substantially in the last five sectors covered by the survey. Food products (32
two and a half years. On the whole, there seems to be percent) and apparel and footwear (29 percent) com-
no clear evidence of a supply-side credit crunch, as most prised 61 percent of the total number of relevant estab-
firms-regardless of how they are classified, whether by lishments. In terms of employment size, 68 percent of
sector, export orientation, or size-claimed to have con- firms in the sampling frame are listed as having less than
tinued access to credit during the crisis period. Also, 100 workers. Over half of the establishments in the
most claimed that they had not encountered a liquidity sampling frame are located in the Nationa:' Capital
problem during the crisis period. What is worrisome, Region (NCR).
though, is that an overwhelming majority was pes- Based on the list, establishments were independently
simistic about business prospects for the next six selected from each sector with a goal of spreading the
months. sample across the five sectors roughly equally. The
The following section gives a brief description of the number of engaged workers was used as a stra.ification
survey of the Philippine industry and a few of the char- variable-a greater number of samples were selected
acteristics of the sample firms. The paper then examines from establishments with more than 100 workers. A
issues pertaining to the impact of the crisis on surveyed simple random sample was drawn within each stratum.
firms and their views on the causes of the crisis. Another Annex B shows the percentage distribution of establish-
section discusses issues related to the firms' main ments by sector and classes in the frame and in the
sources of funding, debt structure, transparency, and resulting sample selected.
policy environment. This is followed by a brief discus- The questionnaire consisted of two separate forms.
sion on the firms' assessment of the prospects of their Form 1 was designed to elicit responses from irterviews
business in the short term. The last section offers con- with the sample establishments' chief executive officers
cluding remarks and suggests some policies. Form 2 was designed as a self-accomplishing schedule
for personnel officers, production managers, or finan-
Description of the survey cial managers. The questionnaires were fielded from
September 1998 to January 1999 by the NSO.
The Survey of Philippine Industry and the Asian This report is based on the responses of 541 estab-
Financial Crisis covered establishments engaged in the lishments out of a targeted number of 750. Food prod-
following manufacturing industries: food products, ucts, apparel and footwear, and electrical machinery
sectors are about equally represented in th~e set of
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respondents, with textiles and chemical products hav- were evenly represented among "older" firms. Among
ing half that number (see table 13.1). This is attribut- manufacturing sectors, food products and chemicals
able to the fact that most of the establishments for these had more nonexporters; the reverse is true for apparel
two sectors were contacted much later and the retrieval and footwear and the electrical machinery sectors.
rate was thus lower. About 53 percent of exporters may be considered as
The responding firms had an average number of 388 "high" volume exporters-that is, exports comprise
employees in 1996. Small establishments (defined as more than 50 percent of their sales. Except for the food
those with employment in 1996 of less than 150) dom- products and chemicals sectors, in which more firms
inated the food products and textiles sectors with 57 were small- or medium-volume exporters (meaning,
and 64 percent shares, respectively. Apparel and exports comprised less than 50 percent of sales), high-
footwear and electrical machinery sectors are both volume exporters dominated all sectors. This is most
equally represented in terms of size. evideni: in the electrical machinery sector, which
Fifty-six (56) percent of the responding firms were includes the "electronics" sector in which 71 percent
located outside the NCR. More likely than not (65.3 were high-volume exporters.
percent of the time) the respondent firms were "old"- A firn is defined as having "no foreign control" if for-
in other words, established prior to 1990. eign equity comprises less than 10 percent of the firm's
Establishments in the electrical machinery and elec- equity. If foreign equity accounts for at least 50 percent
tronics sector employed more workers than any other of the equity, the firm is said to be under "total foreign
sector, averaging about 643 workers. Establishments of control." About 21 percent of the responding firms
"older" firms had more employees than new ones, and were under total foreign control. For all sectors, the
establishments located outside the NCR had more majoriy of the firms had "no foreign control." Only 8
employees than those in the NCR. percenr of the food products sector were under total
Exporters comprised 51.9 percent of the sample foreign. control, but this figure rose to 39.3 percent in
respondents. For "new" firms and those located outside the electrical machinery sector. The proportion of firms
the NCR, there were more exporters (56 and 58 per- with large foreign equity was grcater among new firms.
cent, respectively) than nonexporters but both groups Because most industrial estates and technological parks
TABLE 13.1
ProfiLe of responding firms
By export By volume of Byforeign Average
By size orientation exports control number
of
Large Small Exporters Nonexporters Small Medium High None Some Total employees Total
Sector
Food 59 78 51 82 24 8 19 113 13 11 384 137
TextiLes 28 49 39 37 14 4 21 58 8 11 242 77
Apparet 61 62 78 42 30 4 44 78 16 29 331 123
ChemicaLs 47 40 38 49 19 7 12 62 8 17 250 87
ELectricaL machinery 59 58 70 46 17 3 50 62 9 46 643 117
Age
New 71 105 98 77 39 2 57 96 19 61 330 176
Old 183 182 178 179 65 24 89 277 35 53 413 365
Location
NCR 113 125 105 131 34 19 52 188 22 28 429 238
Others 141 162 171 125 70 7 94 185 32 86 342 303
Total 254 287 276 256 104 26 146 373 54 114 388 -
-: not availabLe.
Source: WorLd Bank, Firm-LeveL Survey.
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are located outside the NCR, it is understandable that capacity utilization rate dropped from 75 percent in
more firms outside the NCR had large foreign equity. 1996 to 66 percent (the food sector) in the sanme period.
Table 13.2 gives a quick look at the profile of the sam- The percentage changes in the capacity utilization of
ple firms using 1996 data, except for information refer- different sectors that are season-independent: can also
ring to the firms' responses to the crisis. The be computed from figure 13.1. The first half of 1997
information contained in this table will be the main had already seen a significant decline in the capacity uti-
focus of discussion presented in the subsequent sections lization rate (-3.4 percent relative to the 1996 average
of this study. for all sectors), with apparel and leather as the worst
performer experiencing a -5.5 percent change. Food
Analysis of the impact of the crisis on products also did poorly, reducing the rate by 5.1 per-
the firms cent during the first half of 1997.
Although the decline continued in the seconid half of
Capacity utilization 1997, it was not as deep as in the first half. On average,
it dropped by only 2.3 percent relative to the first half
The period from 1996 to the first half of 1998 saw a of the same year.
continuous decline in the capacity utilization rate in the The results seem to suggest that the recessionary
manufacturing sectors covered by the survey. From an effect took its toll on the Philippine industrial sector
average high of 78 percent for all sectors in 1996, the during the first half of 1998. The capacity utilization
rate declined to an average of 69 percent in the first half rate declined on average by 6.5 percent relative to the
of 1998 (see figure 13.1). previous period. The worst performer was the electrical
The performance varied across sectors. Of the five machinery sector whose rate shrank by 10.8 percent.
manufacturing sectors, the apparel sector attained the The survey results also show the difference between
highest capacity utilization rate in 1996 of 82 percent, the capacity utilization rates of exporters and nonex-
while the food and textile sectors registered the lowest porters-results indicate that the latter were hit harder
rate of 75 percent. In the first half of 1998, all sectors by the crisis compared to the former. For example, in
experienced a drop. From a high of 82 percent in 1996, 1996, exporters and nonexporters had a rate of 78.2
the highest rate declined to only 71 percent (the chemi- percent and 77.2, respectively. In the first half of 1998,
cal sector) in the first half of 1998. Similarly, the lowest the rate of the latter was down to 65.2 percent, while
that of the former decreased to 71.9 percent.
TABLE 13.2
Profile of firms
Borrow in
foreign currency Size Export orientation Foreign control FDI firm
Yes No Large SmoaL Exporters Nonexporters None Some Total Yes No Total
Financial indicators
Short-term debt/TotaL financing 0.33 0.26 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.30 0.32 0.38 0.26 0.19 0.2r 0.31
Long-term debt/Total financing 0.27 0.15 0.23 0.24 0.22 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.17 0.30 0.31 0.23
Debt-equity ratio 2.95 1.57 2.19 2.32 2.14 2.66 3.00 2.79 1.41 1.65 3.OC 2.27
Firm characteristics
Number of employees 485 285 711 58 608 190 283 625 692 668 267 406
Share that export (percent) 64 36 65 35 - - 50 12 38 55 45
Share that are FDI (percent) 34 22 40 15 84 16 5 12 38 - -
Response to the crisis
Current capacity utiLization (percent) 78 77 79 76 78 77 77 84 79 81 76 78
Share with few workers (percent) 69 31 50 50 47 53 72 10 18 29 71 41
Optimistic of future growth (percent) 59 41 28 26 31 23 25 35 30 32 25 27
Total 61 39 47 53 52 48 69 10 21 34 66 -
-: not available.
Source: Wortd Bank, Firm-Level Survey.
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FIGURE 13.1
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Figure 13.1 also divides the sample firms into two cat- FIUR 13.2
egories: large and small. Based on the trend, it would
appear that small firms were hit harder than the large Net profitability over time
ones. In 1996, small firms had a capacity utilization rate Percent
of 76.3 percent. In the first half of 1998, their rate 12.07
dropped to 65.7 percent (or a decline of 13.9 percent). 12 l 1996
The drop for large firms was only 9.4 percent over the 10 0 1997
same period: from 79.4 percent in 1996 to 72 percent in 8 l First half of 1998
the first half of 1998. 6
4 3.53
Profitability 2 2.06
The continuous drop in the firms' capacity utilization 0
rate translated into poor performance in terms of net Source: WorLd Bank, Firm-Level Study.
profitability. From a high of 12.1 percent in 1996, net
profitability of the sample firms dropped dramatically I 133
to 3.5 percent in 1997and to 2.1 percent in the first half
of 1998 (see figure 13.2). Growth rate
The average profitability of the firms classified Percent
according to export orientation and size shows a con- 20 -Real GNP - ReaL manufacturing GVA Inflation rate
sistently declining trend for the last two and a half 15 Real exports
years. Among the five sectors, the food and electrical
machinery sectors exhibited a consistently declining net 10
profitability during this period, while the textile, 5
apparel, and chemical sectors showed a fluctuating
profitability. 0
-5 <~~< 9< 9< 9< 9<
Sectoral performance versus broader sector 9 9'? 9 ? 9 'e
performance Year
Source: World Bank, Firm-Level Study.
Table 13.3 presents indicators of the general macroeco-
nomic environment in the Philippines during the period sector reached a peak of 43.6 percent in the fourth quar-
of analysis. Real GNP growth reached a peak of 7.8 ter of 1997. Following that period its growth deceler-
percent in the third quarter of 1996, subsequently ated considerably, although it did not contract.
decelerated, and started to contract in the second quar- Based on these indicators, the survey result, seem to
ter of 1998. In the fourth quarter of 1998, real GNP have confirmed the general slowdown in the manufac-
contracted by 1.2 percent (see figure 13.3). turing sector.
The overall output of the manufacturing sector
started to contract in the second quarter of 1998. By the Perceived causes of slowdown
fourth quarter, it had declined by 3.4 percent.
In terms of the sectors covered in the study, only The survey identified ten major causes of output
apparel registered an improvement in real growth in the decline. These are (a) decline in domestic demand; (b)
gross value added. In particular, this sector registered a decline in foreign demand; (c) insufficient credit being
peak of 18.2 percent in the second quarter of 1998. The extended by suppliers; (d) insufficient bank c:redit for
rest of the sectors, however, slowed down consider- working capital; (e) insufficient bank credit for expan-
ably-including the electronics sector. The electronics sion; (f) high interest rates; (g) high cost of raw materials
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TABLE 13.3
Macroeconomic variables
(Growth rate)
1996ql 1996q2 1996q3 1996q4 1997ql 1997q2 1997q3 1997q4 1998ql 1998q2 1998q3 1998q4
Gross nationaL product 7.3 8.7 7.8 5.1 5.4 5.3 5.2 5.3 2.0 (0.3) (0.0) (1.2)
Gross domestic product 5.3 6.1 6.9 4.9 5.5 5.6 4.9 4.8 1.6 (0.8) (0.7) (1.9)
Agriculture, fishery, and forestry 2.9 6.8 7.9 (0.5) 4.9 1.8 0.4 4.1 (3.8) (11.5) (3.1) (7.8)
Industry sector 5.8 5.5 7.0 6.5 5.1 7.6 6.4 5.6 1.6 (0.2) (3.5) (4.4)
Mining and quarrying 4.6 (19.2) (3.3) 3.1 (13.1) (1.0) 1.8 23.9 17.5 5.7 0.3 (16.0)
Manufacturing 4.9 6.2 6.3 4.9 2.3 5.3 4.3 4.7 2.0 (0.9) (1.5) (3.4)
Food 3.3 10.1 5.2 7.8 3.4 2.7 (0.6) (1.9) 5.7 0.9 1.5 -
Textiles (3.1) (6.1) 7.4 (8.0) (14.1) (6.8) (0.1) 4.6 (4.1) (8.5) (8.8) -
AppareL, Leather 4.3 (4.7) (4.5) (23.3) (14.0) 4.3 6.2 7.9 5.3 18.2 9.1 -
ChemicaLs, rubber, pLastic' (2.1) 6.5 11.0 6.6 10.2 2.7 10.0 6.1 (5.6) (2.1) (0.3) -
ELectronics 14.9 17.9 14.3 12.3 21.8 20.6 33.7 46.3 21.9 7.3 7.9 -
Construction 7.6 9.3 12.8 13.8 21.3 18.5 18.1 7.6 (5.0) (1.8) (15.6) (10.0)
Service sector 6.1 6.3 6.5 6.7 6.1 5.7 5.6 4.6 4.5 3.6 2.7 3.3
Exportb 12.9 11.3 5.3 8.7 8.6 15.2 17.6 14.5 13.4 3.7 3.7 -
Garments 11.6 (7.2) (12.9) (6.4) (13.9) (5.8) 9.9 (9.6) (0.1) 8.5 (8.2) -
Semiconductors 25.4 14.3 (2.5) 3.5 3.6 21.1 43.6 41.9 25.4 15.1 1.6 -
Inflation rate 11.6 10.5 7.0 4.8 4.8 4.5 4.8 6.0 7.0 8.0 10.4 10.6
1991-Treasury biLL rate' 13.0 12.8 11.5 11.5 10.1 10.5 15.3 17.7 16.6 14.0 13.8 13.4
-: not avaiLabLe.
a. Chemicals onLy.
b. In reaL peso vaLue.
c LeveL of T-bills
Note:
DetaiLs for Mfg: 1985 constant prces.
1991-T-BilLs: End of period was used.
Inflation rate was computed using the average consumer price index.
ql = first quarter; q2 = second quarter; q3 = third quarter; q4 = fourth quarter.
Source: NSO.
owing to the depreciation of the peso; (h) increasing FIGURIE 13.4
labor costs; (i) shortages in raw materials; and (j) non- Perceived causes of current output decline
delivery of goods by suppliers hurt by the crisis. If one
.. . . ,. r i\l~~~~~~~~~* onexporters
assumes that reduced capacity utilization implies * Exporters
reduced output level, then the above reasons could also
be used as causes for the drop in the capacity utilization probLem
rate discussed earlier.
Figure 13.4 presents separate sets of results for the problem
exporters and nonexporters with regard to their per-
ception on the possible causes of the decline in output LocaL Foreign Access Depreciation. Labor High Raw
and capacity utilization. In the survey, 1 means that the demand demand to inPut cost interest materials
respondent believes there is no contribution, while 5 capitat costs raftes shortagePerceived causes of current stowdown
identifies the factor as a major contributor. For both Exporters Ronk
Peso dlepreciation-input coscs 3.66 
exporters and nonexporters, the biggest contributor to Higher interest rates 3.26 2
Foreicn demand 3.21 3
the slowdown in output was the increase in input costs Labor cost 3.08 4
the 1~~~~ of the peso. effect the ~~~~~~~~Access to capitaL 2.68 
owing to the depreciation of the peso. The effect of the Locat demand 2.49 6
currency depreciation was slightly bigger for nonex- Accesstocreditforexpansion 2o40 7
Nonexporters Rank
porters (3.88) than for exporters (3.66). Note that Peso lepreciation-input costs 3.88 l
LocaL demand 3.72 2
while a peso depreciation would be favorable to all Higher interest rates 3.232 
Lahor cosc 3.11 4
exporters, it would adversely affect some of them Access to capital 2.53 
because of the relatively high import content of their Accews to credit from suppliers 2.533 6
products. Source: W6orld Bank, Firm-LeveL Study.
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For the exporters, the second major cause of the slow- 13.5
down was high interest rates. By contrast, for the non- Competitor's profile
exporters, the second major factor was the decline in (percent)
domestic demand.
Changes in foreign demand emerged as the third most DomesticaLly
important factor causing the slowdown as far as the 50
exporters were concerned, while high interest rates 40
turned out to be the third-ranking factor causing the 20
decline in output for the nonexporters. 10
For both exporters and nonexporters, the fourth- and 0 1996 1997 1998 first haUf
fifth-ranking factors were the same-labor cost and m Domestic producers 50.35 4414 4| 010
access to capital, respectively. For the exporters, the
sixth factor and the last factor on the list were local 20 InternationaLLy
demand and access to credit for expansion. However, 15
for nonexporters, the sixth factor was raw material 10
shortage, while the last on the list was access to credit 5
from suppliers.3 0 1996 1997 1998 first half
From the point of view of a firm facing a competitive nLow-cost producers 9.89 11.88 13.00
*Neighboring countries 12.37 14.43 13.95
market, the results discussed above seem to suggest that ElNICs 8.83 8.66 9.51
. . * . . . * * * I-~~~~~~~~~~~~~OECD countries | 6.54 6.96 8.40 l
the simultaneous drop in demand and increase in the
average cost during the crisis period squeezed a firm's Note:
Low-cost producers are firms in Vietnam, China, Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar.
profit. The results also seem to suggest that the surveyed Neighborng countres' data are from firms in Malaysia, Indonesia, a,id Thailand.
NICs' data are from firms in Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapo-e.
firms did not face much difficulty in accessing credit, OECD countries' data are from firms in the United States, Japan, anc Europe.
although they had to pay a higher interest on it.4 Source: WorLd Bank, Firm-Level Survey.
The proportion of firms reducing the number
Competitor profiles of workers
The results shown in figure 13.5 indicate that for those About two-fifths of the firms surveyed reported that
firms selling to the domestic market, the biggest com- they had been operating with fewer workers since the
petitors were other domestic producers owned by local crisis struck in July 1997 (see figure 13.6). Firms in the
investors or owners. Joint venture companies and apparel and leather sector had the highest pioportion
multinationals were considered far less of a threat than (49 percent) that reduced the number of workers in the
other domestic producers in terms of competition in the wake of the crisis, followed by the electrical machinery
domestic market. sector (44 percent). In terms of other criteria, the figure
In the international market, the biggest threat to the was 46 percent for nonexporters versus 38 percent for
local exporters in terms of competition were those firms exporters; 44 percent for large firms versus 394 percent
within the neighboring countries (in other words, firms for small firms; 43 percent for firms with no foreign
in Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand). Not too far control versus 41 percent with some foreign co-ntrol and
behind the first group were firms in low-cost producing 35 percent with total foreign control.
countries such as Vietnam, China, Cambodia, Laos,
and Myanmar. The third group of firms that posed mar- The profile of workers who lost jobs
ket competition in the international market were firms
in newly industrialized countries (South Korea, Taiwan, The survey results show that those leaving the firms
Hong Kong, and Singapore). The last group of firms were younger workers and newer arrivals t see table
was from developed countries. 13.4). This is not surprising; the firms had little capital
invested in these employees. Also, many of those newly
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TABLE 13.4
Profile of workers leaving the plan
(percent)
Average age (years) Average tenure (yeors)
30 or tess 31-50 Above 50 3 orless 4-10 Above 10
By sector
Food products 43 42 15 40 31 30
TextiLes 51 38 10 41 35 24
Apparel, Leather 59 36 5 50 29 21
Chemicals, rubber, pLastic 49 42 9 44 31 25
ElectricaL machinery 71 26 3 53 36 11
Total 55 37 9 46 32 22
By export orientation
Exporters 58 34 8 49 30 21
Nonexporters 51 40 8 43 35 22
Total 55 37 8 46 3221
By size
SmaLL 58 35 7 51 31 18
Large 52 38 10 41 33 26
Total 55 37 9 46 32 22
Source: Wortd Bank, Firm-LeveL Survey.
FIGURE 13.6 hired workers may not have earned their permanent
appointmlient yet.
Percent of firms with fewer workers More than half (55 percent) of the workers leaving
Percent offirms the firrms were thirty years old or less. Another 37 per-
60 cent were between 31 and 50. There was a higher pro-
S0 48.78 43.59 46.1 4445 portion of younger and newer wvorkers leaving the firms
40 36.535.6 3737 35.1 38.7 ' in the electrical machinery sector than in the other four
30 sectors; in exporting firms than in nonexporting firms;
20 and in small firms than in large firms.
10 As regards tenure, almost half of the employees had
0 l, , . , been with the company for 3 years or less while about
se&eF9°KoW '' 9ee >2 ',ei9° '°ffii&iS <.ot°&c,o4 o4 s :one-third had been there for 4 to 10 years.
Percent offirms The piroportion of firms retrenching workers
60 or using other methods of reducing labor
46.09 47443.43 44.49
40 | g 37.68 35 09 4m g s 36.68 Some 39 percent of the surveyed firms were filling up
their vacancies as workers left (see table 13.5).
20 Howevrer, 29 percent had laid off workers as a result of
the crisis. Some 61 percent gave severance pay or bene-
Nonexporters some foreign control SmaLL fits to workers who were separated from work.
WhiLe the apparel sector (42 percent) and the chemi-
Source: Wor[d Bank, Firm-LeveL Study. cal secLor (43 percent) had a higher proportion of firms
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filling up their vacancies than the other sectors, they vacation was greater for the exporters than for the non-
also had a higher proportion (34 percent and 37 per- exporters. However, more nonexporters than exporters
cent, respectively) laying off workers as a result of the cut down on work hours or days and froze salary increases
crisis than the other sectors. And the electrical machin- of both rank-and-file and management personnel.
ery, textiles, and apparel sectors gave severance pay or In terms of size, a higher proportion of large firms
benefits at a higher rate than other sectors, at 48, 54, than small firms cut down on work hours or clays, com-
and 55 percent, respectively. pressed the work week, and resorted to forced vacation.
A higher proportion of exporting firms than nonex- In terms of freezing salary increases for rank-and-file
porters filled up their vacancies, but in terms of laying workers, however, the ranking was reversed.
off workers the order was reversed. Nearly equal pro- Membership of workers in unions was mentioned by
portions of firms in each category gave severance bene- 41 percent of the sample firms (see table 13.6).
fits to their laid-off workers. Compared with firms in other sectors, the electrical
A higher proportion of large firms than small firms machinery sector had the lowest proportion (23 per-
filled up their vacancies and laid off their workers. The cent) of workers who were members of unions. The fig-
proportions were about equal in terms of giving sever- ures were 43 percent for exporting firms and '3 percent
ance benefits to laid-off workers. for large firms-surpassing nonexporting and small
Aside from laying off workers, firms in general may firms, respectively.
resort to other measures to respond to an economic cri- As regards formal training activities, 52 percent of the
sis that will possibly affect them. These may include (a) surveyed firms claimed that they had formal training
cutting down on the work hours or days of workers activities for their workers (see table 13.6). More than
paid hourly or daily; (b) compressing the work week for half of the firms in the food, chemical, and electrical
workers paid monthly; (c) introducing forced vacation machinery sectors also made this claim. Exporting firms
leaves; and (d) freezing salary increases or cutting (61 percent) and large firms (67 percent) had higher
salaries of rank-and-file workers, management, or proportions in this category than nonexporting and
both. Almost two-fifths of the sample firms cut down small firms, respectively.
on work hours and days, about one-fifth implemented Among those firms that had training activities for
a compressed work week, about one-fourth used forced their workers, one-fourth reported that they were plan-
vacation, and close to one-third froze the salary ning to reduce the amount of training for their workers
increases of rank-and-file employees and management. owing to the crisis. The apparel and leather sector had
Only a small proportion of the sample firms imple- the highest proportion of firms planning a reduction.
mented salary cuts for rank-and-file (3 percent) and Nonexporters had a higher proportion than exporters
management personnel (5 percent) (see table 13.5). in this regard. And finally, one-fourth of the large and
In terms of sectors, the apparel and leather sector had small firms planned to decrease their training activities.
the highest proportion of firms that cut down on work-
ing hours in response to the crisis. The electrical Labor policy
machinery sector had the highest proportion of firms
that resorted to compressing the work week for their Minimum wage fixing. The prevailing law governing
employees. Forced vacation, by contrast, was used by a minimum wage in the country is the Republic Act (RA)
higher proportion of firms in the food and electrical 6727 or the Wage Rationalization Act enactecL in 1989.
machinery sectors than in other sectors. The textile and It created the National Wage and Productivity
electrical machinery sectors had a higher proportion of Commission,5 but wage fixing was devolved to the
firms that froze salary increases of rank-and-file employ- Regional Wages and Productivity Tripartite Boards. In
ees than other sectors. Freezing the salary increases of terms of promulgating wage orders, the Tripartite
management personnel was employed by more firms in Boards have been proven to be faster than wage legisla-
the food and textile sectors than in other sectors. tion despite the required hearing and consultation
In terms of export orientation, the number of firms process to be followed.
resorting to compressing the work week and forced
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TABLE 13.5
Responses to crisis: Labor
(percent)
Filling Laying off Paying Reducing Compressing Mandating Freezing Freezing Cutting Cutting
vocancies workers severance hours work week vacation salary: salany: salary: salary:
rank &file mgL rank &_file mgt.
By sector
Food products 39 21 68 38 16 26 27 32 2 4
Textiles 31 29 65 36 17 20 29 37 1 9
Apparel, leather 42 34 56 41 20 23 27 29 6 7
Chemicals, rubber, plastic 43 37 70 33 18 23 31 29 4 2
Electrical machinery 38 29 47 40 22 25 28 27 3 4
TotaL 39 29 61 38 19 24 28 31 3 5
By export orientation
Exporters 47 29 59 34 20 26 25 29 3 5
Nonexporters 30 31 62 43 18 22 32 33 4 5
Total 39 30 60 38 19 24 28 31 3 5
By size
Small 33 27 59 37 17 16 29 31 4 5
Large 45 32 62 39 20 32 27 31 2 4
TotaL 39 29 61 38 19 24 28 31 3 5
Source: World Bank, Firm-Level Survey.
The minimum wage has been adjusted almost regu- TABLE 13.6
larly and the past year is not an exception. The inflation Human resource and training
rate has been the primary factor contributing to wage (percent)
hikes. The wage adjustment in 1998 was a response to Workers With Decreased
the increase in the inflation rate brought about by the member formal amount of
of union training training
substantial depreciation of the domestic currency.
Restrictions on layoffs. Tenure security is one of the By sector
F:ood prociucts 45 51 26
employee rights that is safeguarded by the Constitution. TextFiles 45 51 26Textiles ~~43 44 21
This right prohibits management from terminating the Apparel, leather 48 44 38
services of a regular employee without just cause and ChemicaLC , rubber, plastic 49 59 24Electrical machinery 23 62 18
without due process of law. TotaL 41 52 25
Mandated severance pay. There are authorized causes By export orientation
for termination of employment by employers. These Exporters 45 61 22
include (a) installation of labor-saving devices; (b) redun- Nonexporters 37 42 31Total 41 52 25
dancy; (c) retrenchment to prevent losses; or (d) long- B size
term illness or disease. In the case of (a) and (b), the Small 27 38 25
separation pay is one month pay or at least one month Large 55 67 25
pay for every year of service, whichever is higher In the TotaL 41 52 25
.. Source: WolI akFr-ee uvy
case of (c) and (d), it is one month pay or one-half S odd Bank, Firm-LeveL Survey.
month for every year of service, whichever is higher.
Under the Accord, employers promised that they would
Social programs "exercise the utmost restraint in the lay-off, termination
or rotation of their employees, which should be availed
In response to the crisis, the Department of Labor and of only as a last resort." On the part of workers, they
Employment (DOLE) was able to work out on pledged that they would "exercise utmost restraint in
February 6, 1998 a tripartite agreement dubbed the declaring or going on strikes, slowdown of work and
"Social Accord for Industrial Harmony and Stability." other forms of concerted work stoppages, which should
The Impact of the Southeast Asian Financial Crisis on the Philippine Manufacturing Sector 205
be availed of only as a last resort." Similar accords have that this program violates the government's standing
been brokered by DOLE in various regions of the coun- policy of doing away with subsidized credit programs.
try. The statistics on labor strikes seem to suggest that Still another program proposed was the setting up of
the accord is holding. In particular, the number of a guarantee facility for loans to small anc. medium
recorded strikes has not significantly gone up during the enterprises that are still viable but are under distress
crisis period compared with the period before the crisis. owing to the crisis. The program, called the Elnterprise
Moreover, on February 11, 1998, a National Stabilization Guarantee Fund, is being implernented by
Economic Summit was convened by President Ramos the Small Business Guarantee and Finance Corporation
to draft a comprehensive response to the crisis. Among (SBGFC). The proposed facility will guarantee up to 50
the proposals taken up was for DOLE to monitor percent of the principal loan balance. While awaiting
worker layoffs, provide job placement for displaced the proposed financing requirement of P1 billion, the
workers, disseminate information on job vacancies, and SBGFC has already set aside P200 million froni its own
implement programs for retraining, entrepreneurship, funds for the project. As of March 1999, there was still
and credit and livelihood assistance. It should be noted, no available record of performance other than the
however, that these are ongoing activities of the depart- preparation of the guidelines and presentation of the
ment. The monitoring of worker layoffs is being done project to government and private institutions that are
by the Bureau of Labor and Employment Statistics, involved with small and medium enterprises. With the
which publishes on its Web site (www.manila- Department of Trade and Industry's endorsement, the
online.net/bless/welcome.htm) the latest update on project was presented to donor agencies for possible
actual and planned layoffs including the number and funding support.
firms involved.
While DOLE has prepared the program document Financial position of the firms biefore
for the "Comprehensive Program Package for and after the crisis
Displaced Workers," there appears to be no readily
available data on actual assistance given to displaced The sources of funds
workers. The program includes monitoring, job loss
prevention, training, livelihood programs, placement Firms raise short- and long-term funds from internal
assistance, and educational assistance for the children and external sources. As can be observed from figure
of displaced workers. 13.7, income from sales and loans from local banks
Another recommendation that came out of the were the two main sources-internal and external,
Summit was for the Social Security System (SSS) to respectively-of short-term and long-term funds for the
implement a 200 million peso Emergency Loan sample firms before (that is, January to June 1997) and
Program for displaced workers. According to a pub- during the crisis period. It should be noted that this
lished report,6 P3 007 million had already been dis- source structure has hardly changed at all since the
bursed as of December 1998, and the SSS has recently onset of the Southeast Asian financial crisis.
approved the allocation of another P200 million for the
program. As reported by the SSS, the program had The firms' reliance on debt
already approved some 25,815 applications as of
February 22, 1999. The program offers a maximum of The average debt-equity ratio of the surveyed firms in
P12,500 to members at 6 per year payable in 24 equal 1996 stood at 2.27 (see figure 13.8 and table 13.7).8 It
monthly installments starting after a 12-month grace inched up to 2.46 in 1997, but dropped to 2.04 in the
period. Borrowers are required to be members in good first half of 1998, a level that is below that of 1996. This
standing and present either termination papers or proof pattcrn holds true for large and small firms, for export-
of employment from DOLE and certification from the ing and nonexporting firms, and for all sectors but
employer that they have suffered loss in income because one-namely, electrical machinery, whose debt-equity
of job rotation or reduced work hours. It must be noted ratio had already started to decline in 1997. The above
results seem to suggest that the surveyed firms
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FIGURE 13.7
Source of short-term and Long-term financing
(percent of total financing)
Before the crisis
40
40
25
15
20
5
Short-term financing Long-term financing
El SaLes 37.81 40.04
* LocaL bank 36.97 31.98
E Foreign bank 1.45 2.44
E Financial institution 0.90 1.93
* LocaL money lenders 1.01 0.16
1 Suppliers 2.70 2.80
* Partner 1.21 2.36
During the crisis
40
30
25
20
10
5
0
Short-term financing Long-term finandng
l SaLes 36.02 38.03
* SuppLiers 36.20 30.67
11 Foreign bank 1.13 2.25
* Financial institution 0.93 1.13
* LocaL money Lenders 0.98 0.26
[ Suppliers 2.70 3.01
* Partner 1.39 2.61
Source: WorLd Bank, Firm-Level Study.
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TABLE 13.7
Financial indicators
Indicators Sector Size Export orientation
1 2 3 4 5 Large Small Exporter Nonexporter Aiverage
Short-term debt/total financing°
1996 0.29 0.30 0.34 0.27 0.33 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.30 0.31
1997 0.30 0.33 0.39 0.31 0.34 0.35 0.32 0.34 0.33 0.33
First half of 1998 0.27 0.34 0.44 0.26 0.32 0.33 0.31 0.34 0.29 0.32
Long-term debt/total financingb
1996 0.21 0.30 0.25 0.24 0.20 0.23 0.24 0.22 0.25 0.23
1997 0.20 0.26 0.19 0.25 0.19 0.21 0.22 0.20 0.23 0.21
First haLf of 1998 0.19 0.26 0.17 0.25 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.19 0.23 0.21
Debt-equity ratio
1996 2.27 1.94 2.65 1.67 2.94 2.19 2.32 2.14 2.66 2.27
1997 2.40 2.23 2.85 2.18 2.71 2.40 2.54 2.29 2.75 2.46
First haLf of 1998 1.80 2.18 2.40 1.56 2.19 2.12 1.92 1.98 2.16 2.04
a. Both sectors 2 and 3 incLude 3 outliers.
b. Sector 2 incLudes 3 outLiers; sector 3 includes 1 outlier.
Note:
Sector Codes:
5ector I-Food products.
Sector 2-TextiLes.
Sector 3-Apparel. leather.
Sector 4-ChemicaLs, rubber, pLastic.
Sector 5-ElectricaL machinery.
Source: Wored Bank, Erm-Level Survey.
attempted to reduce their debt as they began to feel the trast, the textile sector made the smallest adjustment in
effects of the financial crisis in 1998.9 However, the the first half of 1998. In 1996, the electrical rmachinery
degree of adjustment in the debt-equity ratio seems to sector obtained the highest debt-equity ratio, followed
vary by firm type. More specifically, the decline in the by the apparel and leather sector. This ranking was
debt-equity ratio in the first half of 1998 was much reversed in the first half of 1998.
larger for nonexporting firms than for exporting firms. The shares of short-term and long-term debt in the
Small firms made greater adjustments than large firms total amount of financing could serve as a good indica-
during the same period. Among the five sectors, the tor of the firms' vulnerability to sudden tightness in the
food and chemical sectors experienced much larger credit market. Short-term debt comprised almost one-
declines compared with the other three sectors. By con- third of the firms' total financing (see figure 13.9 and
table 13.7). The firms' share of or degree of reliance on
FIGURE 13.8 short-term debt changed little during the period from
1996 to the first half of 1998; this was especially true
Debt-equity ratios for large firms regarding the degree of reliance.
3.0 2.46 Regarding changes in share, large firms showed much
2.5 2.27 2.04 larger changes than small firms during the indicated
2.0 period. In the first half of 1998, the large firms' share of
1.5 short-term debt stood at 33 percent comparedi with 31
1.0 percent for small firms.
Some differences in the behavior pattern of the short-
0.5 term debt's share among various sectors can also be dis-
Average cerned during this period. The food, chemical and
MM 1996 * 1997 E111998 1st haLf electrical machinery sectors exhibited an inverted U-
*1996e: World Bank, 3i m-Level Survey. shape. By contrast, the textile and apparel sectors
showed a rising share. It should be noted that the
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FIGURE 13.9 same level and pattern of behavior during the indicated
Ratio of short-term debt to totaL financing period. Exporters and nonexporters showed a similar
pattern, but the former's share of long-term debt was
0.34 0.333 lower than that of the latter. Among the five sectors, the
0.34 textile and apparel sectors experienced a significant0.33 et
0.33 decline. while the other three sectors went through little
0.32 0.320 change. In the first half of 1998, the textile and chemi-
0.32 0.309 cal sectors showed a much higher share of long-term
0.31 debt than the other three sectors.
0.31 The results discussed above suggest that the decline in
0.30 the deft-equity ratio experienced by the firms in the
Average first half of 1998 can be attributed to the drop in both
G 1996 0 1997 G 1998 1st haLf their short- and long-term debt during the same period.
Source: World Bank, Firm-Level Survey.
The avaiLabiLity of credit
apparel sector stood out prominently among the five The respondents were asked whether banks or finance
sectors with its short-term debt accounting for 44 per- companies had declined to grant them a loan before and
cent of total financing. When the firms are classified during the crisis. Only 6 percent answered positively to
according to export orientation, results show that the this qu,stion before the Southeast Asian financial cri-
share of short-term debt of nonexporting firms declined sis-that is, from January to June 1997 (see table 13.8).
to 29 percent in the first half of 1998 from 33 percent During the crisis, the proportion of firms being denied
in 1997, whereas that of exporting firms remained the bank loans had doubled. It should be noted that this
same at 34 percent during the same period. proportion in the first half of 1998 was slightly higher
The surveyed firms' share of long-term debt in total for exporters (14 percent) than for nonexporters (12
financing declined a little from 23 percent in 1996 to 21 percent). Large firms also slightly surpassed small firms,
percent in 1997, and stayed at that level during the first at 15 versus12 percent. The electrical machinery sector
half of 1998 (see figure 13.10 and table 13.7). The appears to be the least affected by the crisis in terms of
shares reported by large and small firms had almost the TABLE 13.8
Firms that were denied bank Loans
(percent)
FIGURE 13.10
January 1- July 1- January 1-
Ratio of Long-term debt to totaL financing Category June 30, 1997 December 31, 1997 March 30. 1998
0.235 0.232 By sectorFood prodlucts 6.31 16.22 11.71
0.230 TextiLes 6.15 9.23 15.15
0.225 AppareL 7.48 15.89 17.59
0.220 ChemicaL; 6.49 10.26 15.38
0.215 0.213 ElectricaL machinery 5.61 7255 6.540.210 ~~~~~Total 6.42 12.21 12.98
0.210
0.205 By export orientation
0.200 Exporters 6.61 11.98 14.34
Nonexporters 6.28 12.56 11.61
0.195 Total 6.45 12.26 13.03
Average
By size oaffirms
SmaLL 5.24 8.66 11.16
U1996 01997 E19981st haLf Large 7.56 15.68 14.77
TotaL 6.42 12.21 12.98
Source: WorLd Bank, Firm-Level Survey.
Source: WoiLd Bank, Firm-Level Survey.
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access to bank credit-only 6 percent of the firms in this credit to their customers. The proportion of firms
sector were turned down for credit in the first half of extending credit to their customers appears to be higher
1998. By contrast, 18 percent of the apparel sector for nonexporters than for exporters, and higher for
firms were denied bank loans in the first half of 1998, large firms than small firms. Among the five sectors, the
up from only 7 percent in 1996. chemical sector had the highest proportion, while the
Note that though the percentage of those that admit- apparel and leather sector had the lowest.
ted having been denied a loan by a bank or finance com- The firms were asked about which usual source of
pany had doubled during the crisis period, this is still loans or credit had become more restrictive in making
much smaller than what was generally expected con- credit available to them since the onset of the regional
sidering the economic uncertainty brought about by the financial crisis in July 1997 (see figure 13.1 1). I)omestic
Southeast Asian currency meltdown. In other words, a
great majority of the sample firms continued to have ;FIGURE 13.11
access to credit during the crisis period. Restrictiveness of credit after the crisis
Firms typically buy inputs on credit. Seventy-four
(74) percent of the surveyed firms confirmed this prac- 40
tice (see table 13.9). This proportion does not signifi- 35
cantly differ among different categories. The results 30
seem to suggest that the firms' access to supplier credit 25
during the crisis was not hampered. As table 13.9 20
shows, 81 percent of the sample respondents said that 15
their input suppliers were still extending credit to them 10
after July 1997. The proportion does not significantly 5
differ among the various categories either. 0 mm
Firms also typically sell their products to their cus- . 03
tomers on credit. About three-fourths of the sample Xa
firms were doing this before the crisis. During the crisis
period, a little over three-fourths of the sample firms SSource: Wor[d Bank, Firm-Leve[ Survey.
claimed to have continued selling their products on
TABLE 13.9
Access to suppliers' credit
(percent)
Suppliers till Still extending
Buying inputs extending credit Selling products credit to buyers
Category on credit (after July 1997) on credit (after Jby 1997)
By sector
Food products 71.43 82.30 80.45 84.96
TextiLes 72.73 84.06 83.12 81.16
AppareL 69.42 75.45 55.37 59.63
Chemicals 75.58 82.72 86.05 9C.00
ElectricaL machinery 80.00 83.33 80.00 79.25
TotaL 73.68 81.29 75.94 78.20
By export orientation
Exporters 72.89 84.34 71.79 74.39
Nonexporters 75.10 77.92 80.63 82.17
Total 73.95 81.25 76.05 78.15
By size of firms
SmaLl 69.96 75.31 75.27 76.37
Large 77.91 87.19 76.71 8C.00
TotaL 73.68 81.29 75.94 78.20
Source: WorLd Bank, Firm-Level Survey.
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TABLE 13.10 tation. However, when the sample firms are classified
Adequate liquidity to finance production by sector, the electrical machinery sector appears to
(percent) have a different pattern of responses from the rest. In
Category Yes particular, half of the firms in this sector claimed that
their access to credit had not changed at all during the
By sector crisis period. Only a little over one-fifth indicated that
Food products 75.00
Textiles 67.57 it had become more restrictive.
Apparel 73.28
Chemicals 80.95
ElectricaL machinery 82.88 The tic,uidity problem
Total 76.22
By export orientation The satnple firms were also asked whether they, at the
Exporters 79-77 time of the survey, had adequate liquidity to finance
Nonexporters 72.18
Total 76.08 their production. About three-fourths of the total sam-
By sizeoaffirms ple of i.irms declared having no liquiditv problem at
Small 74.36 that moment (see table 13.10). The claim was made by
Large 78.33 a rouglily equal proportion of small and large firms.
The same can be said of exporters and nonexporters.Source: World Bank, Firm-LeveL Survey. Looking at the responses of the firms broken down by
sector, the textiles sector appears to have the lowest
percentage.
banks were the most frequently mentioned source in Among those claiming that they had inadequate liq-
response, followed by input suppliers. Interestingly, 36 uidity to run their operations, a little over half singled
percent of the firms mentioned that the availability of out low revenue as the major reason (see table 13.11). A
credit from their usual source had remained the same. little over one-third mentioned low collection rates and
The same pattern of responses can be observed when insufficient loans as the major reason for encountering a
respondents are broken down by size and export orien- liquidity problem during the time of the interview.
TABLE 13.11
Causes of inadequate liquidity
(percent)
Insufficient Insufficient credit Low collection
Category Low revenue loans from suppliers rate Others
By sector
Food products 44.83 32.26 24.14 37.93 13.33
Textiles 50.00 28.57 20.00 33.33 6.67
Apparel 60.71 60.71 25.00 30.77 28.57
ChemicaLs 40.00 14.29 15.38 50.00 40.00
Electrical machinery 66.67 14.29 6.67 28.57 22.22
TotaL 52.63 34.26 20.00 35.58 21.43
By export orientation
Exporters 52.08 32.61 16.28 19.05 29.63
Nonexporters 53.03 35.48 22.58 46.77 16.28
Total 52.63 34.26 20.00 35.58 21.43
By size of firms
Small 59.09 35.48 25.00 38.33 22.73
Large 43.75 32.61 13.33 31.82 19.23
TotaL 52.63 34.26 20.00 35.58 21.43
Source: World Bank, Firm-LeveL Survey.
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Transparency (83 percent). The rest have proportions ranging from
89 to 92 percent.
Financial statements, collateral and Results show that even though 88 percent of the total
guarantees sample respondents for this study claimed that their
financial statements were audited by independent audi-
Accounting information-in other words, balance tors, only 65 percent said that they typically needed
sheets and income statements-is one of the instru- audited financial statements to apply for and receive a
ments that can make firms transparent to lenders. The bank loan (see table 13.13). As expected, largc firms
value of this information can be enhanced if it is certi- reported a higher proportion (71 percent) than small
fied by an independent auditing firm. firms (60 percent) with regard to being required to sub-
Philippine firms and banks are required to maintain mit audited financial statements when appl-ying for a
appropriate financial records that observe standard and loan. The difference is less significant between
customary accounting and auditing principles and pro- exporters (68 percent) and nonexporters (6_3 percent).
cedures. Out of the total sample of firms in this study, Among the five sectors, the electrical machinery sector
88 percent claimed to have financial statements audited reported the lowest proportion (56 percent) concerning
by an independent auditing firm (see table 13.12). As this requirement.
expected, the proportion of firms having audited finan- Usually, the longer the maturity of the loan, the
cial statements is lower for small firms (82 percent) than greater the chance that a bank will require collateral
for large firms (93 percent). Ninety-three (93) percent from a borrower The results of the survey support this
of exporting firms maintain audited financial state- trend. Almost half of the total number of respondents
ments, whereas 82 percent of nonexporting firms do so. said that they had typically had to provide collateral
The rigor involved in competing in the international when they borrowed for 12 months or longer; the per-
market is perhaps one of the compelling reasons for centages were only 27 percent when borrowing for 6
exporters to have audited financial statements. Looking months or longer, and 24 percent for less than 6 months
at the five sectors, the textile firms appear to have the (see table 13.14). There is not much difference in this
lowest proportion of firms with financial statements respect when respondents are grouped by export orien-
audited (80 percent), followed by food-producing firms tation or size. When classified by sector, the tzxtile sec-
tor appears to have the highest proportion of
TABLE 13.12 TABLE 13.13
FinanciaL statements audited by independent Submission of audited financial statemenit to
auditing firm apply for a loan
(percent) (percent)
Category Yes Category Reqaired
By sector By sector
Food products 83.49 Food products 66.67
Textiles 80.30 TextiLes 63.D8
AppareL 88.89 AppareL 64.31
ChemicaLs 91.25 Chemicals 78.48
ELectricaL machinery 91.74 Electrical machinery 55.36
TotaL 87.50 Total 65.25
By export orientation By export orientation
Exporters 92.71 Exporters 67.48
Nonexporters 81.61 Nonexporters 62.e5
Total 87.45 TotaL 65.32
By size of firms By size of firms
Small 81.55 Small 59.48
Large 93.31 Large 70.33
TotaL 87.50 Total 65.25
Source: WorLd Bank, Firm-Level Survey. Source: WorLd Bank, Firm-Levet Survey.
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TABLE 13.14 and effective system of accounts, safeguard the integrity
Requirement of a collateral for a loan of their assets, and devise a system of internal controls
(percent) that will help establish the viability of the business.10
Loan Following the Statements of Financial Accounting
Less than 6 months 12 months Standards, an enterprise must include a description of
Category 6 months or longer or longer the accounting policies it has adopted as an integral part
of the financial statements. Financial statements are
By sector
Food products 22.77 25.77 50.00 generated by an accounting process that follows the
Textiles 37.29 41.38 55.00 generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) on
AppareL 25.25 29.90 50.49 three levels: pervasive principles, broad operating prin-
ChemicaLs 18.67 19.18 56.41
Electrical machinery 17.65 21.00 35.64 ciples, and detailed principles.
TotaL 23.39 26.59 48.65 The enterprise's "accounting principles" are the spe-
By export orientation cific accounting principles and methods that are con-
Exporters 21.97 25.00 45.61
Nonexporters 24.64 28.02 51.87 sidered by the enterprise as the most appropriate i
TotaL 23.27 26.48 48.64 presenting its financial position, the changes in said
By size offirms financial position, and the results of operations in
SmaLL 23.56 25.49 46.98 accordance with the GAAP. Some examples of disclo-
Large 23.25 27.60 50.22
Total 23.39 26.59 48.65 sure of accounting principles and methods are, among
Source: World Bank, Firm-LeveL Survey. others, depreciation methods, amortization of intangi-
bles, inventory pricing and overall valuation policy,
respondents claiming that they were required to present methods of revenue recognition, and gains and losses
a collateral for their loans with a maturity period of less on disposal of property. The GAAP also require the dis-
than six months. By contrast, the electrical machinery closure of related party transactions including those
sector had the lowest proportion of firms reporting that between a parent company and its subsidiaries,
they were required to present a collateral for their long- between or among subsidiaries of a common parent, an
term loans. enterprise and trust for the benefit of employees, and so
Of those who said that they were required by their on. Transactions involving related parties cannot be
banks to present collateral, 87 percent mentioned land presumed to be carried out at arm's length because the
and buildings they had been using as collateral and 65 requisir.e conditions of competitive, free market trans-
percent named machinery and equipment. Only 24 per- actions may not exist. Finally, the nature of the control
cent mentioned stocks used as collateral. relationship among enterprises under common owner-
In some cases, banks have required their borrowers to ship or management control must also be disclosed.
have guarantors for their loans, especially if the bor- The Philippines has an Auditing and Standards
rowers were unable to present an acceptable collateral Counc.l, established in 1987, which issues statements
or if the collateral was inadequate. Twenty-nine (29) on the "Generally Accepted Auditing Standards."
percent of the total number of respondents mentioned These standards are approved by the Board of
having obtained guarantees on their financing. Large Accountancy and the Professional Regulation
firms and exporters had a higher proportion of respon- Commission. The standards require the independent
dents obtaining guarantees for their loans than small auditor to indicate whether the financial statements
and nonexporting firms. A large proportion of them (60 present:ed conform to generally accepted accounting
percent) mentioned their stockholders as their usual principles.
guarantors, and one-fourth mentioned other banks. The generally accepted auditing standards are applic-
able in the audit of the financial statements of banks,
The levet and depth of accounting practices related financial institutions, and business enterprises.
The primary objective of an audit is the statement of an
Philippine enterprises are duty bound to adopt sound opinion by the independent auditor on the financial
accounting policies and practices, maintain an adequate statements of a business enterprise. For this purpose,
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the auditor studies and evaluates the accounting sys- wanting to cover their foreign exchange exposure-and
tems and internal controls, tests the operation of those in the domestic interest rate.
controls, and assesses the accounting transactions and The government issued Executive Order (EO) 465 on
account balances. January 13, 1998, to modify the nomenclature and tar-
There are more than 200 accounting and auditing iff structure of 22 industries identified as "Philippine
firms registered with the Securities and Exchange winners." These are the industries that have proven to
Commission (SEC). Almost all of them are located in the be competitive or shown some potential. EC, 465 was
NCR; however, they also provide auditing services to the result of the review of the pace of tariff reduction
firms located outside the NCR by sending audit teams. under EO 264 in consideration of the recent Asian
In conclusion, it can be said that the existing account- financial crisis.
ing and auditing systems are comparable to those of The rates of duty for certain tariff lines were either
more developed countries. However, the actual raised or reduced under EO 465. Other tariff lines had
accounting and auditing practices are different from the same rate as set under EO 264. It should, however,
their respective standards. In particular, small- and be noted that EO 465 was not designed to delay the
medium-sized firms seldom keep good accounting sys- attainment of a uniform tariff rate of 5 percent by 2004.
tems and this is one of the reasons why banks seldom While it resulted in a small increase in the overall aver-
lend to this group of borrowers. Also, it has been a gen- age nominal tariff rate from the pre-EO 465 level, the
eral practice among firms to keep two books of overall effective protection rate actually went down.
accounts, one for their creditors (this is called the "in- The government secured in December 1998 from the
house financial statement") and one for the Bureau of World Bank US$150 million for the Private Enterprise
Internal Revenues (BIR) for tax purposes, and the dif- Credit Support Project, which aims to help enterprises
ference between the two is glaring. This is complicated restructure and meet their permanent working capital
because auditors certify only the accuracy of the needs, improve productivity, and create jobs. It also
accounting information and methods used, not neces- secured another US$150 million from the World Bank
sarily the veracity of the information. This is because for its Third Rural Finance Project, which will assist
under the Philippine practice, much depends on the farmers and agribusiness undertake new pro jects, and
willingness of the firm to disclose pertinent information finance working capital requirements. A US$7 million
about itself and the project. Therefore, audited financial microfinance component is included in the project to
statements are as good as the amount and quality of supplement ongoing microfinance programs and help
information provided by the firm. Under this environ- satisfy demand for credit by small-scale enterprises.
ment, the problem of asymmetric information persists.
Short-run prospects
Measures to assist Philippine enterprises
A great majority of the sample firms were not optimistic
Concerned about the rapidly deteriorating condition of about the economy in general, and their situation in
the corporate sector as the crisis continued to deepen, particular, regarding the six months followingy the sur-
the government introduced some measures to alleviate vey. Almost half thought that their capacity utilization
the firms' plight. rate, which had already significantly dropped since the
The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas created in December onset of the crisis, would remain the same, while one-
1997 the Currency Rate Protection Program, which fourth were expecting a further decline (see figure
essentially is a nondeliverable forward facility, to pro- 13.12). Only 27 percent were optimistic--namely,
tect corporations with foreign exchange liabilities expecting a rebound in their capacity utilization rate in
against currency fluctuation risk. Since this program the next six months. In terms of export orientation,
can spread the demand for dollars between the spot and results suggest that nonexporters were more pes-
forward market, it can also ease the demand pressure in simistic-they expected the rate to decline fiarther or
both the spot market-caused by corporate borrowers remain the same in the next six months-than exporters.
In terms of size, small firms were more pessimistic than
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FIGURE 13.12 While banks are now much more discriminating in
Expected output, June-December 1999 lending to the business sector, the decline in total loan
growth in 1998 could also be attributed to the lower
50 OM Decrease demand for credit, which was brought about by the
40 * Increase sharp reduction in demand for goods produced by the
El Same firms during the crisis period.
30 The significant drop in the firms' capacity utilization
rate andl output during the crisis period would normally
20 have required a drastic cut in the workforce. However,
0_ to minimize layoffs, the sample firms resorted to other
means, such as reducing the work week or work days,
0 applying forced vacation leave, and freezing salary
Source: World Bank, Firm-Level Survey. increases, to save some jobs.
This study has generally confirmed the adverse
impacts of the financial crisis on the manufacturing sec-
large firms. When classified according to sector, it tor; however, it also yields some positive signs that the
appears that the apparel sector was the least pessimistic government can use as a platform for formulating poli-
and the textile sector the most pessimistic about busi- cies and programs to stage a rapid economic recovery.
ness prospects in the short-term. First, most of the firms surveyed were still earning prof-
its, alb it declining in the last two and a half months. If
Conclusions and recommendations the worst of the crisis has already passed, then these
firms can quickly rebound, using partly their profits to
The survey results clearly show that the capacity uti- finance their growth. Second, most of the firms still
lization rate of the Philippine manufacturing firms have access to credit, although at a relatively higher
started to decline even before the crisis struck in July price. A reduction in the interest rate will surely help
1997, and that it continued to drop as the crisis deep- them a lot during the recovery period. Third, although
ened. While the recent drop can be attributed to the the firns resorted to some cost-cutting measures, most
slowdown in both the domestic and foreign demand for of thern preferred to preserve jobs, a strategy they think
goods and the sudden rise of the interest rate and of the will pay off once the crisis fades away. With most of
cost of inputs (especially imported inputs), thereby their core staff intact and excess capacity readily avail-
squeezing the firms' profits, the earlier drop could per- able, a resurgence in demand will certainly be most wel-
haps be attributable to overinvestment made by the come by them.
firms in building additional capacity given a much more All this leads us to conclude that the most appropri-
liberal and cheaper access to external sources of funds. ate policy that the government could adopt now would
Thus, the current capacity underutilization may be be an expansionary one to stimulate aggregate demand.
attributed to both cyclical and structural factors, which Both rnonetary and fiscal policies are required to sup-
call for demand management as well as industrial port such an expansionary policy.
restructuring policy measures. There is still some room for relaxing monetary policy.
As the crisis deepened, it seems that a consensus First of all, the inflation rate had already started to
emerged: the firms were facing a credit crunch. In other come down last February. The agricultural sector-par-
words, institutional lenders had stopped lending to ticularly the crop subsector, which suffered a large
them because of the highly volatile economic situation. decline in 1998 as a result of the El Nino weather phe-
The results of this study do not provide clear evidence nomenon-is expected to rebound in 1999. Second, the
on the existence of a supply-side credit crunch during reserve money level during the February 1999 test
the crisis period. It should be noted that a great major- perioc6 was found to be P30 billion below the level
ity of surveyed firms still had uninterrupted access to agreecl upon between the government and IMF under
institutional loans, albeit at a much higher interest rate. the existing standby arrangement program.
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The relaxation of the monetary policy, which will mass housing projects in their respective localities. Of
push the interest rate down, can accomplish four things. course, the government housing finance system has to
One is that it will lighten the debt-service burden of be reformed quickly so that it can efficiently provide the
enterprises, freeing some resources that can be used to services the public requires of it, without necessarily dis-
meet increased demand for goods. It can also reduce the sipating its funds.
cost of debt restructuring, whenever resorted to by both To support its pump-priming measures in 1998, the
enterprises and banks. Still another benefit is that it can government tapped foreign sources of funds to avoid
stimulate consumer spending and revive the sagging crowding out the private sector and also secure foreign
consumer durable goods sector. Finally, it can help exchange to beef up the country's international
arrest the appreciation of the peso in relation to the U.S. reserves. Since private sector demand for funds is still
dollar and improve the competitiveness of the export down and the interest rate has already come down to
sector, which has been stimulating the economy during the precrisis level, it would be worthwhile for the gov-
this crisis period. ernment to secure funding for its pump-priming mea-
There is a limit to how much of the task outlined sures for 1999 from the local market, where the cost of
above can be accomplished by monetary policy. financing is now lower than in foreign markets.
Pushing the interest rate further down and exhorting Finally, the recent crisis has underscored the impor-
banks to lend to private enterprises would not be suffi- tance of keeping a flexible exchange rate policy.
cient to stimulate growth unless demand for goods is However, even if a flexible exchange rate policy is pur-
increased with the help of fiscal policy. Thus, on the fis- sued and corporate governance is improved, the level of
cal side, the pump-priming measures should continue in foreign capital inflows experienced by the country
1999, focusing on the critical sectors of the economy, before the Asian financial crisis is unlikely to be
specifically the agriculture sector, which has the most attained in the near term unless additional measures are
extensive linkages with the rest of the economy, and the put in place. One way is to liberalize further the entry of
social sectors, such as health, education, and housing. foreign banks into the country, preferably allowing for-
However, there are two important programs that the eign banks to wholly own domestic banks-either by
government could launch to help the labor and manu- establishing new subsidiaries or buying existing ones,
facturing sectors directly. One is to provide skill train- especially those that are not well capitalized. The pres-
ing programs for those who have been laid off as a ence of more foreign banks in the country can certainly
result of the retrenchment undertaken by firms in the breathe new life into the banking system and make
wake of the crisis. These programs should be offered in additional capital available to the Philippine economy.
various regions of the country so that the benefits can
be widely spread. It should be noted that those who
were laid off are younger, and therefore most probably
less experienced and less skilled-but highly trainable.
The government may give incentives to those firms that
have resorted to reducing work hours and days to
encourage them to offer their unutilized facilities and
perhaps the slack time of their senior staff for training.
The other is for the government to stimulate the hous-
ing sector, which is a strategy with direct short-term
economic and social impact. There is still a huge back-
log of housing units, especially for lower middle class
and poor households, in the country today. One of the
ways of doing this is to strengthen the Home Insurance
Guarantee Corporation so that it will have additional
resources to provide guarantees to bonds to be issued by
local government units for the purpose of financing
216 Asian Corporate Recovery: Findings from Firm-Level Surveys in Five Countries
Annex 13.A
Sector Industry codes Description
1. Food products
1512 Production, processing, and preserving of maat and meat products
1513 Production and preserving offish and fish products and other seafoods
1514 Processing and preserving of fruits and vegetabLes
1515 Manufacture of vegetable and animaL oils ard fats
152 Manufacture of dairy products
154 Manufacture of starches and starch products
156 Manufacture of bakery products
157 Manufacture of sugar
158, 1593, 1594 Manufacture of coconut-based products
1591 Manufacture of cocoa, chocoLate and sugar confectionery
1592 Manufacture of macaroni, noodles, couscous, and simiLar farinaceous products
1595 Coffee roasting and processing
1599 Manufacture of other food products, nec (eg, soup, vinegar, nuts)
2. Textiles
171 Spinning, weaving and finishing of textiLes
172 Manufacture of other textiLes
173, 174 Manufacture of knitted and crocheted fabrics and articLes; manufacture of embroidered fabrics
3. Wearing apparel
and footware
181 Ready-made garments manufacturing
189 Manufacture of wearing apparel, nec
192 Manufacture of footwear
4. Chemical products,
rubber
2411 Manufacture of basic hemicaLs except fertiLizers and nitrogen compounds
2412 Manufacture of plastics in primary forms and of synthetic rubber
2423 Manufacture of paints, varnishes and similal- coatings, printing ink and mastics
2424 Manufacture of pharmaceuticaLs, medicinaL chemicals and botanicaL products
2425 Manufacture of soap and detergents, cleaninig and poLishing preparations, perfumes and toilet
preparations
2429 Manufacture of other chemicaL products, nec (e.g. matches, ink, gLues and adhesives)
243 Manufacture of man-made fibers
251 Manufacture of rubber products
252 Manufacture of pLastic products
5. Electrical
machinery
311 Manufacture of eLectric motors, generators and transformers
312, 313 Manufacture of eLectricity distribution and control apparatus; manufacture of insuLated wire and cables
321, 322 Manufacture of eLectronic vaLves and tubes; manufacture of semiconductor devices and other eLectronic
components
323, 324 Manufacture of teLevision a d radio transmitters and apparatus for line telephony and Line teLegraphy;
manufacture of teLevision a d radio receivers, ound or video recording or reproducing apparatus, and
associated goods
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Annex 13.B
Industry stratum/sector ATE class
20-49 50-99 100-199 >=200 % of total
Total Frame 46.9 21.1 15.7 16.4 100.0
SampLe 19.3 17.2 18.0 45.5 100.0
Food products % frame 54.1 21.0 11.5 13.3 32.0
% sampLe 18.1 17.4 19.6 44.9 22.0
Textiles % frame 40.1 24.1 11.5 13.3 32.0
%o sample 21.3 23.2 18.5 37.0 18.0
Wearing apparel and footware % frame 46.8 19.7 15.8 17.7 20.0
% sample 15.6 12.5 13.7 58.2 22.0
Chemical products, rubber % frame 46.3 22.1 19.4 12.2 23.0
% sampLe 20.3 15.2 16.9 47.6 20.0
Electrical machinery % frame 21.8 19.0 21.8 37.5 6.0
% sampLe 21.8 19.0 21.8 37.5 18.0
Notes or regression anaLysis to test some hypotheses. The authors p[an to
do this in subsequent studies using the same database.
The authors are with the PhiLippine Institute for Development 3. The issue regarding the impact of the crisis on the firms' access
Studies (PIDS). The survey of sample firms, which was conducted by to capitaL is discussed in greater detail beLow.
the NationaL Statistics Office (NSO), and this report were funded by 4. This issue wiLL be discussed in greater detail beLow.
the WorLd Bank. The authors are gratefuL to Ms. OfeLia M. Templo, 5. The NWPC serves as the consuLtative and advisory body to the
Assistant Director General of the NationaL Economic and DeveLopment President on matters reLating to wages, income, and productivity-and
Authority, for providing direction to the research team. The authors aLso exercises technical and administrative supervision over the RWPTBs.
are aLso gratefuL to Ms. Ma. CheLo V. ManLagnit and Ms. Hope A. Gerochi 6. Business World.
for research assistance and to Ms. Juanita E. ToLentino f r secretariaL 7. Another P100 miLLion has been added to the initial fund of P200
assistance. This report is avaiLabLe at the Institute's web site: million.
http://www.pids.gov.ph. 8. This is based on the median.
1. For example, see Lamberte (1999) and Virtucio (1998). 9. See below for a discussion on the credit crunch.
2. There is no attempt in this study to do cross-tabulation analysis 10. This section draws on Lamberte and Llanto (1995).
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Thailand: The Road to
Recovery
Fiscal Policy Office and the Office of Industrial Economics,
Bangkok, Thailand
his report presents the results of a comprehensive survey-conductedT from October 1998 to February 1999-of 700 firms in key manufac-
turing sectors in Thailand. The survey provides microeconomic-level
information on the impact ol0 the financial crisis on output, employment, cor-
porate finance, and profitability. It also provides insights into the efficacy of
government programs, and -he prospects for corporate recovery as seen by
these firms. Similar studies undertaken in Indonesia, the Republic of Korea,
Malaysia, and the Philippines allow for regional comparisons and the possibil-
ity to benchmark firm performance.
The macroeconomic story of the crisis has become a familiar one. Until now,
however, much less has been known about the microeconomic-level impact of
the crisis and how firms have responded over the last 18 months. Based on new
information collected from 642 establishments in five principal manufacturing
sectors, this paper provides insights into the key difficulties facing the firms and
relates them to the policy environment and policy reforms enacted by the gov-
ernment in response to the crisis.
After having enjoyed a reab annual growth rate of 9.6 percent between 1986
and 1996, Thailand sufferecl a sharp economic downturn with the combina-
tion of currency and financial crises in 1997 as a result of the unsuccessful
defense of the currency and the weak banking system. At the onset of the cri-
sis, Thailand faced four major macroeconomic problems:
* Net international reserves were depleted because of the unsuccessful
defense of the Thai baht;
* There were systemic problems in the financial sector;
* The real sector faced a serious liquidity shortage; and
* Regional economic turmDil was a significant constraint in terms of the
country's ability to resolve its economic difficulties.
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The substantial depreciation of the baht instantly the already rich findings from Dollar and others (1998),
brought soaring costs of foreign debt servicing and for- this paper further investigates (a) whether all these
eign exchange losses to those firms that had borrowed issues have become apparent to Thai industries (and in
heavily abroad or imported their inputs. This com- what ways, if they have), and (b) to what extent the
pounded the difficulties facing firms whose profits had recent monetary and fiscal policies have become effi-
already been squeezed by rising labor costs throughout ciently implemented from the perspective of key indus-
the 1990s. Things got even worse after the economic trial sectors. In line with the previous finclings the
turmoil spread to other Asian tiger countries' and empirical results indicate that:
became the so-called Asian Financial Crisis. The depre- * From 1997 to the first half of 1998, macroeco-
ciation of currencies across the region and the growth ill nomic stability came at the price of shrinking
excess capacity in many manufacturing sectors meant domestic demand, output decline, and high unem-
that firms faced declining export prices in U.S. dollar ployment.
terms at the same time that many saw their costs * There was little evidence of a severe credit crunch
increasing. after the crisis. However, the survey does slhow that
To restore economic stability swiftly, the government the availability of credit has been declining.
initially pursued tight monetary and fiscal policies by * Toward the end of 1998, there were some signals of
imposing temporary capital controls, raising interest improvement in the firms' financial conditions and
rates and running budget surpluses-which eventually growing confidence in the current policy environ-
prevented the baht from entering a free fall and brought ment. However, substantial corporate restructuring
stability toward the end of the first half of 1998. has yet to begin and strengthening long-term com-
Unfortunately, economic stability did not come without petitiveness has become an important issue.
a price. Domestic demand plunged at both the house- This paper is organized as follows. The next section
hold and corporate levels. Furthermore, the soaring describes the industrial survey regarding the sectors
domestic interest rates raised the firms' costs of debt ser- covered and the sample composition. This is followed
vicing considerably. The economic slowdown in by a section discussing the impact of the crisis on the
regional trading partner countries also brought signifi- surveyed firms such as changes in demand, level of pro-
cant falls in foreign demand. Consequently, corporate duction, employment, profit margins, and capital struc-
profits declined sharply, and hence impaired firms' abil- ture. The subsequent section presents an in-depth
ity to pay back their debts. With accumulating nonper- analysis of the constraints to corporate recovery and
forming loans, the financial sector became risk-averse their implications on government policies. The issues
and was less willing to give credit to the corporate sec- addressed include global demand, credit availability,
tor. Therefore, many firms were left with insufficient and industrial competitiveness. Prospects for the first
working capital and unable to sell their goods, faced the half of 1999 and policy recommendations are discussed
real prospect of becoming insolvent. in the last main section. Finally, key macroeconomic
Nevertheless, in recent months financial conditions data and methodology are presented in annexes 14.A
have continued to improve. The strengthening of mar- and 14.B.
ket confidence has extended beyond the exchange rate
to declining inflation and a leveling-off in indicators of Description of the survey
production and demand. Fiscal policy has been
assigned the task of supporting domestic demand by The data used in this paper come from the Office of
expanding fiscal deficits while interest rates have been Industrial Economics and the World Bank's 1998-99
allowed to decline substantially in line with improved survey of Thailand's manufacturing sectors, which is a
market confidence and falling inflationary pressure. follow-up to the similar survey conducted between
(See figure 14.A.1.) October 1997 and March 1998. (See Dollar an, others
Using data from the Office of Industrial Economics (1998) for a description of the first survey and its find-
and the World Bank's 1998-99 Industrial Survey and ings.) There were five manufacturing sectors selected
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for the surveys, based on their contributions to the FIGURE 14.1
country's export and GDP. The five sectors are (1) gar-
ments, (2) textiles, (3) electronics, (4) food processing, Sampte distribution
and (5) auto parts. (See tables 14.A.1 and 14.A.2 for (percent)
sector shares.) In the 1998-99 survey, each establish- Sectors Firm sizes
ment was asked over 300 questions on the plant's pro- _ 32 3
duction, financial structure, and labor force in 1996, '
1997, and the current period. Close to 90 percent of the 10
1,227 establishments surveyed in 1997 (1,107 estab-
lishments) survived the year and were still engaged in 7
manufacturing operations in 1998. Out of 1,107 inter- 17 21
viewees, 642 establishments were re-interviewed. Thus,
a 58 percent response rate was achieved for the second U Ga ments Li Electronics Cl SmaLl * Large
survey during November 1998 and February 1999. E Te tiLes A Food
The sectoral coverage of these establishments is dis- * Auto parts
tributed unequally, in part as a reflection of the differ- Export onentation Foreign controL
ent numbers of establishments in each sector in the 9
broader manufacturing population. Thus, fewer foodfo7
processing plants are included in the sample, in line 44
with the smaller number of such plants overall. In the
sample, about one-third of the firms are relatively new, 55
having been established since 1990; one-third are large, 2
with over 150 employees; 55 percent export at least
some of their output, and 29 percent have a partnership 1 Nonexporters 1E None * Some
or joint venture with a foreign firm. (See figure 14.1 and * Exporters E:1 TotaL
tables 14.1 and 14.2 for more details regarding the l
characteristics of the sample.)
While the sample of firms was chosen randomly to
minimize possible biases and to allow for statistically Changes in domestic and foreign demand
significant analysis, it should be noted that as a re-
suvey, there is a bias in favor of more successful firms. The downward pressure on the Thai and neighboring
Firms that had to close because of current economic dif- economies caused by the currency depreciation brought
ficulties would have been less likely to participate in the substantial declines in both domestic and foreign
survey, so the results tend to represent upper bounds, or demaad. However, from the perspective of the Thai
more optimistic projections, of firm performance relative firms that were surveyed, the impact of the contraction
to the entire population of firms in the Thai economy. of domestic demand was larger than that of foreign
demand. Approximately 82 percent of the nonex-
Corporate adjustments to the crisis porte^s addressed the shrinkage in domestic demand as
their major current difficulty, whereas 51 percent of the
This section will use the microeconomic evidence from exporters reported a decline in foreign demand as a sig-
the survey to analyze the impact of this crisis in five con- nificant concern. In part this reflects the fact that not all
texts: (1) changes in domestic and foreign demand, (2) of these firms export, but also that losses in exports to
changes in the level of production, (3) changes in the the crisis countries were partly offset by gains in exports
level of employment, (4) changes in profit margins, and to no ncrisis countries such as the ones in the Euro Zone
(5) changes in the capital structure. and North America. Firms whose primary export market
is within the region (including Japan) were significantly
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TABLE 14.1
Characteristics of the sample
By size By export orientation By volume of exports Byforeign control FDI firm Average
no. of
Large Small Exporters Nonexporters Small Medium High None Some Total Yes No employees Total
Sector
Garment 64 130 133 73 5 23 93 167 31 3 42 159 236 207
TextiLes 41 85 53 84 6 19 24 113 15 6 24 110 201 138
Electronics 43 48 68 38 8 18 31 50 20 34 61 43 443 106
Food 33 22 45 19 7 5 29 42 16 4 22 40 718 64
Auto parts 40 83 56 68 8 23 16 91 25 9 38 87 268 127
Age
New 86 131 133 94 9 32 74 160 40 22 70 152 342 230
OLd 130 225 214 178 23 23 54 116 288 65 33 113 273 300
Location
Non-BKK 47 41 70 30 7 16 36 57 20 23 49 51 502 101
Grtr. BKK 174 327 285 252 27 72 157 406 87 33 138 388 279 541
Total 221 368 355 282 34 88 193 463 107 56 187 439 312 642
Source: Office of IndustriaL Economics.
TABLE 14.2
Profile of the firm
Borrow in
foreign currency Size Export orientation Foreign control FDI firm
Yes No Large Small Exporters Nonexporters None Some Total Yes No Total
Financial indicators
Short-term debt/total financing 0.43 0.29 0.42 0.27 0.39 0.25 0.32 0.29 0.52 0.36 0.3-. 0.32
Long-term debt/totaL financing 0.18 0.26 0.21 0.26 0.23 0.25 0.25 0.27 0.07 0.22 0.24 0.24
Debt-equity ratio 4.21 3.40 4.4 3.2 3.89 3.32 3.53 3.20 5.20 4.01 3.4:. 3.62
Firm characteristics
Number of empLoyees 593 215 736 58 471 130 229 559 653 611 201 312
Share that export () 85 44 79 38 100 0 46 77 96 81 45 55
Share that are FDI (%) 59 18 45 17 43 12 5 100 100 100 0 29
Response to the crisis
Current capacity utiLization (%) 64 60 67 57 67 55 60 64 66 64 60 61
Share with few workers 46 53 45 56 41 63 53 52 36 48 53 51
Optimistic for future growth 32 19 28 19 30 13 21 20 41 27 21 22
Total 27 73 34 57 55 44 72 17 9 29 68 100
Source: Office of Industrial Economics.
more likely to see their exports decline and to cite a fall lishments reported an increase in their export volume.
in foreign demand. Yet, over 60 percent of these establishments identified
Among the 34 percent of establishments whose price competitiveness and exchange rate effects as their
export volume declined, 49 percent, 56 percent, and 58 major sources of export increases. This opposite effect
percent identified, respectively, loss of price competi- caused by price competitiveness reflects the currency
tiveness, unstable political and economic conditions in depreciation of crisis countries and the fact that
export markets, and a fall in foreign demand as their regional excess capacity helped to drive down dollar-
major concerns. By contrast, 41 percent of the estab- export prices. Increasing export volumes is thus not suf-
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ficient to ensure improved firm performance if the val- pliers were more willing to give credits and services to
ues of exports are falling at a higher rate. larger firms, owing to their higher buying volume.
Respectively, 27 percent and 21 percent of the small
Changes in the leve( of production firms reported supplier credits and goods deliveries as
their major difficulties-compared with 16 percent and
In keeping with changes in demand, 70 percent of the 5 percmt for the large firms.
surveyed establishments reported a decline in their level Likewise, 74 percent of the non-foreign direct invest-
of outputs after the crisis. The average capacity utiliza- ment (FDI) firms reported a decline in output compared
tion fell down from 71 percent in the first half of 1997 with 63 percent of the FDI firms. Firms with no foreign
to 61 percent in the first half of 1998, or a 12 percent ties were more likely to experience a decline in output
reduction in utilization rate for each surveyed firm. than those with foreign ties (that is, those that are under
These establishments cited a contraction in domestic foreign control or are joint venture firms), which is
demand and a sharp increase in input costs caused by attributable to the smaller share of exporters among the
currency depreciation as their major sources of output non-F DI firms (45 percent compared with 81 percent in
decline. Interestingly, these firms perceived access to the F]DI firms).
capital as a less severe problem. Over 70 percent of The sector that experienced the greatest fall in output
them identified a fall in domestic demand and higher is auto parts, with a 25 percent decline in the utilization
input costs from currency depreciation as their major rate. Of all the sectors, it is the one most influenced by
problems, while less than 35 percent and 52 percent, the state of the domestic economy. New cars or motor-
respectively, reported access to working capital and cycles represent large durable good purchases that
costly loans as their main obstacle. many consumers have decided to postpone in this time
The degrees to which the firms experienced a decline of crisis. Electronics is the other sector that has been hit
in production varied by firm characteristics. About 84 particularly hard, with a 22 percent decline in utiliza-
percent of the nonexporters reported a decline in their tion. While geared toward export markets, the firms
output after the crisis, compared with 60 percent of have suffered from excess capacity within the region
exporters. There was also a significant difference in the and the largest fall in export prices.2 (See figures 14.2
reduction in utilization rate between the nonexporters through 14.4.)
and the exporters; on average, capacity utilization fell
by 10 percent more for the former. This reflects the fact Changes in the Level of employment
that the contraction in domestic demand was larger
than that of foreign demand as mentioned in the previ- The downward trend in the level of production led to a
ous section ("Changes in domestic and foreign decline in employment during the crisis. However, these
demand"). changes in employment were smaller than those in out-
By the same token, 79 percent of the small establish- put l,vels. Even though 70 percent of the surveyed
ments (compared with 60 percent of the large establish- establishments reported a decline in their outputs after
ments) reported a decline in output after the crisis. the crisis, approximately 50 percent reported a decline
These small establishments experienced a 13 percent in employment. This is because these firms, to some
decline in utilization rate, compared with 11 percent extent, were committed to their workers. In addition,
among the large establishments. This partly reflects the labor and welfare regulations (which are costly sever-
fact that over 60 percent of the small firms were nonex- ance compensation payments) might turn them away
porters, while nearly 80 percent of the large firms were from laying off their workers. Therefore, firms pre-
exporters. In addition, being labor-intensive, high labor ferred other measures (such as reducing the length of
costs had more impact on the small firms' production the workweek and cutting administrative costs) over
costs than on that of the larger firms. Nearly 56 percent laying off workers.
of the small establishments identified high labor costs as Or ly 17 percent of the firms that experienced a reduc-
their major sources of output decline, compared with tion in employment identified layoffs as the measure
38 percent in the large establishments. In addition, sup- they had adopted during the crisis. However, over 70
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percent of them reported not filling vacancies and ask- lishments whose number of workers either decreased or
ing for volunteer leave, and about 46 percent reported remained the same. About 41 percent of them used
paying severance compensation as the actions they rotational work shifts and 38 percent reduced the
took. Also, other alternatives were used among estab- length of their work week.
Similar to changes in the level of production, the
FIGURE 14.2 \ extent to which surveyed firms experienced a decline in
FIGURE 14.2 employment-and the employment policies they
Capacity utilization by sector adopted to cope with the crisis-varied by firrm charac-
Percent teristics. Larger shares of the small firms (56 percent)
90 and the nonexporters (63 percent) reported a (lecline in
their level of employment, compared with .he large
80 firms (45 percent) and the exporters (41 percent). Close
to 80 percent of the small establishments and 60 percent
70 = = L _ L of the large establishments experienced declines in out-
put, whereas, respectively, 56 percent and 45 percent
60 * *; 0 | l 0 | l0000 reported decreases in employment. This reflects their
difference in work force reduction policies. Ihe man-
50 * 0 l: 0 000 l0:;0 E 000 agement and owners of the small firms tendecd to have
closer ties with their workers. Consequently, aggressive
40 * ll [ l l 11 [ ~~~~policies such as layoffs and severance compensation
Garments TextiLes ELectronics Food Autoparts Atl Sectors
payment were more preferable among the large firms,
*Capacity utilization 1996 *Capacity utiLization 1H 1997 whereas defensive policies such as not filling vacancies
and volunteer leave were chosen byv the small firms. Of
H Capacity utilization 2H 1997 E Capacity utilization 1H 1998 the smll eab e 71 perent and 6prcent,the small establishments, 71 percent and 63 percent,
Source: Office of Industrial Economics.
FIGURE 14.3
Perceived causes of current output decline
Domestic demand
Foreign demand
Depreciation
Labor costs
Costly loans
Heavy debt burden
Wk. capital
Expans. credit
Suppl. credit U Nonexporters
Raw materiaLs 5 Exporters
Nondelivery of goods
|- <Minor problem Major probLem -
Source: Office of Industrial Economics.
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FIGURE 14.4 majoriLy shares exported more than 50 percent of their
outputs and did not have foreign debt (45 percent and
Percent of firms with lower outputs and 82 percent of garment plants, respectively), the fall in
profit mnargins in 1997 mostly reflects the losses from
Percent offirms foreign exchange after the baht devaluation. By con-
80 trast, the further decline in profit margins in the first
70 half of 1998 might have resulted from the substantial
60 decline in profit margins of the auto parts firms, which
50
40 accour¢ted for 20 percent of the surveyed firms. By con-
20 trast, the textiles, electronics, and food processing sec-
10 tors show a possibility for financial stability. However,
0 . , it is still too soon to judge whether stability has come for
>p @ 99Go9s<,OR<otSt@O the garments sector, since their profit margins were
barely at break-even point in the same period.
ED Lower outputs * Fewer workers As shown above, the degree to which surveyed firms
Source: Office of Industrial Economics. experienced a decline in profit margins varied by their
financial characteristics. In order to identify the sources
of differences in profit margins, this paper will perform
respectively, did not fill vacancies and asked for volun- analyses on the four major components of net profits:
teer leave, whereas the figures were close to 72 percent (1) sales revenues, (2) operating expenses (namely,
for the large establishments. By contrast, only 13 per- labor, overhead, and input costs), (3) administrative
cent of the small establishments compared with 21 per- expenses (marketing expenses), and (4) financial
cent of the large establishments laid off their workers. expenses (interest expenses and gains or losses from for-
Likewise, 38 percent of the small firms paid severance eign exchange).
compensation, while 63 percent of the large establish- First, being exposed to foreign currency losses imme-
ments did so. (See figures 14.4 and 14.5.) diately after the baht depreciation in 1997, the average
The profile of jobs being lost also provides an insight gains or losses from foreign exchange of those firms
to the surveyed firms' employment policies during the that had borrowed abroad dropped sharply from 0 per-
crisis. Among establishments that experienced a decline cent in 1996 to -5 percent in 1997 and returned to 0
in employment, 77 percent reported the average age of percent in the first half of 1998. Meanwhile, the firms
people leaving the plants to be in the range of 20-30
years. Similarly, 88 percent of such establishments
reported the average length of tenure of people leaving FIGURE 14.5
the plants to be less than three years. Among these
plants, the average share of unskilled, skilled, and non- Employment strategies for firms with
production workers leaving the plants were 49 percent, fewe.r workers
30 percent, and 8 percent, respectively.3 I
' i ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Not fitting gg 
vacancies as lm o l m
Changes in profit margins Requesting
voLunceer leave
After the onset of the crisis, approximately 52 percent Paying severance
of the establishments experienced a decline in their | 1 
profit margins (net income relative to sales).4 The aver- Layoffs or a Large
age profit margins dropped sharply from 3 percent in retenchng mSmalL
1996 to -4 percent in 1997 and experienced a further, 0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80
albeit slight drop to -5 percent in the first half of 1998. Shares of firms (percent)
With the exception of the garments sector firms whose Source: Office of Industrial Economics.
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that had not borrowed abroad remained at the same -1 cussed in the section on "Industrial Competitiveness
percent level in 1996, climbed to 0 percent in 1997, and and Industrial Restructuring" below. (See figures 14.6
came back down to -1 percent in the first half of 1998. and 14.7.)
Therefore, profit margins of firms with foreign debt fell
from 3 percent in 1996 to -16 percent in 1997 and rose Changes in capital structure
to -7 percent in the first half of 1998, compared with 3
percent to 1 percent and to -4 percent in the same The sample firms were reasonably highly leveraged at
period for those that had not borrowed abroad. the onset of the crisis. In 1996, the debt-equity ratio was
Likewise, being vulnerable to high interest rates, 3.21 on average. Examining debt financiag more
firms with high leverage tended to experience a fall in closely, we found that the firms relied heavily on short-
profit margins after the Bank of Thailand pursued a
high interest rate policy from July 1997 to June 1998 to
stabilize the baht. Among establishments with debt- FIUE 14.6
equity ratios greater than 2.0, the average interest
expenses relative to sales hovered around 8 percent in Profit margins over time
1996 and 1997, then increased to 11 percent in the first Profit margins
half of 1998. However, the figures for firms with lower Overall
debt remained at 5 percent in 1996 and 1997 and 0.04
increased to 7 percent in the first half of 1998. As a 0.02
result, profit margins of firms with heavy debt burden 0.010 
fell from 1 percent in 1996 to -7 percent in 1997 and -0.02
rose to -2 percent in the first half of 1998. Meanwhile, -004
margins of firms with less debt burden dropped from 5 -o.os
percent in 1996 to 4 percent in 1997 and to -1 percent 1996 1997 1993 1H
in the first half of 1998.5 Profit margins
Similarly, being geared toward domestic economy Foreign borrowing
and paying more on interest expenses, the auto parts 0.05
sector experienced the greatest fall in profit margins in O
1997 and the first half of 1998. This sector's average -0.05
profit margins decreased from 7 percent in 1996 to -9 -o1
percent in 1997, and to -18 percent in the first half of .1X
1998. Interestingly, the average profit margins from the -0.15
survey shows that exporters did no better than nonex- 1996 1997 1998 1H
porters in 1997 and the first half of 1998-despite the No foreign debt Have foreign debt
relatively small difference in their interest expenses and
gains or losses from foreign exchange. In other words, Profit margins
we found that interest expenses, gains and losses from 0.1Heavy borrowing
foreign exchange, and revenues (which were measured
by demand) had no strong relationship with the profit O
margins function of the surveyed firms. Consequently,
we then looked back at production costs of the net -0.
profit components as stated in the first paragraph. One
might deduce that operating costs and administrative -0.2
expenses were stronger variables in terms of profit mar- 1996 1997 1998 1 H
gins than the previous variables. Hence, at this point the Not heavAiy indebted H-ieaviy indebted
issue of eroding industrial competitiveness could arise,
resulting in higher operating costs, which will be dis-
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FIGURE 14.7 the financial sector was less willing to lend money,
Profit margins without auto parts owing to the proliferation of nonperforming loans-
which meant that loans might not be rolled over.
Net income/sales Furthermore, the firms' needs for expansion credit were
0.04 likely co decrease because of the fall in demand. Long-
term debt relative to total financing dropped from 24 to
0.02 22 percent, while short-term debt financing only
0 Excluding auto parts _ Overal increased from 32 to 33 percent. With the soaring inter-
0.00 NOR= est rate, the firms might also switch from debt financing
_0 2 to equity financing.7 Average domestic debt relative to
total f nancing dropped from 49 percent in 1997 to 48
-0.04 percent in the first half of 1998, while that of foreign
debt fell from 24 to 21 percent. Despite these positive
-0.06 1996 1997 1998 1H changes to the firms' capital structure, there is little evi-
dence that any substantial restructuring has taken place
Source: Office of IndustriaL Economics. in the corporate sector. Much more strenuous efforts
are needed from both the government and the private
sector. (See figures 14.8 and 14.9.)
term debt financing. The average short-term debt rela- Constraints on corporate recovery and
tive to total financing was about 31 percent in 1996, policy implications
while that of long-term debt was 24 percent in the same
period. As a result, these establishments were extremely In the previous section, we briefly showed that
vulnerable to changes in the interest and foreign demand played important roles in the surveyed firms'
exchange rates, as evidenced by changes in profit mar- ability to make a comeback in the first half of 1998.
gins (see the previous subsection on this topic). After the However, this is just one part of the story. Credit avail-
onset of the crisis, the average debt-equity ratio rose to ability and the firms' long-term competitiveness are
3.62 at the end of 1997 and fell back to 2.92 at the end also crucial to the prospect of corporate recovery. In
of 1998's first half. Although foreign debt accounted for this section, we will examine these issues and their
only 6 percent of the total financing in 1996, the rise in implication on government policies in three dimen-
debt-equity ratios in 1997 mostly reflected the substan-
tial increase in foreign debt after the baht depreciation.6
The debt-equity ratio of surveyed firms with foreign
debt increased from 2.84 in 1996 to 4.21 in 1997, while FIGURE 14.8
that of firms with only domestic debt increased mildly Debt-equi ratios
from 3.35 to 3.40. Foreign debt relative to total financ-
ing rose from 19 percent in 1996 to 24 percent in 1997. Percert
Meanwhile, overall domestic debt financing decreased 4.0
mildly from 50 to 49 percent. The small rise in the debt- 3.5
equity ratio of firms that had not borrowed abroad can 3.0
be attributed to the increases in short-term debt financ-
ing from 28 percent in 1996 to 29 percent in 1997. This 2_5
is because the decline in profitability left these firms 2.0
with insufficient working capital, and hence they bor- 1.5
rowed to finance their operations. |1.0 l 19 19 IH
In contrast, the fall in debt-equity ratios in the first 1996 1997
half of 1998 could be attributed to several factors. First, Source: Office of Industrial Economics.
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FIGURE 14.9 The survey demonstrated that a lot of firms were cut-
ting off their labor force to stay viable during the crisis;
Reliance on short-term finance it follows that the rate of unemployment is likely to
Share of short-term debt increase in the coming periods. Thailand's economic
0.6 growth for 1999 is predicted to be 1 percent while
01996 unemployment is predicted to increase from 1.31 mil-
0.5 1st ha[f9 lion in 1998 to 1.55 million people in 1999.8 Conse-
0.4 quently, the bulk of the additional fiscal stimulus during
0.3 [ [. 1998-1999 will focus on social safety nets, including
job training and labor intensive projects.
0.2
0.1 Availability of credits and financial
0 restructuring
Non- Exporter Small Large Total Some No foreign
exporter foreign foreign control
controL control According to the survey results, there was little evidence
Source: Office of IndustnaL Economics. of a severe credit crunch.9 Among 54 percent of estab-
lishments with a liquidity problem, 78 percent and 77
percent identified, respectively, revenue decline and
sions: (1) global demand and expansionary policies, (2) high input costs as the sources of their problems,
availability of credits and financial restructuring, and (3) whereas 55 percent, 37 percent, and 59 percent
industrial competitiveness and industrial restructuring. reported, respectively, insufficient working capital,
insufficient supplies of credits, and a heavy debt burden.
GLobal demand and expansionary policies Moreover, only 34 percent of establishments with
unchanged or increased output (in other words, the
Since, as shown previously, Thai firms rely substantially establishments that were more likely to stay viable)
on foreign demand, they are vulnerable to global eco- reported having a liquidity problem, comparec. with 62
nomic and political conditions. Because foreign com- percent of those with output decline.
petitors' currencies have depreciated and considerable However, the survey does show that the availability
excess capacity exists in regional export sectors, a of credit has been declining. Given the financial sector's
decreased foreign demand could cause a substantial fall growing problem with NPLs, the majority of surveyed
in the firms' profitability. At the moment, there are sig- establishments had a hard time obtaining credit. With
nificant risks of further fall in foreign demand in China, the exception of bond and equity markets whose uti-
Japan, the United States, and South America. For exam- lization was not widespread (3-4 percent), the degree of
ple, a devaluation of the Chinese renminbi could have difficulty in getting credits was the highest with domes-
dramatic repercussions on the region's currencies, as tic financial institutions (83 percent) because many
would a significant correction of the U.S. stock market. finance companies were closed down after the crisis.
The possibility of a contagion from the devaluation of Moreover, those remaining were extremely wary of
the Brazilian real will also need to be watched. Fiscal lending and would only do so to the least crisis-affected
expansion in Japan as well as its progress in financial firms. The decrease in the availability of credits were the
sector reforms will continue to have an important lowest in family or friends (57 percent) and partner
impact on the region. Consequently, Thailand cannot firms (53 percent) as sources of funds, owing to the
rely only on external demand-led recovery-as the close ties between lenders and borrowers. The extent to
prospect for expansion of global demand seems remote. which surveyed firms experienced a decline in credit
The government should also focus on generating domes- availability also varied by the amount of outstanding
tic demand by adopting expansionary monetary and fis- debts they had on their balance sheet. ApproXimately
cal policies such as interest rate cuts and deficit spending 77 percent and 73 percent of heavily indebted estab-
to counteract the crisis. lishments reported difficulties in getting credit from
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domestic and foreign banks, compared with 62 percent percent of establishments with heavy debts claimed they
and 51 percent of those with lower debts. Firms with were unable to meet loan payments at the time of the
lower debt burden were more preferable because the survey, whereas 15 percent of those with lower debts
higher their debts, the higher default risks financial did so. (See figures 14.10 and 14.11.)
institutions faced in lending to these firms. Close to 27
FIGURE 14.10
Sources of short-term and long-term financing
Percentage of totalfinancing
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Source: Office of IndustriaL Economics.
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used collateral, 65 percent of the loan value was cov-
ered by land, which was the most popular asset theAvailability of credit after the crisis, by source ee yln,w'hwstems oua se hfirms used to cover their loans. There is also a point to
Percent of firms be made about the transparency problem. Approxi-
80 mately 24 percent of the establishments claimed that
they had not been using any form of audited statements,
collateral, and guarantees to get financing. T'his raises
60 1* Utilization rate the issues of unprofessional financial practices and lack
_ Shares with less availabLe credit of transparency. As a result, comprehensive financial
regulation and supervision is strongly required to
40 | improve practices in these areas. In addition, lending
requirements (40) need to be augmented with audited
20 statements. During the precrisis period, thc lending
amount was executed based on the collateral value of
the debtor's assets, which reflected the asset-price bub-
o MM ME_____ _ ble. However, as the crisis developed, collateral values
y-,D <tM X Rte Sb9t 4t24 $54 / dropped sharply. Thus, increased financial restraint for
w <<°S ,° 6°& 94S private firms and a more transparent approach is
Source: o l. required-perhaps with an appropriate mixture of cash
flow and collateral lending.
IndustriaL competitiveness and industrial
Given the decline in credit availability and the struc- restructuring
tural weakness of the financial sector, expansionary
monetary policy becomes less effective in directing the Will the above expansionary monetary and fiscal poli-
domestic economy toward recovery. In this respect, the cies, financial and debt restructuring, and greater use of
government is required to take active roles in restruc- credit schemes bring a rebound? Yes. However, these
turing both financial and corporate sectors through measures cannot guarantee a real recovery. Moving the
public incentives and forceful actions. These include (a) economy toward that goal also requires corporate sec-
recapitalizing the financial sector, (b) restructuring cor- tors to undertake extensive structural reform.
poratc debt, and (c) using credit schemes to increase Over the years Thai producers have relied heavily on
credit availability. exploitation of volume and low-cost-based competition
In addition to financial restructuring to get the finan- with foreign rivals; meanwhile, the value-based compe-
cial sector to resume lending, the government might tition has not been much utilized. Approximately 62
need to review its roles on corporate financial trans- percent of the surveyed establishments regarded domes-
parency and disclosure of information. Firms and tic producers, domestic joint venture firms, and multi-
financial institutions are collaboratively required to (a) national corporations in Thailand as their biggest
adopt a joint creditor-debtor review of creditor portfo- competitors. This indicates that most of the firms are
lios and define criteria using clear and sound indicators, competing among themselves with low degree of for-
and (b) develop a sound and transparent credit rating eign competition-as a result, devaluation advantage is
system of comparison for internal use. According to the nonexistent. Foreign firms that do compete wv ith Thai
survey, collateral was the most common form of lend- producers are those in the area of price cornpetition
ing insurance that the firms provided to their lenders. (that is, the low-cost category). Close to 16 percent of
Close to 59 percent of the surveyed establishments used the sample establishments regarded Low-cost producers
collateral-especially land-to get loans, while 40 per- (namely, firms from China, Vietnam, Myanmar, and
cent and 33 percent used audited statements and guar- Laos) as their biggest competitors (see figure [4.12). In
antees. Among the 59 percent of the establishments that other words, Thai consumer products in general have
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little differentiation, low value adding, low degree of their niarket shares successfully, while the country's
production, and little technological enhancement market shares and profitabiliry have been declining.
applied to the products. Thai producers can keep such The present favorable exchange rate cannot fully offset
practices and still turn a profit only as long as domestic losses from Thailand's eroding long-term competitive-
production costs remain competitively lower than those ness.
of foreign firms. In conjunction with the currently ongoing industrial
In the globalization age, entities that are more likely restructuring initiated by corporate sectors, the
to survive are ones that can sell better products at lower National Committee for Industrial Development has
prices. Unfortunately, labor costs in Thailand have been developed the "Industrial Restructuring Plan." The
rising recently compared with those of the country's action plan for this strategy was approved by the cabi-
low-cost competitors. To make matters worse, there are net on June 16, 1998. The plan focuses on upgrading
relatively fewer investments in product and process Thailand's competitiveness and increasing positive
development and human capital to improve product impact on society through the following six strategies:lI
quality and production efficiency, compared to low- * Move toward production of high value added prod-
cost competitors. Product and process innovation and ucts for the middle-to-higher markets, with higher
investment in human capital was relatively low in the quality standards, by:
surveyed firms. Only 27 percent and 41 percent of the - Upgrading technology and machinery as well as
establishments claimed having, respectively, research qluality management and
and development spending prior to the crisis, and hav- - Developing product designs in line with market
ing new product introduction during 1995-1997. p.references;
Meanwhile, only 54 percent of the establishments * Improve efficiency in terms of production costs, and
reported having formal training of any kind when they strea.mline production process; improve delivery,
were first surveyed.10 Consequently, Thailand's major quick response, and management capability;
and new low-cost competitors have been expanding
FIGURE 14.12
Competitors' profile
Percentage offirms that Percentage offirms that consider
consider the biggest competitor the biggest competitor
80 Domestically 20 Internationally
* Domestic producers * Domestic joint ventures U Low-cost producers i OECD countries
[0 EMultinationaLs 15 * Neighboring countries F1 NICs
40 1
20 5
1996 1997 Now 1996 1997 Now
Note:
Low-cost producers = firms in Vietnam, China, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar.
Neighboring countries - firms in MaLaysia, Indonesia, the PhiLippines, Thailand.
NICs = firms in Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore.
OECD countries = firms in North America, Europe, Japan, AustraLia.
Source: Office of IndustriaL Economics.
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* Upgrade knowledge and production skills of indus- same or rise in the first half of 1999. However, only 49
trial personnel; percent and 52 percent, respectively, actually experi-
* Create production and trading alliances with both enced this trend in the same period of 1998. Likewise,
domestic and overseas companies to penetrate and the interest rates for automobile loans were falling. As
expand the markets and to enhance technology a result, 36 percent of the auto parts establishments sur-
transfer; veyed were expecting a decrease in their capacity uti-
* Decrease industrial pollution through the adoption lization in the first half of 1999. However, :he actual
of clean technology and industrial zoning policies; experience of 1998 was that 50 percent decreased their
and capacity utilization. The electronics and foodl process-
* Disperse industrial employment to regional and ing sectors, and the exporters were also optimistic in
rural areas. their output growth in the first half of 1999.
Nevertheless, it is still too early to predict their output
Prospects for the first half of 1999 and growth since they were overly optimistic about their
policy recommendations prospects in the first half of 1998. Nearly 44, 33, and
29 percent, in the above respective groups, expected
Prospects for the first half of 1999 their capacity utilization to decrease in the first half of
1998. In actuality, 53, 53, and 40 percent of them expe-
The current macroeconomic indicators related to finan- rienced falls in their capacity utilization.14 (See figure
cial stability (namely, the foreign exchange rate, infla- 14.13.)
tion, and the interest rate) all show marked
improvement. Moreover, since the third quarter of PoLicy recommendations
1998, there have been indications that various compo-
nents of domestic demand and production (as measured The firm-level information produced by the survey has
by the manufacturing production index, value added tax given important insights into the impact of the Asian
(VAT), the excise tax on motor vehicles, and imported financial crisis on Thai industries, and their responses to
capital goods) have picked up. The problem, however, the new environment and policy regime. Basec on these
remains with the expansion of credit given by the finan- findings, we propose the following recommendations
cial sector to the real sector.12 for further consideration:
The survey findings also show improvement in out- Continuation of fiscal expansion. As the possibility
put levels. The surveyed firms are anticipating a better of export-led recovery seems remote and the domestic
performance in the upcoming year than what they actu-
ally experienced in 1998. However, the results do not FIGURE 14.13
show a significant progress. This could be attributable F 1
to the fact that benefits from the government's expan- Expected capacity utilization in the
sionary fiscal policies had not been realized at the firm first half of 1999
level by the time of the survey.13 Approximately 62 per- Percentage offirms
cent of the surveyed establishments expected their 50 n Decrease * Same E Increase
capacity utilization to remain the same or rise, and 35 45
40
percent expected a fall in the first half of 1999. In 1998, 35
by contrast, the actual experience yielded 54 percent 30
and 41 percent for the two respective categories. 25
The extent to which surveyed firms were optimistic 20
regarding output growth in the first half of 1999 also o0
varied by firm characteristics. As the baht stabilized and 5
interest rates fell, 71 percent and 64 percent of the firms Garments TextiLes ELectronics Food Auto parts A L sectors
that, respectively, had foreign debt and had borrowed
.. . . ~~~~~~~Source: Office of Industrial Economics.
heavily expected their capacity utilization to remain the
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demand contraction is perceived to be the biggest prob- would be to affect declining credit expansion of the ail-
lem by the surveyed firms, the continuation of larger fis- ing dornestic private financial institutions. However,
cal deficit expansion by external financing is justified to when economic stability has been restored, the domes-
rejuvenate stagnant domestic demand. As already dis- tic private financial institutions would still be the major
cussed in the paper, Thailand cannot solely rely upon vehicle for financing. The progress of loan disburse-
export-led recovery thinking. Therefore, it is important ment is still at an early stage. Moreover, the survey
to reinforce the recovery by increasing fiscal stimuli shows that despite the relatively low use of these spe-
through existing government spending programs. The cialized funds, there has been a clear increase in their
additional spending should include providing financial availab[lity. Approximately 11, 9, and 11 percent of the
resources for the corporate sector and alleviating the surveyed firms claimed using such sources of financing
social impact resulting from the crisis through (a) pub- in 1996, 1997, and 1998, respectively. It is expected
lic employment, (b) skill-demand based training for the that s ecialized credit schemes-particularly export
unemployed, and (c) maintaining current social security finance, housing finance, rural credit, and SMEs
and public welfare. finance-will continue to play an increasingly impor-
Support for small and medium enterprises (SMEs). tant role in the recovery of the corporate sector.
Thai SMEs, which account for 98 percent of the total Financial sector reform. Financial sector reform is
enterprises in the country, are the ones hardest hit by the unarguably no less important than any earlier points.
crisis-as shown by the amount of output decline, the As already stated, the real recovery cannot be accom-
liquidity problem, and unemployment. Therefore, gov- plished without financial restructuring. The govern-
ernmental support for SMEs toward self-sustainability ment should continue its full support for the existing
in the long run is recommended. The support for SMEs recapitalization measures to further credit expansion.
must be systemically laid down to achieve equilibrium The supervisory and regulatory framework should be
between Thai ownership and access to new technology strengthened to enhance financial stability and the effi-
and product innovation from overseas. This requires a cient provision of financial services. Also, disclosure of
wider range of measures encouraging financial and information has to be incorporated into supervision as
technical assistance as well as advisory services support well as regulation practices to improve transparency
that will help integrate SMEs into the market environ- and accountability. In addition, given declining credit
ment. A package of funding through specialized finan- availability and low use of debt and equity issues from
cial institutions totaling 35 billion baht was approved the survey, capital market development needs to be inte-
by the government in December 1998. An SMEs grated to increase market liquidity and provide addi-
Promotion Act and SMEs promotion funds are being tional sources of funding for Thai corporates. This
set up. A special consultant may be created to assist would create alternatives to borrowing from foreign
Thai SMEs with financial advice and management and demestic financial institutions.
plans for their corporate restructuring and improved Facilitating corporate debt restructuring progress. In
cash-flow management, enabling the effective acquisi- our findings, the extent of corporate debt restructuring
tion of additional capital. In addition, with well-devel- was reLatively small; this can be seen through the debt-
oped restructuring plans the government can possibly equity ratio, profit margins, and debt repayment abili-
further strengthen the recapitalization of SMEs by ties of the surveyed firm. The likelihood of moral
introducing a new equity-financing source that would hazards in debt servicing tends to increase given the
inject equity capital directly into SMEs. surge in the amounts tied up in nonperforming loans.
Enhancing credit expansion of specialized financial The firms might be reluctant to service their debts in the
institutions (SFIs). The SFIs represent an important short run, preferring to do so in the longer run.
financing source for the private sector. During a crisis, Interestingly, there was a relatively small number of
they have a more important role besides providing cred- firms (13 percent) claiming that thev had been able to
its for their current customers. SFIs must also actively meet their loan payments between three months and
expand their coverage for those who seek liquidity and one year. By contrast, the majority of the surveyed firms
investments. Consequently, in the short run, SFIs' role (65 percent) reported that they had been able to do so
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for more than one year, and 22 percent were not able to tiveness of government programs for research and
meet their loan payments. Based on these results it is development (R&D) and technologv development (for
evident that the government should provide additional example, those of the National Science and Technology
measures to stimulate corporate debt restructuring. It Development Agency, the Ministry of Industry (MOI),
should strengthen the legal framework for debt restruc- Board of Industry (BOI) incentives for R&D, and BOI
turing by adopting such measures as amendments to the unit for Industrial Linkage Development) were
bankruptcy and foreclosure laws. Several other initia- astounding. Relatively small numbers of firms were
tives toward a more enabling environment should be informed about such programs. Among these pro-
accelerated, including steps to promote secure lending, grams, the ones administered by the MOI were the best
a credit bureau, and liberalization of foreign ownership known at 31 percent. However, only 42 percent of the
of business activities and foreign ownership of real surveyed establishments claimed having used them. (See
property. Operation improvement is also required in figure 14.14.) Moreover, the necessity of infrastructure
accordance with debt restructuring. This is because investments must not be undermined by the crisis-
Thai firms have made many nonstrategic and noncore these fundamentally attract foreign direct investment
investments that added fixed cost without increasing and improve income and wealth distribution to the
operating efficiency and productivity for a long period population. And finally, tariff reform needs to be under-
before the crisis. Finally, the government should call for taken to rationalize the tariff structure and to
a more in-depth analysis of the progress of financial and strengthen the competitive edge of Thai industries in the
corporate restructuring in relation to NPLs in domestic long run.
financial institutions and the extent to which the pro-
gram has been implemented by the SMEs.
Additional support for long-term competitiveness FIGURE 14.14
enhancement. Despite improving financial conditions, Use of government programs and incentiles
the survey indicates that corporate structural reform in R&D and technology development
still lags behind and long-term competitiveness needs to
be enhanced. Specifically, long-term competitiveness
development measures should be set up with respect to 40 1 Awareness rate
the four following criteria: (a) technological develop- * Utilization rate
ment, (b) human resource development, (c) infrastruc- 30
ture investments, and (d) tariff reform. The government 20
should review its roles in supporting technological and 2
human resource development. Given the poor survey 10
results, both the government and Thai firms must col-
laboratively design their ideal training, and research 0
and development programs in order to maximize the NSTDA MOI Thai BOI BUILD Taxes Others
utilization of such programs. These programs were ResearchFund
unsuccessful in reaching the firms, especially the small
ones and the nonexporters. The findings on the effec- -eiI aE
234 Asian Corporate Recovery: Findings from Firm-Level Surveys in Five Countries
Annex 14.1A
Macroeconomic data
List of tables and figures Table 1 4.A.1 GDP shares of manufacturing
commodities.
Figure 14.A.1 Changes in Thailand's key economic Table 14.A.2 Exports shares by commodity group.
indicators.
FIGURE 14.A.1
Changes in Thailand's economic indicators
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30 40
20 20
10 0
0 -20
-40 -140
-20 2g -60
-30 -80
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Source: Bank of Thailand. Source: Bank of Thailand.
Note.
1. The changes are on a year-on-year basis.
2. The effect on VAT caused by an increase in the tax rate has been removed.
1. Real import of capital goods.
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TABLE 14.A.1
GDP shares of manufacturing commodities
At 1988 prices At ctrrent market prices
1994 1995 1996P 1994 1995 1996P
Apparel except footwear 9.21 9.79 9.78 11.52 11.44 11.70
Other manufacturng industdes 9.13 9.68 9.29 8.93 8.87 8.18
ElectricaL machinery and supplies 9.00 8.29 7.87 8.80 8.14 7.83
Food 8.60 8.49 7.74 8.23 7.78 8.01
Textiles 8.26 7.74 7.06 7.96 7.75 6.68
Transport equipment 8.20 7.76 7.65 7.80 8.62 8.66
Machinery 6.86 7.36 8.83 6.55 7.28 8.37
PetroLeum refineries and petroleum products 6.72 7.69 8.88 6.25 6.46 7.62
Beverages 6.61 6.87 6.81 6.24 6.45 6.36
NonmetaLLic mineraL products 6.18 6.05 6.24 5.66 5.30 5.45
Leather, leather products, and footwear 3.45 3.15 2.90 4.10 3.74 3.12
Furniture and fixtures 3.02 3.07 2.74 3.02 2.84 2.61
Rubber and plastic products 2.73 2.75 3.01 2.73 3.14 2.60
Fabricated metal products 2.40 2.56 2.61 2.53 2.56 2.74
Tobacco 2.22 1.89 1.97 2.39 2.10 2.13
Chemicals and chemical products 2.04 1.80 1.53 2.18 2.31 2.24
Basic metal industries 1.96 1.89 1.82 1.75 1.79 1.79
Paper and paper products 1.58 1.57 1.70 1.39 1.54 1.77
Wood and wood products 1.08 1.10 1.19 0.99 0.75 0.69
Printing, publishing, and alLied industries 0.74 0.50 0.38 0.99 1.15 1.46
TotaL 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
p. Projected.
Source: NESDB, http://www.nesdb.go.th.
TABLE 14.A.2
Export shares by commodity group
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
ElectrcaL products 16 18 19 21 22 -
Agricultural products 12 11 11 12 10 -
Food 11 10 9 9 8 -
Garments 10 9 7 6 5 -
Textiles 6 6 5 6 5 -
Precious tones and jeweLry 4 4 4 4 3 -
PLastic products 4 3 4 2 3 -
Base metal products 2 2 2 3 3 -
Footwear 3 3 4 2 2 -
Vehicle parts and accessories 1 2 1 1 2 -
Furniture and parts 2 2 1 1 1 -
Mineral products 1 1 1 1 1 -
Others 29 29 31 33 35 -
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
-: not avaiLable
Source: Bank of ThaiLand Month[y Bulletin.
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Anfn ex 14. B TABLE 14B.1
EstabLishment classification used in the paper
Methodology Classification Definition (percent)
Size
Small EmpLoy Less than 150 workers
Missing values Large EmpLoy at Least 150 workers
Export oarintation
Nonexporters Do not export their outputs directly
Unfortunately, some firms did not answer all of our Exporters Export at least some of their outputs directLy
questions, and hence the figures shown in the tables Volume of exports
sometimes do not add up to the total values. SmaLl 0 < Export Sales/TotaL SaLes < 0.05Medium 0.05 < Export SaLes/TotaL Sales < 0.50
High 0.50 < Export Sates/Total Sales
Negative quity values Foreign control
None 0 ' Share of Foreign Equity < 10
Firms with negative equity values were excluded from Some 10 ' Share of Foreign Equity < 50
any calculations that are related to the firms' equity val- FTII firms
ues such as debt-equity ratio and change in equity Yes Share of Foreign Equity 2 0 or answered
financing. 'Foreign-Owned/ControLLed Firm" or 'Joint
Venture with Foreign Firm"
No Otherwise
Outliers in financial data Borrow in foreign currency
No foreign debt Do not have debt denominated in currencies
Before the average calculations, normalization tech- other than baht
Have 'oreign debt Have debt denominated in currencies other
nique using a 95 percent confidence interval was per- than baht
formed to eliminate outliers for the firms' debt-equity Heavy dent
ratios, profit margins, interest expenses, and gains or No Total Debt/Total Equity S 2.0
losses from foreign currency. (See statistics or econo- Yes TotaL Debt/Total Equity , 2.0
metric textbooks for more details.) Market
Domestic Do not export
Crisis Countries
Establishment classification anc Japan Biggest export markets are Indonesia, Korea,
Malaysia, the Philippines, or Japan
Noncrisis
Throughout this paper, we group the surveyed firms Countries Otherwise
using different classifications and compare their results. Age
Definitions for such classifications are shown in table New Estabtished in and after 1990
14.B.1. Old EstabLished before 1990
Location
Bangkok and
Greater Bangkok Located in Bangkok, Ayutthaya, Nonthaburi,
Pathum Thani, Samut Prakan, or Samut
Sakhon
Non-Bangkok Otherwise
Total OveraLL vaLue (all estabLishments)
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Notes found that this was not the case. The average percent change in equity
and the average percent change in debt from 1996 to 1997 both had
This paper was the result of a joint coLLaboration effort undertaken positive signs.
by Nat ChuLkarattana and Dhanoos SutthiphisaL of the Office of 7. The average percent change in equity from 1997 to the first
Industrial Economics of the Ministry of Industry, and Pongpanu haLf of 1998 had a positive sign, whereas that of debt hEd a negative
Svetarundra, Chanatip Promphan, and Wanchart Kittisuwan of the sign.
Fiscat Policy Office of the Ministry of Finance The authors wish to 8. Estimated figure from the Ministry of Labor and Social WeLfare
express their appreciation to Mary Hallward-Driemeier fo her invalu- as of the end of 1998.
abLe comments and suggestions. 9. For conditions that would be conducive to a credit crunch to
1. These countries are Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and have existed, the Liquidity of the firms would need to have been so
the Republic of Korea. constrained that these firms would not have had the funds necessary
2. While the large majority of the firms have decreased their to finance the costs of production. However, they wouLd have been
capacity utilization, about one-fifth have been successful in expand- abLe to sell their goods if they had been abLe to produce them.
ing their production since the onset of the crisis. These firms are likely 10. The extent of product and process innovation anc investment
to be food processing or garment pLants. They aLso tend to be large in human capital also varied by firm characteristics. With more
firms that export he majority of their output. resources, large firms, exporters (whose majority shares cf firms were
3. As with those firms that increased their capacity utilization, Large firms), and firms with foreign ties invested more on product and
garment and food processing firms are those that were most likely to process innovation and human capital than small firms.
have increased employment since July 1997-although fewer firms 11. An excerpt from the Ministry of Industry's Industrial
increased employment compared with those that increased capacity Restructuring Master Plan: Executive Summary proposed to the
utilization. Interestingly, the employment increases were not concen- Cabinet, January 1998.
trated among the exporting firms or among the large firms, further 12. Year-on-year percentage changes in macroeconomic indicators
indicating the gap between capacity utilization and job creation. from April to November 1998 are as follows: -16.10 percent o 3.40
4. The response rate to questions asking for financial and profit percent for the manufacturing production index; -12.25 percent o
information was lower than for the rest of the questionnaire. However, -5.59 percent for VAT; -83.51 percent o 34.08 percent for the excise
there is no systematic bias in terms of firm characteristics ( ector, size, tax on motor vehicles; and -42.07 percent to -1.55 percent for
age, export status, ownership, and so on) between those that did and imported capital goods.
did not answer these questions. As in the section on the description 13. The previous spending plans were aimed at budget surpluses
of the survey, it should be noted that the responses are likely to be and had not been changed to budget deficits until early 1998. This
biased toward favorable results; that the more viable and successful led to a large adjustment in the fiscal budget to stimulate domestic
firms are most likely to have provided the requested information. demand between the first and third quarters of 1998. Hence, the gov-
5. The effects attributable to other factors such as lower gains or ernment started having Large budget deficits in the third quarter of
losses from foreign exchange might dominate the effects of high inter- 1998.
est expenses. 14. Comparing the firms' expectations ayear ago with their actual
6. One might argue that the increase in debt-equity ratio in 1997 performance in 1998, the correlation was weak (0.16). At that time,
might come from the substantial reduction in equity. However, we the firms were overly optimistic about their prospects.
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